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Crisis and Prosperity: Status, Accountability and Time in 
Central Greece 
 
Daniel Martyn Knight 
Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology 
Department of Anthropology 
Durham University 
 
This thesis is concerned with how people negotiate periods of socio-economic crisis and prosperity in 
the town of Trikala, Thessaly, central Greece. Localised understandings of the global economic 
crisis are analysed in relation to history, social status and concepts of time. The complex interaction 
between people within global and local economic networks is also emphasised.  
 
It is argued that certain historical periods are crucial to Trikalini conceptualisations of the current 
economic crisis. Specific past events significantly inform understandings of the present crisis through 
what is termed ‘cultural proximity’. This is the notion that previous times of social and economic 
turmoil, apparently distant points in time, are embodied within the context of the present. Some 
past epochs of prosperity and crisis have proved more significant than others in shaping 
contemporary crisis experience. As accounts of the Great Famine of 1941-1943 are brought to 
the fore by the current economic crisis, concepts of lineal time and the nationalisation of critical 
events must be interrogated. 
 
How economic crisis affects perceptions of social status, mobility and political accountability in 
Trikala are also explored. Such perceptions are further informed by the consequences of past local 
and national level crises and the uneven incorporation of capitalist trends in central Greece. 
 
Through the exploration of cultural economic patterns and the social significance of historical 
events, the impacts of economic crisis in Trikala are explored. By examining accounts of crisis in 
Trikala, the case is made for understanding crisis trends with global implications within the 
context of cultural repertoires and historical frameworks. Trikala thus becomes a microcosm 
through which to conceptualise the current economic crisis in Europe. 
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Chapter One: Theoretical Overview 
 
This thesis is concerned with how people understand and negotiate epochs of 
socio-economic crisis and prosperity in the town of Trikala, in Thessaly, central 
Greece. It is an account of how a period of economic change is shaping the 
experiences of people of a peripheral Greek town. At the time of this research 
social and economic change was “part of the lived experience” (Just 2000:7) of 
the Trikalinoi. To unlock these understandings and to do justice to their complex 
local, national and global qualities this thesis does not follow a specific trend or 
theoretical school as there is not one single passkey to open all the potential 
doors and windows (Serres 1995a:91-92). Instead, it will take as its starting 
point the local detail, expressed by the informants themselves, and henceforth 
attempt to analyse the concepts in a way that allows for their multifaceted 
appreciation. 
 
In Trikala, aspects of culture such as social status and mobility have been 
affected by the interplay between localised cultural patterns and global socio-
economic trends. It will be argued that such social phenomena should be 
historically contextualised since the negotiation of some periods of prosperity 
and crisis have proved more significant than others in shaping contemporary 
experience and particular value judgements. Cultural facets are not locally 
homogeneous but rather constantly changing and must be considered as 
simultaneously constructs of history and products of the contemporary. They are 
the result of the interaction between local cultural and economic patterns and 
wider global trends, past and present.  
 
Local cultural patterns operate within wider sets of economic structures and 
trends. Social relations are thus facilitated through channels of nationalised and 
globalised discourse. Trikalinoi are consequentially implicated in national and 
global times of crisis as well as prosperity. The cultural patterns give a localised 
flavour to a multitude of national and global phenomena, contributing to the 
severity of times of economic crisis, both in formation and consequence. 
 
 10 
Just summarises the main theoretical and methodological criticisms of 
Mediterranean ethnography since the 1970s, many of which are addressed in 
this thesis. These issues include: 
 
“a concentration on the marginal and „exotic‟ at the expense of the mainstream and 
the representative … a failure to study the links between rural and urban populations 
and to situate studies of rural communities within their national (and international) 
contexts … a neglect of comparison and of history … and a failure to take up such 
wider issues as state formation, nationalism, urbanization, bureaucratization, class 
conflict and commercialization … while the related ambition (or pretence) of 
presenting holistic ethnographic accounts has led to the depiction of rural 
communities as bounded, self-contained and internally coherent isolates” (Just 
2000:20-21). 
 
The links between rural and urban settings, local, national and international 
contexts and the emphasis on historical contextualisation form much of the 
theoretical basis of this thesis. Further issues of social stratification, 
commercialisation, bureaucratisation and nationalism are recurring themes 
throughout. Far from being a „check list‟ of essentials for incorporation, these 
concerns have been initially addressed through the ethnographic material as they 
were raised by the people themselves. 
 
The empirical fieldwork on which this thesis is based straddled a period when 
almost two decades of socio-economic prosperity was drastically replaced by 
severe crisis and austerity. The crisis became entrenched through all sections of 
social life – social relations, national and local politics, employment, social 
memory, public rhetoric and, of course, economic activity. The local 
experiences of a crisis – or series of crises – played out on the national and 
global stage form the core of this thesis. History plays a key role in shaping 
localised understandings of crisis (and indeed, economy [Narotzky 2004]). 
Cultural proximity to past events – the notion that „two distant points in time can 
suddenly become close, even superimposed‟ in social memory (Serres 
1995a:57-59) – informs people‟s experiences of contemporary events. 
 
Culturally proximate time is a key theoretical theme-come-thread that recurs 
throughout this thesis, as are concepts of social status and mobility, public 
representation and blame. The historical basis allows for social change to be 
tracked throughout the study. The weaving of these specific threads through 
 11 
multiple layers of social discourse embedded in this thesis reflects how 
informants „pick a thread here, drop a stitch there‟ in daily interactions (Das 
1995:1). Hence the structure of this document will follow the metaphor of 
weaving. The concepts discussed under subheadings in this chapter will 
introduce key theories and ideas that will be expanded upon and analysed in 
relation to the relevant ethnography throughout the subsequent chapters. It is the 
first knot that holds together the multiple stands of yarn before they embark on 
their complex adventure, crossing each other in places whilst appearing to veer 
away in opposite directions elsewhere. Therefore a full unpacking of these 
theories is not intended in this chapter; it is quite simply an „overview‟ for what 
is to come. The intricate pattern of the weave will be tied together at the other 
end by another knot – the conclusion – where the strands of theory will once 
again be pulled together, fastened. I hope that the complementary colours of the 
theory and the ethnography will combine, allowing for the overall pattern to 
materialise. 
 
Economic Anthropology in Greece: why Trikala, why economics? 
 
When plotting a map of anthropological research sites in Greece there is a 
severe lack of coverage in central mainland Greece, especially Thessaly. This is 
particularly the case in the Anglophone literature. Apart from Kirtsoglou and 
Theodossopoulos‟ paper on „Christian‟ refugees from Anatolia, set in Volos 
(Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2001), and Danforth‟s account of death rituals 
in Potamia, northern Thessaly ([1982] incidentally and coincidently the first 
ethnography I ever read as an undergraduate student), the treatment of the region 
in comparison to others such as Greek Macedonia and the Peloponnese is 
limited. Trikala has been addressed within the wider context of western 
Thessaly by human geographer David Bennison (1977) who explores “the 
sectorial structure of the Greek economy with particular reference to retail 
trade” (1977:viii). His focus is on how the clustering of establishments within 
urban centres such as Trikala, Kalampaka and Karditsa, affects the movement of 
customers from the periphery to „central places‟ (ibid.:7). Other publications in 
English include the work of Greek-university based scholars Marantzidis and 
Mavrommatis, who address issues of social exclusion among Gypsies in the 
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town of Sofades near Karditsa (1999). Additionally, Karakasidou refers to 
Trikala as the area from which Christian merchants relocated to Greek 
Macedonia after crossing Mount Olympus in the mid-nineteenth century, 
establishing an economic niche “by feeding and trading with the passing 
caravans” (1997:12, 41, 220). Bennison‟s study and Karakasidou‟s few passing 
historical allusions are the two significant references to socio-economic activity 
in Trikala, although the choice of Trikala as my field site was more than merely 
“filling in the ethnographic map” (Just 2000:1). 
 
I originally went to Greece intending to study „class‟ and „economics‟, 
something that at the time I never thought would be approached through the lens 
of crisis. Although the ethnographic appreciations of Greece touch upon a 
variety of thematic areas within the discipline, it could be argued that – strictly 
speaking – the region as a whole has not produced considerable studies in 
economic anthropology. The reason for such a lack of interest in producing 
classic economic anthropology on the behalf of Greek ethnographers is perhaps 
to be found in the noted emphasis on kinship and gender that characterises 
Mediterranean ethnography as a whole (Goddard 1994). It has been argued that 
the anthropology of Greece and the Mediterranean was classically closely 
connected to the analysis of the values of honour and shame in works such as 
that of Campbell (1964) that attempted to explain Greek culture on the basis of 
institutionalised marriage and kinship (cf. Loizos and Papataxiarchis 1991, 
Goddard 1994). According to the code of honour and shame the position of a 
family and its individuals in the social world of the rural village – the par 
excellence site of anthropological research at the time – depended on its 
reputation, which in turn rested upon the chastity (shame) of its female members 
(Peristiany 1965, Cowan 1990:9, Dubisch 1995:196). The values of honour and 
shame placed the institution of kinship at the centre of anthropological enquiry 
(cf. Just 2000:5) due to a long established tradition of anthropological training in 
“African systems of lineage” (Goddard 1994:68). As a consequence, Greek 
culture(s) – and indeed the Mediterranean – was explained at first on the basis of 
kinship and gender relations (Goddard 1994). 
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Despite the aforementioned tendency in Greek ethnography, one can find cases 
where economic concepts were discussed by anthropologists of Greece. One 
such case is the concept of „self-sufficiency‟ that describes the systematic 
exploitation of a household‟s resources and the clear preference of households to 
utilise such resources instead of buying readily available goods at the market (du 
Boulay 1974, Loizos 1975). The concept of self-sufficiency relates to the idea of 
„self-interest‟ which however does not refer to single individuals but to whole 
households (Theodossopoulos 1997:264). Self-interest dictates the protection of 
a household‟s economic prosperity but also its prestige. In turn, the latter was 
described as depending on the accumulation of economic and social capital as 
well as on reputation that in most cases indeed obeyed the rules of honour and 
shame (du Boulay 1974, Theodossopoulos 1999). Also connected to self-
sufficiency are discussions of reciprocity. In order to remain loyal to the ideal of 
self-sufficiency, rural households have been observed by ethnographers to foster 
relationships of generalised reciprocity (Theodossopoulos 1997, cf. Sahlins 
1972). Generalised reciprocity in this case describes situations where 
households exchange labour in order to remain self-sufficient, or more 
frequently, members of the same household offer their labour without receiving 
an exact and timely reward for the sake of the household‟s prosperity (self-
interest) (cf. Campbell 1964, du Boulay 1974, Hirschon 1989, Theodossopoulos 
1999). The latter case of generalised reciprocity within households could easily 
be compared and contrasted to ethnographic data that led to major debates in 
anthropology, such as the one between Josephides (1985) and Strathern (1988) 
about the exploitation of women. Although in a much later discussion 
Theodossopoulos (1999) explains the investing of labour on behalf of women in 
their households in terms of investing in relationships (somewhat following 
Strathern‟s perspective) initially this debate never took off in Greek 
ethnography. The reason for this is to be found in the original emphasis on 
complementarity that the theorisation of the values of honour and shame 
entailed (cf. Cowan 1990). The emphasis on honour and shame created a 
division of the symbolic space of the Greek rural village into the public domain 
– where men acted to defend the household‟s honour – and the domestic domain 
– where women were confined in order to safeguard their chastity and by 
consequence the prestige of the household and the family‟s self-interest 
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(Peristiany 1965, du Boulay 1974, Dubisch 1986). The clear ethnographic 
division between public and domestic obscured questions of labour and/or 
exploitation, and even reciprocity patterns since women and men were seen as 
co-existing in a complementary fashion. Consumption, another major concept in 
economic anthropology, was discussed by Greek ethnographers mostly in 
relation to either commensality in the framework of friendship networks among 
men or women (Papataxiarchis 1991, Kirtsoglou 2004), or conspicuous 
consumption of aesthetically refined items for the acquisition of social capital 
(Faubion 1993).  
 
The fact that a number of terms, concepts and practices have not been discussed 
by Greek ethnographers in the context of classic economic anthropology does 
not necessarily mean that many issues currently debated in Greek ethnography 
do not directly relate to economic anthropology. One such issue is Greece‟s 
ethnographic predicament of being at times classified as „West‟ and at other 
times as „Rest‟ –„East‟, „South‟ or „European periphery‟ (Herzfeld 1987:3). The 
ambiguous position of Greece in today‟s geopolitical and economic map, the 
long history of underdevelopment, frequently attributed to „corruption‟ and the 
interference of personal relations in an otherwise expected free-market 
(Mouzelis 1978, 1980), and the importance of kinship are all issues that concern 
a study in economic anthropology in Greece.  
 
Furthermore, seen from one perspective, Campbell‟s original study of patronage 
was never perhaps fully explored in terms of its consequences for our 
understanding of the relationship between economics, politics and social values. 
The criticism that classic Mediterranean studies received in the context of post 
structural-functionalist anthropology led to the theoretical marginalisation of 
some potentially useful concepts. If Narotzky is right to say that a “place has a 
local and a global dimension and is inscribed in history” (Narotzky 1997:223), 
then modern Greece is perhaps one of the most fertile research spaces to be 
approached through the lens of economic anthropology. 
 
However, because economic life can never be separated from other dimensions 
of culture and society, my research efforts focus on “the ways in which the 
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economy is an integrated part of a social and cultural totality” (Eriksen 
2001:176), including notions of historical crisis, prosperity and political 
rhetoric. This means re-examining notions of patronage, honour and shame and 
public representation in order to explore contemporary understandings of 
economic relationships and socio-cultural change. 
 
A Note on Theoretical Direction 
 
“Theory guides the way which we separate interesting from trivial events 
experienced during fieldwork. It helps link the observations that interest us into a 
coherent ethnographic account and points towards particular interpretations or 
explanations of what we consider related events. Theories do not, however, blind us 
completely to the complexity of the field experience. Our findings may lead us to 
modify a useful theory or even reject a theoretical orientation altogether if it appears 
indifferent to what interested us in the field” (Layton 2000:101). 
 
Despite ethnography-driven theory being central to this thesis, it would be 
wrong to ignore those scholarly figures and their associated frameworks which 
have inevitably influenced and inspired routes of analysis. It is inherent that any 
piece of anthropological scholarship will be either intentionally or 
unintentionally embedded with the ideas and concepts of those that have gone 
before, those beacons of light which guide us in the formation of our „personal‟ 
academic identity. Throughout this piece of work it will at times become 
abruptly apparent as to which line of thought the analysis pays homage; in other 
places the influence is more subtle. For the most part the ethnography has 
guided the theoretical associations, yet this research has been influenced and 
inspired by many esteemed scholars of the Mediterranean region, the field of 
economic anthropology and the wider anthropological discipline. In addition, 
scholars from the fields of philosophy (such as Michel Serres), human 
geography (David Bennison), economics and sociology (Georg Simmel) have 
been appropriated where their contribution is considered valuable. 
 
Scholars such as Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard and John Campbell were 
inspirational starting points in informing the approach to the field and the 
subsequent analysis of the material. Indeed the initial idea of this doctoral 
research was generated by a desire to reassess Campbell‟s 1964 masterpiece 
„Honour, Family and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a 
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Greek Mountain Community‟, a research concept which has drastically changed 
since its inception. Other ethnographies of Greece which have inspired parts of 
this thesis include Jill Dubisch‟s 1995 work „In a Different Place: Pilgrimage, 
Gender and Politics at a Greek Island Shrine‟, especially in the reassessment of 
the public/private dichotomy which for her, as for me, posed a significant 
ethnographic and theoretical challenge. As will become apparent, numerous 
were the occasions when, often at inadvertent moments, David Sutton‟s work on 
social memory in Greece (1998, 2001) also became a source of intellectual 
stimulation, offering theoretical nuances to the significance of historical events 
in everyday life. 
 
Relating to the field of economic anthropology, although not necessarily 
classified strictly within these highly ambiguous boundaries, the work of Marcel 
Mauss (exchange), Georg Simmel (money, value and commodities) Marcel 
Sahlins (irregular appropriation of capitalism), Arjun Appadurai (commodities), 
James Carrier (market economy) and Susana Narotzky (social capital) must be 
acknowledged as influencing the direction of ethnographic analysis. 
Furthermore, Bronislaw Malinowski‟s contributions to the study of exchange 
systems has been both practically and metaphorically implemented at stages 
throughout this thesis, such as in the discussion of the circulation of blame 
(chapter six) and „tournaments of consumerism‟ (chapter eight). 
 
Economically, although not always ideologically, the work of Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels has been a constant source of inspiration. So often a taboo 
issue in the social sciences, and in contemporary anthropology in particular, as 
an inescapable category with manifold stereotyped associations – the box from 
which one, once assigned, is doomed never to escape – Marxist economic theory 
has its place in contemporary socio-economic studies. When employed in this 
thesis, the original texts of Marx have been the primary source from which 
analysis has been instigated. The Marxist renaissance in the guise of structural 
Marxism during the 1960s was often selective in the analysis of the original 
material. The reinvention of convenient concepts without fully contextualising 
the original Marxist thought led to stigmatised representations outside of 
historical context. These second or third-hand accounts constructed “in a 
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structuralist fashion” (Narotzky 1997:5) do not always do justice to the original 
work – taken within the socio-historic context – and seem to have created a new 
theoretical field in themselves. Thus structural Marxism and the associated texts 
now serve as the primary referential basis for „Marxism‟ in anthropology. 
Although these works do have a great deal of ideological and theoretical value, 
one must concede that they have gone some way to packaging the original work 
of Marx in a specific manner. Once coupled with ethnography, which in some 
cases is situated in Greece, the material often seems to be analytically restricted 
through the implementation of strict Marxist terminology and ideology. The 
potential contribution of Marxism to ethnographic analysis is therefore 
overlooked and is at once tabooed, categorised and often dismissed outside of 
the passionate subgroup. Whilst terminology such as „exploitation‟ and 
„domination‟ are not appropriate to analyse the social phenomena at play in 
Trikala, key Marxist concepts concerning capitalism and economic crisis are 
referred to throughout as an explanatory notation of the observable social 
phenomena. This is to say that the ethnographic material strongly advises the 
theoretical direction. 
 
There is also much „topical theoretical influence‟ in this study. This is especially 
apparent in relation to the topic of social change and to theories of time. 
Studying the work of philosopher Michel Serres has become a fascinating and 
enthralling undertaking. The complex issue of the projection of historical events 
into simultaneous moments of contemporary reality has inspired the theorisation 
of cultural proximity. Here the literature has helped clarify a complicated and at 
times almost inexplicable cultural phenomenon which goes beyond „Memories 
Cast in Stone‟ (Sutton 1998). But once again the emphasis is on 
ethnographically driven classification constructed in an explanatory fashion and 
Serres‟ often abstract concepts have not been taken uncritically. 
 
On the topic of social change Robert Layton‟s work in France, „Anthropology 
and History in Franche-Comté‟ (2000) has been a frequent source of guidance 
and intellectual stimulation. Charting social change in numerous arenas over the 
course of thirty years in an Alpine village, his work has also been an excellent 
resource on the application of complementary theory to ethnographic material. 
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As he eloquently highlights, the anthropologist is the mediator in the dialogue 
between theory and ethnography and employs the former to assist the 
appreciation of „the social processes that underlie observations‟ (2000:101). 
Layton‟s work is particularly relevant to this study due to the multiplicity of 
social change in one locale, pertinent here due to his appreciation of historical 
variables in the formation of socio-economic experience in contemporary 
everyday life. 
 
Thus there are numerous influences and inspirations behind the analysis of the 
ethnographic data spanning a range of theoretical trends. From classic structural-
functionalist ethnography to the philosophy of time, the contextual application 
of theory is desired to complement the rich ethnographic milieu of a community 
coming to terms with the reality of economic crisis. 
 
The Current Greek Economic Crisis of 2008-present 
 
The first rumblings of economic downturn surfaced in the public domain 
towards the end of 2008 when many principal national economies went into 
recession. This roused much speculation as to the stability of the Greek 
economy. By the end of 2009 the world came to learn of Greece‟s extensive 
financial problems. Strategies were implemented on the national and 
transnational level that would significantly affect the socio-economic prospects 
of most everyday Greeks. A vast range of austerity measures have since been 
introduced to cut the national deficit. A combined bailout plan worth £95 billion 
(110 billion euros, $146.2 billion) has been provided by the eurozone and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). It remains to be seen whether this money is 
managed in such a way as to significantly change the critical situation
1
 (cf. Horn 
1998:135, MacGaffey 1998:38, Osirim 1998:281, Bowles 2002, Trostle 
2005:108). Obviously this course of action should benefit the statistics of the 
„Greek economy‟ on the macro level, but will inevitably leave many families 
without a livelihood as wages are cut and redundancies made (the effects of 
international competition in agricultural markets since the introduction of the 
                                                 
1
 Recent predictions show that the Greek economy will shrink by approximately 4 per cent by 
the end of this financial year (2010-2011) (Hewitt 2010). 
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euro has been severely felt in central Greece and has led to fundamental changes 
in the structure and organisation of many small companies [cf. Boutsouki and 
Bennison 1999, Theodoridis and Bennison 2009]). 
 
As of April 2010 the national debt lay at 115 per cent of the GDP (above 300 
billion euros) and is expected to rise to 149 per cent by 2013 before falling. 
Inflation is at a thirteen-year high of 5.4 per cent (The Economist, vol. 396, issue 
8689, 3
rd
 July 2010). The budget deficit is at 13.6 per cent with the government 
aiming to cut this to less than 3 per cent by 2014. The deficit figures for the past 
ten years do not officially go beyond 8 per cent – it was officially 7.9 per cent in 
2004. After being above 10 per cent of GDP in 1995, official figures for the 
deficit fell to 1.8 per cent in 1999, thus complying with the criteria for European 
single currency membership (Eurostat 2004:4, also National Statistical Service 
of Greece). In 2003 the Greek government reported a deficit of 1.7 per cent. 
Eurostat refused to verify this figure and refused to accept official government 
debt statistics, asking for revisions dating back to 1997
2
. The Greek government 
then revised the 2003 deficit to 4.6 per cent of GDP. Eurostat reported this 
revision as “exceptional”, and once again they questioned the reliability of 
Greek deficit statistics over the period of 1995-2003 (2004:2). Recently (2006-
2008) the official figures have been between 2.3 and 3.4 per cent and the 
projected figures for the following year have always signalled a decrease in the 
national deficit (Ministry of Economy and Finance 2008). Yet in 2009 the 





                                                 
2
 Eurostat is part of the European Commission located in Luxembourg. Its responsibilities are to 
provide the European Union with statistical information at European level and to promote the 
harmonisation of statistical methods across the Member States of the European Union and 
candidate countries.  
3
 The liberal policy on trade deficit, we are informed, has accumulated over more than the last 
forty years in order to encourage foreign competition and modernise industry. Campbell and 
Sherrard have also linked this aspect of risk to the regional perception of social status. Foreign 
luxury consumer goods became status symbols for the elite during the 1960s. In “a socially 
competitive community” conspicuous consumption of cars, clothes and household appliances is 
converted into political prestige with resulting indignation by those who see but cannot possess 
(Campbell and Sherrard 1968:303, McNall 1976:29). Such commodities are once again things 
„out of sight‟ for many people during the current crisis and impending austerity measures, much 
as they were at the time of Campbell and Sherrard‟s writing. 
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These macro-scale economic figures have been highly publicised on the global 
stage; the consequences are felt at the local level among people such as the 
Trikalinoi, the subjects of this study. As a prerequisite for the 110 billion euro 
bailout the Greek government had to implement numerous economic austerity 
measures. These included scrapping bonus payments for public sector workers, 
capping annual holiday bonuses, freezing public sector wages for three years, 
increasing VAT from 21 per cent to 23 per cent, raising the retirement age to 65 
for men and women (it was formally 57 and 52 respectively [The Economist, 
vol. 396, issue 8689, 3
rd
 July 2010]), raising taxes on fuel, alcohol and tobacco 
by 10 per cent, freezing pensions, increasing taxes on new construction, and 
encouraging growth in the private sector
4
. Additional policies include the 
reduction of an over-inflated public sector and the creation of new haulage 
licences which are currently highly monopolised. 
 
The roots of the current Greek economic crisis can be traced as far back as the 
accession into the European Union in 1981 and the subsequent liberal market 
policy promoted by both the national government and Brussels. The more 
immediate origins can be found in the economic circumstances surrounding the 
incorporation of Greece into the European single currency (euro) in January 
2001. The culturally specific interaction with global capitalist markets, coupled 
with mass over-confidence in individual and national affluence during the years 
of prosperity, contributed to the intensity of the eventual crisis. 
 
After originally failing to meet the Maastricht criteria for eurozone 
incorporation in 1999, Greece was required to implement a series of austerity 
measures, including deficit reduction and cuts in public spending, to allow for 
accession in 2001 (Salvatore 2002:121, Leblond 2004, Portone 2004). For 
example, by the Maastricht criteria the inflation rate had to be under 2 per cent; 
it was at 4 per cent in Greece (Salvatore 2002, Portone 2004). The eventual 
incorporation was not without severe criticism from many economic analysts 
who believed that the Greek economy and the rate of inflation in the country 
were not stable enough to support the single currency. Indeed, even Wim 




Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, stated that Greece still had 
„a lot of work to do to improve its economy and bring inflation under control‟5. 
Despite these general reservations, Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis 
(PASOK – Panhellenic Socialist Movement) stated that „Greece would have 
much greater economic stability‟ once joining the eurozone. This was despite 
the special measures taken to fix the exchange rate months in advance due to 
Greece‟s „exceptional circumstances‟6. 
 
Investors also voiced their concerns at allowing Greece to join the euro, arguing 
that this would send out the wrong signal to financial markets – suggesting that 
in future other weaker economies may be allowed in without complying fully 
with membership conditions. At the time Greece had one of the highest inflation 
rates in Europe and public sector borrowing was much higher than would be 
normally permitted under the European Union rules governing entry to the 
project. These underlying problems were not tackled after eurozone entry, 
contributing to the 2009 economic crisis (The Economist, vol. 395, issue 8688, 
26
th
 June 2010). 
 
As it turns out, the official figures for meeting the Maastricht criteria were 
probably falsified, as were the deficit statistics (Piga 2001, The Economist, vol. 
395, issue 8688, 26
th
 June 2010). This was not only a Greek phenomenon as it 
was proven that the Italian government also „massaged‟ economic statistics to 
facilitate entry into the European single currency in 1997 (Piga 2001). In the 
context of the current crisis numerous political figures such as German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel have in hindsight condemned the role of investment 
banks in helping Greece falsify national statistics
7
 and the fact that the Greek 
government took advantage of the fixed exchange rate (340.75 drachmas to the 
euro) in order to freeze public wages and round commodity prices upwards. The 




“Greece's adoption of the physical euro will have major implications for a country 
that has traditionally relied more heavily on cash transactions than has most of 
                                                 
5
 www.bbc.co.uk /1/hi/business/1095783.stm 
6




Europe … which implies that the actual physical changeover will have at least as 
much impact in Greece as elsewhere. And an awkward exchange parity (340.75 
drachmas to the euro) will not exactly set people's minds to rest as they pore over 
conversion charts to see what a chunk of feta will cost under the new regime … 75% 
of citizens fear price abuses on adopting the euro.” 
 
Other fears abounded. The BBC reported in April 2000: 
 
“There are also fears that the Greek economy has qualified for the euro by “limbo 
dancing” – making great efforts to meet the requirements only to let things go as 
soon as they are under the barrier. Even if the Greek economy can take the discipline 
of EU membership, there is likely to be tough times ahead. The eurozone‟s 
economies may be growing quickly these days, but it is also true that the whole of the 
zone should now be acting as one giant domestic economy. That is likely to mean 
that fewer companies will dominate the market and that may well mean that the 
prosperous areas of Europe will become richer at the expense of outlying regions … 
For Greece, this means the euro is even more of a risk than it is for other members. 
As the poorest country in Euroland, it is hoping that the overall economic benefits of 
membership will outweigh the possible loss of homegrown economic success, as 
money and business flows to the economic centre of Europe
8”. 
 
In April 2010 German Chancellor Angela Merkel admitted that perhaps Greece 
should not have been allowed to join the Euro: 
 
“In 2000 we had a situation when we were confronted with the question of whether 
Greece should be able to join the eurozone. It turned [out] that the decision may not 
have been scrutinised closely enough
9”. 
 
Due to the stringent management of the euro currency, it has recently been 
suggested by commentators such as German Christian Social Union 
parliamentary member Hans-Peter Friedrich that the only way out of the present 
economic crisis is for Greece to leave the single currency and re-structure the 


















 This view has also been aired by British and German political conservatives, see “Thinking 
the Unthinkable about the Euro”, Guardian Newspaper, www.guardian.co.uk 
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Recurrent Themes of Analysis 
 
There are numerous recurring themes throughout this thesis that are illustrated 
within the accounts of social and economic change, crisis and prosperity. Each 
will be analysed in their ethnographic setting within the body of the document. 
However, it is necessary at this stage to provide an introduction to some of the 
main threads of discussion pertinent to the analysis of the following 
ethnography. These are by no means the only themes of investigation but 
provide an overview of the core topics discussed within this thesis. 
 
Public Representation and Blame 
 
As a range of austerity measures grip the nation, the people of Greece are left to 
ponder where it all went wrong. Who is accountable, where does the blame lie 
and how is this reflected in the public domain? As will become apparent, the 
responses to these questions are multi-faceted and highly complex. Many 
Trikalinoi identify financial mismanagement and corruption at the governmental 
level, others emphasise the role of unregulated markets, some cite the meddling 
of the external Other, the foreigner. Usually blame is directed toward a mixture 
of the above, but ultimately there is an underlying resignation that the years of 
indiscriminate bank loans and uncritical consumerism have been put in hiatus. 
The very fact that many Greeks have become „economic experts‟ highlights the 
intensity of the situation on the ground, yet the Greek economic crisis has had 
political as well as economic consequences that transcend public and private 
arenas both within and beyond the national border. 
 
The current Greek crisis has had both local and global consequences. As well as 
the direct economic impact on local livelihoods and global markets, the „Greek 
crisis‟ has been employed as a metaphorical trope, a filter for political 
aspirations worldwide. „The Greek Crisis‟ has been employed as a political 
trope (Fernandez 1986, 1993), a persuasive „story seed‟ (Carrithers 2007:2), rich 
in both metaphor and narrative. The phrase „Greek crisis‟ is now synonymous 
with poor government, austerity measures, financial bail-outs, civil unrest and 
economic turmoil. The political propaganda surrounding notions of the „Greek 
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crisis‟ employed on various national stages incites fear, panic and movement for 
political change. It is a metaphor of persuasion beyond the national borders of 
Greece employed to stimulate similar reactions to those demonstrated by people 
experiencing the crisis first-hand. Rhetoric has been built around the Greek 
economic crisis which is disseminated on the global stage. As other nations 
experience economic downturns and political uncertainty, the metaphor is 
enforced by opposing parties in order to place blame for the circumstances 
firmly on the national governing bodies. The metaphor of the Greek economic 
crisis is employed to empower people to strive for political and social change in 
order to avoid a similar situation to Greece – whether that is a rational potential 
fate or purely exaggerated rhetoric. Panic and fear is spread by uncontextualised 
statistics and political propaganda. The Greek crisis has been used to signify 
governmental mismanagement, unregulated free-markets, corruption and 
capitalist excess; a model of crisis. This trope has been constructed much in the 
same way that America was propagated as „both gatekeeper and model for the 
free market‟ after the Cold War. Thus a facet of externalised Greek national 
identity is „defined by a perceived set of universal political and economic 
values‟ (Chomsky 1996:95). Often rhetoric tenders little absolute empirical 
truth, for, as Chomsky notes in relation to the perception of American economic 
policy, many paradoxes fill the gaps between propaganda and reality (ibid.:95, 
100-101). Nothing in social reality is quite as simple as portrayed through 
propaganda or blame; the fact that a critical situation is presented as simple at all 
must raise suspicion (Chomsky and Barsamian 2001:27, also Gudeman and 
Rivera 1990:42, Carrier 2009). 
 
Blame is circulated both from the bottom-up and the top-down, as well as intra-
strata. This is a central theme to this thesis in relation to public representations 
of crisis. Public representation in this case relates to media representation, 
political propaganda and the grassroots understanding of crisis. Basic 
observations of changes in these three realms unravel a tangled ball of meaning 
from the governmental to the everyday negotiation of economic situation. This 
is most apparent in terms of blame and accountability as a variety of narratives 
criss-cross public arenas. Narratives of blame and accountability are present in 
public domains in Trikala; the cafeterias of the central commercial street, 
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Asklipiou, are the loci for topical conversation concerning the economic crisis, 
its causes and consequences. 
 
Over time the multiple arguments concerning accountability separate the local 
and the global and also fuse them in historical narrative. When coming to power 
in October 2009 Greek Prime Minister Giorgos Papandreou (PASOK) blamed 
the falsification of deficit statistics on the previous Nea Dimokratia government 
of Konstantinos Karamanlis (2004-2009). He claimed to have uncovered the 
„true‟ deficit of 13.6 per cent when taking office as it had been estimated at 1.8 
per cent the previous year. The public initially accepted the news with knowing 
resignation as it is common knowledge that elements of the government „eat 
money‟ (trone lefta). However, when the ramifications of the economic turmoil 
became apparent in the form of financial bailouts, job losses, wage cuts and 
austerity measures, the Papandreou administration had to defend itself from 
increasing public criticism. People had generally become uninterested in using 
Karamanlis as the target towards which to vent their mounting frustrations. 
Blaming the previous government was no longer a politically viable option. In 
turn the Papandreou government turned their attention to directing the blame 
outwards, towards their European counterparts. 
 
Such is the nature of transnational capitalist economics that the consequences of 
crises are often portrayed by political bodies as a common and collective 
responsibility. The causes cannot be traced to a single state or political body 
alone but blame can be transferred to numerous politically ambiguous sources 
where local and global historical narratives have merged. Here there is a notable 
difference between blame and accountability. Blame can be circulated as 
„poisonous knowledge‟ (Das 1995), often in the form of gossip and hollow 
accusations which aim to both relocate and disseminate the cause of the problem 
away from the realms of social reality. Accountability implies that someone(s) 
will be brought to justice; to be held accountable. Due to a multitude of cultural 
phenomena – which are often far too simplistically categorised as corruption – 
running through nearly all social and political institutions from the grassroots to 
the government, there is little chance for any individuals to be held accountable 
for the Greek economic crisis (even if it were possible to pinpoint such persons 
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in such an interconnected global politico-economic context). Sometimes 
politicians shift the blame towards external bodies; nevertheless it is national 
publics who ultimately deal with the consequences of crisis and the measures 
enforced by their governments. In the words of a British Chancellor of the 
Exchequer “we are all in this together” in both cause and consequence, whether 
we like it or not. The concept that „we must start afresh‟ is used to “help people 
persuade themselves” of collective responsibility (Chomsky and Barsamian 
2001:ix). Surely the persuasive rhetoric of the inchoate we has never been 
stronger (cf. Carrithers 2007, 2008). 
 
How blame and accountability are understood within a range of publics – from 
the representations of economic turmoil on the streets of Trikala to nationalised 
representations through the mass-media – will form a central ethnographic and 




The concept of cultural proximity is explored fully in chapter seven (Time, 
Crisis and Social Memory) in relation to understandings of the Great Famine of 
1941-1943 in the context of the current economic crisis. In this thesis what I call 
cultural proximity will be theorised to propose that specific past events inform 
the localised understanding of times of crisis. These events may not have 
necessarily been experienced first-hand, yet the layers of cultural meaning result 
in an embodiment of historical moments within the contemporary context; „two 
distant points in time can suddenly become close, even superimposed‟ in social 
experience (Serres 1995a:57-59). Here the central theoretical points concerning 
cultural proximity will be emphasised followed by a discussion of why some 
events are considered culturally proximate whilst others are not. 
 
In everyday life there are events and experiences that may appear historically 
distant or detached due to the passage of time. However, some of these distant 
events may subsequently be very culturally close at specific moments. With the 
reoccurrence of periods of crisis, some past events are recalled as if they possess 
a contemporary quality; they are culturally proximate. As an embodiment of 
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past events, cultural proximity can be facilitated by collective memory, objects 
and artefacts, nationalist rhetorics and the education system. The understanding 
of contemporary moments of crisis is informed by the past through something 
more than merely social memory. For example, during the current economic 
crisis engulfing Trikala, the Great Famine of 1941-1943 is felt, is even feared, as 
if it were a facet of the present-day. Time is thus condensed into a singularly 
meaningful instant where two or more historical moments are simultaneous 
(Serres 1995a:57-59). 
 
People can understand and experience current events based on accounts of the 
past, whether experienced first-hand or whether the events are separated by 
many generations. Therefore, comparative analysis does not necessarily depend 
on perceptions of proximity in linear time. The connection between two distant 
events can be played out through symbolic systems, cognitive categories and 
local/national vocabularies (Just 1989a, Seremetakis 1991:11-12). 
Understanding the significance of past events within the context of the present 
can be facilitated by the analysis of particular aspects of past experience; 
hunger, violence and discrimination to name but a few. A theorisation of non-
linear time is thus required in order to further explain the concept of cultural 
proximity. 
 
In order to explain the concept of folded, pleated and fluctuating time, Serres 
uses the example of the handkerchief. He notes that if you take a handkerchief 
and spread it out in order to iron it, you can observe certain fixed distances and 
proximities. If you sketch a circle in one area, you can mark out nearby points 
and measure far-off distances. Then take the same handkerchief and crumple it, 
by putting it in your pocket. Two distant points suddenly are close, even 
superimposed. If, further, you tear it in certain places, two points that were close 
can become very distant. This science of nearness and rifts is known as 
topology, while the science of stable and well-defined distances is called 
metrical geometry (1995a:60). 
 
Central to the concept of cultural proximity is the idea that time does not merely 
„pass‟ but is extraordinarily complex with various stopping points, ruptures and 
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gaps (ibid.:57). Serres offers a theory of percolating and fluctuating time, 
„dancing like flames‟ that allows for a perception of culturally simultaneous 
temporal points. If we consider time as percolating then we can comprehend 
how “one flux passes through, while the other does not” (ibid.:58). The flux that 
gets caught in the percolator is that which remains culturally proximate, 
meaningful and close. These „moments of time‟ remain contemporary far 
beyond their original context. The cultural filter of crisis is what makes some 
past events feel very culturally close, such as the Great Famine at the time of the 
current economic crisis. 
 
The current economic crisis in Greece is not a situation devoid of history; it is 
rooted in social and cultural practice, global networks and political policy (cf. 
Narotzky 2004). Similarly, people‟s understandings of critical events are not 
devoid of component parts – experience of and cultural proximity with past 
events contribute to contemporary formations of crisis management. Social 
memory is the assemblage of different periods of crisis, multiple cultural and 
familial narratives of socio-historic experience and nationalised rhetorics of 
times past. The „advertising‟ of the new event, the crisis, is embellished through 
the mass media and is packaged with notions of blame, nationalist rhetoric, and 
political propaganda (Chomsky 1996, Sutton 1998:175-178). Such an 
understanding of contemporary events within the wider context of historical 
time leads to a double understanding of contemporaneity: the event in its own 
time as part of our era, and the event as an assemblage of reconstituted historical 
parts (Serres 1995a:47). 
 
Hence cultural proximity can also be linked to past accounts of blame and 
accountability. This can contribute to some events becoming culturally 
proximate due to their historical significance, whilst others do not. This is 
associated to patterns in the dissemination of blame during previous political 
environments (cf. Winichakul 2002). In Trikala, as in other parts of rural Greece 
(Hart 1992, Hart 1996), the civil war as a period of social, political and 
economic upheaval is rarely discussed in the public domain. It is in no way 
glorified in collective memory and despite being of the same historical era – the 
1940s – it is not culturally proximate during the present economic crisis. The 
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communist defeat during the civil war created an intensely anti-communist 
government until 1974. It was only after the legalisation of the Greek 
Communist Party and the socialist government of 1981-1989 that interest in the 
civil war as a topic of debate was substantially revived – and this was restricted 
to the literary domain (Marantzidis and Antoniou 2004:223). These 
discrepancies led to two main narratives of blame; the right wing calls this the 
national-minded (Ethnikofrones) versus traitors of the nation, the left wing 
divides civil war society into patriots versus collaborators-reactionaries 
(Marantzidis and Antoniou 2004:224). These social divisions in sympathy still 
run through local communities. 
 
Some historical events are considered sinful and thus a collective notion of „let 
us not speak of this again‟ is engaged (Winichakul 2002:255); “radical 
differences are played down and denied” (Barth 1969:14). From 1974 onwards 
any remnants of internal blame for the civil war, brothers against brothers, was 
supposedly assigned to the pages of history as a collective rhetoric against the 
external Other was wholly adopted, thus denying any „internal divisions and 
ambiguities in Greek society‟ (Marantzidis and Antoniou 2004:225). Yet at the 
local level, in Thessaly at least, this attempt to normalise the cognitive process 
had limited effect. The significance of civil war allegiances means that it 
remains a suppressed topic at the narrative level. The crossing of internal 
cultural boundaries and prescriptive judgement has no discursive framework in 
relation to the civil war (cf. Barth 1969). There is a pre-existing framework for 
discussing the Great Famine due to processes of nationalising discourse; a 
process that has so far failed at the grassroots level in relation to the civil war. 
The killing of brothers is still perceived as sinful and thus continues to be 
difficult to cognitively frame (cf. Schwartz 1998). This means that the Great 
Famine remains salient as a collectivising keystone event. Das argues that 
selective remembering and forgetting are directly related to concepts of 
collectivisation, unity and division (1995:128-129). In times of social upheaval, 
people prefer to construct or put together rather than destroy or divide (ibid.:26). 
This is partially why narratives of famine prevail over civil war as culturally 
proximate despite being of the same (linear) time. The fluxes in time are 
therefore highlighted in relation to events with complex social and cultural 
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histories as some events appear close and relevant at a given moment whilst 
others are disregarded. These complexities do not only relate to political 
agendas or economic fluctuations but also to the significance of certain 
culturally loaded aspects of society such as food (Sutton 2001). 
 
The periodic publicising and silencing of crisis narratives relates to changes in 
the social and political environment and the level of trauma experienced 
(Winichakul 2002:245). In some cases there may be decades of silence which 
are glossed over by official government rhetoric. Hence discussions of these 
crises do not penetrate the public sphere and are not recalled as culturally 
proximate due to their fragmented and divisive nature. This selective 
recollection is not coincidental but usually corresponds with periods of social 
change and is enshrouded in a plurality of emotion and meaning that is brought 
to the fore at specific moments. 
 
Political and social ramifications are frequently reasons for sustained silence 
both on a governmental stage and the level of the village community (Hart 
1992). Furthermore, the personal accounts of crisis may not fit the “normative 
ideology” portrayed by the state or fellow villagers (ibid.:246). The selective 
silencing and evoking of times of crisis can also be related to concepts of 
assimilation with cultural surroundings – as was the case with the resettled 
refugees from Anatolia during the 1920s (cf. Pentzopoulos 1962, Hirschon 
1989, Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2001). 
 
“In other words, at least three forms of domination are at work in silencing this past: 
first, the threat of political repercussions; second, the sense of guilt whether of the 
perpetrators or the survivors; and third, the ideology of national history, which 
suppresses the „anomalies‟, or pushes them into silence, leading to ambivalent 
memories …” (Winichakul 2002:246). 
 
As social conditions change so does the willingness of people to share narratives 
of their traumatic experiences (Winichakul 2002:254, 257-258). In Greece today 
the Great Famine is portrayed as a time of collective suffering caused by the 
actions of an external Other: Nazi Germany. In Trikala this event which mainly 
affected the people of Athens some 320 kilometres away has been adopted into 
local collective experience through nationalist processes. On the other hand, the 
 31 
civil war is still considered sinful; brothers fighting brothers
11
. In contemporary 
Trikala, political sympathies relating to this crisis are diverse. The civil war is 
not a collectivising event in the same manner as the Great Famine, thus it is not 
embodied as culturally proximate during subsequent times of crisis. 
 
It is this resurfacing and reassessment of accounts of crisis in relation to later 
social circumstances that is particularly significant in the narratives recited by 
Trikalinoi. The past and its meanings are framed and comprehended from a 
present perspective. Culturally proximate historical events are experienced as 
contemporary understandings of times past which assist the negotiation of 
present social circumstances. 
 
Patronage at Play: a Trikalini context 
 
Social, political and economic life in contemporary Trikala is comprised of traits 
associated with western capitalism and more customary modes of relations such 
as patronage and clientelism. This complex fusion of modes of relations affects 
all aspects of Trikalini society from the practical matters of securing bank loans 
and access to medical treatment to notions of social status and mobility. In every 
situation it is less about one „option‟ or the other – capitalist or traditional – but 
more a synthesis of the two, resulting in the cultural interpretation of underlying 
socio-economic structures. Hence medical treatment can include access to a 
prestigious surgeon through patron-client networks as well as bribery
12
 in the 
form of fakelákia (small envelopes of money). Getting a job for a large 
multinational supermarket chain is at the discretion of the local Greek manager, 
regardless of company policy (Boutsouki and Bennison 1999, Theodoridis and 
Bennison 2009). Perceptions of social status can involve value judgements 
based on both consumerism and inheritance. This is a local reflection of global 
trends in a similar way that there is a localised formation and interpretation of 
global crisis. 
                                                 
11
 However, as Winichakul notes, “Time changes public discourses. Apparently, it changes 
memories and histories too. Time is not an empty passage of orbiting celestial bodies. Nor is it 
homogeneous. It has subjects, whose memories are caught up in complex contention … It is not 
uncommon for one to feel guilt only after deep reflections on the views of the present” 
(2002:258). 
12
 Loizos makes the point that bribery should not be equated to patronage (1977:115). 
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Culturally embedded phenomena such as bribery, tax evasion and favour 
exchange that may be deemed wholly corrupt
13
 within many capitalist societies 
are part and parcel of the „Greek way‟ of doing capitalism (Bratsis 2003, 
Featherstone 2008 also Moss 1995 for the Italian context). They must be 
considered within the framework of „cultural translation‟ (Just 2001:39, 
Boissevain 1977, Bloch and Parry 1989). This demonstrates the “incomplete and 
uneven character of capitalist penetration and modernization in Greece” 
(Seremetakis 1994:39). Hence preceding concepts of social relations operate 
simultaneously alongside, or underneath, capitalist systems. In economics such 
an uneven penetration is termed an „economic dualism‟; when a „modern 
dynamic capitalist sector‟ exists alongside a „traditional agricultural sector‟ 
(Colman and Nixson 1986:32-33). The formation of localised or regionalised 
economies is culturally specific, based on interpretations and adaptations of 
wider processes (Taussig 1980:127-128). Hence capitalism is infused with 
cultural sentiments, meanings and subjectivities (Yanagisako 2002:xi, 32) as 
well as the imprint of cultural history and state-endorsed rhetoric. “Western 
capitalism” has been integrated with ways that “strengthen and develop” 
previous cultural systems (ibid.:xii, Sahlins 1999). 
 
As an economic system, Gellner argues that patronage is not necessarily a form 
of corruption when observed within its cultural context as it is imbued with 
notions of pride. This is despite the fact that “it nevertheless knows that it is not 
itself the official morality”; it is a form of „moral climate‟ (1977:3, original 
emphasis, Scott 1977, Moss 1995). The formal economy cannot, Gellner 
continues, be evoked as a form of patronage as it is impersonal. This leads to 
confusion as to the boundary between patronage and corruption (cf. Moss 1995). 
                                                 
13
 According to the international corruption index 2010, published by Transparency 
International, Greece is ranked 78
th
 out of 178 nations. The index is a measure of domestic, 
public sector corruption. On a scale of 0 to 10 – 0 indicating high levels of corruption, 10 
representing low levels – Greece was placed between Colombia and Lesotho with a score of 3.5. 
In comparison the first placed nations were Denmark, New Zealand and Singapore (9.3), the 
worst was Somalia (1.1) and United Kingdom was in 20
th
 place (7.6). The United Sates of 
America was 22
nd
 (7.1), Australia 8
th
 (8.7) and Italy 67
th
 (3.9). The same body insist that the best 
way out of the current global economic crisis is through „a zero tolerance policy on corruption‟ 
(www.transparency.org). For anthropological perspectives on corruption see Haller and Shore 
(2005). 
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Therefore patronage should be understood as one form of „doing things‟ that 
operates within the same social spheres as other modes of relations; it is part of 
the cultural repertoire. Some of these social spheres may be more prone to 
patronage than others (Gellner 1977:5). Furthermore, patronage is one aspect of 
a multitude of systems that comprise the „moral climate‟ of a specific locale 
where notions of corruption are both bureaucratically and culturally defined – 
often by ambiguous terminology (Moss 1995:59-60, also Roniger 1994:3). 
 
Changes in the modes of socio-economic relations, coupled with shifting 
economic contexts of prosperity and crisis, inherently alter the criteria by which 
Trikalinoi negotiate and define certain aspects of their collective lives. This will 
be highlighted in this thesis through the discussion of changing perceptions of 
social status and mobility. Patron-clientelism is indeed discussed primarily in 
relation to perceptions of social status and routes of social mobility. In each case 
patronage is analysed within the context of other social processes and not as a 
stand-alone institution. It is approached as somewhere between a cultural pattern 
and a structural trait (Silverman 1977). Patron-clientelism is one aspect of a 
complex social background formed and informed by social beings. Thus 
accounts of patronage and favour exchange are adjacent to notions of 
consumerism and (im)moral economy. In turn, patronage has often become 
difficult to define in a monolithic fashion. However, this does not mean that 
patronage as a social mode of exchange faces demise when other institutions 
offer alternative “material possibilities of economic performance” (Kitschelt 




Patronage has been discussed in Mediterranean ethnography since the inception 
of the modern discipline. It must therefore not be taken lightly as a process 
integral to the functioning of society. This is not to say that patronage is a static 
pre-assumed trait void of spatio-temporal context and immune to cultural and 
historical variation and manipulation (Gellner 1977). Likewise, it is not a 
monolithic stand-alone institution but is linked to complex networks of 
representation (cf. Zinn 2001). The role of this form of social relations as a 
                                                 
14
 It has been argued by scholars such as Kitschelt that patronage is “at odds with theories of 
political development, state formation and democratic institutions” (2007:298). 
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constituent part of wider Greek culture is quite different in 2010 than it was in 
Campbell‟s 1964 study.  
 
In basic definition, patronage is classically portrayed as a system of contractual 
relationships between a patron, usually a person with authority or other form of 
economic or political power, and a client (Campbell 1964:230). What makes the 
network of patronage effective is the conceptualisation of power vis-à-vis the 
patron and client. The client does not necessarily feel inferior in this 
relationship, due to reciprocity (ibid.:231, Gellner 1977, but see Davis 1977, 
Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984, Zinn 2001, Lyon 2002). The client demands 
favours, usually of economic or political nature from the patron, while the 
patron demands honour or allegiance (1964:234). In some cases, gifts towards 
the patron aim at enhancing the feeling of obligation in the receiver. Patronage, 
according to Campbell, apart from the „distribution of various facilities‟, 
protects families from social exclusion “for without friends a man loses all 
power, influence and social prestige” (ibid.:238). For Campbell, patronage is not 
simply a social structure as it is endowed with cultural aspects of honour, 
emotion, and obligation; it is a performance (Weingrod 1977:50). This is in 
opposition to other studies of patronage that emphasise the point of interaction 
as part of an instrumental structural system (Boissevain 1966, Sayari 1977, Scott 
1977). Thus patronage wanders “between a definitional specificity, on the one 
hand, and a kind of poetic metaphor, on the other” (Weingrod 1977:41). 
 
The patron-client pattern has most usually been analysed as a form of social 
structure. The assumption of mutual dependency on a structural relationship 
requires reassessment as patron-clientelism is by no means the only means for 
survival in contemporary Mediterranean societies (ibid.:1977:45). Whilst 
patronage remains a form of structure open to and formed by social actors it is 
not a process imperative for the continued functioning of a generic social 
system. The structural approach presumes the arrangement of actors at various 
points of the “overall stratification hierarchy” (ibid.). These potential 
relationships can be activated through informal social networks, meaning that 
access is gained to key “decision making points” on the hierarchy (ibid.:46, 
Mair 1969:122). The system is reproduced, sustaining the overall structure of 
 35 
society in a form of equilibrium. Furthermore, the focus on structure in relation 
to patronage has led to the theorisation of the Mediterranean as a homogeneous 
„culture area‟ (Just 2001:46-47) with patronage as the idiom for „doing politics‟. 
Such an approach to the analysis of patronage can result in ethnographic 
accounts emphasising the role of the client (Lyon 2002:9, 224).  
 
An alternative approach to the study of patronage is through a processual or 
performative framework. This stance outlines patronage as a process of 
ceremonial performances and focuses as much on the outcomes and social 
implications of the relationship as the interaction itself. The processual approach 
aims at abstracting underlying social processes emerging from clientelist 
interactions (Weingrod 1977:48). The focus on process highlights culturally 
embedded idioms such as power, honour and sentiment that come to the fore 
through “highly stylised, ritualised performances” (ibid.:50). However the 
cultural aspects of the processes still seem to be embedded in the structure itself 
rather than being highly variable fluent cultural aspects in their own right. 
 
I propose that patronage in Trikala be considered a persistent cultural pattern 
akin to a dynamic social structure. The actors change the form and interaction of 
relations depending on socio-economic context. It is a dynamic, flexible and 
historically contextual system. At present, in Trikala patronage represents just 
one way, embedded with many others, towards achieving economic ends. Often 
material gifts have been replaced by money which has become more of a feature 
which loads with ambivalence the relationship between patrons and clients. For 
example, in Trikalini marriages it is customary to give money in a small 
envelope (fakeláki) as a gift to the prospective couple instead of purchasing any 
other form of present. In these cases the small envelopes are most welcome as 
they are considerable economic contributions towards the new household. These 
fakelákia are not only morally acceptable but emphasise the generosity of the 
donor. In such cases, money is positively loaded and under no circumstances is 
associated with corruption and bribery. In other cases, such as the fakeláki 
(singular of fakelákia) that one gives to a doctor in a hospital in order to ensure 
the positive outcome of an operation or simply the positive treatment of one‟s 
kin, money is negatively loaded and the fakeláki represents all things associated 
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with corruption in the health system. Yet, one cannot help but notice an apparent 
ambivalence which is highly pertinent to my argument here. In both cases – 
marriage or hospital bribery – what is given in exchange is the fakeláki. A 
fakeláki can have both a positive and a negative meaning depending on context. 
Nevertheless, the same medium is used in both cases and only under specific 
context shifting markers does it change its „colour‟.  
 
The significance of money as mediator within the specific cultural setting is 
apparent in a multitude of social situations (Taussig 1980, Bloch and Parry 
1989) and has become integral to most socio-economic relationships. This is to 
say that patronage is very much associated with profit-making businesses (Just 
2000:174) as well as individual entrepreneurship. Moss offers the example of an 
Italian businessman in the 1980s who found that only by changing his usual gift 
to the political elite could he gain a public works contract. Instead of the, until 
then, customary gift of bread and mushrooms he conveyed the sum of 40 million 
lire (Moss 1995:58). He obtained the contract. Adjacent economic systems have 
substantially altered the grounds of the patron-client relationship. Furthermore, 
other economic relations such as bank credit could be viewed as extensions of 
patron-client credit systems as services are provided in exchange for custom 
(allegiance) and eventual „profit‟. Thus the structural basis of patronage has 
changed along with changes in bureaucracy, administration and economy (Moss 
1995:58). 
 
Furthermore, as Campbell argues, patronage is an effective representational 
political system which connects wider with localised political contexts (and now 
also transnational). The state may be perceived as an abstract and distant entity 
and state officials may deliberately project a hostile and impersonal image 
(Campbell 1964:238). In such cases, people with political or authoritative 
power, within the community assume the responsibility to link their peripheral 
communities to the abstract and bureaucratic state. The patrons become bridges 
between the loci of state power and “introduce some flexibility” into otherwise 
“rigid and uncomprehending” aspects of social life (ibid.:259). In return the 
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client unquestionably supports the politics of the patron and expresses the 
feelings of gratitude and indebtedness
15
 (1964:259, Herzfeld 1985:19-20). 
 
This is not however merely a political process at the level of governance. As 
some „votes‟ or opinions count more than the others on the council, so certain 
„votes‟ or opinions count more in the community. Certain members of society 
have the ability to negotiate with agents of bureaucracy and authority in a more 
effective manner (Campbell 1964:225, Crozier 1964, Boissevain 1966, Moss 
1995, Piattoni 2002). Therefore, patronage is also much concerned with forms 
of power and influence within the politics of the local community (Gellner 
1977:1). 
 
Patron-clientelism is approached in this thesis as a structure-type pattern with 
cultural and historical elements interacting with constantly changing modes of 
relations and shifting institutions. It is a changing product of its time that is at 
once a constituent of social structure and culture. Patronage brings together 
different forms of socio-economic relations, thus its institutional basis is often 
ambiguous (Pipyrou 2010a). It is not statically entrenched within „the 
traditional‟ nor has it been fully incorporated into „modern capitalist‟ 
economics. It is one form of „getting things done‟ that transgresses otherwise 
bureaucratic and political (in the loosest sense of the term) boundaries that may 
be considered rigid in another cultural context. As such it is part of the local 
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 For Campbell debt complies with a form of dependence which is a measure of weakness 
(1964:226). This is especially interesting when considering the trend for taking out substantial 
bank loans prevalent during the period of economic prosperity in Trikala pre-crisis. The social 
implications for significant debt were often disregarded within specific social groups. This is 
related to the impersonal relationship provided by „faceless‟ actors involved in the transaction 
(Gellner 1977:6). The impact of financial loans becoming commonplace and thus socially 
sanctioned, coupled with the faceless nature of the „patron‟ – the bank – changed public 
perceptions of indebtedness. Often such debts were also incurred under the pretence of striving 




Social change is an underlying principal for much of this thesis with the 
emphasis on the cultural and historical construction of crisis experience. 
Through the lens of crisis and prosperity, social change is examined from the 
annexation of Thessaly to the Greek state in 1881 to the present day. Obviously 
the ethnographic data over the course of 130 years has been drawn from many 
sources. Greek scholars who discuss the relevant issues in-situ facilitate an 
engagement with the social pulse of the time
16
. Additionally, foreign 
ambassadors, dignitaries and travellers writing throughout the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century further allow for the socio-historical 
contextualisation of key events. During the turbulent years of the 1940s – 
arguably the most significant period of social change in Trikala – we begin to 
encounter extensive first-hand ethnographic material. 
 
The focus of this thesis is on how previous periods of social change have shaped 
people‟s experiences of the present events. This is expressed through a variety 
of tropes such as nationalist rhetoric relating to past events, political policy, 
agricultural mechanisation, shifting economic patterns, and the embodiment of 
significant past events – cultural proximity. Additionally, the consequences of 
social change on local perceptions of social status and mobility will be explored. 
In this case, the two aspects of change impact upon each other considerably, as 
periods of crisis and prosperity create spaces for mobility and alter perceptions 
of status. Hence „social change‟ is examined as a historical topic rather than an 
absolute anthropological theory in its own right. 
 
Significant periods of social change for Trikalinoi range from the agrarian 
reforms of the 1920s to civil war, famine, military dictatorship, European 
integration and the introduction of liberal markets, a stock market crash and the 
current economic crisis. Many of these events were products of the national or 
the global, yet had particular consequences for a relatively rural community in 
                                                 
16
 The history discussed in this thesis is from the point of view of a social anthropologist. 
Therefore, as Just notes (1989b:viii), when discussing historical events the scholarship of others 
has been extensively utilised and must be understood as critiqued from an anthropological 
perspective. 
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central Greece. Social change is therefore not presented as a bounded process 
within a closed community but is related to periods of change on other social 
levels. Whilst it is understood as an elongated process spanning 130 years, 
intense periods of social change are examined independently to help piece 
together the significance of certain historical events. 
 
Periods of social change have been selected from the realms of history as 
illustrative of the continuing process. These choices have been made on the 
basis of three criteria that make them relevant to the understanding of 
contemporary society. Firstly, despite being linked to national and global 
patterns, the periods considered have a direct and significant impact on the 
inhabitants of Trikala. Secondly, the economic consequences of the events are of 
primary concern when discussing social change. Finally, some events have an 
intense impact on the Trikalinoi despite not having a direct effect on the locale. 
These events signify social change on a wider scale but have come to occupy a 
central place in the local collective conscience (Chase-Dunn and Babones 2006). 
 
Approaches to discussing social change are diverse as the topic itself spans all 
themes of social research, from holistic village studies to political processes, 
conflict and natural disaster. Here there are two selected approaches which assist 
in the understanding of periods of social change such as crisis and conflict as 
well as modernisation and mechanisation. Both Gluckman (1968) and Layton 
(2000) are relevant to this study for numerous reasons. They both deal in 
different ways with concepts of time – which is another central feature of this 
thesis. Gluckman discusses „structural duration‟ and „historical time‟ as two 
measures of social change. Layton‟s detailed account of historical time in 
Franche-Comté, France, is the culmination of research over a period of nearly 
thirty years. Furthermore, Layton regularly contextualises change as far back as 
the eighteenth century and beyond. Additionally, both pieces of work discuss a 
multitude of different types of social change, which the scholars base in a 
variety of dynamic anthropological theories. The accounts acknowledge radical 
and gradual change over a range of social arenas. Finally, the two studies 
represent how two very different epistemological approaches to social change 
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can be pertinent to the analysis of the same ethnographic situation – that of 
Trikala. 
 
Gluckman (1968) has discussed social change in relation to the „structural 
duration‟ of individual institutions. He begins by stating that „all social life 
exists in time and all processes in time involve changes‟. However, there are 
several types of „time‟ as well as distinctive types of „change‟ (1968:219). By 
equating „social institution‟ to „cultural pattern‟, Gluckman defines „structural 
duration‟ as the time scale of an institution. For example, the time scale for 
analysing a family may be four or five generations and parliament has a 
structural duration of around fifteen years (ibid.:119, 223). He argues that often 
such analyses do not take into consideration the external factors effecting social 
change in each institution, thus eliminating external intrusions, extraordinary 
events and contradictions. However, such a structural analysis of a monolithic 
institution through „structural duration‟ alone does not represent clearly what 
happens in “actual historical time”, only in the as if time of structural duration. 
Changes may be more “radical” once the institution is analysed as part of the 
social whole, such is the case with changes in the patronage system in Trikala. 
Even in such cases, Gluckman argues, new forms of wealth can be invested into 
old relationships and visa-versa (ibid.:230). 
 
The differentiation in theories of time means that there are encapsulations of 
past events in present cultural patterns (Gluckman 1968:220). The present 
condition of social institutions illustrates the effects of changes over real 
historical time. History is incorporated and presented in the reality of the present 
(in a similar fashion to the cultural proximity of individual events discussed 
above). These changes to institutions eventually get permanently encapsulated 
and produce standardised ideas about history and time (ibid.:220). The 
institutions accommodate social change. 
 
Gluckman‟s theory of structural duration in the analysis of social change, even 
when considered in its own historical and disciplinary context, is open to much 
criticism. Gluckman states that in this abstract perception of time individual 
institutions always go through a cyclical process and end up where they started 
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(ibid.:221, Kurtz 2001:107), thus maintaining equilibrium
17
. Although he does 
concede that in „real historical time‟ social institutions are not in a state of stasis, 
he maintains that the elements of an institution remain in a “state of balance” 
when they eventually recover from disturbance. This is despite the fact that 
individuals may occupy different positions within the institution after times of 
social upheaval. These differentiations in the social positions of individual 
actors are of utmost importance in much twenty-first century anthropology and 
are overlooked by purely structural analysis. 
 
The analysis of social change within an abstract form of time overcomplicates 
the understanding of the process at grassroots level. Gluckman acknowledges 
that the theory of structural duration “is abstracted from reality since it may not 
deal with the whole complexity of reality” (ibid.). If the analysis operates within 
abstract time then the distance of translation into „real‟ social experience 
detaches the anthropological theory from the ethnographic material. 
 
The theory focuses on notions of stability and equilibrium. Social reality does 
not always follow such a structured path. Indeed, it has been a more recent trend 
to analyse social change in terms of „chaos theory‟ rather than equilibrium 
(Bonabeau 1997, Mosko and Damon 2005). Gluckman again recognises this 
inadequacy: 
 
“Various institutions have different structural durations, and their “intermesh” has to 
be analyzed. Events emerging from the operation of one institution may intervene in 
the operation of another institution in a manner that is haphazard as far as the 
systematic interdependencies of the recipient institution are concerned. External 
events from quite different areas of the world may intrude into the field under 
analysis, again in what, from the point of view of an analyst of systems, is a 
haphazard manner” (ibid.:223). 
 
He defends this by emphasising the resistance of institutions to social change 
and suggests that the analyst must overcome this hurdle by “carrying out a 
process of mental abstraction” (ibid.:223). The major crises are the result of 
                                                 
17
 It was a feature of the processual paradigm, instigated by Gluckman, that dynamic political 
processes were analysed in terms of a „social drama‟ (Turner 1957). In this framework an initial 
breach in social relations results in a crisis. Each side of the breach then mobilises „powerful 
sources‟, leading to concerns over potential conflict. This in turn results in countervailing 
measures by leaders who deploy adjustive or redressive mechanisms, thus restoring peaceful 
relations (Kurtz 2001:107). This highlights the cyclical nature of the processual approach. 
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smaller accumulative crises that occur in the structural patterns. Once again this 
seems an unsatisfactory rebuke when considering the „structural consequences‟ 
of crises such as civil war and even the effects of global recession on local 
institutions. Gluckman adequately defines many of the shortcomings of his 
theory before reverting to structural-type in answering the criticisms. 
 
The abstraction of singular institutions from historical time – however we 
choose to theorise this – is problematic. This thesis looks at changes in social 
and economic patterns by exploring the experiences of the „everyday people‟ 
and how this is linked to wider national and global bodies. Historical time plays 
a critical role in the analysis of contemporary experience, facilitated by 
institutions such as the state, European Union, stock market and the education 
system. However these „institutions‟ are not examined separately or within a 
concept of time as a vacuum. They are not compared directly as primarily 
mutually exclusive entities. Gluckman‟s appreciation of the global and the 
national in influencing the changes in local communities is useful when 
discussing social change. His emphasis on structure is a distinctive idiom of the 
time, yet in a period of rapid radical change he concludes that it is necessary to 
resort almost entirely to narrative and from this to seek various types of patterns 
(Gluckman 1968:233). This appears to contradict his statement that social reality 
is something “external and constraining” rather than something internally 
constructed. Actors are thus “self-deceived” by their surroundings (1968:232). I 
agree that actor‟s behaviour is influenced by cultural patterns and the constant 
penetration of their social environment by external innovations, yet the 
prioritisation of theoretical model over actor narrative is a little hard to swallow 
in 2010 (although this prioritisation was not what Gluckman intended in the 
context of 1960s anthropology). To understand the social repercussions of the 
current economic crisis such a narrative approach is often required. 
 
Through a structural-functionalist framework it became apparent that social 
change was dictated by institutions whilst individual action and history were 
„neutralised‟. Therefore repeatable and controllable factors dictated the stability 
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of society (Layton 2000:101). In his study of Franche-Comté, France
18
, Layton 
critiques the structural-functionalist approach that assumes societies were 
inherently stable and their existing form was in preservation through customs 
and sanctions (ibid.:102). Through a wonderfully detailed ethnographic study 
over the course of nearly thirty years, Layton argues that there are variations in 
individual and collective interpretations of historical events and the application 
of socio-economic strategies. Through his research he found that no two villages 
on the Plateau of Levier were structurally identical but their development 
depended on the historical adoption – or not – of co-operatives, entrepreneurs, 
and councils varying in space and time (ibid.:103). The equilibrium model as 
proposed above by Gluckman was inadequate to explain variation within what 
should have been an area of cultural unity. 
 
Different localised routes of social change have different impacts as cultural 
repertoires are diverse even within a geographically restricted area. Cultural 
unity lies in a number of organisational themes and the management of 
resources and environmental conditions (ibid.:104-105). The diverse paths of 
social change in the cultural area, Layton argues, were the result of different 
responses to changes in the local economy; “social systems are typically rather 
fluid; their structures change and there is a thin line between structure and 
process”. People have choice between alternative actions (as will be 
demonstrated in relation to modes of social mobility in Trikala), hence cultural 
patterns are not merely the product of social rules and institutions (ibid.:106, 
Mair 1969:121). The interaction between people and social variables determines 
routes of social change and subsequent sustainability. Institutional arrangements 
remain resistant to change until change renders them “untenable” and thus they 
are replaced by new arrangements in a “series of steps” (Layton 2000:307). 
 
To the extreme, social structure can be deemed the epiphenomenon of how 
people allocate time and resources within a given context (Barth 1967, Layton 
1997). The strategic decisions of people change the system. However, the focus 
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 For further discussion on social change in France see Mendras and Cole (1988) focusing on 
class, kinship and national institutions, and Vaughan, Kolinsky and Sheriff (1980) on education, 
industry and agriculture. Friedl (1974) and Rosenberg (1988) are also excellent resources when 
discussing history, society and change in France. 
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should not be on the individual in a social and historical vacuum – strategic 
decisions are „inextricably part of the nation-state context‟ as „contributors to the 
market-economy and answerable to its laws‟ (ibid.:110). People participate in 
social systems not just respond to them and new strategies are often derived 
from old ones. For example, Layton notes that the agricultural market economy 
is a product of rural depopulation that began in the mid-nineteenth century. In 
turn the majority of economic change is related to changes in state policy and 
the differentiation in livelihood strategies; they are mutually influential in a form 
of „historical production‟ (Narotzky 2004:58). Therefore order in social relations 
is not the outcome of an underlying structure nor is it purely the product of the 
actor‟s rationale (Layton 2000:112). Instead, following Bourdieu (1977) and 
Giddens (1984), “agent‟s strategies constitute local society and culture”; the 
“situated activities of agents, taking place through time and in space”. Actors‟ 
activities reproduce the social conditions (ibid.). Both the approaches of 
Bourdieu and Giddens allow for more agency, and strategy, than was allocated 
through a structural-functionalist or structuralist model. Agents draw on certain 
rules and resources within their social environment to make strategic decisions 
according to cultural and environmental context, thus interaction transforms the 
overall structure. 
 
Cultural strategies are consciously pursued and result in historical as well as 
cultural variation (ibid.:176). They can be reactions to wider social trends such 
as depopulation, conflict or policy change, but social interaction is the key to 
understanding change through time as local culture is enacted in relation to a 
social and natural environment. The wider social system changes if a different 
strategy becomes more appropriate or widely available (ibid.:179). Social 
change is thus primarily the product of strategy, yet variation in the behaviour of 
individuals is always in relation to the cultural background (ibid.:223). A key 
point to Layton‟s argument is that social structure – or cultural environment – is 
as likely to transform social relations as it is to reproduce social order due to the 
implication of strategy by cultural actors (ibid.:360). 
 
In the context of social change in Trikala many of Layton‟s points are highly 
relevant. The historical contextualisation of social change is of great import. The 
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availability of new opportunities for the employment of strategies as well as 
innovation is caused by periods of crisis. The diverse investment of time and 
capital in the context of altered forms of social environment change subsequent 
social relations in either a temporary or permanent fashion. Crisis provides 
opportunity for innovation and, as has been demonstrated throughout the recent 
history of Trikala, these fluctuations in the socio-economic environment form 
the bases for diverse shifts in social relations. In a similar respect, periods of 
prosperity and affluence allow for alternative strategic investments. The 
reinvestment of capital in times of prosperity – into the stock market for 
example – at once perpetuates economic affluence and eventually causes 
subsequent crisis. Thus the strategic decisions of the individual are reproduced 
as such a major pattern that the alteration of the existing socio-economic system 
becomes almost inevitable. The proposal that social change can fuel necessity 
for further social change is exemplified through examples of crisis, as social 
change does not necessarily imply positive connotations. The social 
environment is altered, thus cultural patterns interact with shifting social 
backgrounds. 
 
As history informs cultural repertoire, so contemporary strategic decisions are 
the product of historical significance. Not only do previous decisions in times of 
crisis alter the trajectory of social change, but they directly inform the decisions 
of contemporary actors. In Trikala this is most evident in respect to perceptions 
of social mobility and the strategic investments based upon notions of value 
judgement. These judgements are imbued with a range of sentiments based on 
family histories and the construction of difference in cultural repertoires. 
 
The cultural repertoire is appropriated by a variety of actors to inform decisions 
and hence we have regional variations in the intensity and formation of crises. 
Even though the roots of the formation may be ultimately beyond the control of 
the local community (despite the fact that they may participate in the wider 
systems that cause the downfall), the cultural patterns of the locale contribute to 
the flavour of the local experience of crisis. This extends to the adaptation of 
local communities to particular social circumstances (Layton 2000:355). 
Applying Layton‟s framework slightly further, the patterns of economic 
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behaviour embraced at any given time are the product of local cultural 
repertoires, but can be endorsed, even encouraged, by the state and global trends 
(ibid.:123). 
 
Indeed, Layton records how economic diversification changed and destabilised 
the once-efficient strategies for regulating interpersonal relations on the local 
level. This is exacerbated in times of extreme social and/or economic crisis. 
New economic strategies transform local culture due to the participation of 
people in changing economic environments and rapidly shifting strategic 
investment (ibid.:255, 358). For example, economic innovation in saturated or 
collapsing markets can provoke diverse trajectories in future economic 
strategies. Strategic investment in relation to historical conditions can also result 
in upwards or downwards social mobility as strategic decisions are 
implemented. As Layton notes, “Households which have a similar composition 
and economic status at one moment may increasingly diverge in response to 
demographic variables or the accessibility of alternative employment” 
(2000:107). This is in response to „economic selection‟ – the selection and 
rejection of economic routes (ibid.:304-305). Culturally and historically 
informed modes of dealing with crisis can seriously affect strategic investments 
and thus social status and mobility. This emphasises the dialogue between the 
individual, social life, cultural repertoire and history (bid.:365). 
 
Individual decisions may have the ability to change the eventual trajectory of 
social systems in the long run. Opportunistic or „chance‟ innovations by 
individuals illustrate how communities are not closed systems but are open to 
turbulences in social processes instigated in both a top-down and bottom-up 
manner. Yet, Layton reminds us, individuals are always involved in socially 
embedded relationships – their decisions take place within these relationships 
and wider fields of social interaction (ibid.:235, also Kirtsoglou and 
Theodossopoulos 2010). Individual strategy is crucial to understanding social 
change but the “consequences are determined by the social environment in 
which different strategies are enacted, copied, or discarded” (ibid.:258). The 
first people to participate in imported aspects to the existing cultural repertoire 
create social trends that others can participate in or oppose. In Trikala this was 
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the case with status competitions provoked by the liberalisation of the economy 
in the 1980s and the years of economic prosperity in the 1990s. Competition for 
status through consumerism, what in this thesis I term „tournaments of 
consumerism‟, was the result of innovations in terms of alternative capital 
investment. They were adaptations of previous aspects of the cultural repertoire 
in relation to new opportunities for investment. Over time this change actually 
created another form of distinction between sections of Trikalini society based 
on patterns of consumerism where the evaluation of status is diverse (chapter 
eight). 
 
Although the individual, and the dynamic relationships between individuals, is 
important to understanding the detail of social change, this thesis deals with 
change on a wide-scale that implicates institutions on a national and global 
level. The understandings and implications of social change on the local people 
are explored but the changes themselves are the outcome of often abstract 
processes such as global economic downturn, conflict, population movement 
and governmental policy. However, the strategic decisions of people in relation 




This thesis has a distinctive format based on initially addressing historical 
accounts of crisis before moving on to discussing how these historical periods 
inform contemporary experiences of crisis. These historical events will be 
referred back to throughout the study and the theoretical strands outlined above 
are discussed as they surface throughout the document. The chronological 
ordering of the first chapters is imperative to secure the basis of the ensuing 
discussion. The thesis is primarily concerned with the experience of crisis in 
Trikala and thus the first part is dedicated to setting a historical background of 
upheaval. As alluded to above, the selection of historical eras for discussion is 
based on three distinct criteria pertaining to the relevance of specific crises to 
the Trikalinoi. Hence those crises with direct impacts on local society, crises 
with significant economic consequences, and events which occupy a central 
place in local collective conscience will be addressed. The chapter on social 
 48 
status and mobility towards the end of the thesis incorporates narratives from the 
time of prosperity directly before the current economic crisis and assesses the 
consequences of the subsequent turmoil. This chapter also refers back to the 
history of crisis and demonstrates how drastically changing economic conditions 
affect such things as social status and mobility. 
 
After an introduction to Trikala and a summary of research methods in chapter 
two, chapter three begins to outline a history of crisis in Thessaly since 
annexation from the Ottoman Empire in 1881. This entry incorporates issues 
such as the peasant uprisings and the redistribution of ciftliks, agrarian reforms 
and the Greek-Turkish population exchange of the 1920s. The chapter concludes 
by offering accounts of the social upheaval of the 1940s which includes Axis 
occupation, the Great Famine and civil war. All these events are approached 
primarily from a socio-economic perspective. The direct narrative material for 
periods before the Second World War is laced with accounts from scholars and 
politicians of the time. The decade of the 1940s is especially important to help 
understand how Trikalinoi conceptualise contemporary crises and the impact of 
social change. The discussion of historical material from 1881-1950 in chapter 
three highlights the significance of global and national processes on local 
experience as not merely a modern product of globalisation and international 
capitalist markets. 
 
Chapter four continues the investigation into the history of crisis in Thessaly 
from 1950 to the present day. This period encapsulates distinct fluctuations 
between economic prosperity and crisis, as well as political diversification. As 
such, the experience of shifting social environments allows for a delicate 
analysis of how economic fluctuations and political decisions are perceived by 
Trikalinoi and what enduring impact these changes sustain. Furthermore, 
through European integration and the liberalisation of national markets, global 
economic trends begin to seriously affect local investments of both time and 
capital. The consequences of these investments will here be explored. 
 
The periods of crisis outlined in chapters three and four are employed as 
historical and cultural reference points by the informants to understand 
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successive periods of social change. They highlight cultural patterns of dealing 
with crisis and how these entwine with global economic processes and political 
decision making. The scene for the historically informed cultural experience of 
crisis is thus set. 
 
Chapter five is concerned with theorising crisis. The theoretical context for 
discussing crisis in Trikala is outlined. As such the chapter presents theories of 
crisis formation and economic opportunism in times of social change. The 
Marxist perspective on economic crisis is examined and concepts of regional 
crisis formation are proposed. This chapter aims to give a firm theoretical 
context for discussing localised experiences of crisis by bringing the relevance 
of history into domains of contemporary life. 
 
In chapter six the importance of the public sphere(s) in understanding crisis in 
Trikala is addressed through analysing the changing appropriation of local 
realms of public representation. The public sphere is central to both the 
informants and the anthropologist in understanding shifting modes of 
representation. Notions such as collective suffering and escapism will be 
presented in relation to the changing faces of spheres of socialisation. This 
includes readdressing the infamous public/private dichotomy associated with 
Mediterranean ethnography. The public sphere as an arena for disseminating 
concepts of blame and accountability is also a theme of chapter six. This topic 
envelops publics from small group socialisation on the streets of Trikala to 
realms of international politics. In all cases the economic consequences of crisis 
on representation in public domains is the focus of theoretical and ethnographic 
scrutiny. 
 
Chapter seven explores further the localised conceptualisations of the current 
economic crisis. By applying Michel Serres as an as if informant, narratives of 
Trikalinoi are theorised in terms of cultural proximity. This is the idea that past 
periods of crisis can be evoked, even embodied, in order to explain 
contemporary social conditions. Trikalinoi refer to the Great Famine of 1941-
1943 as a period of embodied crisis that is present in contemporary time. Serres‟ 
theory of proximate time – that two historical moments can become 
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simultaneous – is paramount to the explanation of the ethnographic material. 
Furthermore, the reasons why the Great Famine should be evoked over other 
periods of crisis are central to this chapter, especially as the famine was not as 
harshly felt in Trikala as it was in other parts of Greece. Channels such as 
nationalism, the education system and the cultural significance of food are 
proposed as explanatory factors. The issues of time and social memory are 
explored in an attempt to understand the complex patterns of cognition 
associated with periods of crisis. 
 
Chapter eight focuses on perceptions of social status and mobility in Trikala. 
Accounts of status and mobility pre-crisis are presented as dependent on specific 
value judgements. The criteria for status and mobility vary through the cross-
section of society as diverse channels of capital investment allow for internal 
competitions. The increase in consumerism during times of prosperity is placed 
in its historical context as material consumption as a form of prestige is 
compared with generational status. This tension also encompasses notions of 
„traditional‟ modes of economics and „recent‟ passages of socio-economic 
investment. Although „tournaments of consumerism‟ are apparent to varying 
extents in all sections of society, the criteria by which status and mobility is 
evaluated is diverse. The sustainability of social status and mobility is also 
interrogated in light of the onset of economic crisis and austerity. This chapter 
once again highlights the significance of history and social change on local and 
global levels in the shaping of value judgements and strategic investments. 
Alternative investments in material artefacts – what are termed „positional 
goods‟ – and education accord to diverse notions of social status. Such diversity 
in investment implies diversity in the consequences of economic downturn. 
 
Through exploring historical periods of crisis and their relevance to 
contemporary social experience the following chapters weave together many 
theoretical paths. The culturally informed experience of national and global 
crises emphasises the intricate entwining of all levels of social experience. 
People interact within contexts of transnational and localised socio-economic 
relations. Periods of social change and upheaval inform subsequent experiences 
of crisis as cultural patterns are attached to wider economic trends. The 
 51 
consequences of culturally informed decisions in specific periods of economic 
prosperity and crisis continue to shape localised versions of regional, national 
































Chapter Two: Introduction and Research Methods 
 
Introduction: setting the research scene 
 
A Note on Trikala 
 
The majority of the material on which this thesis is based was collected during a 
period of twelve months of ethnographic fieldwork from November 2007 to 
November 2008 in the town of Trikala, Thessaly, in central Greece. My 
affiliation with the town dates back to 2004, since when I have paid 
approximately two visits per year in addition to my long-term field research. In 
2009, and with economic crisis palpably in the air, I returned to Trikala twice 
for a combined duration of seven weeks. In 2010 I spent a further five weeks in 
the field. These return visits proved central in assisting with the contemplation 
of much of the material collected during the original fieldwork period. 
 
The town of Trikala is situated in the west of the periphery of Thessaly
19
 in 
central mainland Greece. Trikala has a population of 51,862 (2001 census) and 
is located on a vast agricultural plain simply known as the „Plain of Thessaly‟. 
The plain is hemmed in by the Chasia and Kamvonia mountains to the north, the 
Olympus range to the northeast, the Pindos Mountains to the west and the Ossa 
and Pelion mountains to the south. The people of the plain experience very hot 
dry summers with temperatures regularly lingering at around 45°c and cold dry 
winters, when temperatures have been recorded as low as -25°c (although in my 
year of fieldwork the coldest it got was a mere -9°c). 
 
Thessaly was incorporated into the Greek state from the Ottoman Empire in 
1881 and now borders the peripheries of West and Central Macedonia to the 
north, Sterea Ellada to the south and Epirus to the west, with the Aegean Sea 
forming the eastern frontier. Despite consisting of the largest agricultural plain 
                                                 
19
 The population of Thessaly is 753,888 according to the 2001 national census. The 
administrative regions in Greece consist of 13 peripheries, dived into 54 prefectures (nomes). In 
Thessaly there are four prefectures – Trikala, Larisa, Magnesia and Karditsa – which are divided 
into 105 municipalities and communities. 
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in Greece, the geography of Thessaly is actually rather diverse; approximately 
36 per cent of the land is flat, 17 per cent is semi-mountainous and 45 per cent is 
mountainous. Due to the size of the agricultural plain, the periphery of Thessaly 
is often referred to as „the bread basket of Greece‟ due to its high production 
levels (Campbell and Sherrard 1968). For this reason the region has been 
deemed as “the major growth zone of the country” (Bennison 1977:6) due to its 
strategic position halfway between the political and economic powerhouse of 
Athens to the south and the industrial port city of Thessaloniki to the north. Due 
to technological advances in flood control and the enhancement of the regional 
transport infrastructure, this is a label that has stuck since the 1970s, although as 
yet without much fruition. Further recent developments, such as the construction 
of the new Trikala-Larisa motorway and the Ioannina-Kozani-Thessaloniki 
national road, promise to further link western Thessaly to the ports of 
Thessaloniki and Igoumenitsa and the crucial Balkan trade routes. Additionally, 
the planned expansion of the International Airport of Central Greece near Volos 
will make Trikala and western Thessaly more accessible to European 
investment, especially the currently low-key tourist industry. 
 
Trikala is one of four urban centres in Thessaly – the others being Larisa 
(126,076), Volos (82,439) and Karditsa (37,768) (2001 census) – and is the seat 
of one of the four prefectures that comprise Thessaly. The town is situated on 
the river Litheos, a tributary of the river Pineios, and lies approximately four 
hours drive (327km) northwest of Athens and three hours (249km) southwest of 
Thessaloniki. The settlement dates back to Classical times when it was known 
by the name Trikki. References to ancient Trikki can be found in many Classical 
texts, including the work of Homer. Remnants of an ancient sanctuary dedicated 
to the physician-god Asklepios are located near the centre of the modern town. 
This was once the site of a „healing centre‟ dedicated to Asklepios and is widely 










Map.1. The location of Thessaly periphery (light shading) and Trikala prefecture 










Map.3. Trikala prefecture. The research for this thesis is focused principally on 
the town of Trikala and the „golden triangle‟ between Trikala, Kalambaka and 
Pili. 
 
On a small hill overlooking the old town (known as Varousi) there is an ancient 
acropolis upon which stands a substantial Byzantine fortress that dominates the 
skyline. Other historic sites in the town include multiple Byzantine churches and 
the Ottoman Kursum Tzami, a sixteenth century mosque restored in the mid-
1990s with European Union funding and the only work of the great Ottoman 




                                                 
21
 Mimar Sinan (c. 1490-1578) oversaw the construction of the famous Sultan Ahmed Mosque 
(also known as the Blue Mosque) in Istanbul as he was chief architect on the Suleiman Mosque 
(also in Istanbul) and the Selimiye Mosque in Edrine. He was chief Ottoman architect for 
Sultans Suleiman I, Selim II, and Murad III. 
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Picture.1. Greek Orthodox Church of Agios Konstantinos with the Ottoman 
Kursum Tzami in the background 
 
The critical events in the history of Trikala since annexation from the Ottoman 
Empire are extensively covered in chapters three and four and facilitate the 
central arguments of this thesis. These events are discussed primarily in terms of 
social and economic impact on the local inhabitants, but also touch on issues of 
national and international importance. Therefore, for the present only a very 
brief outline of the history of the town will be presented. 
 
The first signs of life in the vicinity of Trikala date back to numerous Neolithic 
settlements believed to be from around 6,000 BCE. The ancient city of Trikki 
was founded around 3,000 BCE and was purportedly named after the nymph of 
the same name. The city was of high importance in antiquity and became the 
capital of the State of Estaiotidas
22
 before falling to the Persians in 480 BCE. In 
352 BCE Philip of Macedon united Thessaly with the Kingdom of Macedonia. 
After a brief Roman occupation at the turn of the Millennium, Trikala 




experienced the rule of numerous prospectors, including the Goths, Huns, Slavs, 
Bulgars, Normans, Catalans and Byzantines, before finally being incorporated 
into the Ottoman Empire in 1393 (Katsogiannos 1992:9). In 1779 the town was 
recorded as being home to 12,000 people consisting „of more Turks than 
Greeks‟, although the Greeks governed the city with their own money and had 
the power to appoint and dismiss Turkish administrators as they pleased 
(Katsogiannos 1992:22). 
 
During Ottoman rule Thessaly was divided into vast ciftliks (great estates) 
which were worked by colligi (villager tenants). Ciftliks were originally granted 
to Muslim settlers to Turkish lands and were to eventually become a system of 
great estates that enswathed the Plain of Thessaly (Mouzelis 1978, Aroni-Tsichli 
2005:26). After annexation in 1881 the ciftliks were bought by new Greek 
investors, changing local social relations for decades, until the eventual 
implementation of the agrarian reforms from 1917 (Karavidas 1931, Sanders 
1962, Mazower 1991). Relations with the land were further changed to 
accommodate the settlement of refugees from Asia Minor after the 1923 Treaty 
of Lausanne and the economic crisis of the late 1920s (Pentzopoulos 1962, 
Mazower 1991). 
 
Western Thessaly was the scene of much fighting during the Second World 
War, with Greek, British and Commonwealth troops attempting to hold off 
German advances through the Kalampaka pass. The region was also affected by 
the Great Famine of 1941-1943 (Hionidou 2006) and the civil war (Close 1993, 
1995) that also denotes the decade. During the civil war Trikala was the centre 
for the communist organisations EAM/ELAS and the surrounding area 
experienced considerable clashes between communist and nationalist groups. 
This period is also significant for the number of people that relocated from 
Greek Macedonia to the town, partially in order to escape the increased threats 
of violence from both sides, which included regular kidnappings. 
 
Since the military junta of 1967-1974, Trikala and the surrounding plain has 
been the focus of much attention regarding grain production for exportation. The 
national government had for a long time felt that Thessaly was not efficient in 
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fulfilling its potential as „the bread basket of Greece‟, both in terms of providing 
national self-sufficiency and surplus for transnational export. With the help of 
the European Union after accession in 1981, the regional focus has been on the 
increased production of cash crops and intensive farming strategies. 
 
Trikala: getting around 
 
In terms of urbanity Trikala is difficult to classify. Although a large town by 
Greek standards in terms of population (51,862), the urban area is very compact 
and surrounded by an array of agricultural villages. Most villages within the 
immediate vicinity consist of populations of between 100 and 800 residents
23
. 
Trikala acts as a commercial hub; as the location for weekly markets, transport 
links, national and multinational chain stores, banks, and other commercial 
amenities. However, the town cannot be classified as urban in the same way as 
Athens, Thessaloniki or even Larisa. The interaction between town and villages 
is intense and one could not prosper without the other. Trikala is detached from 
other urban centres – it only has two direct trains a day to Thessaloniki, over 
three hours away and the same number to Athens, some five hours away. Thus 
Trikala is a distinctly rural urban centre – or an urban centre with a distinctly 
rural flair
24
. As it happens, the situational context of this research was to reflect 
this rural-urban ambiguity as I resided in the village of Livadi, 4 kilometres 
from the centre of Trikala, with a family who embraced and exemplified the 
rural-urban relationship. 
 
The town of Trikala consists of the central commercial street, Asklipiou, lined 
with cafeterias-come-bars and high-rent commercial outlets, and a series of 
adjacent roads and pedestrianised areas. Asklipiou is also the location for many 
of the most highly respected medical practices in the town, situated high up on 
the fourth and fifth floors of apartment blocks at the southern end of the main 
pedestrianised area. Asklipiou is considered as the heart of the town, although 
                                                 
23
 See Bennison (1977) for an analytic break-down of village populations and services provided 
in Nomos Trikalon. 
24
 See Just (2000:20-24) for a discussion of rural and urban contexts for anthropological research 
in Greece and Vermeulen (1983) for urban anthropology in Greece.  
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the „central square‟ is located a five minute walk away past the statue of 
Stefanos Sarafis and over a bridge to the other side of the river. 
 
In terms of transport amenities Trikala is home to a non-mainline train station 
which continues north as far as Kalampaka, and an inter-city bus station (KTEL) 
with multiple daily services to other urban centres across mainland Greece. The 
three main roads connect Trikala with Larisa to the east, Karditsa to the south 
and Kalampaka (and then on to Ioannina or Grevena) to the north-west. The 
town is home to a general hospital with what is collectively acknowledged to be 
the worst reputation in the Balkans (an issue confirmed by doctors employed 
within), a 15,000 capacity sports stadium, three major hotels and branches of all 
major national but no foreign banks. There are two multinational supermarket 
chains situated in the town, one situated in the centre and one that has two stores 
on the periphery. Other commercial amenities of interest include travel agents 
offering package deals to such exotic destinations as Java and Barbados, five 
internet cafes, and the store that has colonised every Greek provincial town – 
Marks and Spencer. 
 
The central streets are a blend of national and local fast food outlets, national 
and multinational chain stores such as Zara, Alexi Andriotti, Benetton, Sephora 
and Hondos Center, and innumerable cafeteria-come-bars. The capillary streets, 
although only a few minutes walk from Asklipiou, are more a combination of 
small privately owned businesses such as hairdressers, travel agencies, and book 
shops. Above these outlets there are often approximately five stories of two or 
three bedroom residential accommodation with balconies overlooking the 
rooftops of the town centre and views away towards Kalampaka or Pyli. 
 
Off the central square two opposing avenues are the scenes of alternative social 
and economic activities. To the north-west there is the old town with its 
assortment of intimate restaurants with typically Greek menus and small 
privately owned speciality shops such as a picture framers and professional 
photographers. To the south-east the streets widen to open onto what every 
Monday morning becomes the local market, catering for all needs of diet and 
 60 
apparel. Many people take the early bus ride in from the surrounding villages to 




On the outskirts of the town, but still only a ten minute walk away from the 
centre, are the residential neighbourhoods. The odd lonesome Ottoman relic 
with its distinctive rusty coloured stone walls and ramshackle tiled roof is 
sandwiched between concrete new builds dating from between the 1950s-1990s, 
painted white. The houses often have little uniformity and thus the internal 
dimensions vary greatly. Often the houses have been divided into apartments as 
parents have given them to their children as part of the dowry or in inheritance. 
Many were self-built by internal migrants after the civil war, whilst others are 
more recent, having been constructed as a result of the investment of capital 
gained through the economically prosperous years of the 1990s. Such an 
irregularity in style creates a unique atmosphere with each building bringing its 
own distinct character to the neighbourhood, each with a story to tell. It also 
means that the discovery of Ottoman buildings is all the more exciting as they 
appear unexpectedly from behind an array of 1960s concrete miscellanies. 
 
Spaces of Socialisation 
 
The main space for socialisation in Trikala is the 700 metre long central 
commercial street of Asklipiou (Hellander 2006). Built in the 1890s and 
partially pedestrianised in 1932
26
, Asklipiou is nowadays lined with numerous 
coffeeshops-come-bars and high-end national and transnational fashion outlets. 
The street has been established since the beginning of the twentieth century as 
the par-excellence place of the „volta‟ (a leisurely stroll with the point being to 
see and to be seen). After the Second World War the volta on Asklipiou became 
a custom that exists until the present day. The gradual increase in economic 
prosperity, the augmentation of the population and the female emancipation 
turned Asklipiou into the central place for bride-picking (nifopazero). Up until 
the 1970s even the Sunday best clothes were tailored for the dual purpose of 
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church and the volta on Asklipiou, as were the female high heels and the male 
black suits. Asklipiou was not only the place of the volta for the Trikalinoi, but 
also for people from the surrounding villages. Therefore there co-existed 
multiple versions of traditional costumes on display in the street, including the 
sigouna, the costume of the local Karagounides that consisted of woven black 
and white wool waistcoats decorated with cord, gold thread and beads worn over 
a heavily embroidered wool or silk shirt and a long skirt (anagennisis 7
th
 of 
September 1948 in Katsogiannos 2000:214). A lot of women had the courage to 
stroll continuously for two to three hours until they had blisters on their feet 
(ibid.:215). 
 
Since the post-war period Asklipiou has been home to the most elegant 
entertainment establishments. Nowadays the street consists of many cafeterias, 
bars and shops catering for the top-end of the Greek high street, as well as three 
of Trikala‟s finest hotels and expensive apartment blocks housing a range of 
doctors, dentists and lawyers. The immediate area on and around Asklipiou 
continues to be the centre for voltes (plural of volta) and is the place to see and 
be seen. People come from both the town and the surrounding villages adorned 
in the latest fashions, sporting the must-have sunglasses, designer jackets and 
handbags. Teenage youths and middle-aged professionals alike are on display in 
high heels, short skirts or with leather jackets and flashy watches. It is the 
favourite space for people of all ages to sit back, frappé in hand, and look the 
part. Asklipiou still operates as the centre for young men and women to watch 
each other, meet up and socialise; and due to the dual purpose of the numerous 
cafeterias-come-bars, this is now a twenty-four hour a day practice. It is 
impossible to walk the length of the street at any hour without physically feeling 
the eyes peering at you across the empty beer bottles and coffee cups. There is 
an outwardly obvious status competition and a tournament of consumerism 
taking place and thus the street has become a metaphorical measure for many 
social and economic features, including the current state of economic crisis or 
prosperity. As will become apparent throughout this thesis, the public 
representation of crisis and prosperity is inherently linked to the observable 
changes on Asklipiou both in terms of general consumer and individual activity. 
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It is also the ideal place for people to gossip and to exchange information and 
narratives of the past. 
 
Interestingly, Asklipiou has also become a metaphorical gauge for local 
stereotypes relating to „types‟ of people. The street can be employed negatively 
in daily discourse to denote a person that has nothing better to do than sit around 
drinking coffee all day attempting to appear „cool‟ by exhibiting themselves. 
This is especially true when applied to the villagers that visit Trikala with the 
sole intention of sitting at a cafeteria on Asklipiou. During my time in Trikala 
the occasions were numerous when a conversation would involve the derogatory 
phrases “they don‟t want to find a job, they would rather sit on Asklipiou …”, 
“the students finish university and spend their parents‟ money in the cafeterias 
of Asklipiou. They are sat there in the morning and return during the night …”, 
“they are the type of people that incorporate visiting their father in hospital with 
a trip to Asklipiou to drink their kafedaki …”, “He spent his money on designer 
clothes to go and chat up the girls on Asklipiou, now he is broke …”, “I am sure 





Picture.2. Setting up for another day‟s trade: early morning on Asklipiou 
 
 
Picture.3. Monday market in central Trikala 
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Other social spaces in the town are worth noting for their diverse demographic 
appeal and atmospheric flavour. The central square (Kentriki Plateia) Riga 
Fereou situated close to the Monday open-air market and surrounded by banks 
and national chain stores, is the location for the early morning gathering of 
elderly local men. Sheltered from the sun by a canopy of dense trees, the 
shallow pond and two small cafeterias provide the ideal location for elderly men 
to gather on a daily basis from about 7.30am until just before midday. In the 
evening the severe lack of nightlife around the plateia means that it is little more 
than a taxi rank and a pass-through route to Asklipiou and Plateia OTE. Plateia 
OTE on the outskirts of the old town and a mere ten minute walk from 
Asklipiou is popular with families and young people alike. The popularity of 
this specific social space has increased of late as people attempt to find an 
alternative to the high prices of Asklipiou in a time of economic austerity. 
Despite the „special offers‟ now found on and around Asklipiou, Plateia OTE 
and the narrow winding streets of the old town with their range of tavernas and 
intimate bars has become a favoured financial (although not exactly „budget‟) 
alternative for those not so obsessed with the volta. On the outskirts of the town, 
the tavernas of Lofos (literally, hill), offer panoramic views over the otherwise 
extremely flat city and cater for a more refined cliental. Lofos is often the first 
port of call for people who want to dine in a smart restaurant before heading out 
to sample the nightlife of the town centre. 
 
In addition to the central plateies, each neighbourhood has its own local square. 
These squares are the hub of local socialisation where men, women and children 
gather throughout the day to play, discuss politics, the economic situation, 
football, and gossip about members of the family and mutual friends. The 
surrounding villages, such as Livadi where I resided during my fieldwork, 
almost unanimously consist of a central square with adjacent children‟s 






A Note on Livadi 
 
The village of Livadi was where I set up home for the twelve-month duration of 
my fieldwork and subsequent visits. Livadi is situated four kilometres northwest 
of Trikala towards Kalampaka. From the outskirts of the village and from the 
balconies of the houses the views stretch as far as the monasteries of Meteora 
and the peaks of the Pindos mountains, which are capped with snow for six 
months of the year. The village has a population of approximately 800 souls and 
has almost become a suburb of Trikala due to recent developments along the 
main transport routes out of the town. Livadi consists of a church, cemetery, 
primary school, children‟s playground, five coffee shops, a small „supermarket‟, 
KAPI (literally, Open Centre for Protecting the Elderly) that doubles up as the 
post office and, as of 2010, a pharmacy and a fast food outlet. The village square 
contains a concrete fountain at its heart which is filled with water and turned on 
for special occasions. The square is dotted with wooden benches and is at the 
heart of the public sphere in Livadi. 
 
Off the square is the small supermarket, catering for everyday dietary and 
household needs, including a delicatessen and butchers. Outside the store are 
situated two large refrigerators of chilled drinks, a freezer full of ice creams, and 
a selection of children‟s toys including footballs and small dolls. Next to the 
supermarket is a small cafeteria and the KAPI where the elderly men of the 
village congregate every morning around 8am and drink the first of many 
coffees as they patronise up to three of the five cafeterias each day (cf. Just 
2000:174-177). They also collect the family mail from Vaso, the owner, on the 
days the postman comes. Just off the main square lies another slightly larger 
cafeteria which is home to the only giant television screen in the village. As 
such, as well as catering for the morning coffees, this space gets more congested 
on evenings when Greek Super League or international football, as well as 
basketball, is screened live. On these occasions – sometimes as many as five 
nights a week (or more during World Cup or European Championship years) – 
the television is audible as far away as the cemetery on the other extreme of the 
village periphery. This cafeteria has recently branched out as a small take-away 
offering souvlakia and giro and a selection of alcoholic beverages. From 2010 a 
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small pharmacy has opened adjacent to this cafeteria and orders prescriptions 
and over-the-counter medication from Trikala on a daily basis. On the road 
towards Trikala are situated the other two coffee shops, one next to a small 
murky stream and the other – the biggest of the five – located within a small 
wooded area. The latter is most commonly used to host local gatherings on 
occasions of weddings and funerals. 
 
The primary school, usually catering for between ten and twenty children, and 
small Orthodox church back on to the village square and are opposite a 
children‟s playground which doubles up as a football pitch for teenage boys on 
summer evenings (as the village football pitch is a ten minute walk from the 
central square). The playground is serviced by the village fresh water spring 
which is next to the bus stop which the Trikala-Livadi bus frequents eight to ten 
times a day. Of a summer evening Livadi is buzzing with a thick balmy 
atmosphere. As it is on a vast, flat, treeless inland plain, hemmed in by high 
mountains on three sides there is rarely a breeze during the summer months 
when night-time temperatures regularly remain above 25-30°c. The humidity is 
increased by the amount of irrigation sprinklers activated in the surrounding 
fields. During the winter months Livadi appears barren and uninviting. The air is 
crisp and the village regularly remains covered in a blanket of snow for weeks at 
a time. 
 
The village has been the site for much new development over the past ten years 
as people living in the often cramped apartments of central Trikala have bought 
plots of land from the local government in order to build spacious new family 
homes. The expansion of the village has been intensified by people relocating 
from the mountainous Pindos area of western Thessaly towards urban centres in 
search of work. Hence the population of working age in Livadi is now a mix of 
commuters and the more traditional agriculturalists that work the land around 
the village. Additionally, the recent influx of gypsies (tsiggani) has meant that 
semi-legal, semi-permanent settlements have been set up on the outskirts of the 
village, much to the dissatisfaction of the resident villagers. These structures are 
located on one side of a central road and are made of corrugated iron, crude 
concrete blocks and pieces of coloured material. However, opposite these 
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makeshift dwellings the very same people are building plush extravagant villas 
erected due to the pooling of collective finances. Slowly each extended family is 
moving across the road into the newly built houses. 
 
The movement of people between village and town in Trikala nomos 
(prefecture) is substantial. This is exaggerated in Livadi due to its proximity to 
Trikala and the amount of people that are employed in the town. Each village 
has at least a small supermarket and a coffee shop, and most have some sort of 
business that doubles up as a post office. In the majority of the surrounding 
villages there is a proportion of daily commuters but most of the trips to Trikala 
are more occasional in order to take care of „jobs‟ (douleies) such as visiting the 
bank, attending the weekly market, going to the doctor and dentist or purchasing 
domestic appliances. Visiting friends, family and going for voltes in the central 
streets are also reasons for occasional visits to the town. 
 
Livelihoods in Trikala 
 
Employment and livelihood strategies in nomos Trikalon are a combination of 
intensive and subsistence agriculture, employment in the public sector and small 
private businesses. Over the past century Trikala has been associated with 
agriculture and a strongly connected tertiary sector
27
 (Bennison 1977:viii). Until 
the post-war period much of the local economy was based on subsistence 
agriculture
28
. From the 1960s to the 1970s this practice began to be slowly 
phased out as the government encouraged the cultivation of commercial crops in 
an attempt to make Greece self-sufficient rather than depending on excessive 
imports that were prone to price fluctuations (Bennison 1977). However, since 
the incorporation of Greece into the European Community (1981) and the 
liberalisation of the national markets in the 1980s, there has been a delicate 
                                                 
27
 Here I define tertiary as the businesses and institutions relating to commercial activity, 
banking services, medical and hospital services, administration and transport (Bennison 
1977:184). 
28
 For a discussion on the agricultural economy of Trikala in the early nineteenth century see 
Leake (1835). For a more contemporary account of agricultural economy and the consequences 
for tertiary development in the 1970s see Bennison (1977). Concerning the agrarian reform in 
Greece and specifically its effects on Thessaly, see Karavidas (1931) and Sanders (1962). For an 
overview of Greek agriculture in relation to capitalism and modernity see Mouzelis (1978). 
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balance between political and economic incentives for intensive agriculture on 
the one hand and increased foreign competition driving down prices on the 
other. The viability of the agricultural livelihood is constantly fluctuating, with 
some people having to take second jobs to supplement their income. A solution 
to the problem of profitable agricultural exports and the associated issue of the 
organisation of labour and production costs has been sought ever since the 
subsistence livelihood started to give way to commercial crops in the 1960s and 
1970s (Campbell and Sherrard 1968:328). This has led to a local saying that was 
repeated to me on many occasions; “There is no money in the villages because 
the fields do not bring money”. 
 
According to many of my informants, the preferred jobs in Trikala in terms of 
money, stability and desirability are in the various chain supermarkets and 
shops. These are a mixture of Greek and foreign companies that pay a flat rate 
on a monthly basis. Acquiring jobs at these supermarkets is not straightforward 
as people must be patronised by someone already working in the store (see 
chapter eight). The most distinguished and prestigious occupations are as 
doctors, dentists and university professors. In terms of the majority of 
employment in the town, many people work in smaller shops in the town centre. 
This includes those living in the immediate peripheral villages who commute on 
a daily basis, but not those residing more than ten kilometres out of the town 
that tend to be employed either in agriculture or in small private businesses. 
Another source of a good income and a respectable job is that of a teacher, for 
which one requires a university degree. As most teachers are employed in state 
schools, the wage in stable, the pension good, the medical insurance is covered 
and the job is secure (or so it was thought in 2007/2008). Teachers in private 
schools often have a higher degree or have studied abroad and hence earn a 
higher wage, but without the pension and medical perks. There is an abundance 
of private language schools in Trikala and numerous night schools that offer 
education to mature students. The long held idea that working for the state is the 
most secure form of employment has recently been challenged by the wide 
sweeping redundancies made as part of the economic austerity measures. 
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The companies OTE (telecommunications), Trikki, Tyras and Fage (all 
producers of dairy products) are four national companies and major employers 
in nomos Trikalon. Due to the latter three, Thessaly has become self-sufficient 
in milk and cheese and the companies possess a wide distribution network 
across Greece. However, there are no large agricultural factories apart from 
storage centres. This shortage of factories is something that local people blame 
for the perceived high unemployment and lack of “opportunities” for young 
people that return from university. Additionally, OTE is considered as one of the 
best and most prestigious employers in Trikala due to the terms offered to 
employees. Some companies have recently been found to be employing as many 
as 300 people for just 100 legitimate posts. This meant that many employees 
spent their time „at work‟ by sitting at empty desks, „popping out‟ to do the 
shopping, or drinking coffee and socialising. With recent economic austerity 
measures, many of these jobs have now been cut. 
 
Since the late 1990s the European Union (EU) has been issuing grants for 
people in Greece to start their own business. The scheme proved popular in 
Trikala and many people set up hairdressing salons, travel agents, garages, 
photo shops or book stores, to name but a few. The majority of these businesses 
are located close to the town centre. One lady, Stella, set up a tourist office with 
an EU grant of 6,000 euros a year paid in two instalments per year for the course 
of three years (amounting to 18,000 euros in total). The funding, coupled with 
her father‟s money, just about covered the purchase and furnishing of the shop, 
the establishment of business contacts and the initial advertising. Two years on 
Stella is still feeling the strain of the initial „setting-up‟ period of the business, 
although she has now established a regular client base. Another benefactor from 
the grant is Aris, who has set up a garage along one of the main roads into 
Trikala. He says that a lot of the money goes on advertising as establishing a 
regular clientele beyond family and friends is one of the most difficult tasks. He 
has tried some advertisements on the local radio and has created some catchy 
slogans. Aris says that he tries to appeal to the materialistic nature of many 
young Trikalini men who believe that they can modify their car in order to 
attract young women. However, the problem is that “people in Trikala tend to 
go for the cheapest product, not the best quality”. This is a problem echoed by 
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many who have set up businesses with the EU grant – establishing the client 
base is difficult but friends always inform friends, appealing to people that do 
not appreciate the „quality‟ of workmanship was more complicated. Maro, a 
hairdresser and another benefactor of the grant, gets around this problem by 
advertising „English-style‟ haircuts: „the fashion of London‟. “The Trikalini 
women cannot resist … they have something to tell their friends, who get jealous 
and come to me for the same”. This is a strategy that also works well for Stella 
as “people compete for the most exotic holiday, so these are the ones I 
concentrate on advertising”. 
 
The main problem with the grant is that after three years the business has to 
support itself. Family members are usually required to contribute financially in 
order to bridge the gap. Due to the nature of the small private businesses, often 
employing at the most three people, income fluctuates depending on the time of 
year and economic conditions. Some people, such as Maro, do separate evening 
jobs or attend night classes in order to train as teachers or to improve their 
English so as to increase their employment prospective. Some times of year 
there is hardly any income for the hairdressers, whilst at Christmas, Easter and 
before the summer holidays, the diary is fully booked. Aris finds that his garage 
is quite the opposite; at Christmas, Easter and during the summer people are 
saving their money for things other than their car. Other problems for the self-
employed businessman/woman include the fact that employees rarely have 
contracts so can quit without notice, and there is not the security of state 
pensions or insurance. Furthermore, many feel that „the good life‟ is impeded as 
there are no set holiday times and stress is constant. Employees in the public 
sector refute this argument and state that „at least you are your own boss. You 
can close when you want, do what you want and do not have the stress of a 








Cultural Identification in Trikala 
 
Trikala is home to numerous cultural groups that originate from central and 
northern Greece, as well as from further afield. All groups are subject to cultural 
stereotypes employed by other factions, but there is much social interaction 
between the groups. In the mid-twentieth century Trikala was the focus of much 
permanent rural to urban geographical mobility
29
. The source of much of this 
population movement was the villages of Greek Macedonia on the fringes of the 
northern border of Thessaly. For example, some villages in nomos Grevenon in 
the Pindos Mountains, experienced an almost total migration to the three closest 
urban centres – Thessaloniki, Kozani and Trikala. The inhabitants, many of 
which were employed in the prominent construction industry of the 
mountainous region, sought employment elsewhere after the upheaval of the 
Second World War and the subsequent civil war (1946-1949) that was harshly 
experienced in the northern regions of Greece. The factors for what could be 
classified as an internal migration were primarily social and economic and 
related to escaping persecution, finding employment opportunities, education 
and social mobility. In Trikala, these people were accommodated on the 
periphery of the town in make-shift houses and effectively found a way into the 
labour market. Eventually the people acquired land in other neighbourhoods by 
pooling their capital and built houses on adjacent plots according to the criteria 
of village identification (this is explored fully in the chapter three). 
 
Nowadays, the majority of families retain at least one dwelling and often an 
amount of land back in the village of origin and this is transmitted to the 
successive generations in the form of dowry and inheritance. For the most part, 
extensive exogamy has resulted in the loosening of the links with the place of 
origin. Today the second and third generation descendants of the migrant 
families maintain more or less meaningful connections with their Macedonian 
                                                 
29
 Rural to urban mobility (here I deliberately refrain from using the term migration) was 
homogeneously felt in most Mediterranean and Balkan regions after the Second World War and 
was influenced by many social and economic factors. Between 1956 and 1960, some 250,000 
people participated in internal rural to urban migration in Greece. Additionally many 
temporarily emigrated abroad, most notably to West Germany (Campbell and Sherrard 
1968:328, see Friedl 1976, Davis 1977, Hirschon 1989, Argyrou 1996 for discussion of 
migration in the context of Greece). 
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villages according to how often they frequent their houses during national 
holidays and summer vacations. It is still usual for second generation
30
 residents 
who were born and raised in Trikala, to identify themselves as „Macedonian‟ 
and when asked, state, “I am from the village of Kalimera, Grevenon” for 
example. The third generation descendants of the population movement now 
maintain various affiliations with the villages of their Grandparents, depending 
on ethnic/cultural identification, property ownership, how many elderly relatives 
continue to reside in the village and how often they themselves continue to visit 
the place. 
 
Due to the aforementioned internal population movements, coupled with the 
compulsory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey after the 
Treaty of Lausanne in 1923
31
, Trikala is now home to a variety of cultural 
groups, all of which distinguish themselves according to cultural traits. The 
descendants of the civil war migrants from Greek Macedonia are mainly, 
although not exclusively, of Vlach or Sarakatsani background. The Vlachs, often 
stereotyped as the people of the highlands, have their own language and set of 
culture values. Many of my informants argue that Vlachs are not as „Hellenised‟ 
as other cultural groups and therefore always patronise their own people before 
giving consideration to anyone else. Often the term „Vlach‟ is used in discourse 
in order to denote the „second class citizen‟, the uneducated, and the vulgar. The 
category „Vlach‟, Cowan argues, has different valences depending on context. 
Hence a person living on the Greek side of the Macedonian border inhabits the 
category rather differently to another in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) (2000:12). 
 
Another group, the Karagounides, evoke a stereotype of “the people of the 
plain”. This is in direct contrast to the stereotype associated with the Vlachs. 
Karagounides postulate themselves as „the real Greeks‟. They consider 
themselves to be the true „locals‟ (dopioi), which in this case is better translated 
as „people of this place‟ (Agelopoulos 1997:11, Cowan 1997:153, Kirtsoglou 
                                                 
30
 Here I follow Lisón-Tolosana‟s (1966) definition of „generations‟. 
31
 This was the peace treaty drawn up concerning the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire (cf. 
Pentzopoulos 1962, Hirschon 1989 for how the treaty affected population exchange). 
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and Sistani 2003:192) that have been in the area since Classical times. Others 
perceive them as having „thick heads‟ and being very stubborn. The Sarakatsani, 
most famously the subjects of Campbell‟s 1964 ethnography „Honour, Family 
and Patronage‟, are stereotyped as a nomadic people of the Epirus region. They 
are associated with being Vlach due to their traditional employment as 
pastoralists. However, on meeting a Sarakatsan, this equation will be refuted 
with a phrase such as “you found the Vlach, now make his tomb” (traditional 
proverb). Other cultural groups in Trikala include Arvanites, Tsigganoi 
(gypsies), Jews, and descendants from the resettled refugees of the 1923 
population exchange with Turkey – mainly of Cappadocian and Pontian 
backgrounds. Pontian people, for example, are the focus of stereotypes 
concerning stupidity. Indeed, the word „Pontian‟ is used on a daily basis to 
describe someone who has no sense. Additionally, their folk tales and traditional 
dances can become the subject of exaggerated imitations by non-Pontians. 
 
Negative stereotypes about the Other are circulated on a daily basis in Trikala. 
Innumerable are the times when I have heard statements of the type; “the Vlachs 
are cunning and successful entrepreneurs”; “the Karagounides are stupid and 
idle”; “the Pontians are completely thick”. Such assertions are reinforced by 
proverbs and folk tales where traits such as intelligence and cunning are 
exaggerated. Indeed, within folk songs, in short stories and in everyday 
discourse, the Other is always present, stereotyped, but always within. 
 
Often in the field I have heard it claimed that Vlachs and Pontians are not 
Greek. To claim that a Karagouni‟s ancestors had Vlach blood is met with 
denial and distain as they are sometimes thought of as of Slavic origins. “For we 
are Karagounides. The real Greeks, of real Greece. As old as time. Greeks 
won‟t lower themselves to the level of work of an Albanian, or even a Vlach”. 
After the influx of the Albanian economic emigrants during the 1980s the 
stereotype repertoire has been widened in order to include them. This has been 
reflected in a shift in economic practice among my Karagounides informants 
who no longer go to work in the Peloponnese during the winter months, despite 
the fact that it is now very much easier to do so, because the work in the fields is 
„below‟ them and only suitable for „Albanians‟. Furthermore, when looking for 
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work in Trikala to support their fluctuating agricultural income, many 
automatically dismiss certain jobs due to their stereotyped association to another 
„lower‟ group of people. Such comparisons allow each group to classify and feel 
secure with their own expectations (Theodossopoulos 2003:179). 
 
All of the above are stereotypes authored by people who reside in close 
proximity with each other. Yet in the face of nationalised debates such as „the 
Macedonian Question‟32 these people are united, their stereotypes of each other 
set aside for the defence of a grander stereotyped ideology and they may easily 
dismiss the fact that they refer to an area inhabited by the same groups of people 
whom they have culturally, cognitively and economically stereotyped. This form 
of sub-national stereotype allows the conceptualisation of Greece as at once 
being a homogeneous entity whilst still being comprised of a number of 
meaningful parts. Hence, whilst in the field, “the boundaries of neither cultures 
nor traditions can be taken either analytically or methodologically for granted” 




As mentioned above, my affiliation to the field dates back to 2004 when, as a 
first-year undergraduate student in anthropology, I visited the family of a friend 
who reside in a village 4 kilometres from Trikala. I had travelled to Greece for 
family holidays since 1989 when a trip to Crete formed one of my earliest 
childhood memories; what, over time, has become a memory of a memory. 
Subsequent holidays to various Islands and a first venture onto the mainland in 
2001 reinforced the place that Greece, and Greeks, had captured in both my 
heart and mind. I have so far explained the theoretical and ethnographic reasons 
why I decided to conduct fieldwork in Trikala, I shall now present a more 
personal account of why this specific site was selected. 
                                                 
32
 In Greece when one refers to Macedonia (Makedonia) this is always with reference to the 
geographical region of Greek Macedonia and not FYROM (known as Skopia in Greece). The 
dispute of the name is not a particularly recent phenomenon. Similarly to myself, Sutton notes 
that this issue was “dominating the political scene, the Greek media and the discussions of 
ordinary people” during the period of his fieldwork in 1992 and 1993 (1998:175). Following 
Sutton, I believe that the use of the name Skopia in reference to FYROM is a deliberate 
rhetorical ploy to reduce the country to its capital city (Sutton 1998:177). 
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My first day at university in Lampeter in 2003 sealed what, in hindsight, was a 
foregone conclusion. Finding myself to be the only Englishman in a hall of forty 
Greeks and the simultaneous discovery that my foremost anthropology lecturer 
was also Greek, my future was sealed. The three years at Lampeter saw me 
create a circle of companions of Greek origin and this provided an invaluable 
primer in the Greek language – despite the fact that most things I was taught to 
say were completely irrelevant for what was required for an everyday 
conversation. These relationships, two in particular, introduced me to the region 
of Thessaly. The visit in 2004 was my first to Trikala and would be followed up 
by trips in 2005, 2006 and a preliminary fieldwork visit for four weeks in April 
2007 before entering my doctoral fieldwork period in November 2007. My 
fieldwork started in a time of economic prosperity in Trikala. No one could have 
begun to predict the air of economic uncertainty that was proliferating on the 
global stage one year later. The full impact of the severe economic reality did 
not hit Greece until the following year, 2009, however in the latter months of 
my original fieldwork year significant doubt had started to surface in Trikala as 
to the effects of the global crisis on the local level. The unchecked years of 
prosperity were beginning to be questioned in relation to previous experiences 
of economic downturn, such as the stock market crash of the late 1990s when a 
global downturn led to full-scale crisis in Greece. With major economies going 
into recession, how would this affect Trikalinoi? 
 
In the final three months of my official fieldwork year my line of questioning 
started to change towards peoples experiences of crisis and economic hardship. 
What they expected, what they had experienced in the past, their fears and 
assumptions relating to government handling of national budgets and the 
perspectives of individual investors and consumers in Trikala. What resulted 
was an interrogation of the sustainability of prosperity in the age of capitalism. 
This dove-tailed with my initial research questions and the main themes that had 
come from my fieldwork so far – issues concerning social status, social 
mobility, small and medium enterprises and the relationship between patron-
clientelism and capitalist systems of social relations. I found that by adopting 
this stance and the rather fortunate early recognition that something big was 
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about to happen, helped connect the global, national and local perspectives of 
socio-economic experience as well as link the past – „history‟, crudely put – 
with the present. In hindsight I feel very lucky to have conducted research that 
has straddled such a significant time of social change, the fissure between socio-
economic prosperity and crisis closing rapidly over the past few years and 
culminating in a series of historical events of considerable magnitude. 
 
With the situation in Greece developing quickly on my return to England in 
November 2008 I continued to follow developments closely through online 
newspapers and frequent telephone conversations with friends in Trikala. In 
2009 I managed to return to Trikala twice, once in July for a period of four 
weeks and once just before Christmas for a period of three weeks. The following 
year I visited in April for three weeks and August for two weeks. Each visit has 
been with the dual purpose of seeing friends and family whilst primarily 
collecting information and assessing the situation on the ground. These follow-
up trips have been priceless in helping make sense of much of the data gathered 
in the latter months of my fieldwork year. The relations and relationships that 
were created in the field have allowed for immediate access to pools of 
information during follow-up visits foregoing the usual formalities one may 
encounter when meeting an informant for the first time. 
 
I believe that „the elongated field‟ is a very positive aspect of conducting 
fieldwork generally, and particularly for the case in hand. If one were to cut-off 
the field after a preordained period of time, despite fascinating new 
developments, solely due to university, funding or personally imposed 
restrictions, highly significant aspects of social reality would be purposefully 
ignored, even deleted, in the ethnographic record. The binding of the fieldwork 
experience in specific spatio-temporal frames is sometimes necessary as 
otherwise no piece of work would ever come to a conclusion. However, in this 
case, a number of factors combine to justify the continuation of „fieldwork‟ 
beyond the original spatio-temporal boundary. For one, Trikala has remained 
highly accessible to me. In many ways the field is physically „in the house‟ on a 
daily basis and is further accessed through the telephone and emails. Secondary 
sources are also readily available. Yet the main argument concerning 
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accessibility is the ease at which one can return to the place itself, to slot back in 
to social circles, to live in the same house with the same family as if they are 
your own and observe first hand the shifting social dynamics. 
 
Methods of Data Collection 
 
My primary technique of data collection was through participant observation. 
For a period of one year and subsequent visits amounting to another four 
months, I lived in the village of Livadi, near Trikala, Greece. During this time I 
accompanied my informants as they went about their daily lives, working, 
shopping, socialising, preparing weddings and burying their dead. Much of the 
data on which this thesis is based comes from informal conversations and 
discussions with inhabitants of Trikala, Livadi and other villages of nomos 
Trikalon. Informal discussions took place both on the individual level and 
among groups of friends and relatives (Ellen 1984, Silverman 1993). Many of 
these people became my friends, even family, whilst others acted as 
gatekeepers, culture keepers and institutional contacts. These informal 
conversations were recorded in a field diary that consisted of narratives, stories, 
historical data and my own reflexive accounts of experiencing „the field‟33. As 
will become apparent below, living with a family in Livadi allowed for a unique 
insight into daily family life, the moments of elation, and the times of great 
mourning, the monetary matters, family conflicts and long winter evenings 
watching political satires and old Greek films on the television. The informal 
recording of these events in the fieldwork diary was paramount to the 
construction of a thesis that aims to do justice to how social relations are 
affected at every level by shifting socio-economic conditions. 
 
Some „interviews‟ were more structured (cf. Spradley 1980:123-125, Mishler 
1986). This was especially the case with doctors, dentists and government 
officials as I often had to fit into their busy schedules which included working 
evenings. On these more formal occasions I often prepared a line of questioning 
in advance, although on many occasions the stimulating conversation concluded 
                                                 
33
 For a discussion on the use of computers in fieldwork see Coffey and Atkinson (1996:ch.7). 
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that the topics under discussion were very flexible. However, the prepared 
questions, written in Greek, assisted in reminding me of key points that needed 
to be addressed throughout the course of inevitably meandering conversations. 
With such informants, especially those outside of my immediate circle of 
friends, it was more difficult to gain trust as the concept of my anthropological 
research – especially on economics, crisis and mobility – seemed abstract and 
was sometimes even viewed with suspicion (cf. Punch 1986:17-18)34. Therefore 
I aimed to form a relationship with more „distant‟ informants over the course of 
numerous meetings until they understood exactly what my purpose was, and 
until I could establish the limits of my questioning. I found that in these cases 
the observation of body language, posture and the tone of conversation were 
especially illuminating as to the acceptable boundaries of questioning and the 
perceived validity of some responses (Ong 1967, Spradley 1980:128-129, 
Silverman 1993:41-43). 
 
For reasons of practicality, trust, and based on previous experiences, a tape 
recorder was rarely used to document conversations. Primarily, it would have 
been impossible to record discussions in daily life as nearly every exchange held 
a degree of cultural information. It would have also implied a distance between 
people who readily accepted me as an equal in their conceptual worlds. From 
previous experience I have also found that the use of tape recorders can raise 
numerous methodological and ethical issues. Some people may not wish to talk 
– or talk openly, especially about issues of economics, income, consumption and 
corruption – whilst being recorded. Even if prior consent is gained I have 
occasionally felt that informants are uneasy with being recorded. In formal 
interviews I therefore preferred to take notes that were written in shorthand and 
typed-up when I returned home. I did, however, record some accounts of 
historical events, such as the accounts of the Great Famine and the relocation of 
people from Greek Macedonia to Trikala, as I knew these people well and the 
level of historical detail in their accounts required precise recording. 
 
                                                 
34
 Punch portrays how ethnographers have been treated with contempt, suspicion and even 
physical violence concerning what they write about their informants (1986:17-18). 
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The qualitative methods of data collection were complemented with quantitative 
statistical collection. It could be argued that quantitative methods only produce 
abstract and statistical information, and that no „physical observation‟ can be 
obtained through the use of statistics (Ellen 1984, Bernard 1994:275). Yet these 
data were essential due to the focus of the research on economic aspects of 
social life. Eventually these statistical collections formed a backdrop, a basis, for 
the construction of this thesis, yet their relevance as primary data sources were 
often negligible in relation to the final theoretical line of discussion. Hence data 
such as levels of income, bonuses, the percentage of income declared for 
taxation, loans taken out for children, bank balances and credit card limits
35
, and 
comparative statistical analysis of people who have worked abroad and in 
Greece, have proved very informative but are not all directly referred to in the 
final thesis. 
 
One of the first activities I conducted in order to familiarise myself with the 
geography of the town was to perform an informal survey of shops, businesses 
and land use in the centre of Trikala. This exercise proved useful in acquainting 
me with many of the significant social arenas and their various clienteles as well 
as gaining a general idea of the types of business investment present in Trikala. 
Therefore I acquired a map of the centre of the town and mapped on top the 
general business types, notes on construction and development works taking 
place and formed a key for the types of clientele attracted to the area. This map 





Another aspect of the quantitative data was the occasional acquisition of 
statistics concerning personal and family income and expenditure. These data 
were recorded from close informants and those that readily offered it and helped 
in the analysis of consumer activity, the competition for status and prestige, how 
certain aspects of expenditure were prioritised, family networks of money 
                                                 
35
 On waiting for my flight from Athens to Thessaloniki on entering the field, I started noticing 
the amount of advertisements for „20,000 euro‟ credit card limits. Such adverts on billboards and 
in magazines were abundant in the urban centres in 2007/2008. 
36
 For a discussion of conducting visual anthropology in the field, including methodological and 
ethical issues relating to photography, see Pink (2001, 2007). 
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distribution, the allocation of bank and credit loans and notions of social 
mobility. There was one key ethical issue with this form of data collection. 
Many people had more than one source of income, although not all sources were 
declared for taxation. This led to two occasions of interrogation as to who I was, 
who employed me and where the data were destined for. Giannis, a friend of a 
friend, waited for two months before letting any information concerning his 
employment be known. This was despite numerous assurances from our mutual 
friend that the information was not going to get back to government sources. It 
turns out, let‟s say, that Giannis owns a shop (his „official‟ job), is a tour guide 
in Meteora at weekends and evenings, and drives a bus for occasional 
excursions organised by a local travel agent. I myself was also cautious about 
asking people about their income. The likelihood is that most people will 
significantly round up or down their actual wages, meaning that without 
contextualisation based on a prior relationship established over a substantial 
period of time, there is little way of knowing whether the information given is 
correct. This task is made even more difficult by the fact that over half of my 
informants are self-employed and their monthly income fluctuates enormously 
throughout the year, meaning that attempts at correlation between others 
similarly employed is often complicated. Here the old adage of „lies, damn lies 
and statistics‟ holds firm on both the personal and governmental scale. 
 
Another secondary source of information was the local archives in Trikala. 
Unfortunately the title „local‟ is a little misleading as most of the records relate 
to national events and statistical polls. Perplexingly, the records for Trikala are 
mainly to be found in Athens. However, I did come across some interesting old 
maps and the occasional piece of census data that proved helpful in piecing 
together geographic and demographic change in the town since the Second 
World War. I found that most snippets of historical data were affirmed through 
personal accounts of past events. 
 
An issue that was unforeseen to me before conducting fieldwork, was the fact 
that some questions proved difficult for some people to understand not so much 
in terms of content but in terms of why I wanted to know certain things (cf. 
Bernard 1994:269). This went beyond concepts of trust and related to why a 22 
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year old Englishman wanted so much information on Greek economic history. 
In the first two months this matter was not helped by the shock I suffered by my 
complete immersion into the Greek language. Sometimes a question was 
unintentionally constructed along the lines of direct translation, as if it was 
addressing a fellow English academic. This initial „crisis in communication‟ 
actually led to many highly informative conversations with my informants. As 
the reasoning behind the questions was explained they often enthusiastically 
responded with impulsive stories of their experiences of economic hardship and 
crisis or accounts of social mobility in their family. Some of these narratives 
would later come to constitute key „case studies‟ for this thesis. What I was 
trying to do was certainly comprehensible but the abstract concept often needed 
explaining during more formal interviews with new informants. When this 
situation occurred within the first week of my fieldwork I opened a file I had 
saved from a previous research methods course. The opening quote read: 
 
“… research involves an inexhaustible variety of settings and an endless range of 
situational exigencies for which ready made recipes do not exist. The conduct of the 
researcher, and the outcomes of research are vulnerable to unique developments in 
the field and to dramatic predicaments that can often be solved only situationally.  
Paradoxically, we must try to learn from our mistakes, but that can not prevent us 
repeating them” (Punch 1986:26, original emphasis). 
 
When conducting fieldwork the researcher is entwined in a series of „moral 
obligations‟ both towards their informants and the discipline (Punch 1986:25, 
Pels 2000, Caplan 2003:1-2). Ethnographers have to consider the „rights and 
interests‟ of “informants and other research participants (citizens); gatekeepers; 
sponsors and funders; themselves; colleagues; their own and host governments; 
their universities or employers and the public(s)” (Ellen 1984:133, 137). Ethical 
issues can transcend the „academic pale‟ and the researcher may, at times, use 
his/her own judgement to avoid controversial situations
37
 (Punch 1986:31). 
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 Yet Punch points out that such selective research tends to only „give voice‟ to certain sections 
of society and hinder any attempts of anthropological representation of other social groups 
(1986:20). Often the reluctance to investigate certain social groups and institutions is related to 
the „power‟ of the subjects embodied within such groups. This is especially prominent in the 
context of research in government organisations. The threat of libel action deters the perspective 
researcher and allows “repressive state apparatus” to remain in the ethnographic „dark‟ (ibid.). 
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The ethics of fieldwork can be divided into many sub-fields. All considerations 
are concerned with the responsibility of the researchers to understand their 
„moral and ethical‟ duties towards a variety of bodies and many of these points 
have been addressed above. There are the epistemological considerations, such 
as informant representation and reflexivity in the final text (cf. Clifford and 
Marcus 1986, Geertz 1988, Atkinson 1992, Okely 1992), practical 
considerations concerned with conduct and practice in the field and the issue of 
respecting the demands of funding bodies and the host institution (Ellen 1984). 
 
In this thesis pseudonyms for personal, family and place names are used 
extensively. It has already been noted how some informants viewed with 
suspicion and apprehension my role in collecting economic data and narratives 
of crisis, such as the man with three jobs that could have been exposed for tax 
evasion. In another case I was approached by the younger brother of one of my 
key informants who had told me details of his consumer habits – namely 
cigarettes – that he was afraid would get back to his parents. In this delicate 
situation I assured him of the confidentiality of the information we exchanged 
during our meetings; a point I always made explicit. Further details of his 
nocturnal activities have remained undisclosed in this thesis. 
 
Pseudonyms must be used carefully so as not to distort the ethnographic record 
in terms of spatio-temporal situation and social context. However, it is the 
anthropologist‟s professional responsibility to protect the physical, social and 
psychological rights of their informants (Bowman 1998, ASA 1999). 
Pseudonyms thus help maintain the informant‟s privacy without compromising 
the ethnographic record. In this thesis pseudonyms are used for most personal 
names apart from when discussing public figures in a third person or referential 
context. Village names are changed in order to maintain the confidentiality of 
the actors discussed in each social milieu. In some delicate cases occupations 
and travelling distances/directions have also been altered. The names of major 
urban centres such as Trikala, Kalampaka and Thessaloniki remain the same. 
Nonetheless, I have been careful not to “tamper with the social connotations” of 
what is being discussed (Kirtsoglou 2004:15). 
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Ethical considerations also include epistemological issues relating to the writing 
up process and the production of the final text for, “the field is not merely 
reported in the texts of fieldwork: it is constituted by our reading and writing” 
(Atkinson 1992:9). Adopting a post-modern perspective for a moment, the 
ethnographer creates and recreates the field within his/her text and must be 
aware that the field has no boundaries per-se, apart from those externally applied 
for the process of creating a coherent document (ibid.). The selective 
representation of the field can therefore be expressed as a „triple constitution‟. 
The first influence is the ethnographer‟s gaze, which can be affected by 
preconceptions of the field prior to commencing research. Additionally, the gaze 
is continuously constructed and manipulated throughout the fieldwork period in 
relation to social situations, theoretical trends and personal aspirations and 
oversights (ibid.). Secondly the production of the field is affected by the 
ethnographer‟s ability to construct a „text-of-the-field‟, and thirdly the field is 
reconstructed through the reader‟s interpretation and contextualisation of the 
textual representation (Geertz 1973, Leach 1984:22 in Rapport and Overing 
2000:26, Gudeman and Rivera 1990:3, Atkinson 1992:9). The text can therefore 
be said to be a representation of both the author and the field combined, what 
Atkinson calls a „semiotic triangle‟ (1992:10). In the production of ethnographic 
texts the author and their field are forever locked in a „perpetual embrace‟ 
(Atkinson 1992:10), with the author striving to convince the reader that they 
have “truly been there” and have thus been “penetrated by another form of life” 




On the topic of ethnographic representation, Clifford argues that since the 
writing of ethnographic texts is central to anthropology „both in the field and 
thereafter‟, cultural accounts tend to have a „constructed, artificial nature‟. This 
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 According to Schneider, the ethnographer draws on his/her own experience to construct a 
narrative to fulfil the intentions of a specific theoretical framework (Schneider 1984:1-5). Geertz 
argues that this information and „knowledge‟ goes through many processes of representation and 
interpretation. For example, the final outcome behind any ethnographic text is directly related to 
the original situation (not only the reporting of it) and is therefore captured in four changes: 
Firstly what actually happened at the time. Secondly, what the ethnographer understood and how 
the ethnographer has interpreted the situation. Thirdly, what the ethnographer wrote about the 
situation – since „anthropological writings themselves are interpretations‟. Finally, what the 
reader understood and interpreted from the ethnographic text (Geertz 1973:14-15, Clifford 
1986:25). Such interpretations inherently result in selective inclusion, exclusion and 
transformation of fieldwork material by the researcher (Okely 1992). 
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means that ethnography is „caught up in the invention, not the representation of 
cultures‟ (1986:2) in order to feed the „theory-fieldwork-ethnography‟ triangle 
central to the discipline (Moore 1999). Accordingly, „ethnography decodes and 
recodes, tilling the grounds of collective order and diversity, inclusion and 
exclusion‟ (Clifford 1986:2). Clifford famously – or infamously – goes on to 
argue that ethnographies hold „partial truths‟, „committed and incomplete‟ and 
thus ethnography is only ever partial, despite the continued desire of the 
ethnographer to write a complete account (ibid.:7). In order to portray cultures 
through a „Self-Other‟ relationship, simplifications and exclusions cannot be 
avoided and are always negotiated by the claims of rhetoric and power. Thus, 
according to Clifford, ethnographic writings are determined in „at least six 
ways‟: contextually, rhetorically, institutionally, generically, politically and 
historically. These determinations „govern the inscription of coherent 
ethnographic fictions‟ (Clifford 1986:6). 
 
This self-reflexive approach to the fieldwork and writing-up process advocated 
by scholars such as Atkinson and Clifford is valuable if the key points are taken 
into consideration without over saturating texts with obsessive self-analysis 
leading to doubts concerning what is actually the object of the study (Geertz 
1973, 1988:20). It is easy for the ethnographer to become a self-doubting 
hypochondriac if s/he loses sight of the actual point of the study. The goal is still 
to display the ethnographic data in a coherent way that facilitates the best 
possible understanding of the social reality, whilst acknowledging that many 
underlying points inherently affect the final representation (Okely 1992:1, 
Macdonald 1993:18). 
 
During my fieldwork I found myself making reflexive notes alongside 
ethnographic accounts on a frequent basis. I also questioned a lot of what I was 
being told, what I recorded in my field diary and what I was theorising. This 
came as a natural step in assisting the understanding of the field, the informants 
and my own place within a highly complex socio-cultural context. My activities 
that many would classify well within the often stigmatised category „post-
modernism‟ came as a surprise as I had always promised myself not to get 
caught up in the practice of „running around in circles‟ involved in a pastime 
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that has no end. Instead, I had always told myself, „one must focus on the 
ethnographic data, this is the point of fieldwork, everything else is a given‟. 
However, I later concluded that these self-reflections, and at times self-doubts, 
were a natural part of the process of comprehension, both of the Self and the 
Other. The way that the researcher makes sense of the field does inevitably 
affect the final ethnographic product, yet this need not be a hindrance or in 
opposition to a confident analysis and coherent presentation of the ethnographic 
data. 
 
Living with a Family in the Field 
 
One of the principal advantages of my fieldwork experience was also one of the 
greatest challenges. I first met and resided with the family of my close friend 
(also at university in Britain) on my first visit to Trikala in 2004. Their home has 
been my home for all subsequent visits. The family consists of Eugenia a 60 
year old retired teacher, Giorgos, 74, a retied government employee, Eugenia‟s 
son Angelos, 36, a self-employed mechanic, and his wife and secretary Dimitra, 
33, and their newborn (in 2007) daughter. Eugenia and Giorgos own a three-
bedroom, one-story house in Livadi which they shared with Eugenia‟s parents 
until 2006 when the latter sadly both passed away. After their marriage (the 
second marriage for both), Eugenia and Giorgos decided they wanted to leave 
the centre of Trikala without being too far away from close family members 
who still resided there. Eugenia especially wanted a large garden in which to 
enjoy her retirement. The first floor of the house is currently only partially built 
and is intended for Eugenia‟s daughter, Antonia, 38, who is currently at 
university in Britain. 
 
Angelos and Dimitra live in Trikala in a house built by Eugenia‟s parents for 
her; where she raised Angelos and Antonia before moving to Livadi in 2001. 
The house in Trikala is above another that was also built by Eugenia‟s father 
and was inherited by her brother, Andreas. Andreas sold this house in 2002. 
Angelos and Dimitra‟s child, who was only a few months old when I 
commenced my fieldwork, spent six days a week with Eugenia and Giorgos 
whilst her parents are at work at their garage (between 9am and 7pm). On 
 86 
Sundays Angelos and Dimitra spend the day with Dimitra‟s parents in the 
nearby village of Mikrochori before calling in to Eugenia‟s house in the 
evening. Giorgos has two children in their fifties, one who resides in a village 
eight kilometres from Trikala and one who lives in Athens. Both sons visit their 
father periodically but the time spent inside the house is negligible. 
 
I had therefore known my host family for three years before commencing my 
fieldwork. The immediate advantage was an intricate network of gatekeepers 
and „key contacts‟ that were to prove priceless (Pardo 1996:190 n.12). Eugenia 
and Giorgos also provided everything and more that one would desire from 
one‟s own family, as well as some welcome familiarity in what still seemed an 
alien world. I was also granted unprecedented access not only to the elaborate 
workings of the Greek family, but also to the female domain. Although this is by 
no means as difficult for a male researcher in the Mediterranean to access as it 
once was (cf. Peristiany 1966, Dubisch 1986, 1995), I still believe I was 
privileged to spend much intimate time with Eugenia, Dimitra and her baby in 
the house and this granted a fascinating insight into raising a child in Greece. 
 
This experience was also much needed on my part. Despite taking six months of 
private Greek lessons on top of the informal pieces I had picked up over the 
years, I still felt that language was perhaps the greatest barrier between me and 
my field. My understanding was good, my spoken word less so, especially as the 
dialect was completely different to both the ear and the tongue than what I had 
learnt with my teacher, another Giorgos, from Patras. This was especially 
frustrating as there was so much I wanted to ask, wanted to respond to and there 
was, thank goodness, no question of reverting to English as this was only spoken 
by a handful of informants (and spoken to me by only two people over the year 
who wanted to practice their language skills). I took to recording conversations 
in my fieldwork diary and writing down the questions in English underneath in 
order to refer back to when I had formulated the correct phrases in Greek. With 
this issue Eugenia and Dimitra were especially helpful. They allowed me to 
practice my language without embarrassment or judgement and participated in 
many „diagram-and-dictionary‟ sessions. They also proved exceptional 
informants for all things social, cultural and especially economic. Eugenia had 
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held down many jobs both in the public and private domain as a single mother 
of two. She was educated at the University of Athens, had a measured opinion 
and was always willing to listen as well as speak. Dimitra was informed on all 
of the current political and economic issues (her mother was referred to as the 
„Minister of Culture‟ due to her knowledge in all matters „cultural‟) due to her 
first-hand involvement with the general public as secretary and assistant in their 
mechanics business. 
 
As I arrived in November when the surrounding mountains were already 
covered in a thick blanket of snow, I found myself spending more time than I 
had expected in the house, in what had classically been termed „the female 
domain‟. Coincidently, my two best friends in the field would also be women. 
The fieldwork experience was however very balanced – with Angelos and his 
motor sport friends at the racetrack, shopping for baptism dresses with Dimitra, 
sitting chatting in the hairdressers with Maro, discussing the female body with 
boy-racers on Asklipiou, going on family outings to ancestral villages in Greek 
Macedonia or mixed group trips to the seaside at Volos. 
 
With the substantial privilege of living with a family came much responsibility 
and difficulty. Living in a close-knit family was at times very challenging as 
personal space was not only very limited, but also only sanctioned by other 
members of the family. By this I mean that as all the rooms were on one level 
and very close together it was not always my choice as to when I could write, 
rest or attend to crying babies. On my arrival I was installed in the bedroom of 
Eugenia‟s recently departed parents as opposed to the guest room which had 
now been appropriated by the baby. Over the year this room became known as 
Daniel‟s room rather than „the Grandparent‟s‟ but the personal and family 
possessions therein, ranging from walking sticks to dresses and the trousseau, 
the family computer, sewing machine and tableware, were in demand at 
unpredictable times. These issues were, however, more than offset against the 
unbelievable hospitality of my host family and the great ethnographic value of 
gaining direct entry to a family in the field (Just 2000:3). 
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Other challenges were of a more personal nature. During my time in Livadi 
Eugenia had various visits to hospitals in Trikala, Thessaloniki and Kozani in 
order to monitor and treat a long-term health condition. I took it upon myself to 
accompany her to the hospital appointments rather than let her attend alone. 
Some of these trips lasted for up to one week whilst doctors conducted the 
relevant tests and meant staying in hotels and hospital rooms for significant 
periods of time. Other trips were simply to take blood samples and undergo 
scans. Whilst in the field two other friends were admitted to hospital in Trikala. 
This was a personal challenge to me due to my long-term (and deep rooted) 
phobia of all things medical that I have had since seven years old. The issue 
consists of more than simply feeling „queasy‟ and has, in the past, resulted in my 
becoming more of a hindrance than a help. Yet the determination to accompany 
Eugenia to her hospital appointments was two-fold. Firstly I felt it my 
responsibility as part of the family, partially based on my own fears, I could not 
stand the thought of her going on her own. Secondly, I realised that these trips 
were a fantastic opportunity to see how the health system operated in Greece. 
The results were among the most rewarding of the whole fieldwork period. As 
well as forming contacts with doctors, nurses and chemists, my eyes were 
opened to the extent of the patron-client networks required to gain adequate 
medical care and the sums of money involved in paying the fakelákia (envelopes 
of money). I also witnessed what happened if such money was not paid, 
including a person being unceremoniously trafficked around in an ambulance 
between multiple hospitals (130 kilometres apart) before being treated for her 
stroke, and critically ill patients being forced to walk down corridors to wait in a 
queue to see the doctor who was sat drinking coffee and making diagnoses in his 
office (both in Trikala). Trikala, I am constantly told, “has the worst hospital in 
the Balkans … not Greece, the Balkans … we have a reputation”. This is also 
the opinion from the inside. I hasten to add that many objectively good points of 
the health service were also apparent, especially in Thessaloniki, such as the 
availability of specialist consultants to see patients within days, and the benefits 
of social networks in obtaining excellent surgeons for crucial operations. Yet all 
treatment rested in fact on money and connections. 
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Less pressing responsibilities lay in caring for family members when they 
became ill in the winter months – Eugenia was bedridden for eight days with the 
flu – and becoming the inevitable (and very willing) babysitter. The latter 
usually consisted of a nice long walk with the pram around the village in the 
warmer summer months and numerous lengths of the internal corridor in the 
colder winter months. On more than one occasion it crossed my mind as to what 
an early Greek ethnographer would have made of a man pushing a baby around 
the village on his own on a daily basis. The truth is that in Livadi the act seemed 
acceptable, and at worst was passed off as „the eccentric Englishman‟39. 
 
My movement between village and town, all four kilometres of it, was 
facilitated by a regular local bus and the availability of Giorgos‟ bicycles. Early 
mornings were the best time to catch some people as they had gaps in their 
appointment books or had sent the children off to school. The late night outings 
to Asklipiou were highly informative and captured the experiences of another 
section of Trikalini society. Often villagers offered to take me with them as they 
went about their daily activities or visited relatives in the town or other villages. 
In this way I was able to frequent many places in the prefecture and attend 
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 Bennison recalls that whilst conducting research in western Thessaly during the military 
dictatorship his „strange, foreign behaviour‟ of cycling around recording retail outlets and 
enterprise types got him questioned and subsequently arrested on more than one occasion. 
However, after one particular run-in with police when his lack of official papers was called into 
question, Bennison visited the Minister for Thessaly based in Athens. The Minister told him that 
the local police were talking nonsense as no papers were required and gave him the private 
phone number of the Ministry in Athens to give to any policeman that gave him problems. 
Following an Easter Day arrest and subsequent release near Karditsa, word got around as far 
away as Kalampaka that he was „the harmless eccentric Englishman‟ that had contacts with the 
Ministry in Athens. He was never bothered again. (Bennison, 2010, personal communication). 
 
In a similar vain, Just describes how encounters with the local police hindered his search for a 
fieldwork site in 1976 (two years after the end of the military junta). When Just thought he had 
found the perfect village on the island of Mitilini in which to conduct his research he was 
“hauled in by the local police and interrogated”. They examined his notes and confiscated his 
passport based on the perception that Just (an Australian) may have been a Turkish spy 
masquerading as an American. The embarrassment caused to the villagers by this episode led 
Just to move on to a new location (2000:3). Just also refers to the concept of „the eccentric 
Englishman‟, or in his case, Scotsman. A wandering latter-day hippy known as „Alekos‟ was 
one of the favourite characters to frequent his research village. On arrival, the villagers assumed 
that Just was one of the same (2000:4). 
 
In the 1950s Campbell also recalls the close surveillance of his “suspect work” by Greek 
authorities. Only with the support of the Deputy Prime Minister was Campbell allowed to stay in 
Epirus. As Bennison found (personal communication, 2010), his access to quantitative and 
statistical data, especially maps, was greatly obstructed (Campbell 1964:vii). 
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events that would have otherwise been impossible to observe by solely focusing 
my attentions on the town. 
 
Informant Base: butcher, baker, candlestick maker 
 
Many of my initial informants were connected to members of the extended 
family with which I stayed. From Eugenia, Giorgos, Angelos, Dimitra and 
Antonia I formed multiple friendships, found plenty of gatekeepers and 
fascinating informants. From these initial contacts, many of which remained 
very close throughout and since the fieldwork period, came another set of 
informants – friends of friends, relatives of relatives or professional contacts 
with people in a range of businesses and institutions. Some informants I would 
see three times a day, whilst others I saw once or twice during the year. Yet the 
range was as all-encompassing as one may endeavour. In terms of age and 
gender, the youngest informant (apart from the baby) was thirteen and the oldest 
was one-hundred-and-six. Many initial and close informants were female, yet I 
quickly became acquainted with males of all ages. I played tennis regularly with 
a university-bound eighteen-year-old and sat reminiscing about the pre-war 
years with men in their eighties and nineties. The village coach trips organised 
for the elderly people were some of the most ethnographically fruitful occasions; 
despite, on one trip to Arachova, getting stuck in the snow and having to listen 
to piped klarino music over a poor quality radio for eighteen hours while some 
senior ladies refused to leave the bus for fear of bears. The people whose 
accounts form the basis of this thesis hail from diverse socio-economic 
backgrounds. Doctors, dentists and university professors shared their time and 
opinions as much as farm-hands, housewives and mechanics. University 
graduates and unemployed economic immigrants were members of my company 
at given times, as was a local priest, a military communications expert and a taxi 
driver or two. The geographical range was also surprisingly diverse. Among my 
informants can be cited Greek Macedonians that relocated to Trikala during the 
civil war, descendants of Pontian refugee communities that settled in Trikala 
after the 1923 exchange of populations, second-generation migrants that have 
returned from Germany, Sweden and Australia, British educated graduates, 
Vlachs that hail from the mountains of Epirus, a Sarakatsani dentist, 
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Karagounides that claim to be „the true locals of Trikala‟, Albanian immigrant 
labourers, and people originating from Trikala and now living permanently in 
Athens. All now live, work, or have family in the town of Trikala or the 
surrounding villages between the „golden triangle‟ of Kalampaka, Trikala and 
Pyli. As is the dynamics of population movement within this area, all informants 
had strong and regular links to the town of Trikala. This combination of diverse 
age, profession, and cultural and geographic background provided an excellent 























Chapter Three: A Brief History of Crisis in Thessaly since 1881, 
Part One: 1881-1950 
 
The prefecture of Thessaly was no stranger to times of crisis long before the 
effects of the current financial circumstances began to take hold towards the end 
of my fieldwork in 2008 and the following deficit troubles of 2009. Since 
Thessaly was incorporated into the Greek state in 1881 there have been many 
periods, fluctuating in nature, between social and economic crises and 
intermittent times of prosperity. In order to facilitate the theorisation and 
subsequent discussion of crisis and its public representations it is necessary here 
to outline some key moments in the history of social and economic crisis in 
Thessaly and subsequently Trikala. The historical contexts presented in this 
chapter form the bases for extensive critical theoretical and ethnographic 
discussion throughout this thesis. 
 
There are many important interrelated events that define numerous periods of 
crisis in Greece. These events may appear distant and perhaps separate if one 
accepts a linear notion of time, yet in actual fact they are closer in cultural 
proximity than they might at first seem (Serres 1995a:57-59). Cultural proximity 
in this sense refers to events that hold a significant place in the social memory of 
Trikalinoi that are recalled at specific socio-historic moments as representations 
of the past within the context of the present. Furthermore, these events can 
become embodied by the actors within the context of the present. I argue that it 
is the concept of crisis that triggers moments of cultural proximity, thus making 
„two distant points in time suddenly become close, even superimposed‟ in social 
memory (Serres 1995a:57-59). 
 
As such historical moments of crisis and social change, events including the 
agrarian reforms, the redistribution of land and compulsory population exchange 
with Turkey, the Great Famine during the Axis occupation of Greece, the civil 
war and the military junta of 1967-1974 and European Community integration 
will be outlined in this and the subsequent chapter. Many of these events are 
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intertwined in a dense network of history, political decision making and socio-
economic strategy. 
 
Since the term „crisis‟ can be employed to describe many diverse events, the 
periods of crisis explored here are selective. The choice has been based on three 
main criteria. Primarily, the events focused on have had a direct and significant 
impact on the inhabitants of Trikala; thus episodes such as the civil war, the 
agrarian reforms and the military junta are included but the Cyprus crisis of 
1974-1975 has been omitted (cf. Argyrou 1996, Sant Cassia 2005, Bryant 2010). 
Secondly, the crises that are of most interest for this study are those which have 
had a considerable economic impact. Thus when discussing the Great Famine 
and military junta, the economic aspects are the focus of the analysis. This is not 
to dispute the import of such events in other political or social arenas. Thirdly, 
some events may have not had an intense direct impact on the people of Trikala 
but however occupy a significant place in the local imagery. For reasons that 
will become apparent, the Great Famine of 1941-1943, the compulsory 
population exchange of 1923 and, elsewhere in this thesis, the Macedonian 
Question have been taken as such occasions. It is especially important to justify 
such selections as it will be later discussed how the people themselves select 
certain narratives of crisis as culturally important, whilst others are more 
commonly dismissed in collective recollection. 
 
The date 1881 has been chosen as the lower boundary for the historical 
discussion of crisis. As the date that signifies the annexation of Thessaly from 
the Ottoman Empire to Greece, 1881 marks the point of highly significant social 
change and socio-economic unrest, especially in terms of land tenure. At the 
other end of the scale the historical account is bounded by the decade of the 
1990s when Greece experienced a stock market boom which was informed by a 
collective attitude of free-spending liberalism. The period of 2001 onwards, 
introduced in chapter one, will be analysed in further detail throughout the study 





Great Estates and a Change in Social Relations 
 
Since the end of the sixteenth century the ciftlik system had operated in 
Thessaly as well as in other parts of the Balkans (Karavidas 1931
40
). The 
discussion of ciftliks (also tsiftliks (du Boulay 1974) or chiftliks (Campbell 
1964, Campbell and Sherrard 1968, Kontogiorgi 2003:68) or chifliks (Sant 
Cassia and Bada 1992:12))
41
 in Thessaly can be divided into two distinct phases; 
Ottoman administration pre-annexation and Greek administration post-
annexation. 
 
Ciftliks were originally land grants made by the Ottoman sultans to Muslim 
settlers in Turkish-occupied lands
42
. The ciftliks varied in size between six to 
fifteen hectares and were deemed sufficient to support one family. At the end of 
the seventeenth century, ciftliks became much larger private properties where 
the landlord held rights over whole villages whose villagers became his tenants. 
During this period the peasant workers were contracted under Ottoman laws 
which gave them rights to a certain amount of their produce – usually either 
two-thirds or one-half. For one, the product of their labour was considered 
inalienable. After the annexation of Thessaly to Greece the Ciftliks were 
purchased by entrepreneurs of the diaspora, the majority of whom originated 
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 Kostas Karavidas (1890-1973) is an interesting figure in the history of land reform in Greece. 
As a specially hired agrotologist for the Greek Agricultural Bank he published widely on the 
importance of land reform in the Balkans. He was a follower of the political theorist Dragoumis 
and believed that the grandiose hopes for economic reform through state planning based on West 
European models were unsuitable for Greek conditions. He favoured a “vision of Greece” based 
around local communities rather than a centralised state (cf. Karavidas 1931, 1935, Mazower 
1991:280-281). He recognised there to be „a crisis in agriculture‟ beginning in 1930 due to the 
redistribution of ciftlik lands. 
41
 Prior to the Ciftliks, the land in the Ottoman Empire was granted on non-hereditary fiefs to 
Ottoman soldiers and officials in exchange for certain military commitments. This was known as 
the timar system. The fiefs were governed by laws that were supervised by Ottoman officials. 
Villages were often allowed to be semi-autonomous as long as taxes were paid regularly. The 
timar system was eventually phased out at the beginning of the sixteenth century due to the 
break down of the centralised system of government (Sanders 1962:64, Campbell 1964:11, 
Campbell and Sherrard 1968:55, Bennison 1977:97, Kordatou 1980:39, Inalcik 1985:106-107). 
 
At the same time, in other parts of what is now Greece, such as Zakynthos, under Venetian rule 
from 1485-1797, similar landlord-tenant systems were in place. In Zakynthos these estates were 
termed „serfs‟. The large underclass of peasant labourers, known as semproi, were often 
recruited as soldiers to accompany their masters on military campaigns (Theodossopoulos 
2003:18). 
42
 This led to some people changing their religion from Orthodox Christian to Islam. However, 
this would have severe consequences when in the 1920s all Muslim populations of Greece were 
forcibly „exchanged‟ with the Christian populations of Turkey (Karavidas 1931). 
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from the Ionian Islands and northern Epirus (Mouzelis 1978:77). The Greek 
government supported this move as they hoped that the entrepreneurs would 
bring capital into the region and improve the productivity of the land, thus 
edging Greece towards self-sufficiency in grain. This, however, would not prove 
to be the case. The disillusionment was double sided. The peasant farmers had 
been promised their own pieces of land after annexation despite the rights of the 
Ciftlikades (ciftlik owners) being transferred intact and enhanced through the 
handover deal confirmed in July 1881
43
 (Aroni-Tsichli 2005:26). 
 
In „Old Greece‟ (Attica and the Peloponnese), during the period after 
independence and before the annexation of Thessaly (1833-1881), the 
Byzantine-Roman legal system in place gave the Ciftlikades extensive rights as 
the absolute owners of their lands. However, in this case the Ciftlikades rarely 
exercised these absolute rights and therefore the peasant workers did not pursue 
their ultimate desire of devolution of all land ownership. This was partially 
because on the issue of the „common lands‟ – land that was deemed „civic‟ and 
fell outside the domain of the ciftliks – the landlords and the peasants were 
united in seeking unconditional devolution of ownership and thus the opposition 
between the two interest parties was somewhat nullified (ibid.:27). 
 
At the time of annexation 460 of the 658 villages in Thessaly were ciftliks and 
only 198 kefalochoria (village-led) where usually one village comprised a single 
ciftlik before being divided in two if it expanded beyond its means
44
 (Bennison 
                                                 
43
 The annexation of Thessaly and Arta was the result of long-term diplomatic negotiations that 
commenced at a conference in Berlin in June and July 1878. The handover was finalised 
between 20
th
 June and 2
nd
 July 1881 (Aroni-Tsichli 2005:26). When „Old Greece‟ was granted 
independence in 1821, the ciftliks were annexed in a special law agreed in London in 1930. The 
agreement stated that the owners of the ciftliks could either keep or sell them, yet according to 
this law, the British government were allowed to intervene in order to safeguard the rights of 
Ottoman citizens inhabiting the lands at the time of the handover (Aroni-Tsichli 2005:26). 
44
 It is interesting that in Northern Greece under the governance of the (in)famous Ali Pasha 
(?1750-1822), many Turkish landlords were pressured to sell their holdings to the governor and 
flee to Larisa – the only place that remained beyond his reach. Ali also appropriated the land that 
was left without any inheritors. Within a decade Ali Pasha owned nearly all the land in his 
domain (Fleming 1999:55); eventually he commanded 263 ciftliks in Thessaly (66 per cent of 
the total), 411 in Epirus, 100 in Macedonia and 172 in Sterea Ellada (Aroni-Tsichli 2005:47-48). 
He is now a notorious Ottoman figure that has preoccupied the Greek nationalist imagination 
through education textbooks, films and popular songs for both his atrocities and his political 
astuteness.  
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1977:97). Due to the nature of Ottoman law
45
, the socio-economic situation was 
not homogeneous across Thessaly as the land tenure contracts were varied. In 
central Thessaly the landlord-worker contracts were mainly based on the 
premise of misakarika. Under this agreement, the peasant workers gave one-half 
of their produce to the landlord. In western Thessaly, notably the areas around 
Trikala and Karditsa, the contracts were based on a tritarika system whereby 
only one-third of the produce was handed over to the landlord. The dual-layered 
arrangements had numerous consequences. Under the misakarika the colligi 
(peasant workers) were more submissive due to the stronger relation of 
domination on the part of the landlord. It was noticeable that in the tritarika 
ciftliks the colligi developed closer ties with their land and were more 
progressive in their demands for devolution of ownership. In the tritarika 
ciftliks the living conditions were substantially better and supported a higher 
population. Such notions were driven by the fact that in the tritarika ciftliks 
around Trikala and Karditsa, the Ciftlikades only provided the land and the 
peasants funded the seed and the cultivation costs (Aroni-Tsichli 2005:37). 
 
The colligi benefited from Ottoman law in numerous other ways. The ownership 
of the ciftlik land was ultimately with the Ottoman government who 
subsequently let it to the Ciftlikades under an agreement of perpetual company. 
Hence certain laws were implemented in order to protect the colligi. Each 
peasant worker was connected with his land and house throughout life, the right 
of which was inherited, features that enhanced the inalienable aspect of their 
tenancy. Furthermore, the peasant worker was granted unquestioned access to 
forests, grazing lands, orchards, vineyards and water sources as well as other 
public and civic areas of the ciftliks (ibid.:32-33). 
 
The Greek capitalists were enticed into investing in the old Ottoman ciftliks as a 
means to recuperate losses made during the fluctuating economic crises of the 
late 1800s, cumulating in the bankruptcy of the Ottoman government in 1875-
1876. On the part of the previous Ottoman Ciftlikades, the fear of nationalisation 
                                                 
45
 It was not until 1860 that a legal framework was officially put in place to legislate the owner-
tenant relationships (Bennison 1977:98). For an extensive account of the differentiations 
between ciftlik operation and structure over the centuries of Ottoman rule, see Inalcik (1985). 
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of their lands after the handover outweighed the low prices offered by the 
incoming entrepreneurs, many of which were involved in the banking profession 
and originated from outside of mainland Greece. This „absentee‟ status meant 
that the new owners employed stewards to manage the ciftliks whilst they were 
away but were still supported by the Greek state due to the general opinion that 
the investors would improve production levels that would be beneficial for all 
Greek citizens (ibid.:41). 
 
Yet both the productivity of the ciftliks and the working conditions of the colligi 
deteriorated under Greek ownership. The landlords did not invest in new 
technologies or fertilisers in order to improve productivity and neither did they 
invest in land reclamation projects as anticipated. This was partially due to the 
economic circumstance of the late 1800s when the price of grain plummeted on 
the European markets due to systematic swamping by Indian and American 
exporters. Hence, Greece had to increase its own imports and increase financial 
loans to landowners who could not find a market for their produce. Any profit 
that was made by the Ciftlikades was invested abroad due to their absentee 
status, thus the wider Greek economy was by no means benefiting directly from 
„foreign‟ ownership (ibid.:42-43). 
 
From the perspective of the colligi, under the administration of the Greek 
Ciftlikades they had no legal protection against their landlord who was capable 
of exercising the newly founded right of evicting his tenants whenever he 
pleased (du Boulay 1974:8, Mouzelis 1978:77, Inalcik 1985:106, Sant Cassia 
and Bada 1992:24). This was because the land was no longer ultimately the 
property of the state, as the Ciftlikades had transformed it into private property. 
The colligi were reduced to the role of share-croppers of which the landlord 
would still demand a rent of either one-half or one-third of the gross product of 
the land despite the fact that a contract of perpetual company was no longer 
present (Campbell 1964:11, Campbell and Sherrard 1968:55, du Boulay 
1974:8)
46
. du Boulay notes that in the village of Ambéli, Euboea, the villagers 
                                                 
46
 In the context of agrarian reform in Spain, Lisón-Tolosana notes that “between master and 
labourer there is no relationship apart from the economic one” (1966:26). 
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Although the peasant workers suffered immensely under the post-Ottoman 
ciftlik system, not least due to their ambiguous legal rights, the landowners 
enjoyed great economic prosperity (see also Theodossopoulos 2003:18). The 
Ciftlikades capitalised on the intense industrialisation occurring in Western 
Europe and the subsequent increase in demand for Balkan agricultural products, 
especially cotton, maize and tobacco (Bennison 1977:99). Due to their 
entrepreneurial background, the Ciftlikades also benefited from the simultaneous 
demand for handicraft products in which they invested. This meant that in terms 
of exportation, for a short period Thessaly became the most industrialised area 
of Greece. This was however short lived as cheaper products from Britain 
became more widely available, thus intensifying international competition 
(ibid.:99). 
 
As previously mentioned, the disillusionment with land reform following the 
annexation of 1881 was two-fold. Another aspect that contributed to the lack of 
increase in productivity of the land was the continuation of seasonal renting to 
nomadic shepherd populations. This practice was widespread during the 
Ottoman era and would have had to be curtailed if maximum productivity was to 
be realised. The post-Ottoman government of Charilaos Trikoupis (who served 
as Prime Minister in Greece seven times between 1875 and 1895) strongly 
believed that the plains of Thessaly would promote the Greek economy to a 
level of self-sufficiency as well as provide a surplus to trade on international 
markets. The seasonal renting of grasslands to Sarakatsani and Vlach shepherds 
was thus to become a problem for the broader Greek economy as the land was 
not being cultivated to its optimum level. Indeed, in the second edition of the 
Baedeker guide to Greece of 1894 it is noted that the population of Trikala rises 
from 14,800 in summer to 18,000 in winter due to the seasonal relocation of 
local shepherds (Baedeker 1894). 
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 If the head of the household in possession of a ciftlik died leaving several sons, they were to 
possess the land collectively (Inalcik 1985:106). In the case of Ambéli, the ciftlik was eventually 
bought by the villagers in 1853 and shared equally among the inhabitants (du Boulay 1974:8). 
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Greece relied heavily on the importation of grain paid for with income generated 
by exported currants. Trikoupis acknowledged that this reliance on one 
predominant export was dangerous and thus grain and cereal production should 
be increased in Thessaly. His fears were confirmed in 1892 when France 
introduced a high tariff on Greek currants, meaning that the price fell by 70 per 
cent overnight on London markets
48
. At this point the annexation of Thessaly 
became a problem rather than a benefit for the Greek government as the 
enlargement of the state meant an increase in population; an economic crisis was 
afoot (Campbell and Sherrard 1968:97, Campbell 1968). Thessaly held the key 
to self-sufficiency in grain during this period of food shortage. Pentzopoulos 
notes, “until the annexation of Thessaly they (the Greeks) never had anything 
approaching good farmland” (1962:151, see also Kontogiorgi 2003:73, 2006), 
this would have to be cultivated more efficiently. However, we know that 
between 1896 and 1911 the area devoted to cereal production in Thessaly 
shrunk by 17 per cent (Dakin 1972:251, Mazower 1991:51). The absentee 
landlords cared little for the aspirations of the Greek government and refused to 
reform their land use, continuing to leave one-third of arable land fallow every 
year. Mouzelis argues that this was an inevitable consequence of large land 
ownership in the newly founded Greek state; “big landed property, because it 
takes advantage of the rigidity of land supply, whether in capitalist of feudal 
form, constitutes an obstacle to the growth of industrial capitalism” (1978:76, 
1980). 
 
A foreseeable consequence of the changing status in ciftlik ownership and 
cultivation methods was the peasant uprisings that occurred in Thessaly and 
other parts of Greece at the beginning of the twentieth century. The uprisings 
were in protest at decreasing standards of living, the ambivalent legal rights of 
the colligi and the broken promises of the Greek state. The most notorious 
uprising took place in the village of Kileler near Larisa, Thessaly, in 1909/1910 
                                                 
48
 The „currant disaster‟ had significant economic repercussions which were compounded when 
Greece went to war with Turkey in 1897 (Campbell and Sherrard 1968:97). For further 
discussion see Andreades (1906). 
 100 
following the torture of numerous colligi
49
. Based on contemporary narrative 
accounts and local newspaper reports, Karanikolas presents the collective 
feeling among Greeks that they were residing in “the state of the Ciftlikades; 
they were neither human, nor Greeks, nor Christian” (1980:149). 
 
The primary cause of the peasant uprisings was the rapidly deteriorating living 
conditions of the colligi
50
. The power to change social relations through the 
political system was also curtailed due to the voting persuasions of the workers 
being determined by the political loyalty of their ciftlik masters (Karanikolas 
1980:153). Hence organised revolt was the only path for the colligi to publicly 




 February 1883 a Member of Parliament for Attica named Zigomalas 
was once again defending the colligi of Thessaly for their constant uprisings 
against the new Greek Ciftlikades. His argument is of particular interest for he, 
in a nut shell, exposes the social and political problem of Thessaly after the 
annexation: 
 
“how do you expect the people of Thessaly to feel knowing that they now have a free 
country when they are not entitled to their own land?” (Karanikolas 1980:153-154).  
 
Indeed, it has been noted that under the sporadic Trikoupis government of the 
late nineteenth century, many of the peasant workers were lamenting the 
deterioration of living conditions under Greek rule: 
 
“where are you poor Tourkiko! (The Turk) How better we were before … we (now) 
experience policemen and mayors far worse than the worst Turks” (ibid.:156). 
 
Nikolaos Tarbazis, a Member of Parliament from the village of Zarko, Trikala, 
was one of many instrumental figures in the organisation of colligi uprisings. 
Armed groups of colligi refused to hand over the agreed amount of grain to the 
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 The film To Choma Vaftike Kokkino (Blood on the Land [1965]) charts the violent peasant 
uprisings of early twentieth century Thessaly. 
50
 This is illustrated by some refinements in the official relationship between landlord and 
peasant worker. Now the colligi were obliged to obtain written permission every time they 
wanted to go outside the limits of the ciftlik (Karanikolas 1980:150-152, „Aneksartisia tis 
Larisas‟ 8/8/1982). Furthermore, the Ciftlikades retained power over the „bodies of the wives 
and daughters of the colligi‟. 
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Ciftlikades. The landlords responded in type by forming a paid armed force of 
approximately 150 Turk-Albanians. The running battles between the paid army 
and the colligi plagued Thessaly for many years, during which Tarbazis was 
jailed three times for instigating popular uprisings (Karanikolas 1980:159). 
 
In Thessaly, Christakis Zografos, a Greek banker, was considered one of the 
harshest of the Ciftlikades. He became infamous for the amount of beatings, 
killings and multiple evictions of his tenants. On 5
th
 March 1883 Tarbazis 
revealed in parliament some of the torturous persecutions inflicted by Zografos 
and his administrators; his argument echoes other pro-worker politicians of the 
time and highlights once again the disillusionment with idea of „the 
Independence‟ at the grassroots level: 
 
“how do you expect the colligi of Thessaly and Epirus to fight for their country when 
they know that their families are without protection, a roof, a handful of land for 
burial of their parents whose lawful rights have been stolen, who are tortured in a 
million ways, and in the end they are expelled as slaves” (Karanikolas 1980:161). 
 
This announcement was one among many that referred to the multiple 
alterations of living conditions post-annexation. Not only were the colligi 
subjected to physical abuse, but their land was no longer inalienable and the 
inheritance rights that their ancestors had enjoyed had been revoked. In 
response, Zografos, through the mediation of Prime Minister Trikoupis, 
attempted to bribe Tarbazis with the offer of the position of vice-director of the 
National Bank of Greece. This position would be a trade-off for the cessation of 
Tarbazis‟ involvement with the peasant uprisings in Thessaly. Tarbazis‟ 
response was steadfast: 
 
“Mr Prime Minister, thank you but I refuse. I do not fight for personal interests but 
for the collectivities of Thessaly who were suffering under the Turkish Ciftlikades 
and now under Zografos. I fight for my people – this is what my father taught me to 
do. I have sworn to fight for the freedom of my compatriots because my compatriots 
are slaves in a free country” (Karanikolas 1980:163-164)51. 
 
                                                 
51
 The same feelings were observed among the people of Thessaly in 1913 after the Bulgarian 
war, Sarafis notes; „I remember a soldier telling me “for which country should I fight for when 
my family is poor and the owner evicts me from the land that my forefathers were living on for 
hundreds of years, because I did not cultivate the fields because I was fighting for the nation? 
What kind of state is this? Where are the preachings and the promises?” (Karanikolas 1980:174). 
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It is widely acknowledged that despite a „progressive administration‟ Trikoupis 
failed to provide a substantial agrarian policy, preferring instead to focus on 
rebuilding the nation‟s fragile communications infrastructure. The pressure 
mounting on the government to address the agrarian issue and bring to a close 
their ever increasing economic dependence on the Ciftlikades was escalating. 
The process was brought to the fore after the coup d‟état of 1909 which was a 
result of growing discontent with both internal and external issues (Doukas 
1945:83, 85). The installation of Eleutherios Venizelos as Prime Minister in 
October 1910 came with a promise of sweeping economic reforms that would 
benefit Greece in its entirety. In 1910 a separate Ministry of Agriculture, 
Commerce and Industry was formed on the bases of the 1901 Greek 
Agricultural Society (later to become the Ministry of Agriculture in 1917). The 
aims of the newly established Ministry were to „develop national resources, 
organise and channel productive resources and ultimately further raise the 
standard of living through an increase in national income‟. To public acclaim the 
agricultural economy of Greece began to encounter progressive change 
(ibid.:86). 
 
Agrarian Reforms: 1917 onwards 
 
The importance of the ciftlik system to present socio-economic conditions in 
Trikala becomes apparent when we consider the land reforms that began in 
1917. Karavidas, a prominent agronomist (agrotologos) hired by the Greek 
Agricultural Bank at the time, officially labelled this process „a crisis‟ in 1930 
(Karavidas 1931:173, Mazower 1991:75-79)
52
. For one, the redistribution of the 
ciftliks allowed a new route for social mobility as people could sell their 
smallholdings and reinvest the capital elsewhere, often in educating their 
children. Concepts of social status thus began to be detached from purely land 
ownership, a central theme when considering notions of prestige in twenty-first 
century Trikala. 
 
                                                 
52
 For an interesting comparison on the agrarian reform and the break up of the great estates 
(latifundi) in Southern Italy see Vanzetti and Meissner (1953), Rossi-Doria (1958), Ginsborg 
(1984), Pipyrou (2010b). 
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The land reform legislation was first implemented in 1917 by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, although it did not become fully operational until after 1922. The 
heart of the reform legislation was the redistribution of the ciftlik lands to 
peasant workers in the form of individual smallholdings for private cultivation 
(Sanders 1962:65, Mouzelis 1978:78, Sant Cassia and Bada 1992:10). Yet the 
effects of the reform took a long time to filter down from governmental level 
before the centuries-old system of great estates and peasant workers could be 
altered. 
 
The original law, No. 1072 of November 18
th
, 1917, provided the basis for 
partial expropriation and sequestration of lands. This was followed by a decree 
on 14
th
 February 1923, after the Asia Minor disaster and the influx of refugees 
to Greece, that allowed for wide scale expropriation without compensation to 
the proprietors of medium-size as well as large estates (Pentzopoulos 1962:152). 
Campbell notes that in Epirus it was not until 1927 that the division of ciftlik 
land was substantially implemented (Campbell 1964:15). Sanders also states 
that in 1953, some thirty-six years after the initial reform plans, many people 
around Larisa, Thessaly, were still awaiting their promised allocation of land 
(1962:67). In the context of Zakynthos which operated under a similar system to 
the ciftliks of central Greece, Theodossopoulos notes that it was not until the 
1960s that land began to be redistributed from the large old-established estates 
of the island owned by two brothers, descendents of an old noble Zakynthian 
family. It was only when the nephew, who disapproved of the remnants of 
feudalism, inherited the estate that plots of land were sold off to local farmers 
(2003:31-32). 
 
Despite this apparent lack of reform in many areas of Greece, pressure was 
rapidly mounting on the landlords holding big estates to sell or distribute plots to 
the landless farmers (ibid.:34). In Attica, the prefecture to the south-west of 
Thessaly, Iliopoulos notes: 
 
“This audacious agrarian policy of expropriation, which allowed in general each 
proprietor to keep only 30 hectares of cultivatable land, has permitted landless 
inhabitants of Attica to become owners. This right was acquired on condition of 
complete payment of the value of the plots acquired and with the obligation of 
cultivation under penalty of forfeiture” (Iliopoulos 1951 in Sanders 1962:65). 
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Nevertheless, Thessaly is the par-excellence example of agrarian reform in 
Greece due to its unprecedented rich fertile land, complex history of land 
ownership, and the sheer size of the farm holdings (an average of over eleven 
acres per household compared to less than ten throughout most of mainland 
Greece and five acres in Epirus and the Peloponnese) (Sanders 1962:66, also 
Sivignon 1976, Mazower 1991:75, Sant Cassia and Bada 1992:10). By 1930 
most of the great estates of Thessaly had been converted to land for private 
cultivation. The Ciftlikades were allowed to keep an area up to 500 acres but no 
more. This meant that 1.5 million acres of land was to be redistributed 
nationwide. Until the reforms, half of the Thessaly plain had been owned by a 
single landlord from Larisa who would retain his maximum 500 acres after the 
redistribution. It was the desire of the government that the remainder of the land 
was to be destined for the peasant farmers (Sanders 1962:67). However even 
this was begrudged by the Ciftlikades and some sought to privately sell off as 
much land as possible before the government expropriated it. To facilitate this 
they exploited obscure legal loopholes, adding additional bureaucratic 




There were many practical problems with the redistribution of the ciftlik lands. 
As well as the bureaucratic and political troubles of expropriation and 
redistribution, the land given to the peasant farmers was often scattered and thus 
complicated to manage. Another issue was that the former domka system of 
leaving one-third of the collective village land fallow every year was disrupted 
by the new individual landholdings and the pressures to commence growing 
commercial crops to increase the financial productivity of the land (Sanders 
1962:68, Kontogiorgi 2003:76). More practical problems also arose. Karavidas 
notes for example that under the Ciftlikades, peasant workers were required to 
keep irrigation ditches clear. However, after the redistribution the farmers no 
longer seemed concerned with the maintenance of such ditches (Karavidas 1931 
in Sanders 1962:341). This, Karavidas argues, is due to the fact that “the 
traditional aspirations of our rural population do not lie in farming … When the 
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 Such opportunist entrepreneurship can lead to historic alterations of the socio-economic 
structure, the „influence of which is still sometimes found today‟ (Lisón-Tolosana 1966:5). 
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harvest is a success, the surplus is used to open a shop or to send the son to 
Athens to study law!” (1931:496, see also Friedl 1962, Mazower 1991, Argyrou 
1996). This seems to be supported by other ethnographic accounts such as that 
of Sant Cassia and Bada that presents how when ciftliks were sold off to peasant 
workers, instead of continuing to work the land many new landowners actually 
uprooted and moved to Athens, using the financial capital gained to educate 
their children and “enter into lucrative state employment or politics” (1992:10). 
Hence a preference for other modes of economic livelihood was being displayed 
on the part of the peasant workers, which in turn inevitably alters concepts of 
social status and mobility. 
 
Additionally, Campbell notes, there was a substantial increase in disputes over 
escaped animals trespassing on the land of other farmers. The competition 
between families was not so apparent under the ciftlik system as families often 
came together in collective opposition to their (Greek) landlord. After 
redistribution some people resented the land given to others in the village and 
this heightened the level of distrust within the community (1976:21). 
 
The government reasoning for redistributing land in separated strips was indeed 
logical. The idea was that by employing this system every new land owner 
would be allocated land of differing quality and specialisation (Karavidas 
1931:159). However, the farmers often found this system inconvenient and 
many did not want or need certain pieces of land that they were allocated. In 
order to combat the problem of small separated strips of land some smallholders 
decided to pool their resources together and combine their land. In Nees Karyes, 
south of Larisa, Thessaly, twenty-three men with the smallest and most detached 
pieces of land pooled their farms and agricultural resources in 1952. The total 
area of this collaboration came to 575 acres for one extended farm. In order to 
cultivate the mass of land to its full potential, the men sought the advice of an 
agricultural specialist and bought a tractor and other machinery on his 
recommendation (Sanders 1962:69). A cooperative initiative thus came into 
existence as an indirect consequence of the original land reform. This method of 
pooling agricultural resources is still very common in much of Thessaly today 
but in 1952 the residents of Nees Karyes deemed this alternative economic path 
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an absolute “necessity” (ibid., cf. Lisón-Tolosana 1966 in context of Spain and 




Echoing many narratives of hardship that I have come across in contemporary 
Trikala, one Greek official in the 1950s told Sanders: 
 
“today there is less income per family, less food, and the land values go up. Those 
that have more land become better off, leading to totally new economic and social 
distinctions in the villages.  Many of our farmers are trying to make a living on such 
small farms that all they produce is hate … That is why you see here in Athens many 
strong, healthy men selling matches. They have no work to do either in their villages 
or here in the city” (1962:70). 
 
The consequences of the 1917-1930s agrarian reforms were still being felt long 
into the 1960s. The redistribution of land meant that the peasants could now 
choose what crop to cultivate, where to sell their surplus produce and how to 
reinvest the profit (if any). They also had greater freedom to diversify or indeed 
sell-up and re-invest the financial capital in another enterprise. One of the long-
term consequences of the reforms was the mechanisation of land cultivation. 
Pre-reform, the majority of the Ciftlikades had refused to invest in new 
machinery to improve production on their lands. Yet by 1962 Thessaly had 
become the most mechanised region of Greece (Sanders 1962)
55
. This was 
partially due to the advent of the cooperatives which allowed for the pooling of 
financial capital in order to purchase such expensive items as tractors and 
mechanical ploughs (cf. Layton 2000 in context of rural France). The 
mechanisation was accelerated by the fact that many farmers lost a lot of 
livestock and beasts of burden during the German occupation and civil war. 
Therefore after the wars they chose to re-invest in technology rather than 
replacing the resources they had lost. People who had animals before the 
upheavals were able to gain an economic advantage in terms of technological 
advancement by investing in tractors. Consequentially, with an increased yield 
and small surplus farmers re-invested in the land and the machinery and by the 
1960s began to dispel the nonchalant disinterest previously shown by many 
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 Indeed, Lisón-Tolosana argues that in Spain agrarian reforms have brought about a high 
number of “economically discontented people” with laws that are favourable towards those who 
were „better off‟ and can dictate what they paid labourers (1966:42). 
55
 For a comparative example of the effects of mechanisation on a rural community see Layton 
(2000). 
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Thessaloi towards their newly acquired land. Yet another form of 
disillusionment had been overcome and peasant farmers recovered a sense of 
inalienability with their mode of livelihood (Sanders 1962:84). 
 
The Impact of the Refugees on Land Reform 
 
The acceleration of expropriations in the 1920s was made absolutely necessary 
due to the influx of refugees to Greece following the compulsory exchange of 
populations with Turkey after the Asia Minor disaster
56
 (Mouzelis 1978:78). 
The Treaty of Lausanne was finalised in July 1923. In accordance with the 
treaty, “all Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established on 
Turkish territory (except for Greek inhabitants of Constantinople) and all the 
Greek nationals of Moslem religion established on Greek territory (except the 
Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace) are forcibly exchanged” (Pentzopoulos 
1962:52). 
 
According to the Educational Institute of Greece, 1.2 million refugees resettled 
in Greece after the exchange of populations and an additional 750,000 
individuals had already fled to Greece prior to the treaty due to the dense air of 
uncertainty concerning Greece‟s position in Asia Minor (Pentzopoulos 1962:48, 
see also Hirschon 1989). Between 34,659 and 35,288 refugees were relocated to 
Thessaly, 2.8 per cent to 3.1 per cent of the total (depending on the statistical 
source). According to the 1928 census, of that number in Thessaly, 740 took up 
residence in Trikala nomos (N.S.S.G. 1933 in Bennison 1977:238). At first 
glance this number may appear insignificant, yet the resulting acceleration in 
land reforms relating to the assimilation of these people into the Greek economy 
had significant implications for the people of Thessaly (cf. Karavidas 1931, 
Pentzopoulos 1962, Bennison 1977:104, Mouzelis 1978:19). For one, the influx 
of refugees to central Greece meant that the area of grassland available for 
farming on the plains significantly reduced (Campbell 1964:8). Reflecting the 
trend on a national level, the majority of the remaining ciftliks, such as the 
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 For a discussion of the war with Turkey, 1919-1922, see Pentzopoulos (1962), Clogg (1992), 
Hirschon (1989). 
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estates of Mount Athos in the north of the country, were quickly expropriated to 
provide smallholdings for the resettled populations (Clogg 1992:103).  
 
Despite attempts by the government to integrate the refugees into the Greek 
economy, many struggled to compete in the existing agricultural markets and 
lived in „refugee quarters‟ on the edge of towns (Sanders 1962:67-68, Hirschon 
1989, Clogg 1992:103)
57
. Indeed, it was the policy of the government to 
prioritise rural settlements of refugees rather than people who were relocated to 
urban areas. Hence many villages were re-established in rural Greece as entire 
entities, carbon copies of their previous forms (Hirschon 1989:257). 
 
Pentzopoulos argues that “any sudden and anomalous increase in the population 
of a country has obviously far-reaching economic repercussions” (1962:143). 
This is because the newcomers are as much producers and consumers as the host 
population. In the case of the population exchange, the economic repercussions 
were exaggerated due to the state of the recovering Greek economy after a 
decade of war. Initially, a 20 per cent population increase crippled the already 
strained resources. The problem was exacerbated further by the completely 
destitute nature of the new arrivals, many of whom had no means to support 
themselves, and often no clothes or covers. Hence rapid agricultural and urban 
reforms were absolutely necessary to accommodate the new arrivals and 
minimise the extensive financial liability they posed to the state and consolidate 
a recovering economy.  
 
During the years following the Asia Minor catastrophe, Greece experienced a 
period of prosperity and progress. Despite the fact that over half of the annual 
budget was spent on accommodating the refugees, they themselves eventually 
played a central role in this inter-war economic recovery
58
. Pentzopoulos argues 
                                                 
57
 According to Sanders, the „land hunger‟ exhibited by the Asia Minor refugees arriving in 
Greece was partially due to the extensive lands available to them in the relatively sparsely 
populated lands of the Turkish interior (1962:67). On the political level the refugees thus 
became „interest groups‟ in their own right (Karakasidou 1997:149, Hirschon 2000:164, 
Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2001:398). 
58
 It has been suggested that the immense financial burdens incurred by the Greek state after the 
exchange of populations may have contributed to the Greek financial bankruptcy in 1932 
(Pentzopoulos 1962:145, Svoronos 1981:4, Mazower 1991). 
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that it was due to the competitive conditions into which they were resettled that 
the refugees were aggressive and established successful enterprises. Their 
modes of livelihood were often based on strategies adapted from their previous 
lives in Asia Minor and thus were innovative in the context of Greece 
(ibid.:144-145, 150, 160). He suggests that the unconstitutional way in which 
after the February 14
th
 decree of 1923, land was reclaimed by the state without 
compensation demonstrates the rapid response of the government to provide 
refugees with smallholdings (ibid.:152). Indeed, Greece was widely 
acknowledged as possessing the most revolutionary agricultural policy in 
Eastern Europe, with over 50 per cent of land within her borders affected by the 
reforms. As Pentzopoulos puts it: 
 
“The influx of the refugees constituted the coup de grâce on the big estates, even the 
monastic ones, which were literally swept away. By 1925, 1,496 land properties were 
expropriated and after 1930 “it [was] difficult to find, throughout the length and 
breadth of Greece, an estate exceeding 1,200 acres” (1962:152-153 original 
emphasis). 
 
The primary aim of such an extensive land reform package was to encourage 
independent peasant-proprietors to take an active interest in increasing 
production levels. This aspiration was still linked to the long-term aim of 
making Greece self-sufficient in grain production – a goal that had first been set 
after the 1892 currant crisis. The relatively unstable financial climate of the 
1920s, when crisis and prosperity were perpetually exchanging places, meant 
that the government was met with little resistance from the landholders as long 












The Economic Crisis of 1929-1932  
 
Following the exchange of populations Greece experienced a period of 
enhanced economic growth. The newfound prosperity was facilitated by the 
diversification in the national labour market established by the new arrivals, 
such as the early 1920s tobacco boom, and the upward trend in global market 
investment. However, as the decade drew to a close economic change was 
imminent. The events of the 1929-1932 crisis were not solely a Greek problem. 
One of the most infamous chapters in world economic history was the 1929 
collapse of the Wall Street stock markets and the economic depression of the 
1930s (Mishara 2008). The crash of the overseas markets which ensued led to an 
atmosphere of uncertainty and instability in more peripheral economic regions 
such as Greece. 
 
The first blow, an obstruction of Greek wine exports to France, was to hit at 
both the macro level of the national economy and the level of the small-scale 
producers; state, growers, merchants and workers were all implicated (Mazower 
1991:116). This impediment was in violation to a recent trade agreement and 
meant that attempts to diversify Greek exports actually led to a formation of a 
Greek wine cartel that had the homogenising effect of discouraging competition 
between exporters to the remaining markets in Germany and Britain (ibid.:115). 
The wine embargo was just the beginning of many more serious things to come. 
 
The negative effects of the wine trade violation were aggravated further as 
Greece continued to rely on the exports of tobacco and currants, an issue that 
had not been addressed since the currant crisis of 1892. The parallel crisis in the 
tobacco markets was at the centre of the 1929-1932 slump. Augmented because 
of American reluctance to purchase prime oriental tobacco due to the economic 
situation in the United States, Greek producers had to compete with those in 
Bulgaria and Turkey in providing alternative cheap tobacco to the United States 
of America. Thus large-scale companies were preferred to provide cheaper 
tobacco, meaning that the small-scale producers were left in a poor bargaining 
position. Some peasant farmers were unable to diversify and the falling tobacco 
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prices left several areas of Greece in a state of famine, necessitating tax 
exemptions in 1930 (ibid.:117, Svoronos 1981). 
 
Far from the export complications impacting only major corporates or capitalist 
structures, Karavidas locates the foremost force of the export crisis in small-
scale farming businesses in northern and central Greece. He writes that the unit 
for analysing the crisis is more appropriately, 
 
“The personal, classical, provincial Greek community which … permits the local 
Greek peasants to exploit their produce, their personal capital and their own surplus 
labour, on the spot and indeed not only as producers, but also as traders and 
manufacturers” (1981:13 in Mazower 1991:118). 
 
During the boom years of the 1920s many agriculturalists secured loans either 
from money-lenders or the National Bank, leading to what came to be termed 
„the capitalisation of the countryside‟. Accusations circulated that the farmers 
had spent their loans on petty consumer goods, although some capital was also 
invested in hiring extra workers to harvest the increasing amounts of crop. 
Hence, in Thessaly, there was a seasonal trend for agricultural labourers to 
migrate northwards to assist the collection of the tobacco harvest due to the 
promise of a secure wage. The downturn in agricultural markets and the inability 
to diversify meant that many of the loans could not be repaid during the early 
1930s. The only way to avert immediate financial catastrophe was to borrow 
more money from the newly established Agricultural Bank to meet repayments 
demanded by existing creditors
59
 (Mazower 1991:119-120). 
 
In Thessaly the average income of a farming family fell from 19,200 drachmas 
to 12,330 drachmas in only one year partially due to the decreasing 
opportunities for seasonal migrant labour and partially because of local issues 
concerning the declining market for commercial crops. The circumstances 
severely jeopardised the recently implicated land reform programme as newly 
formed smallholders were beginning to declare themselves bankrupt (Mazower 
1991:130). Giorgos, 90 years old, remembers the effects of the 1929-1932 crisis 
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 The refugee populations were the first to suffer the full affects of the credit crisis when their 
debts had to be defaulted. The money had originally been loaned in order for the refugees to 
construct a new livelihood and become brokers (Mazower 1991:122). 
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on his village, 10 kilometres south of Trikala. Giorgos‟ father was a small-hold 
farmer who obtained his land from an expropriated ciftlik in 1925. Giorgos‟ two 
older brothers regularly assisted with both the olive harvest in the Peloponnese 
and the tobacco harvest near Kavala. As subsistence farmers his family did not 
suffer directly from the market crash, but he recalled the difficult situation at the 
time: 
 
“There was no work for my brothers those years. Neither in the north 
nor in the south. They stayed at home. The money coming into our 
family was maybe half of the previous five years. Of course nobody 
thinks of this now, the younger people, that we had to migrate to 
supplement our income. No one does this nowadays … My brothers 
being at home not only meant we had less money those years, but they 
were eating at home as well. I was helping my father and the other 
villagers collect the crop, as much as a young boy could. We had a lot 
that year, perhaps more than usual so we were okay, we had none to 
sell at the market, but then we never really did. I heard stories of poor 
people up there (he gestures towards the northern mountains, implying 
north) that lost everything. Many had very little to lose but the 
government did not help them”. 
 
I ask him how the farmers on the plain of Thessaly experienced the crisis, 
 
“Like I say, we were not as bad as elsewhere but we suffered with the 
income. The crops were good … other people who were bigger farmers 
than us could not sell their goods so they often stored it or shared it 
with other people”. 
 
The agriculturalists around Trikala felt very distant from what was happening on 
„the markets‟ in the global sense, but the local consequences were mainly 
focused on falling prices for surplus grain, seasonal unemployment and eventual 
hoarding of foodstuffs. Accounts such as Giorgos‟ can be understood as 
furnished with a degree of national consciousness. Although the generation of 
informants born before the Axis occupation and subsequent civil war in the 
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1940s generally demonstrate less of a tendency to relate to „national‟ historical 
events as if they had severe „local‟ impacts (as we shall see in the case of the 
1941-1943 Great Famine), events such as the 1929-1932 economic crisis occupy 
a significant place in the collective consciousness. In Trikala, the „intelligentsia‟ 
are more likely to relate to the national consequences of the 1929-1932 crisis 
and its global impact, whereas the Great Famine is recalled more frequently by 
the whole cross-section of society. This could be attributed to a number of 
factors, including the fact that the Great Famine superseded the 1929-1932 crisis 
chronologically, the effects were more homogeneously felt across the nation and 
the ideological causes of the Great Famine were more relatable and pliable. 
Additionally, blame for the Great Famine was much easier to locate within the 
conceptual reality of most Trikalinoi. 
 
The economic and environmental conditions of other parts of Greece have 
always had an impact on the economic circumstances of Trikalinoi 
agriculturalists. Climatic extremes in another part of the country, declining local 
markets or even crop disease could have subsidiary effects on people in other 
regions. Dimitris, 68, comes from a family who have worked the land around his 
village Mikrochori, near Kalampaka, for generations. He describes how until the 
late 1980s many young men of his village went to work harvesting the olive 
groves in the Peloponnese, stating that this was to supplement the family income 
at a time when the women could be left to tend the land around Mikrochori. 
Even in 2007 Dimitris had to do „odd jobs‟ in the village in order to enhance his 
700 euro per month income from the state pension. He declares that; 
 
“People do not do those jobs anymore. They are considered as below 
the standard of a Greek. Until recently we all used to go to the 
Peloponnese every year to help with the olive harvest. We would get a 
small wage, a place to sleep and our food (although some people did 
sleep outside). It was a good time to be together as well as earning 
money to bring back to our families. It made our livelihood a little 
more comfortable; we even relied on this work when our own crop was 
not good. Now it is considered the work of the Albanians (implying all 
immigrants) to go to the Peloponnese and the Greeks won‟t go down 
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and work there anymore. They don‟t want to work next to an Albanian 
they would rather sit on Asklipiou drinking their frappé and watching 
the girls, even though unemployment is high … Some years we 
couldn‟t go, or we would get there and there was no work for us. 
Sometimes it was because the harvest was poor, maybe the winter was 
dry or there was a severe heat wave. Other times it was because they 
could not pay us. May be they had a bad harvest the year before or 
perhaps they were not selling enough at the market in town, I don‟t 
know, but sometimes we would have to come straight back home 
again. And it was a tough journey, no proper roads when we were 
young … We got to know the people down there and they knew us, 
they would get us work if they could”. 
 
This account from Dimitris helps highlight the integrated nature of local 
economies within the national context. Hence the implications of the 1929-1932 
economic crisis in the tobacco and currant production locales can begin to be 
contemplated within a broader context, emphasising the point that the state, 
growers, merchants, and workers were all affected by the crisis (Mazower 
1991:116). The dual facets of the declining opportunities for seasonal migrant 
labour and the ancillary effects of falling market prices meant that 
agriculturalists on the plain of Thessaly resorted to hoarding grain as both a 
matter of necessity and an insurance policy. Interestingly, the hoarding of olive 
oil during the current economic crisis has also been considered an insurance 
policy against austerity measures and an unstable currency, a practice mirrored 











The Turmoil of the 1940s Part One: occupation and famine 
 
Two significant crises impacted on Greece during the 1940s, both of which had 
emphatic social, political and economic consequences. Firstly, the Great Famine 
of 1941-1943 during the German occupation and secondly the civil war of 1946-
1949. The two events are by no means mutually exclusive and are intertwined 
within social and historical narratives. It is the former of these crises that will 
first be considered. 
 
An estimated 300,000 people died in Athens alone during the Great Famine of 
1941-1943 and to this day this crisis in particular remains at the forefront of 
narratives of crisis in Greece (Hart 1996:29). Many of the problems with the 
food shortage were caused by the expropriation of food stuffs and resources as 
German troops advanced through Greece (Mazower 1993:23-26). The troops 
resided in private houses in order to avoid bombing, many of which were 
severely looted. Everything that could be used was stolen and then the timber 
was used as firewood. The situation got so horrific that even the German 
hierarchy were lamenting the „catastrophic supply situation‟ and advised that the 
army should be bringing supplies into the country rather than taking them out 
(ibid.:24). However, Greece was near the bottom of the list when it came to 
providing substantial food supplies, with the Reich preferring to concentrate on 
the situation in Belgium, Holland and Norway (ibid.:31). Even if the Axis 
powers had been determined to maintain an acceptable level of nutrition in 
Greece they would have had a nigh-impossible task as most of Greece‟s supplies 
were imported by sea (including 600,000 tons of grain a year) and rail. As soon 
as Greece was occupied the sea routes became systematically blocked and the 
people running the railways from Belgrade and Sofia were preoccupied with 
supplying the Axis troops in the Balkans (Sweet-Escott 1954:93). 
 
As the Foreign Director of the Near East Foundation in Athens, Laird Archer,
60
 
recalls from first-hand observations, how the Nazis confiscated hospital food 
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 Laird Archer (1892-1981) was born in Argonia, Kansas. He worked for Henry J. Allen 
Publications prior to becoming Governor Allen's secretary in 1920. Between 1922 and 1923, 
Archer worked for Near East Relief, where he analysed refugee problems in Russia, Turkey, and 
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supplies and sealed off entire markets, annexing the supplies for their own 
troops and machine-gunning down any live poultry before repossessing the 
farmland (Archer 1944:196-197). Indeed, Archer‟s observations in the vicinity 
of Athens, recorded in his diary and published in 1944, are both extremely 
fascinating and an important source of first hand information concerning the 
consequences of the first stage of the Axis occupation. He recounts how dairy 
herds were „reserved‟ for German soldiers who slaughtered many cattle herds 
for meat. The ministry of agriculture estimated that the domestic supply of milk 
was cut by one-third due to the slaughtering (ibid.:197, Mazower 1993:30). 
 
Archer provides a detailed account of how retail outlets were systematically 
looted by German soldiers. By using a currency known as „Occupation Marks‟ – 
a currency with no value outside of Greece – German soldiers were ordered to 
purchase anything and everything from retail outlets and ship the goods home to 
the Reich, thus devastating the commercial centre of Athens (Archer 1944:198). 
The purpose of the practice was threefold; “it will please the Nazi troops, it will 
make their people at home feel they‟re getting something out of the endless 
fighting, and it will help to enfeeble Greece” (ibid.). Obviously the economic 
consequences of this strategy were immense. Firstly, there was a currency that 
had little or no value, especially outside of Athens. Secondly, shopkeepers 
began to hide many products from the soldiers, thus facing closure if they were 
discovered. Additionally, by taking the products off the shelves, they were also 
taken out of the reach of the everyday customers. Thirdly, prices went up 
excessively over a short period of time as shopkeepers attempted to discourage 
such loot-buying – yet the effects of this actually hampered the local people and 
not the soldiers as the price of all available food at the time was far beyond the 
reach of the indigent (Hionidou 2006:44, 48). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Iraq. In 1930, Archer became Foreign Director of the Near East Foundation and remained at that 
post until 1952, when he retired. Archer also chaired the American Reparation Committee in 
1941 and the Coordinating Committee of American Agencies for Reconstruction Planning in 
1942 and 1943. Archer publications include The Balkan Journal (1944). Composed of excerpts 
from his diary, The Balkan Journal deals chiefly with international affairs between June 1934 
and August 1941 (http://libinfo.uark.edu/specialcollections/findingaids/archer.asp). 
 
 117 
From his apartment window in the centre of the city, Archer recalls observing a 
squad of soldiers buying-up a leathergoods shop. They carried their newly 
acquired suitcases to the clothes shop next door and filled the suitcases, thus 
buying-out this store as well. They then entered the neighbouring camera store 
and emptied that as well. In the space of thirty minutes three families were put 
out of business with little chance of re-stocking and virtually no value to the 
money that was exchanged (1944:198). The next stage in the process, Archer 
testifies, was usually the “purchase” of the business itself and the installation of 
a German director. If sale of stock was refused, the owner was arrested and 
taken into internment. During the first few months of the 1941 occupation an 
estimated 2,000 factories of all sizes had been repossessed in Athens by the 
German authorities (ibid.).  
 
To make the shortage of food supplies worse, the exceptionally dry spring of 
1941 decreased the grain harvest by approximately 50 per cent over much of the 
mainland, when a full crop would have still been one third short of the necessary 
annual supply. The people to be most greatly affected by this were initially the 
unemployed, refugees and the families of mobilised men due to the sudden 
cessation of government food subsidies (ibid.:189, Hionidou 2006:33). Although 
this is the general rhetoric of the situation in 1941, Hionidou, a dedicated social 
scholar of the Great Famine, disputes the claim that agricultural production 
dropped so significantly during the Axis occupation. She claims that such 
statistics refer to the amount of production the Greek authorities actually 
managed to tax at the time (2006:68). The main difference in production and 
consumption, Hionidou argues, is that prior to the war the selling of grain and 
cereal to the government was optional but often obtained a good price. During 
the occupation this became compulsory in order to secure foodstuffs for 
rationing. Especially the residents of the Islands often refused to hand over the 
foodstuffs and pay the 10 per cent tax required due to the continuous 
miscalculation of output by the Greek authorities. Only with the impending 
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threat of German military intervention did these incidents of resistance come to 




Obviously, the famine was much more than merely a statistical problem. The 
psychological dimensions are at least as important. The people that lived 
through the famine were changed mentally, morally and politically (Mazower 
1993:41). Hence narratives of the Great Famine intertwine with other periods of 
economic pessimism, such as the financial crisis of 2008-onwards, creating a 
narrative „history of traumatic past‟ (Winichakul 2002:245). For one, attitudes to 
death were altered beyond comparison. Many Greek Orthodox practices could 
not be followed upon the death of a relative. Sometimes the bodies had to be 
abandoned, or at best were buried in a haphazard manner wherever people could 
dig through the frozen earth. The costs involved with a „proper‟ burial were just 
too high, in terms of petrol, transportation and Church permissions (Mazower 
1993:41). The narratives of the famine in Greece span many levels. They are 
embedded in the educational curricula, popular poetry, autobiography, collective 
history, politics, and both public and domestic discourse. 
 
One male informant, Stergios, 76 years old, who lived in Trikala during the 
occupation, narrates: 
 
“When I was a child during the war I used to play on the streets with 
the children of the neighbourhood. Sometimes the women would give 
us small pieces of stale bread to eat whilst we played. I remember that 
on more than one occasion I would eat a small piece of the bread and 
save the rest to take home to my mother. She would always accept the 
bread, poor woman, which by that time was dirty and covered in nasal 
excrement … We (the children) also made a habit of picking up any 
small crumbs that we could find on the streets of our neighbourhood”. 
 
In this case the informant actually recounted this story whilst being directly 
questioned about the twenty-first century economic crisis. The point of the 
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 For a detailed account of the black markets, inflation and economy of occupied Greece see 
Thomadakis (1981). 
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cultural proximity between two seemingly distant events becomes apparent, a 
proximity facilitated by a shared notion of crisis. 
 
Almost all the families of my informants had members who directly experienced 
the famine of 1941-1943, the consequences of which have been passed down 
through the generations, thus informing the current actions of many people. 
Narratives of the Great Famine have become embodied not only through 
narrative and discourse, but also through patterns of consumption. One such 
example is of how Trikalinoi nowadays insist on maintaining a very well 
stocked larder, in keeping with the hoarding practices during the famine and in 
fear of what consequences a new crisis might bring (Mazower 1993:32). The 
large freezers remain stocked with frozen fruit and vegetables which are bought 
in abundance on a regular basis. Indeed, the famine itself added an extra element 
to the importance of food in the Greek imagery (cf. Sutton 2001). 
 
The question “why do you not eat?” and the imperative statements “take some 
food” and “do not throw away the food” are commonplace in everyday life. One 
female informant, 65, explains: 
 
“We have experienced times when we had no food, especially our 
parents. We do not forget these times, we are told of how hard it was 
then … We, who did not even have a piece of bread to eat. Food 
cannot be wasted, and it must be appreciated, for even today not all of 
us have it”. 
 
I have experienced on many occasions bringing home food from „outside‟ after 
a day in the town or preparing to go out to a panagiri (celebration) where food 
would be plentiful. The reaction on both occasions is to crowd around the food 
and to make sure everybody in the immediate parea (company) is fed „before it 
runs out‟ (even though this is logically highly improbable). 
 
This fascination with food both on the level of narrative and consumption must 
be contextualised within a wider framework. The effects of the Great Famine 
ignited by the Axis occupation were not as severely felt in Trikala as in other 
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urban centres such as Athens (Bennison 1977:106, Hionidou 2006:34)
62
. This 
was due in part to the relative failure of the Germans to occupy mountainous 
regions of Thessaly; hence the plains also escaped the severity. Indeed, Trikala 
was one of the major centres of resistance to German forces during World War 
Two. The resistance forces were under the control of the Greek resistance 
organisation, EAM (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo), and its military wing, 
ELAS (Ellinikós Laïkós Apeleftherotikós Stratós), based in Trikala
63
. Another 
reason for the dilution of the crisis in Thessaly was the fact that many people 
still retained access to a small amount of basic produce due to their 
smallholdings and self-sufficient production techniques, something that was 
impossible in the major cities. However, due to the nature of Greek nationalism 
the plight of one part of the nation during the devastating famine, such as 
Athens, is recalled as if the narrative were a first-hand personal experience in 
Trikala. The crisis thus takes on a national importance even in the areas that 
were not so overwhelmingly affected. The accounts of the hardship in Athens 
during the Great Famine are well documented in educational history books and 
popular novels. For example, the majority of people can recite the fact that 
during the famine people were resorting to eating cats that they found on the 
streets of Athens (Psathas 1944). Thus the importance of the Great Famine in 
the social imagery of today should not be underestimated and will form the 
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 The Kalampaka pass, 20km north Trikala, was where the Greek and British Imperial forces 
joined to fend off the German progression through mainland Greece (Archer 1944:177). 
Important battles took place on the 12th of February 1943 at Oxyneia (Meritsa), on the 23rd of 




The Turmoil of the 1940s Part Two: Civil War 
  
The second major crisis in Greece during the 1940s was the civil war that 
devastated the country from 1946 to 1949. The conflict developed in multiple 
stages and thus the official dates vary, from 1941 to 1950. The roots of the crisis 
are indeed inextricably linked to the Axis occupation of Greece during the 
Second World War as the Axis powers employed methods of coercion and 
seduction to gain collaborators from the local populations. With the diverse 
economic, ethnic and cultural backgrounds of the occupied populations, fissures 
in the social composition were relatively easy to find. Previously sutured 
divisions were reopened and hostility was provoked between those who 
benefited and those that suffered from such collaborations (Iatrides 1981, Close 
1993:1, Fleisher 1995:48-49). Politically led by the KKE (Communist Party of 
Greece), many leftists, along with a large section of society that had suffered 
under the Axis occupation, vowed to avenge those who had benefited 
economically and socially. The withdrawal of the Axis forces only fuelled the 




 September 1941 EAM (the National Liberation Front) was founded as 
an organisation under the instruction of the KKE. EAM initially enjoyed 
immense popularity in Thessaly due to the KKE‟s “mastery of propaganda” that 
pitched „the people‟ against „the government‟ who were portrayed as benefiting 
from the consequences of war”64 (Woodhouse 1976:136, Hondros 1981, 
Grigoriadis 2010). EAM was soon to enjoy the political, humanitarian and 
military support of Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, as well as the ideological 
support of Stalinist Russia. 
 
EAM was originally comprised of staunch communists as a resistance to the 
occupying German and Italian forces; however the organisation gradually 
incorporated more liberal and middle class support in the early years of its 
existence. The military arm of EAM was ELAS (National Popular Liberation 
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 Both Iatrides (1972:149-150) and Hondros (1981:45) draw our attention to secret KKE orders 
to EAM/ELAS to cooperate with Allied forces during the occupation in order to „win over the 
middle classes‟ by the time of liberation. 
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Army) whose general headquarters were located in Trikala. EAM/ELAS 
intended to at least prevent the restoration of the monarchy and avoid a return to 
the pre-war persecution of the socialists; at best they planned to seize power in 
government in Athens (Campbell and Sherrard 1968:180, Close 1993:3, 
Fleischer 1995)
65
. As early as September 1943 the EAM/ELAS resistance forces 
were under attack from specially organised Security Battalions under German 
direction (Close 1993:4, Hart 1996). It is difficult to estimate the amount of 
support for EAM/ELAS in their resistance operations as the statistical records of 
the time are notoriously inaccurate; the range has been said to be between 
200,000 and 2,000,000 members (Hondros 1981:41-42). 
 
Until 1942 EAM/ELAS collaborated with EDES (Ellínikos Dímokratikos 
Ethnikós Strátos, Greek Democratic National Army) within the Thessaly region 
in waging guerrilla warfare against the Axis forces and opposing the 
government collaborators. However this uneasy coalition of ideologies – the 
communist EAM/ELAS and the increasingly rightist EDES – would soon turn 
into a bloody territorial war between the two organisations. In 1943 the 
skirmishes between the two organisations drastically increased. EDES enjoyed 
significant support from the British government as the British saw EAM as a 
threat to their traditional influence over Greece. Gradually EDES attracted 
members from a variety of ideological backgrounds and became simply known 
as the „anti-communist‟ organisation66. This label was also given to other non-
communist resistance groups in Greece that participated in localised editions of 
the national ideological conflict (Smith 1993:64). The northern regions of 
Thessaly bordering Greek Macedonia and the Pindos Mountains were especially 
affected during this stage of the civil war. The conflict was complicated further 
by the agreement of EAM to collaborate in a British patronised government at 
the same time that they were fearsomely fighting British-backed government 
forces. In 1944 approximately 22,000 EAM/ELAS fighters took on over twice 
the number of government forces, British Commonwealth troops, police, 
Security Battalions and Greek anti-communists, in Athens-Piraeus. ELAS 
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 EKKA (National and Social Liberation, Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeleftherosis) was an 
equivalent anti-communist party that fought running battles with EAM/ELAS but operated 
mainly in Sterea Ellada and disbanded in 1944 (cf. Close 1995:xii-xiv). 
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sources stated that over 1,000 rightist prisoners were captured and held near 




The 1943-1944 stage of the civil war was especially poignant in Trikala and 
“made a special impact on the public because the military leaders of these 
organizations were well known in the cities and allied with politicians” (Close 
1995:102). One such figure was Aris Velouchiotis who has been described as 
„an outstanding personality‟ and was famous for his charismatic speeches. Some 
of my informants claim personal connections with this figure, often saying that 
their fathers or grandfathers were his friends or acquaintances. One informant 
recalls the account of her late uncle: 
 
“Uncle Christos knew Aris. He was a familiar face around our villages. 
I remember him telling me that Aris was a pretty normal guy, but when 
he spoke people listened, he was convincing and people believed in 
him and the cause he was promoting … he knew how to work the 
audience … but he was a normal man really. I remember he said that 
Aris was not born in Thessaly but was adopted as one of our own …” 
 
Velouchiotis organised many of the guerrilla bands in central Greece and was 
one time leader of the ELAS army as well as simultaneously serving on the 
Central Committee of the KKE. When translated his name literally means „the 
god of war from Veloukhi‟ – the highest peak in the central Pindos range. His 
real name was Athanasios Klaras and although he was born in Lamia he spent 
most of his life in the mountains of Thessaly. He signed a declaration 
denouncing communism in 1939 when advised to do so by the KKE, however 
this was purely a political ploy. Interestingly, he often employed the notion of 
Greece as the „ciftlik of others‟, a situation that he vowed should never happen 
again (Woodhouse 1976:3-5). Velouchiotis was known for his brutal manner of 
warfare and tried to organise another phase of violence after EAM/ELAS had 
agreed to disarm and sign a truce with the British and Greek nationalist forces in 
early 1945. At this stage he denounced the KKE, left Trikala and set out once 
                                                 
67
 At the same time another 60,000 EAM/ELAS members were involved in fighting anti-
communist resistance bands in northern and western Greece (Close 1993:66, cf. Hondros 1981). 
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more into the Pindos range with a small band of devoted guerrillas. Whilst in the 
mountains he learnt through the Trikala-published Rizospastis journal that the 
ceasefire was still being upheld by the communist hierarchy. In the article 
Velouchiotis‟ name was especially mentioned as one who would „face 
punishment‟ if he continued to resist. He finally took his own life in June 1945 
whilst being pursued by communist bands in the Pindos Mountains. His severed 
head was hung from a lamppost in Trikala (Woodhouse 1976:140-141). 
 
Another such figure with personal connections to Trikala was Stefanos Sarafis, 
relative of the historian Lee Sarafis who provides a commentary on the civil war 
in central Greece (cf. Sarafis 2000). Stefanos Sarafis was an army colonel, and 
commander-in-chief, of ELAS from Trikala who died in an „accident‟ – he was 
hit by a car driven by an American Air Force lieutenant in Athens in 1957. 
There are narratives of his funeral in Trikala when the secret police were 
walking up and down Asklipiou to observe who was in attendance (Ioannou 
1981:63, Fleischer 1995). Stefanos Sarafis refused to declare allegiance to the 
king during the civil war. On 5 July 1943 he signed the „project of military 
cooperation‟ according to which all the guerrilla troops would collaborate 
against the Axis occupation under the direction of a collective general. He was 
elected as the representative for EDA for Larisa and Magnesia in 1956
68
. His 
statue now stands near the main square in the centre of Trikala. 
 
The violence of the civil war escalated in 1946 after both EAM/ELAS and the 
British failed to implement their promises of disarmament and political 
cooperation, known as the Varkiza Agreement. During the cessation in 
hostilities and the dissolution of the ELAS military wing a series of rightist 
attacks on communist outposts became notoriously known as the White Terror. 
Leftist retaliation was at first supposed to be a warning to the right not to 
continue with their „campaign or terror‟, yet the action actually had an opposite 
effect and the fighting intensified. The White Terror is typified in the historical 
record as a series of brutal killings by rightists against the left, who did not 
initially retaliate in order to honour their ceasefire agreement with the British. 
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 For accounts of Stefanos Sarafis during the civil war see Sweet-Escott (1954:23), Woodhouse 
(1976). 
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The White Terror is considered to be what instigated the renewed hostilities as 
the KKE led the communist forces into military conflict once again in order to 
“protect itself against its ideological enemies” (Iatrides 1981:152, Smith 1993, 
Close 1995). According to the official KKE publications, at the time of the 
White Terror 1,289 resistance fighters were murdered, 6,671 wounded, 31,632 
tortured, 84,931 arrested, 8,624 imprisoned, 677 offices of resistance 
organisations were attacked and 165 women members of EAM were raped 
without communist retaliation
69
. However, some scholars, such as Kalyvas, take 
a different stance when considering the White Terror. Kalyvas suggests that the 
leftist violence against the rightists, what he terms the Red Terror, is understated 
in the historical record. Kalyvas believes that this distortion is a consequence of 
the eventual „absolute defeat‟ of the communists, thus persecutions of the 
defeated side will inherently be emphasised in public discourse (2000:142). He 
concludes that the so-called Red Terror was a centrally planned process that was 
key to EAM‟s and the KKE‟s strategic goals (ibid.:143). 
 
Since ELAS had been disbanded under the Varkiza Agreement, EAM formed a 
new military wing; DSE (Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas, Democratic Army of 
Greece). DSE fought a bitter war against the Greek National Army (which was 
supported by the British and Americans) from 1946 to 1949 (Campbell and 
Sherrard 1968, Hart 1996:32). Throughout this period, Thessaly, Epirus and 
Greek Macedonia were the main focus of the fighting (Close 1993:7, 1995:193). 
In Thessaly participation in the hostilities rose by over 50 per cent between 1946 
and 1949 due to the successful recruitment drive of Vasiles Bartziotas. Left-
wing attacks on gendarmerie posts and patrols significantly increased to secure 
extra supplies, a feat that was pre-eminently demonstrated by the capture of the 
heavily fortified village of Deskati in northern Thessaly
70
 (Campbell and 
Sherrard 1968:182, Close 1995:193-195, Sarafis 2000:219). In 1946 Yugoslavia 
and Albania also increased their supply of weapons, food and medicines to the 
communist campaign. Close notes that in Thessaly the sympathy towards EAM 
was based in the resistance campaign of the organisation during the Axis 




 For a detailed account of the policing of Deskati during the Axis occupation and subsequent 
civil war, including an intriguing account of British-Indian Imperial troops stationed in the 
remote village, see Sarafis (2000). 
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occupation when the local people benefited from the line of supplies coming 
from the north (1995:194, Sweet-Escott 1954:60, Campbell and Sherrard 
1968:182). In December 1949 EAM/ELAS claimed one final sizeable victory in 
Thessaly by securing an urban centre when they captured the town of Karditsa, 
28 kilometres to the south of Trikala (Close 1995:112-113). 
 
EAM/ELAS enjoyed strong local support in Thessaly throughout the civil war, 
especially as their general headquarters were in Trikala (Woodhouse 1976: 134, 
Close 1995:134, 136, Clogg 2002:137). The mountainous regions that hemmed 
in the vast agricultural plain were strongholds of the communist resistance. Thus 
Thessaly and the neighbouring prefecture of Western Macedonia formed “a 
continuous area of left-wing strength, communicating with the hospitable 
territory of Yugoslavia” (Close and Veremis 1993:98-99). The main communist 
journal, Rizospastis was also published in Trikala during the civil war. This 
perception of the area as a communist stronghold would come to have an effect 
on the local populations during the military junta of 1967-1974 as many people 
were restricted in their movement, employment or even relocated. Indeed, 
Herzfeld notes that after the civil war, a vindictively victorious right-wing 
hounded all suspected communists and barred their children from good jobs and 
interfered with their access to social services (1991:38). The war was also 
fought on an economic level. The communist guerrillas in western Thessaly and 
the Pindos systematically destroyed electricity generators and water supplies, 
leaving much infrastructure damaged beyond repair. Therefore, economic 
stabilisation after the war would be tedious as the government had to deal with 
an immeasurable reconstruction programme (Herzfeld 1991:41). 
 
For the Trikalinoi, as in the majority of rural Greece, people attempted to 
continue with their everyday lives during the civil war (cf. Sarafis 2000:217). As 
previously mentioned, in Trikala I have come across numerous narratives of 
people directly affected by the civil war. Depending on political allegiance, left-
wing and right-wing narratives place the blame initially towards the external 
other – the interference of Britain and the US or Russia and Yugoslavia – but 
somewhat more tentatively inwards towards each other. 
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Patterns in the dissemination of blame can be linked to the political environment 
of the time (cf. Winichakul 2002). In Greece, the communist defeat created an 
intensely anti-communist government until 1974. It was only after the 
legalisation of the Greek Communist Party and the socialist government of 
1981-1989 that interest in the civil war as a topic of literary debate was 
substantially revived (Marantzidis and Antoniou 2004:223)
71
. Scholarly articles 
are often products of concurrent political rhetoric. For example, during the 
intensely anti-communist governments of 1945-1974, two out of three books on 
the civil war were anti-left but between 1974 and 2003 four out of five books 
were pro-left. Marantzidis and Antoniou argue that people brought up after 1974 
have been inducted to a „dominant left-wing model of the civil war‟. These 
discrepancies led to two main narratives of blame; the right wing calls this the 
national-minded (Ethnikofrones) versus traitors of the nation, the left wing 
divides civil war society into patriots versus collaborators-reactionaries 
(Marantzidis and Antoniou 2004:224). 
 
According to leftist accounts of blame abundant after the 1974 fall of the 
military junta, the civil war only began in 1946 and the conflict raging in Greece 
from 1941 was primarily a resistance war against the Axis occupation and their 
internal collaborators. In their discourse the Greek Axis collaborators are 
deprived of their national identity, thus actions against them are not considered 
part of the civil conflict. Thus fratricide was not part of the civil conflict 
hostilities as the opposition was not considered Greek. On the other hand, the 
right-wing rhetoric insists that the civil war began during the Axis occupation 
when various resistance groups began fighting each other. They evoke the 
infamous „three rounds‟ theory which attempts to prove that the Communist 
Party wanted to seize power in post-war Greece at all costs (ibid.). 
 
The right-wing rhetoric post-civil war was set against a backdrop of the Cold 
War and the reworked perspectives of the Second World War. The blame was 
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 According to Hart (1992:78) the civil war is often still a delicate issue to address in the public 
domain whilst the Second World War and the German occupation are less sensitive matters. 
This is due to the “opposing sympathies” of people within the same village. She notes that it was 
actually those with rightist sympathies which were most reluctant to raise the issue and those 
who did speak warned against repeating their comments so as not to “stir up bad feeling” with 
their version of history (1992:79). 
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directed outwards towards the interfering influences of the Soviet Union and 
communist Yugoslavia. The left-wing propaganda reversed these accusations 
towards the meddling British and American imperialism. Either way, from the 
mid 1970s the external Other was held responsible for the civil violence and, 
Marantzidis and Antoniou argue, this remains the accepted mainstream 
approach to this day (ibid.). 
 
Dionisis, 60, tells me of how, 
 
“the others wanted Greece for themselves after the German occupation 
… she was like a prize, like a cup won at the football … the Americans 
wanted it, the Russians wanted it, and they were all aggravating the 
situation”. 
 
From 1974 onwards any remnants of internal blame for the civil war, brothers 
against brothers, was assigned to the pages of history and a collective rhetoric 
against the external Other was wholly adopted, thus denying any „internal 
divisions and ambiguities in Greek society‟ (ibid.:225). Furthermore, the 
resistance against the occupying Other, the Axis forces, is presented as united, 
ignoring the internal civil conflict between factions such as ELAS and EDES. 
This presentation of collective unity was necessary in the 1980s and 1990s when 
the socialist PASOK, the central-right Nea Dimokratia and the Greek 
Communist Party all found themselves in the national government. 
 
At the grassroots level, narratives of blame are informed by personal experience 
as well as official and scholarly rhetoric. Most families in Trikala have relatives 
who have poignant narratives of the civil war. For example, there are many 
stories of kidnappings by communist guerrillas in the Pindos Mountains which 
obviously inform personal and collective opinions on the conflict. These 
narratives are abundant in Trikala partially due to the considerable geographical 
rural to urban movement of people to Trikala from the mountainous regions of 
Greek Macedonia during the civil war. Kidnappings and banditry were 
widespread in the mountainous northern regions at this time and some families 
 129 
currently residing in Trikala have personal accounts of family members being 




In the 1940s the Greek government had policies that encouraged people to 
relocate away from communist troubled mountainous areas to urban centres. 
These policies were aimed at controlling the influence of communist guerrillas 
and were a strategic scheme to discourage people from collaborating with the 
communist side. The relocation policies were aimed at two main categories of 
people, namely those who were anti-communist and those who were suspected 
of collaborating with the communist DSE. Either way, the national government 
sought to create „dead zones‟ in order to break up communist lines of influence, 
a notion particularly prominent in the Pindos mountains that acted as a supply 
chain for communist resources from Yugoslavia and Albania. Therefore, during 
1946 and 1947 many people from the peripheral areas of northern and central 
Greece relocated to urban centres such as Trikala, Kozani and Thessaloniki. Yet 
this migration towards urban centres, when combined with an era of 
exceptionally high inflation (Sweet-Escott 1954, Thomadakis 1981, Palairet 
2000), meant that people faced problems of inadequate education, welfare and 
health provisions due to the limited capacity of public services (Clogg 
1992:182). 
 
One such person who relocated to Trikala during the civil war was Thomas. I 
first met Thomas in 2004 when he was aged 93 and I enjoyed many visits over 
successive years. He recited his story of why he came to Trikala in 1947. 
 
Thomas relocated to Trikala from Kalimera, Grevenon, in Greek Macedonia in 
1947. During the same year he managed to relocate his whole family from the 
village to Trikala, 115 kilometres away by road. Thomas had suffered great loss 
in Kalimera during the civil war as one of his brothers voluntarily joined the 
communist guerrilla forces and was never seen again and the other went 
missing, presumed kidnapped. At the time it was being made widely known that 
the national government would impose harsh punishments on people they 
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 For a discussion of banditry in the Mediterranean see Sant Cassia (1993) and Jenkins (1998). 
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suspected of being, or collaborating, with the communists. Thomas himself did 
not care for politics but given his family‟s ambivalent past record with the 
communists, and constant threats towards raiding his village, he decided to 
remove himself from the situation and move to Trikala, where nobody would 
know him or his family. 
 
On arrival in Trikala Thomas was allocated a place of residence in a 
neighbourhood of „parapigmata‟ (parapigma – put to the side), opposite the 
central sports stadium on the eastern suburbs of the town. Here the 
katathiokomenoi (pursued people), or andartopliktoi (stricken by the communist 
guerrillas) were accommodated. The accommodation comprised of a wooded 
shed-like structure with a corrugated iron roof where whole families were 
obliged to share one room. This residence was provided by the national 
government for all those people who wanted to relocate to urban areas. It was 
further part of the government plan to depopulate the rural areas to create „dead 
zones‟ during the civil war. Thomas was a builder and together with other 
builders who came together from Kalimera, they worked on various public and 
private jobs in the town. Nevertheless, the living conditions for Thomas and his 
wife were extremely difficult and thus together with another co-villager from 
Kalimera they bought some land near the railway lines in the neighbourhood of 
Pyrgos. The two men divided the land into two parts and build houses for their 
families. Thomas would later repeat this exercise in the 1960s when he built 
houses for his children in another district of Trikala. Thomas‟ daughter Eugenia 
remembers that whilst she was growing up in Pyrgos people were referring to 
her as „the katathikomeno‟, thus omitting the „o‟ which creates the word 
properly. “People did not know the word or how to say it properly” she recalls. 
 
Thomas‟ relocation was mainly driven by a conscious decision to avoid 
implication in the politics of the civil war, but also has an economic undertone. 
The civil war had crippled the economy of the villages of Greek Macedonia 
where prior to the 1940s the construction industry was thriving. Builders like 
Thomas would travel around northern Greece in „teams‟ (omades) from Epirus 
to Kavala to gain building contracts. The village of Kalimera, Grevenon, 
enjoyed a reputation for excellent masonry and was relatively wealthy with a 
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high level of prestige. The German occupation and the civil war disrupted the 
movement of the builders who could no longer find enough work locally. The 
dangers of travelling in the mountains due to both leftist and rightist banditry 
meant that those without political or economic interests in the conflicts were 
faced with a dead-end situation. Hence Thomas and others like him decided to 
relocate to the towns where the opportunities for work were greater and their 
families safer. Consequentially, the relocation process during the civil war can 
also be linked to notions of employment, education, and social mobility (cf. 
Moustaka 1968). 
 
Economic Ruins of the 1940s 
 
In statistical terms the events of the 1940s were enormous. It was estimated in 
1946 that the physical damage caused by the Axis occupation alone was $8.5 
million. Over 2,000 villages were burnt or raised to the ground and one-quarter 
of all buildings in Greece were damaged or destroyed (Sweet-Escott 1954:94). 
The production of many crops was non-existent and industry was at a standstill. 
Much of the nation‟s infrastructure was also severely damaged during either the 
German retreat or the subsequent civil war, including most bridges and ports. 
The currency was also in crisis. The amount of gold sovereigns sent to sustain 
the resistance and the common practice of literally „printing money‟ meant that 
inflation seemed impossible to control (ibid.:96, Thomadakis 1981, Palairet 
2000). Stories concerning hoards of gold in western Thessaly are abundant in 
the folklore of the region and are circulated among my informants. 
 
One of my informants in Trikala has recently bought a metal detector in an 
attempt to discover gold sovereigns dropped by Allied forces during the Axis 
occupation. The money was supposed to aid the resistance movement but more 
often or not it was taken by local people and hoarded underground or in houses 
in the villages of northern and central Greece. A house in Trikala was recently 
renovated and a „treasure chest‟ of gold sovereigns was discovered and duly 
looted. The folklore concerning the dropping of British „lires‟ (pounds) into 
Greece is ubiquitous in northern Thessaly and Western Macedonia. 
Occasionally, small groups equipped with metal detectors and all the related 
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paraphernalia, organise „treasure hunting‟ excursions. These stories are adorned 
with myths about snakes and monsters that guard the British treasures. 
 
The folklore concerning the value of gold sovereigns is based firmly within the 
economic reality of civil war Greece. Greece experienced four stages of 
hyperinflation between 1941 and 1946. The rocketing prices peaked in October 
1944 when, after liberation, prices rose by 7,459 per cent in one month 
(Delivanis and Cleveland 1949, Makinen 1986, Palairet 2000:9). By 1944 the 
amount of currency in circulation had increased by 36,100 per cent from 1939 
levels and in 1944 one gold sovereign was equivalent to 170,000,000,000,000 
drachma. On 10
th
 November 1944 the government withdrew the existing 
currency and replaced it with the new drachma. One new drachma was equal to 
600 pounds and 50,000,000,000 old drachma (Palairet 2000:9). As civil war 
intensified from 1945 onwards, it was commonplace to put savings into material 
artefacts or gold sovereigns
73
. This drove the price of gold far above the world 
market price. Thus the national economy again began to slip. In an attempt to 
stabilise the drachma the British government lent Greece £25 million as part of 
the Anglo-Greek financial agreement of 24
th
 January 1946. This was in addition 
to the £46 million lent to Greece by Britain in 1940-1941, the repayment of 
which Britain had already agreed to waive. In return the Greek government 
agreed to stabilise wages, to control the price of certain rationed goods, increase 
taxation and eventually eliminate the budget deficit. In 1946 the United States of 
America added an additional $80 million to the substantial British loans (Sweet-
Escott 1954:101-102). 
 
More financial aid was to come the way of Greece in the form of the Truman 
Doctrine
74
 of 1947 (also a key aspect of the communist defeat during the civil 
war [Campbell and Sherrard 1968:183]) and the Marshall Aid programme or 
European Recovery Program (ERP), also formulated in 1947. Under the Truman 
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 Under Nazi occupation, economic administrator Hermann Neubacher tried, ultimately 
unsuccessfully, to implement a „free market‟ plan in the place of rationing in order to encourage 
Greek citizens away from hoarding and towards free spending. Due to unforeseen trajectories in 
the war in Europe, the policy was never implemented. Neubacher noted that besides foodstuffs, 
the demand for gold sovereigns exhibited by the Greek people was unsustainable and confidence 
in their national currency needed to be restored (Palairet 2000:34). 
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 For a discussion of the Truman Doctrine see Fatouros (1981). 
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agreement the United States would give Greece an initial $300 million, of which 
$149 million was allocated to military aid, $146.5 million was to be put towards 
economic assistance, with the balance being spent on administration. The total 
of the Truman Doctrine was to be revised to $648 million by the middle of 1949 
(Sweet-Escott 1954:105). The Americans had by this time decided that merely 
restoring the Greek economy to its pre-war status would be inadequate. Instead 
they believed in targeting a new industrial development programme that was 
collectively drawn up (Sweet-Escott 1954:107, Fatouros 1981:244)
75
. The cost 
of living had also skyrocketed during the 1940s as everyday particulars became 
rare. In 1947 certain items were 300 times more expensive in terms of real 
wages than in 1939. Some wages increased by up to 250 times as part of the 
collective wage and salary agreements of 1947 (Sweet-Escott 1954.:103). 
 
According to Ginsborg, the American decision to pump aid into Europe was 
purely based on economic and political ideology (1990:78). By the end of the 
Second World War, three-quarters of the world‟s invested capital and two-thirds 
of its industrial capital were concentrated in the United States. Thus the 
Americans desperately required trading partners but Europe‟s economy, and 
thus buying ability, would take many years to recover from the pummelling 
effects of war. Thus the Marshall Plan (or ERP) was set up in 1947, whereby the 
United States would give $29 billion in assistance to Europe over a period of 
four years
76
. Interestingly, due to the impending civil war in Greece, George 
Marshall warned the European beneficiaries that all aid would cease in the event 
of communist victories (Ginsborg 1990:115). Thus the situation for Marshall 
Aid was different in Greece than other European countries, for example Italy, 
where communist opposition did not escalate into full-blown civil war. The 
objective of the programme was to make the recipient nations independent of 
dollar aid by 1952, but from this Greece was exempt due to the ongoing civil 
war. In the first year (1948-1949) Greece received a total of $273.2 million from 
this programme; the figure for the second year was almost identical. However, 
of the total $550 million received in two years of Marshall Aid, only $150 was 
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 Early in 1949 it was suggested that Greece should operate with a minimum deficit of $150 
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 For an account of the impact of American aid in post-war Italy see Ginsborg (1990). 
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directly spent on the reconstruction and development of the economy, the 
majority literally went on maintaining standards of living to the minimum level 
(Sweet-Escott 1954:107-108). In fact, the majority of the estimated $2,500 
million Greece received after liberation was spent on the civil war, as it was in 
the interest of the foreign donors and the Greek government to win against the 
communist opposition (ibid.:161). Indeed, Campbell and Sherrard argue that it 
was only due to the extensive material, financial and military support provided 
by Britain and America that Greece was not enveloped into the „communist 
world‟ between 1947 and 1949 (1968:185). They state that the repercussions of 
such a deep social divide between communist and anti-communist sympathisers 
included a weakened central government that compromised the “practical 
solutions of Greece‟s moral and economic dilemmas” (ibid.:185, Svoronos 
1981). 
 
In Thessaly the American and British aid had visible effects „on the ground‟77. A 
significant part of the foreign aid was put towards agricultural development. 
Large quantities of machinery, especially tractors, were imported to north and 
central Greece. Storage and processing facilities were also improved in order to 
increase productivity. Additionally, money was invested in the instruction of the 
peasant farmers on issues such as effective crop rotation and the best uses of 
feed, fertilisers and equipment (Sweet-Escott 1954:108-109). One must bear in 
mind the observation of Karavidas (1931:496) from the Agricultural Bank of 
Greece that “the traditional aspirations of our rural population do not lie in 
farming …” and the considerable problems caused in productivity when the land 
from the ciftliks were redistributed in the 1920s and 1930s. Once again the 
prospect of Greece becoming self-sufficient in grain production was foremost in 
the minds of the investors. 
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 Campbell (1968b) mentions the affects of the civil war on the Sarakatsani herders of Epirus. 
He says that the currency inflation and the communist insurrection “ruined many of these men” 
(1968b:146). Only the stronger and more able merchants survived by stealing the custom of the 
weaker competitors and offering substantial credit at a time when the shepherds needed a larger 
cash income and thus a larger debt (ibid.). This may be considered as a form of economic 
opportunism at a time of crisis. 
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Chapter Four: A Brief History of Crisis in Thessaly since 1881 
Part Two: Post Civil War until the Present Day 
 
This chapter continues the investigation into the history of critical events in 
Thessaly according to the same criteria as used in the previous chapter. Post-
civil war periods of social upheaval will be presented to be later analysed in 
relation to the current economic crisis. As one might expect, the first-hand 
narrative detail of the post-civil war period is more comprehensive than the pre-
war years. 
 
The Military Junta 1967-1974 
 
Sweet-Escott notes that in 1954 there were only a few areas that relied solely 
upon agriculture as the basis on the economy; one such area, he states, is 
Thessaly (1954:119). The early 1970s saw a shift from wide scale subsistence 
agriculture on the plain of Thessaly, towards small scale cash crops (Campbell 
and Sherrard 1968:328, Campbell 1968, Sivignon 1976, Bennison 1977). This 
was primarily due to the policy of the military junta that aimed to allow “the 
forces of the free market” to operate more effectively and implement a new 
economic development plan (Ministry of Coordination 1968:preface 5, 7-8). 
According to the Ministry of Coordination, the new economic plan implemented 
on 1
st
 January 1968 would transfer Greece “from the category of 
underdeveloped to the category of developed economies” through the “active 
support of the business community, the trade unions and all Greek citizens” 
(1968:preface 5-6). The assurance given by the government of active support for 
private free market initiatives created a problem of how to produce profitable 
agricultural exports whilst managing associated issues of labour organisation 
and production costs (Campbell and Sherrard 1968:328). It is often said by 
Trikalinoi that the economic policies of the dictatorship years
78
 stabilised the 
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 See Ministry of Coordination Central Committee for the Elaboration of the Economic 
Development Plan. 1968. Economic Development Plan for Greece 1968-1972. Athens. This is a 
detailed official document written primarily by Makarezos, often referred to as the „the right 
hand of Papadopoulos‟ during the military dictatorship of 1967-1974. It is interesting to note 
that the majority of the members of the various committees involved in the publication of the 
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economy and brought much economic gratification to the majority of people. 
This was due to the decision of the government to halt the “the strict and 
detailed planning of the activities of the public and private economic agencies” 
as this was seen as contrary to “the best interests of the country” (1968:preface 
8).  Since the early 1970s Trikala has had a growing tertiary sector strongly 
connected to small scale commercial agriculture (Sanders 1962:31, Bennison 
1977:viii) and Thessaly has been deemed “the major growth zone of the 
country” (Bennison 1977:6) due to its strategic position halfway between 
Athens and Thessaloniki. 
 
Although Trikalinoi are quick to denounce the military junta on many political 
and ideological grounds, the views of my informants – even the most staunchly 
socialist – concerning the economic conditions at the time generally concur with 
the official government line that aimed to “secure … a high standard of living 
for the whole population and favourable conditions for sustained cultural and 
social progress” (Ministry of Coordination 1968:2). Maria, who worked as a 
teacher during the junta, represents the general consensus that “one good thing 
about the junta was that we knew we were secure (economically) … the 
employment was good and the wages stable”. As Bennison (1977) has argued, it 
is difficult to analyse the economic statistics provided by the military 
dictatorship of 1967-1974 with confidence, as their validity and accuracy is 
questionable due to the paramount ideological agenda of their authors. Whilst 
this is a legitimate observation, one needs to remember that even under liberal 
democratic rule statistics can be blatantly falsified to meet political agendas, as 
was the case with the deficit statistics throughout the early twenty-first century. 
It is therefore of significant interest to hear people discuss the stable economic 




Once investors were satisfied that the government had secured a degree of 
stability and communism was no longer a plausible threat, the economy grew 
                                                                                                                                            
1968 economic plan were educated in British and U.S. universities (including many from 
Manchester University and the London School of Economics and Political Science). 
79
 One of the greatest economic successes of the military junta was the investment in and 
expansion of the tourist industry. However, this narrative is not as prevalent in Trikala as much 
of the development took place on the Islands and the coastal areas of the mainland. 
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rapidly under the military junta. By eliminating the parliament and much of the 
cumbersome bureaucratic institutions the dictators made economic decisions 
quickly and without diplomatic debate. This streamlined the decision making 
process, kept inflation low and further encouraged international investment, 
such as the entrance of Coca-Cola into the Greek market. Some politically astute 
informants, usually of a nationalist persuasion, have argued that the period of 
economic growth and prosperity under the dictatorship has never since been 
surpassed. 
 
One reason for this desire for a stable free market economy is explicitly laid out 
in the 1968 economic development plan for Greece; “full adaptation to 
economic conditions in (line with) the member countries of the European 
Economic Community” (1968:2, see also EU Regional Policy 1999:98). The 
success of this adaptation seems to be confirmed by the 1981 accession of 
Greece to the European Community, only seven years after the fall of the 
dictatorship in 1974 (Clogg 1992:243, Georgakopoulos 1994:98, Kapteyn 
1996:63)
80
. The incorporation of Greece into the European Community 
signalled a further shift towards neo-liberal modes of economics. 
 
European Community Integration 
 
The accession of Greece into the European Community (EC) in 1981 was 
permitted on many political bases and had multiple economic consequences at 
both the national and local level. After the dismemberment of the dictatorship 
and return to democratic government in 197481, the EC were keen to embrace 
the new democratic republic of Greece (Holman 1996:4-6). This was despite 
preconceived opinions that Greece was neither economically or politically ready 
for the integration into „Europe‟ so soon after the military junta. Although 
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 European Union enlargement brings objective problems. Each member state has extreme 
cultural, economic and political diversity and new interests to be accommodated. For example, 
some countries, like the United Kingdom, had objections to relinquishing national sovereignty. 
Additionally there has become a separation between „dependent‟ states such as the former Soviet 
nations, and the „powerful‟ states, such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
(MacDonald 1993:3, Pinder 1998:17). 
81
 Conservative New Democracy (Nea Dimokratia) candidate Konstantinos Karamanlis was 
sworn in as Prime Minister on 24
th
 July 1974 (Clogg 1992:168). 
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reformed and open to free market trade, there was the general feeling that the 
Greek economy was still unready for the open competition of the common 
market (cf. Kapteyn 1996:118, Holman 1996, Pinder 1998, Ioakimidis 2001, 
Pagoulatos 2001). Yet any such reservations were counter-balanced by a distinct 
feeling of historical obligation towards Greece as the cradle of European 
civilisation. During discussions proceeding admission into the EC, a British 
foreign office minister stated that Greece‟s entry would be “a fitting repayment 
by the Europe of today of the cultural and political debt that we all owe to Greek 
heritage almost three thousand years old” (Clogg 1992:2, also Herzfeld 1986:4, 
Faubion 1993:245). This sentiment was echoed throughout the existing 
members of the European Community (Holman 1996, Pinder 1998), and was 
reinforced by the way in which Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis 
“exploited feelings of guilt at Europe‟s inertia during the dictatorship”, which 
led to an easier path for “the country they (Europe) liked to hail as the fount of 
European Civilisation” (Clogg 1992:177)82. 
 
The entry of Greece into the EC was negotiated by the conservative „Nea 
Dimokratia‟ (New Democracy) party, led by Konstantinos Karamanlis. 
However, in 1981 the socialist PASOK party, led by Andreas Papandreou, came 
to government. The new socialist government had different ideas about the role 
of „Europe‟ in Greek political and economic affairs (Clogg 1992:235, 243, 
Pinder 1998:67). The negotiation of Greek accession into the EC came at a time 
when nationalism in Greece was at its pinnacle (Yalouri 2001). The motto of the 
pro-EC party Nea Dimokratia read, “Greece belongs to the West”, whilst their 
main political opposition, PASOK, replied with “Greece belongs to the Greeks” 
(Clogg 1992:179). The PASOK line was more appealing to the Greek general 
public in the ongoing debate of whether Greece belongs to the East or the West 
– what Herzfeld analyses in terms of „disemia‟ (Herzfeld 1987:95-122). Indeed, 
due to the incumbent socialist government following over thirty years of rightist 
rule, a sense of collective political unity was being formulated on the national 
scale among Greek historical and political scholars. As noted in relation to 
                                                 
82
 For Herzfeld, Ancient Greece is considered “the idealised spiritual and intellectual ancestor of 
Europe” (1987:1). He argues that the initial „nationalist‟ identity – the Greek – is said to have 
originated from the very idea of a „Europe‟ (1987:6). 
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rhetorics of the civil war, during the 1980s, the external other was being put in 
opposition to the collective Greek unity. The socialist propaganda from PASOK 
was that the EC would exclusively benefit the economically powerful minority, 
the large-scale entrepreneurs. The accession to the EC was therefore portrayed 
as a selling-out of Greek heritage to the powers of the West for the benefit of the 
minority; what Yalouri terms „a betrayal of Hellenism‟ (2001:46)83. The 
previous conservative government that negotiated the accession believed that the 
EC represented “a stronghold of democracy that could help consolidate their 
own recently established democratic systems”84 (Holman 1996:4, Pinder 
1998:65). 
 
Through the early years of membership Greece gained a reputation for tending 
to obstruct „Community business‟ whenever a problem arose (Pinder 1998:67). 
This was especially the case when economic policies were debated. For 
example, the negotiations concerning the accession of Portugal and Spain into 
the EC were made more difficult on economic bases, as the Greek government 
emphasised the increased competition over agricultural supplies to Northern 
Europe85. In hindsight this objection was exceedingly valid and, one may argue, 
based on previous experiences of the monopolisation of tobacco exports during 
the 1920s. Many farmers in the villages around Trikala complain of the 
increased international competition and the rapidly falling prices of their 
produce over the past twenty years (cf. Monastiriotis and Tsamis 2007), 
something which is commonly equated to „theft‟ (Just 2000:164). 
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 In the context of Malta, a nation that during the 1990‟s was dominated by the discussion 
concerning „joining Europe‟, Mitchell argues that there are two main approaches to the 
argument.  On the one hand, Europe is seen “as a source of potential economic stability” and 
inherently offers “strategic protection for a country that has historically been threatened” 
(Mitchell 2002:12).  On the other hand, “Europe itself (is) a threat to national sovereignty and 
national identity” that systematically „erodes tradition‟ (ibid., Boissevain 1994:41). 
84
 This is an example of how national agendas of a particular state government can compromise 
– or strengthen – the position of a nation within the wider European political context. Therefore, 
it could be argued, the basic position of power and influence is still held by the individual state 
governments (cf. MacDonald 1993). 
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 Other examples of unconformity early on in the EC membership includes the fact that the 
Greek foreign minister Yannis Haralambopoulos failed to criticise the Soviet Union for shooting 
down a Korean airliner in 1983, Papandreou‟s support for Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation, and the presence of many controversial political leaders at the 1984 
PASOK party congress. Additionally, Clogg notes how Greece “spectacularly broke ranks” with 




Yannis, 35, a local mini-market owner recited the hardship of his neighbours in 
a village 5 kilometres from Trikala. Confirming the numerous daily accounts 
circulated among the villagers, he states that, 
 
“They (the farmers) have nowhere to sell their produce now … the 
fruit and vegetables they harvest cannot all be sold in the market in 
Trikala. Usually the fruit is sold to people in Trikala that then they sell 
it on the distributors (wholesalers) in Athens for a small profit, who, in 
turn sell it on to the supermarkets or may be export it. But the money 
offered to the farmers for their fruit and vegetables is now so low. Why 
to offer a lot of money when the same thing can be imported from 
Spain or Africa for less money, I don‟t know, half the price? Look at 
the prices in Athens that it is selling for and how much the farmers get; 
it is nothing, nothing I tell you. The bureaucracy has meant that it takes 
so many men to sell one piece of fruit and they all want to make their 
own money from it. 
 
I buy some directly from them to help them out, but look at the size of 
my store, I buy only a tiny amount compared to what they have … lets 
face it, it tastes better, its so fresh, the imported stuff might come from 
Spain or Africa, I don‟t know, but it travels for days before it gets sold 
in Athens. Of course they (in Athens) don‟t care, they don‟t know the 
difference, as long as it is cheap. People here now have to take other 
jobs to support their families, but what do they (the companies) care, 
they make money out of it.” 
 
Another informant, Charis, an agriculturalist who cultivates grain to sell to 
wholesalers, insists that the markets for grain have become equally swamped, 
echoing back to the economic crisis of the late 1800s when the European 
markets were systematically flooded to drive down grain prices. Indeed, as 
recently as June 2010 reports in local newspapers were lamenting the falling 




. Charis also believes that the lack of investment in Trikala by the 
Greek government is to blame for the lack of infrastructure surrounding the 
largest agricultural region of Greece. There are numerous agricultural 
cooperatives of distribution, such as Agroviz, and storage facilities in the 
vicinity of the town, many of which belong to AGRI, the Union of Agricultural 
Cooperatives of Trikala. However there are no large scale processing facilities 
or factories. The grain must be transported to larger cities for processing and 
distribution. He explains that agricultural industries are leaving Greece for the 
cheap labour and low taxes of the Balkans, especially Romania and Bulgaria. 
Charis states that: 
 
“they do not invest money in factories here in Trikala, we don‟t even 
have one big agricultural factory, at least in Larisa they have (he 
pauses) may be three or four. They bring employment to the area, they 
create jobs. We have no employment in these agricultural factories” 
 
It is interesting that once again the circulation of blame is both internal and 
external. The government and the Greek companies are held accountable for not 
investing in the area, but ultimately it is the competition from the external Other 
that is the source of falling prices and unemployment. It is the general consensus 
that the amount of bureaucracy throughout the production and wholesale process 
is obstructing the traditional livelihoods of the farming communities. For this 
the European Union is blamed for trying to make everyone in Europe go through 
the same processes, against their will. Peraklis, from an agricultural background 
in Trikala but now residing in Athens, tells me: 
 
“Daniel, something else, I will tell you the biggest problem, THE 
biggest problem, not only in Trikala, although it affects Trikala, but in 
the whole world now, the whole planet, and that is globalisation. 
Globalisation is THE biggest problem Daniel … (he goes on to say the 
same thing multiple times) … they are trying to make us all the same 
and we don‟t realise it, the truth I say. Power is becoming more 
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 I Erevna, 26
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 June 2010. 
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centralised – with America and the EU. Soon all our lives will be run, 
determined, by America and Brussels. For example … my colour as a 
Greek is blue. When I dance I am blue, when I work I am blue, when I 
eat I am blue. You in England, you are a different colour, let‟s say red. 
When you dance you are red, when you work you are red, when you 
eat you are red, and in Germany they have another colour. We are all 
different. But soon we will all have the same colour. They will force it 
upon us, from the centralised power, centralised government, not our 
choice. We are becoming the same.” 
 
However, this is only one side of a multifaceted story of agricultural production 
and consumption. In recent years Trikala has benefited from the free market 
economy especially in relation to the production of dairy products. The town is 
home to three major manufacturers of dairy products; Trikki, Tyras and Fage 
AE. Thessaly has become self-sufficient in milk and cheese and these three 
companies possess a wide distribution network across Greece
87
. The narratives 
of economic hardship and prosperity due to neo-liberal markets are very 
selective on a daily basis. One can comfortably overhear multiple discussions 
concerning low agricultural prices and the lack of processing facilities, yet the 
success of the dairy industry is glossed over without remark. The three dairy 
factories provide extensive local employment and an extent of business prestige. 
 
Despite increasing apprehension concerning how the open market would be 
received, in 1984 Andreas Papandreou explicitly declared that withdrawal from 
the EC would have disastrous economic consequences for Greece. Above all he 
emphasised the importance of the substantial agricultural subsidies for Greek 
farmers and the reduction of tariffs and customs duties
88
 (Clogg 1992:189, 
European Union 28G 1999:37, Georgakopoulos 1994:102, Kapteyn 1996:118). 
The influence of Greece in the EC was to have a profound effect on many 
policies concerning developing economies in the Balkans and Mediterranean 
Europe. This led to „Integrated Mediterranean Programmes‟, which distributed 




 According to Clogg, the political and economic legitimisation provided by the European 
Community helped „anchor Greece‟ firmly within the „western alliance‟ and “legitimising her 
(Greece‟s) still somewhat uncertain European identity” (Clogg 1992:154). 
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funds for regional development in a co-ordinated way (Pinder 1998:67). 
Nowadays, the official political stance from the Greek government is essentially 
one of full support for European Union policy, despite ongoing public debate 
concerning the economic and political efficiency of the membership. 
 
The Liberal Spending of the 1990s: rise and fall of the Greek stock markets – 
Trikala, Greece, the World 
 
The economy of Trikala in the 1990s was defined by extensive free spending, 
encouraged by a stock market boom and the almost indiscriminate availability of 
bank loans
89
. The carefree attitude towards lending and investment was apparent 
on both the state and the individual level (cf. Kapopoulos and Siokis 2005, 
Jermann and Quadrini 2007). 
 
The feeling of economic invincibility that was evident in Trikala was facilitated 
at state level by the lifting in 1991/1992 of strict legislation that controlled 
prices, limited business opening hours and made it virtually impossible to 
employ people on a part-time basis (Boutsouki and Bennison 1999:97). The 
lifting of these restrictions was part of the governmental effort to liberalise the 
wider Greek economy in preparation for the Single European Market and to 
encourage investment by foreign retailers (ibid.). 
 
Since accession into the European Community in 1981, Greece‟s financial 
markets have undergone a process of rapid liberalisation and expansion. 
Remarkable rates of growth were attained during the 1990s which persuaded 
more reluctant eurozone members to allow Greece to join the eurozone in 2001 
(cf. Pagoulatos 2001). It has been suggested that stock markets help support 
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 The 1990s is also characterised by an increasing number of Greek businesses relocating to 
other Balkan nations. With the continued expansion of the European Union and the return to 
peace in the Balkans, Greek investors, both corporate and individual, relocated their business 
interests northwards into other Balkan states. Enticed by the promise of inexpensive labour and 
low taxes the operational centres of many Greek businesses have been relocated, creating a 
„Greek capitalist diaspora‟ in the Balkans (Kamaras 2001). This movement obviously had a 
substantial impact on the local economy of many regions of Greece. Times of economic crisis 
exacerbate the consequences of repositioning transnational investment. The increasing numbers 
of small-scale entrepreneurs and highly qualified corporate executives conducting business north 
of the border has both contributed to the current national crisis on the macro level and intensified 
the perception of victimisation caused by the economic austerity measures on the local level. 
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long term economic growth due to their high liquidity, making investments less 
risky, yet a state of market stability must first be attained (Levine 1997). 
 
Until the early 1980s the financial system in Greece was characterised by 
institutional specialisation being required under governmental law rather than 
informed by market performance. The regulation of the financial system was 
conducted through a complex system of credit rules in a fixed administrative 
environment. The first stage of liberalisation came under the PASOK 
government of 1982 when the role of the Bank of Greece in controlling 
monetary policy was enhanced and a limit was set to government funding 
obtained from the national bank (Hondroyiannis, Lolos and Papapetrou 2004). 
 
In 1990 the newly elected Nea Dimokratia government started to follow a liberal 
Thatcher-Reagan style of economic policy, dismantling the remaining state 
control of the market. One part of this reform was the removal of a local 
monopoly on auditing accounts of the Greek Professional Body (SOL) which 
was opened up to competition from the so-called „Big 8‟ international 
accountancy firms. The aggressive accounting strategies by those supervising 
and reporting on the efficiency of the stock market were partially responsible for 
the beginning of the stock market boom (Forbes, Skerratt and Yiannopoulos 
2006). The new government also privatised many state owned companies and 
built upon the existing 1985-1987 stabilisation programme introduced by the 
PASOK administration. Both the PASOK and the Nea Dimokratia governments 
were committed to „modernising and liberalising‟ the Athens Stock Exchange in 
order to „increase efficiency and make it more accessible to international 
investors‟ (Barkoulas, Baum and Travlos 2000:4). The reforms that were 
introduced by the new stock exchange law (L. 1806/88) and the Basic Banking 
Law of 1992 were expected to positively affect the market and lead to the 
expansion of its activities. An additional incentive for all potential investors is 
the absence of capital gains tax in Greece. It was the international investment, 
especially from within the European Economic Community (EEC), which 
stimulated the economic boom. 
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The fact that both centre-left and centre-right governments sought to expand the 
open markets encouraged public investment as it became apparent that the 
policies were not just a passing political whim. Tsakalotas (2008) attributes the 
downfall of the centre left (PASOK) during the early 1990s and early 2000s to 
their misunderstanding of neo-liberalism. Whilst in opposition, far from 
elaborating on the policies of their predecessors, the centre-left opposition 
reverted to the propaganda of the early 1980s focusing on the war between „old‟ 
and „new‟ and „Greece‟ and „the Other‟, whilst maintaining the basic „package 
of neo-liberal reforms‟ (Tsakalotas 2008:4). This tactic was not popular with the 
electorate during times of economic prosperity and the party suffered at the 
polls. Such a marginal stance was deemed necessary to serve all bases of 
PASOK supporters, from working class agriculturalists to the intellectual elite. 
Despite the heavy losses at the polls and voter dissatisfaction, the party were 
stubborn in maintaining a mixed stance on the issue of the free market. The 
tentative relationship between PASOK and neo-liberal market economics 
compared to rightist liberalism was eventually to prove beneficial during the 
global economic crisis from 2008 onwards when the Greek population became 
disillusioned with global market systems. The fact that PASOK blamed the 
unregulated nature of the market and government collusion with the American 
capitalists for the economic downturn offered an ideological, if not practical, 
alternative and allowed PASOK to claim the political moral high ground 
through playing the political „blame game‟. 
 
Reflecting the international trends of the mid and late 1990s, Greece 
experienced a stock market boom from 1992-1999 (Jermann and Quadrini 2006, 
Barkoulas, Baum and Travlos 2000). Between January 1998 and September 
1999 stock prices increased by an average 332.69 per cent (Caporale, Economou 
and Philippas 2008:2). The boom was attributed to a combination of the newly 
liberal and deregulated economic environment and falling inflation and interest 
rates (Kyriazis and Diacogiannis 2008:163). Greece was deemed to be an 
emerging market where a vast range of enterprises offering a variety of services 
were rapidly going public. Such booms are characterised by the investor‟s 
capital gains accumulation becoming the reference point for evaluating future 
trades. Thus the investor has little interest in following international market 
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trends or prospecting for the future, but solely bases his/her investments on the 
amount of return received under present conditions. The reference point is the 
accumulation of money and not a close following of market conditions. This is 
why a sudden market crash is usually unanticipated by the investor and 
subsequent reactions to a downturn in the market are ineffective. Indeed, the 
ability and efficiency to react to new information is a characteristic of emerging 
markets (Barkoulas, Baum and Travlos 2000:2, Laopodis 2003). In this case the 
public frenzy surrounding investment in the stock market is a trend or fashion in 
itself. 
 
In Greece investor protection is weak. According to Forbes, Skerratt and 
Yiannopoulos (2006), minority shareholder rights are weak due to the 
conspiratorial culture of the trading on the national market based in Athens. The 
companies look after each other‟s vested interests before the interests of their 
own shareholders. After the introduction of the electronic trading system to the 
Athens Exchange in 1992, trading became so frenzied that an 8 per cent price 
limit for movements in the Exchange index was introduced. If prices on the 
Exchange moved by more than this amount in one day then trading was 
suspended.  As the public craze for stock investment increased further, the limit 
for overall daily movement on illiquid stock was decreased to 4 per cent in order 
to stabilise the market. As these limits became more frequently violated, the 
overall movement limit was increased to 12 per cent in 2000 (ibid.). As well as 
encouraging large-scale international investment, „playing the stock markets‟ 
became a national phenomenon. 
 
In mid-nineties Trikala almost everyone of legal age was playing the stock 
markets. There was no need for the „investors‟ to be keen economists or follow 
the market trends, the only thing that mattered was the public appetite to create 
money for nothing. The „speculative bubble‟ meant that interpretation of market 
tends was not the investor‟s priority (Forbes, Skerratt and Yiannopoulos 
2006:2). I had heard many years before my fieldwork that there was a public 
frenzy in Greece for playing the stock markets in the mid and late 1990s. 
Throughout my fieldwork the extent of the fixation and the consequences of the 
impending crash were revealed. 
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Antonia, 23 years old at the time of the stock market boom in 1997, had just 
finished her degree from the philology department of the University of Athens 
when she returned to Trikala to find a job. She and her friends started playing 
the stock market. She recalls that people of every profession and age were 
trading on the market and they were not concerned “which shares they picked” 
because they were guaranteed at least an 8 per cent return within a day, what has 
been termed „the higher abnormal returns of the Greek stock market‟ (Kyriazis 
and Diacogiannis 2008:162). She recalls, 
 
“The people didn‟t know what they were getting involved in. A lot of 
companies floated on the stock market because they were guaranteed 
by the climate to sell off their shares very quickly … I was buying 
shares like crazy. At the time I didn‟t care about the credibility of the 
company, its size and its economic capacity. Amongst others, I 
possessed shares from a fish farm; the price was rising like crazy. I 
found out after the crash that the fish farm was really just a pond with a 
couple of sheds. It was sad really because we were greedy and we were 
so taken by the fervour of the stock market that we thought we could 
be fixed for life. We thought that we would make money for a few 
years and then never work again … There were no interest in the 
trends of the market because we saw it as guaranteed easy money … 
People like me, with no knowledge of markets, economy or anything, 
were investing everything.” 
 
Antonia‟s account reminds me of a game I used to play with my friends over the 
internet. The metaphorical resemblances are poignant. As we were not old 
enough to purchase shares in the mid-nineties, we found an online trading 
company who allowed us to „purchase‟ shares at real-time „prices‟ and trade as 
if we were „in the City‟. No money changed hands however, the target here was 
to become „top of the weekly league‟ in terms of percentage profits. However, 
we all attempted to find trends in the market and buy and sell at the appropriate 
times, although basically, like Antonia and her friends, we knew nothing about 
the stock markets. The statistics of the site were directly linked to the 
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international markets and the game play was very realistic. Simultaneously in 
Trikala, the game was being played with real money and investment capital, 
with the difference being that the lack of knowledge concerning the dynamics 
underpinning the markets would have severe consequences at the time of the 
crash. 
 
During this period of prosperity, a lot of stock trading companies (ELDEs, 
[eteria lipsis kai diavivasis endolon or xrimatistriakes eteries] companies for 
receiving and transmitting shares) opened in Trikala, only to close down again 
straight after the crash. ELDEs also opened in small towns and villages across 
Greece; a total of 1065 offices nationwide in 2000 (Korfiatis, To Vima, 
28/01/2001). In Trikala nomos (population 137,723) fifty ELDE offices opened 
with seventeen in Karditsa nomos population 130,213). The new law 2396/1996, 
passed in 1996 that permitted businesses to set up offices transmitting and 
receiving shares on behalf of their customers, was destined to bring Greece in 
line with European Union open market regulations. After the introduction of the 
new law, 1.3 million Greek citizens registered to trade on the Athens Exchange 
through the ELDE offices. The law allowed anyone to enter the market by 
obtaining personal trading codes from the ELDEs No formal training was 
required for people to open and operate in ELDE offices. As a result many 
people left their jobs as teachers, physicians or retailers in order to set up offices 
that not only offered a route into the Exchange, but also offered advice on 
investment. The misguided advice offered through the untrained and 
unregulated ELDEs is considered to have contributed greatly to the ultimate 
financial ruin of many Greek citizens, and many Trikalinoi. 
 
Due to the unregulated nature of the Athens Stock Exchange, many national and 
international organisations floated their „companies‟ – many of which were 
„rogue‟ – without internal controls on investor security and auditing. This 
resulted after the crash in countless „bouncing cheques‟ being issued to 
customers (Korfiatis, To Vima, 28/01/2001). Additionally, the ELDE offices had 
to be furnished with the latest software systems in order to process transactions 
efficiently, thus opening up a new market for selective computer software 
 149 
companies to supply their systems nationwide
90
. Katerina, a teacher, was 25 
years old when she worked in an ELDE office in 1998. 
 
“The stock market shops all opened together, at the same time, and 
very suddenly. They were places of socialisation, you know, like the 
cafeterias on Asklipiou. I worked there for a year, serving coffee and 
beers to the customers as well as executing the deals. People would 
come in during their break from work in the middle of the day and sit 
watching their shares rise in price. Some would stay until the Athens 
market closed in the evening … It was like they were treasure hunting. 
Some times they would ask me for advice. After working there a while 
I got more confident in what I was doing and tried to help out the best I 
could.” 
 
For most of 1999 the Greek stock market continued to increase in prosperity and 
the ELDEs were flourishing. „Worthless‟ shares rose from $0.10 per share in 
January to as much as $100.00 per share later in the year. The government 
continued to praise the stock market and refused to interfere to protect the small 
scale investors. From September 1999 until early 2000 the Athens Stock 
Exchange suddenly went into free-fall (Caporale, Economou and Philippas 
2008, Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2009).  
 
The 1999-2000 crash was more prominent than that of the 1987 slump and the 
1997 mini-downturn due to the vast numbers of the general public embroiled in 
the turmoil. Hence, this particular crisis holds a prominent place in public 
imagery. On 14
th
 March 2000 the Athens Exchange plummeted by 6.60 per cent 
leading to violent protests in the city. The index continued to fall sharply in 
April, with further daily drops peaking at 9.17 per cent on 17
th
 April (United 
Press, 14
th
 April 2000, Stergiou 2008
91
). From December 1999 to March 2003 
the Athens Exchange had lost 77.88 per cent of its value (Caporale, Economou 
and Philippas 2008:3). Foreign investors were selling their portfolios in an 
attempt to escape the rapidly deteriorating situation. The small investors were 
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91
 Kathimerini, 21/01/2008 
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worst affected. The majority of the general public held on to their shares in 
anticipation of the market picking-up so as they could repay their loans taken to 
finance the original investment. Nikos is just one example of the many people 
who lost their life savings, their homes and businesses and went into 
overwhelming debt due to the crisis. 
 
Nikos, a major land owner, was in his late forties during the late 1990s. His 
capital invested in numerous shares had risen to 870,000,000 drachmas 
(2,553,192 euros at the 2001 pre-single currency exchange rate). Nikos was 
waiting for his investments to reach the 1 billion drachma mark before cashing 
in his shares. The crash hit Greece before he realised his objective. 
 
“We were very greedy. We thought that we would never work again. 
We said that once we reached X million drachma we would stop. 
Obviously we just kept setting the goal higher. People did not believe 
that this would ever end, it was free money, we did not care. Once the 
markets started to drop we still paid little attention as we thought that 
this was just a phase. We did not take the money out, cash it in I mean, 
because we felt that we were losing money despite the fact that we 
were still well in profit compared to the initial investment. We didn‟t 
liquidise our assets and the crash was so vertical, as vertical as the 
boom. People like me lost whole fortunes, land, houses, because they 
had sold property in order to invest in the market. I know some people 
who became suicidal after the crash
92”. 
 
Nikos eventually lost two-thirds of his real estate in Trikala, which was 
comprised of shops on the central commercial streets and neo-classical estates. 
He went bankrupt and had to turn to family and friends in order to rebuild his 
livelihood. Nikos was fortunate that he had money to invest in the first place as 
well as a family network to support him after the crash. Other people sold nearly 
all of their assets – cars, houses and land – in order to invest. Some also took 
extortionate bank loans in order to invest in the markets; these very often could 
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 This parallels the reported suicides of Wall Street bankers during the 1929 stock market crash 
(cf. Mishara 2008). 
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not be repaid. Antonia remembers that some of her friends did this just before 
the crash; “they were left with literally nothing. One of my friends lost all the 
money that he had earned as an economic migrant in Germany. He eventually 
had to move back with his parents in Duisburg.” The stock markets were 
perceived as a quick and reliable way to become socially mobile in financial 
terms. Many Trikalinoi ended up in a worse position than from where they 
started. 
 
It is estimated that during the 1999-2000 crisis over 100 billion euro were lost 
by small-scale investors
93
. Yet it was not only individual investors that were 
severely affected. The Union of Agricultural cooperatives in Trikala purchased 
800 million drachmas of bank bonds by collecting money from cotton sales. Of 
these bonds, 500 million were purchased from the Agricultural Bank, 200 
million from Alfa Pisteos and 100 million from Alfa Trust. An additional 100 
million drachmas were invested in „agro-bonds‟. It is speculated that the 
intention of the Union was to repay a previous 1.550 billion drachma loan taken 
in 1998 to cover their operating needs. As of 30 August 2000 the 900 million 
drachma bonds were collectively worth 250 million drachmas. The Union 
rejected accusations of economic difficulties but could not account for how they 





The Greek government, on the other hand, profited greatly from the Athens 
Stock Exchange by cashing in large amounts of shares just months before the 
crash. According to the official Athens Stock Exchange brochure, the Greek 
government sold off 1,983,270 shares in the Athens Stock Exchange (39.67 per 
cent of the share capital) in December 1997 and a further 600,000 shares (12 per 
cent of the share capital) in December 1998. The 1999-2000 crash was to lead to 
substantial regulatory and institutional reforms mainly focusing on investor 
security (Caporale, Economou and Philippas 2008:1). 
 
 




Conclusions: History of Crisis 1881-2000 
 
These two chapters intended to outline the history of social and economic crisis 
affecting the people of Trikala since 1881. The events discussed were 
strategically selected on criteria of local economic impact and cultural proximity 
and will form the bases for further explorations of crisis in relation to social 
mobility and status, social memory, and public representation in the proceeding 
chapters. From the ciftliks to the stock market crash, social upheaval and crisis 
have affected society and economy on both macro and micro levels. Some 
themes recur throughout the history of crisis. At this stage I wish to simply 
highlight some of these lines that weave together accounts of crisis in Trikala. 
 
One such recurring theme is the intertwining of economic policy with political 
agenda. The conflicting political ideologies of the left and the right over the last 
century have meant that blame for crisis has been circulated internally. An 
external outlet for blame has also been found, first in the form of the United 
States and Britain for „meddling‟ in internal matters, and then in the form of the 
European Union for strict policy control. The civil war and the consequential 
economic difficulties, the Axis occupation, the dictatorship and the stock market 
crisis are understood as the product of a combination of internal collaboration 
and corruption and external interference; both stances are approached with much 
scepticism by Trikalinoi. Internal political ideologies and external pressures led 
to the military junta in 1967 and the liberalisation of the market economy in the 
1980s and 1990s. However, in the case of the markets, liberalisation was not 
regulated closely enough and international trends were dismissed as not 
applying to the Greek economy. Entrance into the European Community and the 
subsequent liberalisation of economic markets, ideological projects infused with 
political ambition and external pressures, transformed the lives of Trikalinoi. 
 
Paths for social mobility is another recurring theme in the history of crisis that 
will be explored further later in this thesis. At times of crisis there are always 
those who can profit from the social circumstances, and not always in a 
clandestine manner. Indeed, one could argue that this strategic opportunism is 
the pinnacle of entrepreneurship. The redistribution of the ciftliks allowed for 
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smallholders to sell their land and move to urban centres to educate their 
children, thus changing forever the notion of social status in Trikala. A selective 
minority even found modes of social mobility through political collaborations 
during the Axis occupation and subsequent civil war through shifting notions 
concerning the local power hierarchies. Even the influx of Asia Minor refugees 
during the 1920s facilitated unexpected paths of social mobility, as did other 
geographic movements such as the relocation of anti-communists during the 
civil war, supported by an ideological government policy. The liberalisation of 
the market economy in the 1980s and 1990s facilitated another path for social 
mobility in financial terms, thus changing the perceptions of social status along 
alternative material lines. Social mobility and, furthermore, social capital is 
available for a mass market audience. 
 
In terms of land and livelihood, alienation, entrepreneurship and self-sufficiency 
are recurring themes. The colligi uprisings of 1909-1910 were linked to 
concepts of alienation from land and the withdrawal of inheritance rights. The 
agrarian reforms that played a central role in returning the land to the people 
were accelerated by the population exchanges of the 1920s; people who had 
been significantly alienated from their homelands. Alienability also surfaces in 
terms of blame. The alienability of responsibility and blame for crisis is a key 
aspect of political success. Self-sufficiency, on the other hand, has been the goal 
of both the state and the individual since before the annexation of Thessaly. 
Whether on a national or local scale, the aim of integrating the local economy 
with international markets, household subsistence with national supply and 
balancing agricultural production with investment surplus has been a challenge 
for the peasant farmer, the petit-capitalist and the national government alike. 
 
Finally, the collective imagery of crisis is a central theme to the socio-historical 
account. As we shall come to understand, some crises occupy a prominent 
position in Trikalinoi social memory. Each crisis is remembered in a different 
idiom and in relation to specific details. Some crises are perceived as „closer‟, 
more „relevant‟ to contemporary life, than others. The collective imagery of 
crisis is facilitated through family narratives and nationalist rhetoric. 
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Hence economic crisis cannot be defined merely in monetary terms but along 
the lines of a multiplicity of social conditions, political and ideological as well 
as practical. Crisis can be expressed through a number of dichotomies in an 
attempt to understand the reasoning behind the events, old systems:new systems, 
external:internal, exploitation:domination, nationalist:socialist, greed:altruism; 
the phenomena and the epiphenomena of crisis can be eternally argued. Yet, as 

























Chapter Five: Theorising Crisis 
 
Having outlined the historical contexts of crisis in Greece and their impacts on 
the Trikalinoi, this chapter takes further the concept of crisis as events with 
multiple eventualities. As has become apparent, the term crisis can relate to 
periods of conflict, mass-migration, natural and environmental disasters, or 
phases of economic hardship. Focusing on economic crises, the concern of this 
chapter is to place crisis within a theoretical framework in order to explore how 
crisis is ultimately represented and evoked in the public domain in Trikala. The 
aim is to deconstruct the notion of crisis as an abstract term by placing it within 
numerous theoretical and ethnographic contexts. Some theories of crisis will be 
explored in relation to classic Marxist conceptualisations based on the 
functioning of the capitalist systems. The discussion will then move towards an 
understanding of regionalised crisis and the roots of the current economic 
situation in Greece.  
 
Throughout this chapter various alternative ethnographic contexts will be 
considered in order to assess „the multiple eventualities/possibilities‟ of the 
rather abstract and often ambiguous term „crisis‟ (cf. Goddard 2010). 
Additionally, reoccurring themes such as notions of blame and accountability, 
social mobility and competing political ideologies will be present as a 
theoretical and ethnographic undertone throughout. This is intended to 
complement not only the complexities of the historical events that form „the 
genealogy of crisis‟ in Trikala, but also to facilitate discussions of cultural 
proximity, social mobility and perceptions of social status in other parts of this 
thesis. 
 
Placing Economic Crisis in a Theoretical Context 
 
„Crisis‟ can be understood as something signifying a period of social change or 
instability that evokes feelings of fear, panic and danger. It is a critical point 
where the social norm is perforated in a significant and often unexpected way, 
what may be referred to as “a decisive change in direction” from the course of 
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everyday life (Meltzer 1981:37). In a wider context, crisis may refer to natural 
disasters such as earthquakes and landslides (Yong 1988, Rozario 2007), 
medical traumas, health scares and epidemics such as the 2009 swine flu 
pandemic (Curson 1985, Janes, Stall and Gifford 1986, Saliou 1994, Kolata 
1999), or times of war and conflict (Stoler 1985, Schmidt and Schröder 2001, 
Stewart and Strathern 2002). 
 
So far in the academic literature there has been a general homogenisation of 
economics as either the cause of crisis or economics as the effects of crisis
94
. 
This somewhat ambiguous approach has led to conflicting arguments 
concerning the nature and definition of economic crisis. On the one hand 
scholars such as Damette and Poncet advocate the inevitability of economic 
crisis in capitalist societies. They state that economic crises are „deep, lasting 
and structural‟ as well as „unavoidable‟ (1980:93). Nevertheless, Meltzer has 
argued that „new meticulous forms of economic analysis will make grand-scale 
economic crises a thing consigned to the pages of capitalist history‟ (1981:38). 
There is an obvious disparity between the two claims that requires further 
explanation. A substantial element of this discrepancy can be located in the 
insufficient definition of what constitutes an economic crisis. Economic crisis is 
often approached as a homogeneous entity in itself, a single moment or event 
which is analysed regardless of the political and social mesh into which it is 
entangled. The intertwining of political, social and economic aspects is all too 
often taken for granted and not further explained, meaning that a lack of 
communication results from ambiguous definitions of crisis and a 
homogenisation of political, social and economic aspects. In order to begin to 
understand the inevitability and tangibility of economic crises we must attempt 
to deconstruct the process of crisis by detailing the primary contributing factors 
and the epiphenomenal effects. This goes against the overwhelming tendency to 
label crises as solely „political‟, „economic‟, „humanitarian‟ or simply conflating 
everything together as „crisis‟. The complex mesh can begin to be untangled by 
attempting to locate the principal economic aspect in the process of crisis 
                                                 
94
 In this instance the term „economic‟ could be replaced with „social mobility‟, as often crisis 
provides spaces for social mobility that were once not available. Similarly, a wide-scale 
collective striving for social mobility can be the cause of crisis by depriving society of the 
adequate infrastructure required to sustain prosperity. 
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formation. By doing so it will become clearer what constitutes the economic 
aspect of crisis and how causes can be distinguished from effects. However, in 
every case the „economic‟ is duly enmeshed with other cultural, institutional and 
political movements. Thus when employing the term „economic‟ this does not 
imply a separate bounded institution. 
 
It is therefore proposed that there should be a distinction made between the 
economic aspect of crisis in terms of economics as the cause of crisis and 
economics as the effect of crisis. As has been illustrated in the previous 
chapters, the economic aspect of periods of crisis cannot simply be glossed over 
with an all-encompassing definition. Although the cause and effect of each crisis 
is often complex, it would appear that there are occasions when economics are 
the „primary cause‟ (Piattoni 2002) of further political and social discourses and 
occasions when economic upheaval is the epiphenomenon of wider political and 
social discourses. To go one step further I would also like to suggest that 
economic issues can act as mediators between the cause of crisis and the effects. 
Each variable affects the other in a circular interrelationship (Piattoni 2002:2). 
Thus a causal chain is set in motion which reverberates with other phenomena 
such as governance, cultural change and economic entrepreneurship (ibid)
95
. 
This is in opposition to a fixed model, advocated by scholars such as Putnam 
(1993) that states that change can only occur within the cultural realm, which in 
turn alters institutional performance and consequentially economic performance. 
Although I agree that localised economic activity is strongly linked to culture, 
the view of Putnam is very deterministic. Let us consider some illustrative 
examples. 
 
An example of economics being the primary cause of crisis would be the events 
of the 1999-2000 Greek stock market crash. In this case a crisis caused by poor 
                                                 
95
 Piattoni suggests an alternative model to the common trend of presenting economic 
performance (economy) as the epiphenomenon of government capacities (institutions) in turn 
determined by the cultural setting (identity) in which government institutions operate. She 
argues that these variables are not sequential from culture to institutions to economy but are 
interrelated in a circular fashion whereby a change in one of these premises reverberates among 
the others. Piattoni believes that this notion gives agency to all aspects of the process (2002:2). 
She further argues that this flexibility allows for concepts of alternative economic activity such 
as clientelism. 
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economic management had many secondary social and political effects (Carney, 
Hudson and Lewis 1980). Another example is the current crisis engulfing 
Greece. This crisis is also of primary economic form. Although one may argue 
that political mismanagement is the cause of the current crisis, one should look 
beyond the immediate national context in search of the primary cause. The 
current crisis was caused by global economic circumstances. The recessions 
experienced in Britain, the United States of America and Japan had severe 
impacts on global markets and affected the ability for peripheral economies such 
as Greece to compete on the world stage. The Greek economy followed suit by 
falling rapidly into recession. Only then were the political mismanagements of 
economic issues, such as the incorporation into the eurozone, revealed. If it were 
not for the initial economic downturn these political decisions would have 
remained unnoticed for much longer. It is true that political mismanagement and 
underlying structural flaws now make the social conditions worse in Greece than 
in other nations that were simultaneously affected by the economic downturn; 
but in essence the initial source of the crisis is of an economic nature. 
 
On the other hand, let us consider the case of the break-up of the ciftliks during 
the agrarian reforms of the 1920s. This crisis had economic consequences but as 
an epiphenomenon of a primarily social crisis. The sense of urgency 
surrounding the redistribution of land caused by the purchase of the ciftliks by 
Greek landlords was the primary cause of the crisis. This was coupled with 
disillusionment relating to the broken socio-political promises of empowerment 
through land possession pledged by the government pre-annexation. The 
interplay between both state and peasant ideology also played a central role in 
the immense social change during the land reforms. However, the consequences 
of this crisis were principally economical. The dramatic events of the peasant 
uprisings in Kileler (1909/1910) would have dramatic long-term economic 
consequences throughout a succession of subsequent crises. For instance, during 
the 1929-1932 economic crisis, newly „liberated‟ smallholders were going 
bankrupt due to the abolition of sharecropping and the falling market prices. In 
Greek Macedonia the newly resettled refugees that once benefited from the 
break-up of the ciftliks now found themselves in excessive debt. Even during the 
Axis occupation individual smallholdings were selectively repossessed by the 
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invading forces. In this case the economic impact was the epiphenomenon of „a 
crisis‟, or „a crisis with (secondary) economic consequences‟. 
 
The third variable in the trilogy concerns the economic aspect of crisis acting as 
a mediator between the primary cause of crisis and the epiphenomenal effects of 
crisis. This can be illustrated through the example of the Axis occupation and 
the subsequent Great Famine
96
 during the 1940s. The initial crisis was formed 
on the grounds of political ideology and warfare
97
. The epiphenomenal effects 
included food shortage, economic hardship and civil conflict. However the 
mediating factor that connects the primary causes with the secondary effects is 
the economic embargos employed by the Axis occupation. Based on political 
policy the occupying forces directed financial aid to other nations such as the 
Netherlands and Belgium, systematically destroyed the national markets and 
deliberately reserved the financial capital of the Greek banks for the Reich. 
Additionally, the German soldiers were ordered to buy-up many Greek 
businesses in a form of systemised looting. Even the Allied forces employed 
economic tactics that contributed to the effects of the crisis by blockading all 
trade in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. These multiple economic policies 
bridged the gap between the primary cause of crisis and the secondary effects. 
Furthermore, in this case the economic aspect of crisis is an ever-present as it is 
located within the German war strategy (the cause of crisis), the economic 
embargos (the mediating policies) and the destruction of livelihoods (the 
effects). 
 
However, the consequences of crisis are not homogeneously experienced in a 
more or less severe manner depending on whether the principal economic aspect 
is located in the cause, mediator or effect. In all of the above examples the 
Trikalinoi have experienced significant economic impacts that have changed 
their lives either temporarily or permanently. Therefore, throughout this thesis I 
refer to economic crises when considering both the economic causes and effects 
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 See also MacGaffey (1998) for consequences of food shortages during political and economic 
crisis in Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo). 
97
 For comparative cases of conflict at times of crisis see Stoler (1985) in Sumatra and the edited 
volume of Schmidt and Schröder (2001). For an account of violence at times of capitalist 
economic change see Macfarlane (1987). 
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of the events. This is not to say that any given „economic crisis‟ is devoid of the 
intertwined political and social paraphernalia. In order to facilitate these 
important aspects, I attempt to locate the principle economic implications for 
each crisis within the wider context of crisis formation. 
 
Opportunism at Times of Economic Crisis 
 
There are certain variables in crises that alter their impact; one such factor is 
longevity. For example, a sharp fall in the stock markets creates an unwanted 
interruption in economic prosperity for millions of people, but usually this 
intermission is temporary. If the markets do not rise immediately then a new 
level of stability is formed at an alternative rate. From this new level subsequent 
times of crisis and prosperity will be calculated. On the other hand, some 
economic crises are prolonged and last for decades, such as in the case of civil 
wars (cf. MacGaffey 1987, 1998, 2000). In the context of Zaire (Democratic 
Republic of Congo), MacGaffey argues that there is an ongoing „humanitarian 
crisis‟ which in turn has created a severe economic crisis, including a flourishing 
secondary economy (black market) and an increase in drug trafficking and 
„blood diamond‟ trade. Even if the civil war were to abruptly end tomorrow, the 
social and economic crisis would continue for a sustained period of time. 
 
Longevity further influences the diverse strategies people devise in order to deal 
with, and even capitalise on, economic crises. Opportunism is always an aspect 
of the economic exploitation of crisis situations. There are often opportunities 
for actors to locate diverse ways to advance their own socio-economic position 
or business prospects based upon their responses to changing social 
circumstances (Theodoridis and Bennison 2009). Usually these economic 
aspects of crisis can be categorised as part of the epiphenomenal effects of the 
original crisis rather than the primary causes. Here some examples will be 
offered in order to illustrate diverse forms of economic opportunism in times of 
both short-term and long-term crises. 
 
Concerning the short term crisis of the 1999-2000 Greek stock market crash, a 
popular conspiracy theory circulates locally stating that the government had 
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inside information concerning an imminent stock market crash. Therefore 
bodies acting on behalf of the government sold over 2 million shares in the year 
before the crash, without informing the general public of the imminent market 
instability. This questionable action was inflated by the fact that many small-
scale investors had little concept of market trends as „playing the stock markets‟ 
was a temporary cultural „fashion‟ and because there was no official security 
mechanism provided for investors. Thus the government was deemed morally 
corrupt in withholding valuable economic information in order to advance its 
own interests. The sense of urgency demonstrated by the government in 
offloading their shares was a strategic action not shared by many small-scale 
investors. The sudden crash in September 1999 left the small-scale investors in a 
state of panic and pandemonium. There was a sense of urgency to make the 
correct economic decision; to sell as prices fell or to hold on the shares in the 




There are numerous examples of economic opportunism during long term crises. 
This is often coupled with changing perceptions of social mobility and the 
elevation of social status. The Greek novelist Dimitris Psathas offers plenty of 
insights in his book „Cheimonas tou 41‟ („Winter of 41‟), a collection of mini 
comic-tragedy stories written during the Axis occupation in Athens and based 
on true stories of his experiences during the War years. In the story of the grocer 
Psathas illustrates how some actors acquired new social prominence during the 
crisis. As a person with direct access to vital rationed resources the grocer is 
rapidly climbing the socio-economic ladder. 
 
„Before the war he was “just Thanasis”, but suddenly the war grabbed him and made 
him “honourable mister Thanasis”. The situations raise some people whilst other 
people are doomed. The situations are favourable to some people‟ (Psathas 1944:15-
18, emphasis added).  
 
Thanasis used his position as grocer to manipulate the crisis situation for his 
personal social and economic gain. This included promising to locate and 
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 An interesting comparison of economic opportunism in times of crisis comes from Italy. After 
natural disasters such as landslides and earthquakes the contracts for rebuilding devastated 
communities are often appropriated by Mafia organisations. This has reportedly been the case 
after the 2009 L‟Aquilla earthquake and constituted the norm for Southern and Central Italy (for 
example see Paoli 2003). 
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„reserve‟ specific items of food, such as butter and beans, for „friends‟ before 
actually selling them on to other customers for a higher price. His exploitation 
of the illicit economy by selling resources to the highest bidder is a common 
practice during times of crisis
99
 (cf. Campbell and Sherrard 1968, Hart 1973, 
1992, 2005, 2007, Thomadakis 1981, MacGaffey 1987, 1998, 2000, Narotzky 
and Moreno 2002, Önis and Rubin 2003, Parvizi and Houweling 2005:3, 
Gregory 2009:152). 
 
In another ethnographic context, that of Zaire, MacGaffey offers a similar 
account of economic opportunism in times of crisis. MacGaffey explores how 
people find social and economic opportunities amidst the chronic state of 
political and economic crisis (1998:37). Once again the illicit (or 
secondary/black) economy, defined as the „unrecorded activities that evade the 
regulations of the „normal‟ official economy, allowing for entrepreneurial 
innovation‟, plays a pivotal role in economic opportunism (ibid.). Due to the 
chronic long-term condition of crisis in Zaire, MacGaffey argues that the official 
and second economies are not distinct sectors, but intermingle in complex 
ways
100
 (ibid.:38, Hart 1973, 2005, Thomadakis 1981). 
 
The political circumstances in Zaire since the 1970s have meant that a 
potentially prosperous nation-state has become a breeding ground for corruption 
and violence, leaving the nation devoid of multinational investment (MacGaffey 
1998:39-40). These voids in the national market mean that there are multiple 
demands for resources that can be met by opportunistic entrepreneurs, thus some 
people can strategically prosper from the crisis. 
 
MacGaffey continues; „from such turmoil people were finding creative and 
ingenuitive ways to deal with the situation and small initiatives were flourishing 
as people learnt to fend for themselves‟ (ibid.), what has been termed “the art of 
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Currently, black market cigarettes and fuel are in high demand in Greece (The Economist, vol. 
396, issue 8689, 3
rd
 July 2010). 
100
 This is an important aspect in the discussion of „corruption as a cultural phenomenon‟ 
(including notions of „moral economies‟ in Bosnia, Bulgaria and Greece). 
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managing, of making do” (Goddard 1996:50)101. Especially resourceful were the 
small enterprises; workshops and garages that had diversified and even started to 
compete with the remaining multinationals
102
, businesses that were operating 
„within the cracks‟ (Pardo 1996:19) of the crisis stricken society (Ciervide 
1992:224, MacGaffey 1998:40). Such was the success of these opportunistic 
small-scale enterprises that imported (by any means possible) the materials 
needed to produce consumer goods during the crisis that a permanent basis was 
formed for large-scale capital accumulation. This eventually led to small-scale 
enterprises expanding into large-scale businesses (MacGaffey 1998:40). The 
tradesmen opportunistically visited other countries in order to supply particular 
demands that were prevalent in Zaire. One such enterprising strategy was to 
purchase food in neighbouring Angola, which had experienced a price slump 
due to a civil war, and sell it in Zaire (ibid.:41-43). However, as the national 
currency was so devalued, the currency of choice for international trade was 
often gold, diamonds, coffee, ivory or drugs, thus forming a multiplicity of illicit 
exchanges. With these resources locals could also barter with workers from 
multinational oil companies in the region that acted as intermediaries to provide 




The above accounts of satisfying consumer needs through entrepreneurial 
networks remind me of the case of Spyros, the mini-supermarket owner in 
Livadi. During my stay in the village Spyros was the man to ask for all your 
consumer needs. His shop, which he owned with his brother-in-law Yannis, 
consisted of just three small aisles selling basic household products and 
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 In the context of Naples, Italy, Goddard explores the notion of „l‟arte dell,arrangiarsi‟, the 
art of managing and making do. She states that the long-term problems of poverty and 
deprivation are reflected in the diverse ways that Neapolitans strive for social and economic 
adequacy. Some activities include the production and distribution of contraband and drugs, 
improvising small shops from downstairs house windows, unofficial car park attendants or more 
mainstream jobs such as working in „sweatshops‟. These activities can help “keep individuals 
and households alive” (1996:50). 
102
 Many Trikalinoi have taken to business diversification in order to compete in over saturated 
local markets. Maro, a hairdresser, offers „exclusive London-style cuts‟ which she advertises 
through cut-outs from British magazines. Stella, a travel agent, has diversified by offering 
„adventure tourism‟ packages. Clients can participate in guided hiking tours, take part in scuba 
diving, or mountaineering. She hopes to extend this to skydiving in the near future. She says that 
this diversification is required due to the intense competition between travel agencies in Trikala. 
103
 The process of money changing also crossed the boundary between Zaire‟s political elite and 
the everyday people as the „middle men‟ in this process were those with access to the 
„currencies‟; often people high in the political hierarchy (MacGaffey 1998:41-43). 
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foodstuffs and a small delicatessen. However, whatever product you wanted, 
whatever manufacturer you preferred, Spyros was highly successful in acquiring 
the exact product within days. His brother and sister both owned similar style 
shops in two other local villages and he also had friends who owned 
supermarkets in Trikala. Usually these networks were enough to satisfy the 
demands of the villagers. That was until the English anthropologist entered the 
village. First it was phone cards. I was informed by a Greek friend prior to my 
stay that a certain make of phone card allowed for exceptionally cheap 
telephone calls to Britain but I was not confident of finding them in the village. 
On my arrival I was informed that Spyros was the man to ask if you wanted 
anything unusual imported into the village, so after a coffee one morning I went 
to place my first request. “No problem” I was informed, “I know these cards, my 
friend Nikos has them in Trikala, I will send my assistant to get some for you, 
come back this afternoon”. That afternoon I had my phone cards. “Okay”, I 
thought, “at least I know they have them in Trikala for next time”. However, 
from that moment forth Spyros kept a packet of phone cards under the counter 
for whenever I requested them, regularly sending someone to collect new 
packets from Trikala. 
 
That Spyros‟ ability for filling in the gaps in the market stretched to Trikala may 
not be of much surprise, but his entrepreneurial talents went further. On the 
imminent arrival of a friend to Trikala I was asked to locate a specific make of 
French hair care product. I decided to begin my search with Spyros. After many 
telephone calls Spyros was unsuccessful in his initial search … he told me to 
“come back tomorrow”. The next day I called in the mini-supermarket and he 
greeted me with a beaming smile, he had located the product in Larisa, over 60 
kilometres and a one hour drive away. He said that he would personally see to it 
that his son drove down to the city to collect the product. The next day I had my 
French hair care product, without an inflation of its market price. He said that he 
would make sure he kept it in stock for the duration of my stay. I did not have 
the heart to explain that it was not for me so I duly accepted his offer whilst 
explaining that I may not need another bottle for the next six months. 
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Every time I requested an item I could not find myself in Trikala Spyros would 
either locate it and pick it up himself, send someone else to collect it, or get it 
delivered to the shop. By doing so, his customers stayed loyal and his reputation 
for tending to the villagers‟ needs was enhanced by filling in the gaps in the 
local markets. Spyros did profit economically of sorts from the activity as well 
as gain a place of social prominence and reputation in the village for being the 
man to consult for all consumer needs. He achieved this prominence by utilising 
his network of social and economic relations (Hobsbawm 1968:35, 51). During 
my year living in the village I encountered numerous stories of other obscure 
requests that Spyros had obtained for his customers ranging from specific types 
of cheese to washing machine detergents and exotic tea bags, all obtained within 
a few days at most. Unlike the grocer described by Psathas, Spyros kept his 
promises and to my knowledge did not auction reserved items to the highest 
bidders
104. Like MacGaffey‟s informants, Spyros was tending to the voids in the 
local market. 
 
Networks of economic relations and the politics „of making do‟ are particularly 
pertinent during times of crisis. Alternative modes of access to and 
accumulation of products is imperative in crisis contexts such as famine and 
civil war. Entrepreneurial opportunism benefits both the consumer who obtains 
their required goods and the businessman who accumulates economic and social 
capital. There may be noticeable exploitation of mediators and inflated 
commodity prices due to opportunism and illicit trade but often there is little 
room for morals in times of crisis. Indeed, in the event that there is no change or 
adaptation to the circumstances of crisis, people, as well as businesses, will 







                                                 
104
 As many products could be easily found in nearby Trikala there were not many cases when 
Spyros had to permanently stock a requested item and the more unusual requests were generally 
one-off purchases. 
105
 For a discussion of how Greek companies employ a variety of business strategies to 
anticipate and accommodate economic crises see Theodoridis and Bennison (2009:399, 401). 
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Marxist Understandings of Crisis 
 
One of the most widely known concepts of crisis relates to the theories of Karl 
Marx – also strongly informed by the essays of Frederick Engels (Arthur 
1970:15). Theorised in direct relation to capitalist and pre-capitalist economic 
production, Marx‟s ideas relate to numerous social processes since social and 
cultural phenomena are constitutive of „the economic‟ (Thompson 1965:84, 
Sayer 1991:2). Put simply, for Marx a crisis was “an interruption in the normal 
reproduction process” and was strongly related to the „material destruction of 
the elements of production‟ and a naturalised trade cycle (Engels 1959, Mandel 
1962:342, Marx and Engels 1970). In Marxist theory the cycle is defined in 
terms of four specific phases of change: economic recovery, boom and 
prosperity, overproduction and slump, crisis and depression (Mandel 1962:347-
349). Poignantly when one considers the current economic circumstances of 
much of the Western world, in the times of crisis and depression the human and 
material basis of reproduction, including the labour power and the instruments 
of production are significantly reduced: inevitably leading to decline in human 
and productive consumption and high unemployment. 
 
In his essay Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, Engels describes the inevitable 
collision between the extension of the markets and the extension of production 
and the consequential resistance of consumption: part and parcel of the “vicious 
circle” of the capitalist system (1968:425, cf. Carney 1980). 
 
“As a matter of fact, since 1825, when the first general crisis broke out, the whole 
industrial and commercial world, production and exchange among all civilised 
peoples and their more or less barbaric hangers-on, are thrown out of joint about once 
every ten years. Commerce is at a standstill, the markets are glutted, products 
accumulate, as multitudinous as they are unsaleable, hard cash disappears, credit 
vanishes, factories are closed, the mass of the workers are in want of the means of 
subsistence, because they have produced too much of the means of subsistence; 
bankruptcy follows upon bankruptcy, execution upon execution. The stagnation lasts 
for years … Little by little the pace quickens. It becomes a trot. The industrial trot 
breaks into a canter, the canter in turn grows into the head-long gallop of a perfect 
steeplechase of industry, commercial credit, and speculation which finally, after 
breakneck leaps, ends where it began – in the ditch of a crisis. And so over and over 
again” (Engels 1968:425). 
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Marx and Engels acknowledged that crisis can take many forms and have a 
plethora of consequences. Natural or social catastrophes, such as crop 
destruction, disease, wars and earthquakes, have devastating social and 
economic effects: a category of crisis that is termed „non-economic‟, at least in 
original primary formation (Mandel 1962:342). Marx argued that these crises 
were equivalent to business fluctuations in the purely capitalist context
106
. 
Economic hardship may follow a natural disaster
107
 due to a shortage of labour 
or infrastructure damage or the effects of the event on natural resources since, as 
Engels has stated, „nature is the material that labour converts to wealth‟ 
(1972:251). Hence economic wealth is based on the original premises of nature 
and labour. This is most evident in relation to the value of land: a notion which 
crosses the non-capitalist/capitalist transition. In The German Ideology Marx 
argues that for a landlord the significance of the land is not profit but the leasing 
of the plots for rent. The land has to be in demand in the first place and can lose 
its „feature‟ of value without losing a single physical characteristic, such as 
fertility (as it may do as the result of a volcanic eruption for example). The 
landlord:tenant economic relationship, and hence the value of the land and the 
livelihood of the individual, relies upon other social circumstances and wider 
economic contexts that condition the demand for tenanted land (1970:102). We 
can therefore determine that Marx believed capitalist crisis to affect both the 
workers and the capitalist class, pre-capitalist and capitalist societies (Elster 
1986:74, Marx 1867). 
 
In the distinctly capitalist context, „material destruction of the elements of 
production‟ pertains to the result of a crisis rather than the cause. An example of 
this would be the reduction in number of people involved in the production 
process. A natural disaster or war would inherently have this effect; as would a 
decline in demand for a commercial product. Mandel illustrates this point by 
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 In an interesting chain of events, in 2010 President Obama equated the crisis of the British 
Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, a natural disaster, with the September 11
th
 terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Centre. The oil spill, although „natural‟ was the cause of capitalist 
production techniques and the terrorist attacks are commonly deemed a consequence of socio-
political policy. Both crises are very different in cause and effect with diverse human 
consequences, yet they were deemed comparable without a problematisation of the paradox. 
107
 Of course, one must keep in mind that natural disasters do not discriminate between capitalist 
and pre-capitalist societies, yet the social and economic consequences are quite diverse. 
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suggesting; “it is not because hunger reigns in people‟s homes that the output of 
labour declines and crisis breaks out, but the other way round” (Mandel 
1962:342). 
 
However apocalyptic it may seem, Marx and Engels argue that the epidemic of 
overproduction that is synonymous with economic crises leads to the destruction 
of industry and commerce which appears equivalent to famine, universal war 
and natural devastation experienced in pre-capitalist societies. At such a time 
society seems to return to barbarism (1968:40). This is because “there is too 
much civilisation, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much 
commerce” and the people have become too powerful for the system (ibid.). 
One may not wholly agree that economic crisis, such as is currently being 
experienced internationally, is directly comparable to famine in sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the terms „civilisation‟ and „barbarism‟ do not sit so comfortably 
nowadays, but as an analogy of social change and when one considers a 
relativisation of normative circumstance, the concept becomes slightly less 
melodramatic. 
 
Capitalist crises with primary economic causes can relate to the concept of 
„monetarily effective demand‟ on the national and international scale. This is to 
say that an abundance of commodities cannot realise their exchange value on the 
market and remain unsaleable, dragging businesses into financial destitution 
(Mandel 1962:343, Elster 1986:75). As multiple businesses are engaged in the 
same capitalist market system, they in turn are likely to feel the effects of a 
depreciation in exchange value
108
. It is interesting to note that it was the 
differentiation between use-value and exchange value, intrinsic in the nature of a 
commodity, which Marx understood as constituting the possibility for crisis in 
the first instance. Again it is a paradox that in order to appropriate the use-value 
of a commodity one must first possess the equivalent in exchange value (Mandel 
1962:343). Of course the exchange value of a commodity is not static. One of 
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 Hobsbawm argues that industrial revolutions and depressions work along similar lines. Thus 
the industrial revolution in Britain cannot be discussed without considering the wider European 
and World economies due to the “larger network of economic relations” (1968:35, 51). 
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the major causes of economic crisis is the inability to repay debts due to a 
change in the commodity/money exchange rate (ibid.:344-345). 
 
One might say that nowadays the strategic investment of money in the balance 
between use and exchange value is the key to avoiding crisis. Yet “the love of 
money” is a vice of every individual thus presupposing periodic crisis as 
inevitable (Marx 1858:155). Due to this „love of money‟ businesses overstretch 
their economic means and are forced into administration and small-investors 
suffer the devastating consequences of stock market crashes. Individual 
responsibility, I would argue, is disseminated through levels of bureaucracy and 
hierarchical power existing at all levels of capitalist business which allows for 
self-denial and moral ineptitude. Due to the nature of the bureaucratic system 
the individual feels little sense of moral obligation to the client, as well as 
hesitant towards trespassing on the territory of someone else‟s power. Thus the 
hierarchical mechanism of capitalist power is often inefficient and, furthermore, 
almost entirely faceless; another aspect that supports the sense of diminished 
responsibility. Weber alludes to such dissemination as essential to the 
functioning of the amoral machine that is capitalist business (Weber 1970:95, 
Sayer 1991:137) and Engels attributes the continuation of periodic crises to the 
“unconscious thoughtless manner” of production inherent in such a process 
(1959:196). Thus the reproduction of the economy, the cycle of trade and the 
fluctuation between times of „poverty and plenty‟, perpetuate with periodic 
interruptions of the socio-economic norm. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to note what Marx and Engels believed to be the way the 
capitalist class got over these crises. We have already alluded to the destruction 
of commodities and the machinery for production as well as job losses in order 
to save money. According to Marx, during economic crises the level of the 
playing field is reset. Thus big businesses that were accustomed to big profits 
are satisfied with average profits and the small businesses may go bankrupt. By 




 – capital can be freed up for the attempted conquest of new 
markets and the more thorough exploitation of the current ones (Marx and 
Engels 1968:41). Cynically, Marx and Engels summarise these solutions as 
„paving the way for more extensive and more destructive crises‟ in the future 
and „diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented‟ (ibid.), all as the 
result of power being within “the hands of the few” (ibid.:55). 
 
Regional Crisis and Social Change 
 
As has been alluded to elsewhere in this thesis, at specific times during their 
formation and resolution economic crises can become a regionalised problem 
(Mandel 1962, Hobsbawm 1968, Carney, Hudson and Lewis 1980, Bowles 
2002). How economic crisis is managed on a regional basis in relation to 
international markets alters their longevity and severity at the regional level. 
Although regional crises usually tend to reflect general crisis tendencies, there is 
often a distinct regional aspect to crisis formation (Carney, Hudson and Lewis 
1980:20). Narotzky‟s definition of „regional‟ is followed; “the place-
boundedness” of economic activities that incorporate specific local 
understandings of “social capital” and the wider economy (2006b:339). Social 
capital is the ability to turn particular non-market relations into “capital” by 
accessing social, political and economic resources through personal networks. 
Relations of production and consumption can at least partially be based on other 
morally and socially predicated forms of responsibility and exchange in a form 
of “capital” not regulated by the state, legal forms or contracts (ibid.:347, 349, 
Bourdieu 1977, Narotzky 2004, Narotzky and Smith 2006). Thus the cultural 
distinction observable in regional varieties of capitalisms can be grounded in 
particular localised social and economic conditions (Bourdieu 1990, Narotzky 
1997:111). These notions can be further located in localised relationships 
between industrialisation, modernisation and political change (Yanagisako 2002, 
Ballinger 2007:59), what Narotzky terms regionalised “dynamic and flexible 
economic structure(s)” (2006b:337). Economic activities are embedded within 
pre-existing social fabrics to create a successful model based on localised social 
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 The reduction in employment numbers can also be the result in new technical innovations and 
the use of machinery (Marx 1973:125). 
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and cultural notions of relations. Structuring socio-economic relations that may 
not be based on official „Market laws‟ (Narotzky 2006b:338, La Pradelle 2006) 
mean that the effects of crisis will be regionally specific. 
 
These variables mean that in some cases regional crises can continue to exist 
even when the wider trend in economic markets is positive (such as in Argentina 
between 1998 and 2002). Some may even be contained if dealt with efficiently. 
According to Damette and Poncet (1980), when there is a global economic 
crisis, state monopoly capitalism begins to lose control at a regional level; thus a 
pre-existing regional crisis can become „standardised‟ by global trends. 
Furthermore, new regional problems are created in order to deal with or exploit 
market conditions. Thus a significant debt may be formed in times of prosperity 
so as to provide capital for accelerated accumulation. In times of recession, 
further problems are created in order to devalorise the capital required to re-
establish conditions for renewed accumulation (Carney 1980:40). Damette and 
Poncet offer the following hypothesis for regional economic crises: 
 
“Regional crises ultimately reflect the general crisis of the system. The initial force is 
provided by the general crisis. Regional crises are not the result of simple 
disaggregation of the overall crisis. There is a specifically regional diminution to the 
problem” (Damette and Poncet 1980:93). 
 
The present economic crisis in Greece is one such illustrative example of a crisis 
with a quintessentially regional flavour. The financial problems that the state 
faces are not new. As early as the 1960s scholars have highlighted the extreme 
problems caused by high government deficits (Campbell and Sherrard 1968:ch. 
9). However, the handling of the national economy during the years of 
prosperity, coupled with slow reactions to the international economic downturn, 
means that the Greek economy has suffered greatly. The management of credit 
was mis-handled on a state level, reflecting the international “serious and 
apparently structural” tendency to turn a blind eye to budget deficits and 
falsified figures (Campbell and Sherrard 1968:299, Piga 2001). The accession of 
Greece to the European Community in 1981 and their membership of the 
European single currency in 2001 were events processed amid a great deal of 
international scepticism as to the readiness of the regional economic arena for 
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new liberalised markets. A „blind eye‟, we are informed, was turned by the 
international community towards certain economic conditions necessary for 
membership of these institutions. Issues such as inflation rates and public 
spending remained unresolved, an attitude that was more recently reflected in 
relation to trade deficits and semi-legal banking agreements that contributed to 
the current crisis (Piga 2001, Balzli 2010). 
 
These inconsistencies are what are discussed above in terms of the 
dissemination of responsibility through bureaucracy and hierarchical power 
relations, resulting in moral ineptitude. Governments base policy within the 
bounds of short-term economic climates due to high levels of public expectation 
and internal governmental statistical targets. The practice of turning „a blind 
eye‟ to economic problems and especially rapidly escalating financial loans is 
not purely an issue at the state level. In Trikala the air of invincibility that could 
be felt during the mid to late 1990s resulted in many people „throwing caution to 
the wind‟ in terms of consumerism and personal debt. As with the case of Nikos, 
the stock market investor in the previous chapter, complete livelihoods were 
devoted to a medium of investment that few people truly understood, in this case 
the stock market. The same issue frequently arose in the context of 
indiscriminate bank loans. One informant stated that; 
 
“If I wanted a new car, perhaps a car better than the BMW Stavros had 
just bought, I would go to the bank in town and ask for the money … 
then a few month later I might fancy a holiday, so off to the bank I 
went”. 
 
The consequences of failing to repay loans were played down by my informants, 
“What is the worst that they can do, repossess my car?” was the most common 
response. By demonstrating such passive attitudes towards the consequences of 
their actions, both the government and the individual investor suffered 
extremely when the international economic crisis struck
110
. In this sense the 
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 Weber has argued that such action, or perhaps inaction, is essential to the functioning of the 
amoral machine that is capitalist business (Weber 1970:95). 
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„global economic crisis‟ took on a localised form due to the economic 
circumstances of the population. 
 
Greece is a good example of the relationship between regional and international 
economic crises as the nation has recently been fashioned as distinctly Western 
with a strong regional yet still highly dependent economy. The mixture of 
capitalist and entrepreneurial mentalities and pre-existing hierarchical systems 
such as patron-clientelism, contribute to the rich economic flavour (cf. Campbell 
1964, 1968, Yanagisako 2002, Bennison and Theodoridis 2009). This is one of 
the reasons why the Marxist „evolutionary‟ concept of economic stages – pre-
capitalist economies being succeeded by intermittent times of capitalist 
prosperity and crisis which in turn is succeeded by another economic condition, 
that of socialism – cannot be uncritically applied to the Greek context. Within 
Greece there are numerous embodiments of economic practice, a miscellany of 
capitalist and pre-capitalist relationships in the conditions of production and 
consumption. The supposedly separate stages are amalgamated into various 
tropes of „doing business‟. This can be connected to what Campbell and 
Sherrard term the „isolation‟ of many Greek people from the philosophy of the 
capitalist system despite being almost obligatorily involved in it by want of 
association (1968:349). This is not to say that people in rural Greece do not 
operate within the realms of global capitalism and to an extent prosper from it. 
In an area relatively detached from mass tourism, transnational investment, 
industrialisation and urbanisation, „the global capitalist experience‟ often 
appears as an epiphenomenon of decisions taken in a distant place by people 
driven by a specific agenda and a powerful ideology
111
 (cf. Chomsky 1996). 
Thus the inhabitants of Trikala and the surrounding villages live their daily lives 
within the realms of both global capitalism and other socio-economic 
„philosophies‟. 
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 It is interesting to note that despite the number of „supermarkets‟ in Trikala, the term 
„supermarket‟ is in fact used for all small self-service outlets in peripheral regions and stems 
from the introduction of large „European style‟ supermarkets in Thessaloniki and Athens in the 
1970s. In Trikala and most of the outlying villages, „supermarkets‟ are usually like British 
„corner shops‟ and are still owned by individuals rather than incorporated firms (Bennison 
1977:82). 
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One example of the “network of shifting but necessary alliances” between 
numerous forms of socio-economic activity (Narotzky 2006b:339) can be taken 
from two transnational supermarkets in the town, both belonging to the same 
chain. The German owned supermarkets are managed by local Trikalinoi, who 
in turn are under the management of regional executives in Athens. The 
supermarket chains are transnational capitalist enterprises where Trikalinoi can 
purchase all their weekly consumer goods. Yet despite official company policy 
the supermarket employees obtain their jobs on the basis of patron-client 
relationships. If a person does not have a network of contacts that relate him/her 
with the local branch manager then there is little hope of obtaining a job, 
regardless of curriculum vitae. This multi-faceted process highlights the 
complex relationship between state policy, unions, employers and employees in 
Greece (Featherstone 2008:7). Additionally, Trikalinoi often frequent these 
large chain stores only „as a last resort‟ as they are considered to lie at the social 
boundaries of their conceptual worlds (Marx 1990). They would rather patronise 
smaller shops belonging to friends and family (Just 2000:174-177). The visits to 
the multinational supermarkets are perceived as faceless market relations 
between two separate „isolated‟ partners not intimately united (ibid.:182). The 
majority of my informants preferred to patronise local businesses owned by 
relatives or friends of friends, demonstrating the instrumental weight of personal 
and affective relations (cf. Bennison 1977, 2010 (personal communication), 
Narotzky 2006b:340, Narotzky and Smith 2006). Fruit and vegetables are shared 
between villagers on the basis of supply and demand and money rarely changes 
hands during these exchanges
112
. This is a point the Just highlights in the context 
of Spartokhori, Meganisi. Here, the villagers were producers of olive oil and 
thus nobody ever purchased oil from the local shop, despite the relatively low 
price. On the occasion that the innocent anthropologist, Just, purchased his first 
bottle of oil he was reprimanded by numerous villagers who competed for his 
„custom‟, as paying for oil was considered little more than „theft‟ (Just 
2000:164). 
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 Other luxury consumer goods such as expensive cars and desirable clothes are indicators of 
socio-economic status (discussed in chapter eight), but are understood as indulgences into a 
world of the Other rather than consumer necessities. 
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Another instance of overcoming aspects considered synonymous with capitalist 
systems relates to the transgression of government imposed economic 
bureaucracy (Crozier 1964, Weber 1970). When problems do arise with official 
state or EU bureaucracy, these issues can be circumnavigated in ways 
inconceivable in other capitalist societies. Perhaps this is what Campbell and 
Sherrard meant by the „isolation‟ of the rural Greek populations from the 
philosophy of the capitalist system; an isolation which to an extent is still 
evident today. What is more, the other economic „philosophies‟ proliferating in 
Trikala have dense cultural and historical roots that operate within the complex 
and multi-faceted local/regional economic environment (cf. Featherstone 2008). 
 
It is therefore worth considering an alternative model of socio-economic 
development that does not demonise capitalism from the outset as a stepping 
stone to something beyond – an alternative to the Marxist paradigm. Such an 
approach is offered by Rostow (1960). Intended to be a “Non-Communist 
Manifesto”, Rostow‟s proposition is that all countries are located within a 
hierarchy of economic development. He identified the stages as: (a) the 
traditional society, (b) the transitional stage that preconditions for take-off, (c) 
the take-off, (d) the drive to maturity, and (e) the stage of high mass 
consumption (Rostow 1960, Colman and Nixson 1986:39). Rostow states that a 
nation must pass through one stage to get to the next, with stages (d) and (e) 
being the stages of self-sustaining capitalist growth. The main differences with 
Marxist concepts of development are that there is perceived to be no end to the 
capitalist cycle of the final stage and each stage is statistically measurable. 
During stages (a) and (b) radical changes are required in agriculture and 
transport and an “entrepreneurial spirit” has to emerge towards market-
orientated economic activities in order for a society to advance further up the 
hierarchy. To progress from each stage economic investment should also grow 
from 5 per cent to 10 per cent of GNP within approximately a decade (ibid.). 
 
The problems with this theory of economic development are manifold. Let us 
begin by keeping in mind Greece as a representative of any number of 
peripheral capitalist economies. For an economy to pass from one stage to the 
next on the hierarchy it must undergo numerous social transformations. Only 
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after these issues have been „resolved‟ may the subsequent stage be obtained. 
This initially poses a problem for any theory of cultural continuity in socio-
economic terms or indeed for multi-faceted capitalism (McNall 1976, Mouzelis 
1978, La Pradelle 2006). It is right to query how a society can completely detach 
itself from the socio-economic remnants of the recent past. What is more, can it 
truly be stated that any nation in the contemporary world is completely 
„traditional‟ and absolutely untouched by at least one of the numerous processes 
of globalisation and capitalism? Additionally, Rostow‟s theory presupposes that 
one stage is qualitatively better than the previous as a stand-alone set of 
conditions. This specific concept of a closed society with homogeneous 
measurable social and economic conditions seems quite farcical; especially the 
suggestion that during the early stages the national economy is completely self-
sufficient. As we have seen in the case of Greece, from the 1800s until the 1970s 
Greece relied heavily on imports to support the national economy and the 
inability to reach levels of self-sufficiency has been a recurring theme for over a 
century (Kuznets 1963:41). During this time Greece was certainly not a „modern 
capitalist nation‟ and thus does not fit in to any of Rostow‟s categories of 
development. Although it is common knowledge that economic crises can be 
regional (for example Argentina 1998-2002, Turkey 2000-2001, South-East 
Asia 1997), as can prosperity (such as the relatively unscathed nature of the 
economy in China, Turkey and Australia in recent times), it has become 
indisputable that current globalised market systems make each and every nation 
susceptible to transnational fluctuations. This notion of periodical transnational 
crisis is not factored into the developmental equation. 
 
Finally, Rostow supposes that there is nothing beyond the condition with which 
many nations now find themselves; his theory is certainly bounded by time and 
experience. If such specific statistics as percentages of GNP investment are the 
means by which a national economy progresses, one must pose the question of 
regression. If this is the case then do the social changes that come with 
advancement up the hierarchy become deformed with economic regression? 
Along these statistical lines of thought Argentina may be deemed to have 
recently regressed as the nation‟s GDP dropped by 20 per cent between 1998 
and 2002 (Page 2009:1). 
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In the same way that economic progression did not happen overnight, neither 
did the current economic crisis in Greece. Neither did it coincide with the advent 
of a new government when PASOK came to power in October 2009. The 
substantial regional flavour that made the crisis so extreme had been an 
underlying inevitability for many years. Indeed, the events contributing to the 
excessive nature of the current crisis – such as fabricated statistics, fraud and tax 
evasion – are not new or unusual in the Greek context (cf. Campbell and 
Sherrard 1968, Mouzelis 1978). One can argue that this is the result of interplay 
between multiple economic philosophies – capitalism, opportunistic 
entrepreneurism, patron-clientelism, social networks, and altruistic exchange – 
all strongly present in everyday life, overlapping to the extent that one becomes 
part of the other, coexisting in simultaneous moments (Narotzky 2006a, 2006b). 
Above all, as none have mutually exclusive rights to the economic sphere, they 
cooperate and facilitate on one level and erode and destroy each other on 
another level. 
 
Culturally embedded phenomena such as bribery and favour exchange that may 
be deemed wholly corrupt within many Western capitalist societies (categorised 
as Rostow advocates above) are part and parcel of the „Greek way‟ of doing 
capitalism (Seremetakis 1994:39, Bratsis 2003, Featherstone 2008)
113
. As there 
are regional forms and variations of „doing economics‟ there are regional forms 
and variations of economic crisis. As La Pradelle explains;  
 
“Societies do not wake up one fine day and discover the market economy as if it were 
Euclidean geometry of thermodynamics. They are either endowed or not with the 
institutional and historical conditions that allow for the instating of a particular mode 
of social relations: market exchange” (2006:6, also Müller 2004, 2007).  
 
The pre-existent socio-economic conditions are not easily neutralised in the way 
that Rostow suggests. The „rules of the modern capitalist game‟ are governed by 
„higher powers‟ and thus people in Trikala are often detached from the ideology 
invested in the liberal market system. Therefore local people drift in and out of 
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 For a discussion of the varieties of capitalism and the liberal economic reforms requested 
under the European Union‟s Lisbon Programme see Featherstone (2008). For a comparative 
account of French varieties of capitalism in relation to town marketplaces see La Pradelle 
(2006). 
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contextual relationships as they carve their own niche into the workings of the 
combined economy (La Pradelle 2006:5-7); or as Narotzky aptly puts its, 
„people make their way toward some kind of livelihood while the currents they 
float on hurl them here and there‟ (Narotzky and Smith 2006:122). The 
circulation of goods and services between kin, neighbours and friends is 
simultaneous with market exchange that deliberately ignores individual 
identities (Sahlins 1972, Marx 1990, Narotzky 1997, 2006b). Specific spatial 
and social contexts engender different economic relationships. There are spatial 
and temporal limits to these transactions that are strategically selected through 
deep cultural understandings of social and economic relations and social capital 
(La Pradelle 2006:7, Sahlins 1972). Hence often more than one sovereign 
system overlaps, creating a culturally unique reading of the social situation, as is 
the case when local managers hire friends and family to work for a transnational 
company or when villagers would rather patronise local shops and pay more 
money for their goods than visit a transnational chain store. These specific 
regionalised culturally informed processes shape how crisis is experienced in 
Trikala and other parts of Greece: the severity, the longevity, the causes, the 
consequences and the resolutions. A global economic crisis formed on 
international markets generates regional effects due to the structural intertwining 
of formal and informal aspects of the economy (Narotzky 2006b:351). 
 
Thus, as most of Europe comes out of a recession, Greece is left behind with 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and eurozone bailout loans and a stringent 
package of austerity measures in place. The style of Greek capitalism from the 
governmental to the individual level has generally contributed to this regional 
crisis. Yet the effects of the Greek crisis are not only restricted to within the 
borders of Greece, such is the nature of international markets. Greek bonds and 
credit ratings have been reduced to the status of „junk‟114 and other nations look 
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 “Junk” status reflects “considerable uncertainty surrounding the timing and impact” of fiscal 
austerity and reform measures on the country's economic growth, “particularly in a less 
supportive global economic environment”, thus discouraging provisional investors from trading 
with Greece on international markets as it is deemed “a severe credit risk” (International 
Business Times, June 14
th
 2010). Greece‟s was reduced by four slots to Ba1 – the highest junk-
level rating – from A3, also as a result of the “balance of the strengths and risks associated with 
the Eurozone/IMF support package” (ibid., The Economist vol. 395, issue 8682, 15th May 2010, 
and vol. 395, issue 8683, 22
nd
 May 2010). Indeed, even before this downgrade, Greece was often 
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set to follow suit, the Euro faces a potential decrease in value and the eurozone 
prepares to be dragged back into economic turmoil. It is interesting to note that 
in Britain, not a constituent member of the European single currency, the public 
is informed through the European Central Bank of „how this will affect us all‟ 
whilst British politicians state that „this is Greece‟s problem and a problem for 
the eurozone‟ (The Economist, 29th April 2010, 6th May 2010, 13th May 2010). 
 
Local Reactions to the Regional Crisis of 2008-present 
 
The reaction to this news in Trikala ranged from disbelief to outrage to fatalistic 
resignation. However nobody was particularly surprised by what they heard. 
The lack of surprise was firstly attributed to the public perception that corrupt 
behaviour, portrayed as causing the situation, is habitual and endemic at the 
state level. Secondly, extensive media speculation had surrounded the integrity 
of economic figures for some months. It is commonly acknowledged that the 
government is corrupt and „eats money‟ on a daily basis. It is also widely 
accepted that politicians regularly resort to grand-scale bribery to avoid 
prosecution
115
. However, as the severity of this „discovery‟ by the newly elected 
PASOK government began to be revealed, the public rhetoric, fuelled by media 
reports, started to change. Ilias, 44, explains; 
 
“I can‟t say that I was shocked at what our politicians had done and the 
position they had put us in. My first reaction was „ack, look at what 
these arseholes have done again … again‟. I thought that it might 
blow-over in a few weeks like all the other „thrillers‟ they give us 
through the television. Yet this one did not go away and the 
accusations got worse, more statistics were discovered to be false. And 
it wasn‟t just the reporters that were telling us of these problems, the 
Prime Minister was appearing on the television regularly. He was 
serious, very precise and obviously implied that this was a collective 
                                                                                                                                            
dismissed by investors as a country of high inflation and repeated devaluations (The Economist, 
vol. 395, issue 8688, 26
th
 June 2010). 
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 The “invisible receipts” have for a long time meant that the prosperity of the Greek economy 
has been falsified and remain a central feature of any analysis of Greece‟s commercial policy 
(Campbell and Sherrard 1968:301). 
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problem that had been caused by the previous (Nea Dimokratia) 
government. As you walked down the street you could hear televisions 
turned up to full volume and the Prime Minister‟s voice booming 
through the open windows. As the consequences of these problems 
became apparent we all started listening more intently, it was all that 
anyone was talking about. People became economic experts over night 
– we now all talk about „spreads‟ and „bonds‟, words that we never 
used before. We thought that we were returning to the bad times of the 
past.” 
 
The fact that people have become „economic experts‟ highlights the intensity of 
the situation. The usual media scaremongering was in this case fully justified. 
The topical satire shows, such as the hugely popular Al-Tsadiri News and Radio 
Arvila, reflect on the consequences of the austerity measures and the 
inconceivable level of governmental corruption. The critique of the current crisis 
is mediated between the public and private domains through television that 
brings public concerns and common discourses into the private realm and thus 
creates new public dialogues. One such provocation provided through the 
medium of television relates to discourses of previous times of crisis. Narratives 
of past crises, especially the Great Famine and to an extent the 1929-1932 
economic crisis, are given impetus in both a top-down (through the mass media) 
and bottom-up (through personal accounts and experiences) manner. Trikalinoi 
are beginning to embody the crisis just as their parents and grandparents have 
embodied previous crises such as the Great Famine and the civil war. Trikalinoi 
are enacting familiar practices such as hoarding food and using bicycles rather 
than cars when possible. These practices are related to the pressures induced by 
the financial bailout packages approved by the IMF and the eurozone. 
 
In 1968 Preston noted that; „it is important that the structure of economic trade 
in Greece should not remain unaltered in the midst of the changing economic 
environments; consumption opportunities and buying habits need to be 
addressed‟ (1968:214). This is an unequivocal necessity if Greece is going to 
recover quickly from the current crisis. Yet even amidst the apparently ingrained 
nature of poor economic policy and institutional corruption in Greece, some 
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scholars strongly believe that post-crisis state policy can be greatly transformed 
(cf. Bowles 2002, Goddard 2010). Bowles suggests that there can be alterations 
in unrestricted free market policy that focuses inwards towards a regional state-
central model that provides localised security in case of economic recession 
(Bowles 2002:237-238). However, for this programme to work a region needs to 
have a powerful and respected leader. In the pre-crisis Balkan context this 
figurehead would have indisputably been Greece; the leading investor in the 
region as well as political and economic powerhouse (Georgakopoulos 1994, 
Kamaras 2001, Bratsis 2003)
116
. Unless Greece can recover entirely and 
effectively from its current conditions it may lead to a crisis in confidence from 
investors within its own region. The initial changes may not initially be on a 
large scale. For example, analysts have also suggested sweeping constitutional 
reform is coupled with departmental reorganisation, ranging from simply letting 
international cruise ships take on new passengers at Greek ports and increasing 
the number of lorry licences (it is cheaper to transport goods from Italy to 
Athens than it is from Thebes, just 32 kilometres away) to reforming the welfare 
state and tackling the „jobs for votes‟ culture. Widespread tax evasion is also an 
issue that needs to be addressed; a study by the London School of Economics 
and Political Science estimated that Greece‟s potential tax yield is reduced by 26 





Eleni, 51, a primary school teacher who resides in a relatively wealthy suburb of 
Trikala, rather holistically captures the public fears embedded in the current 
crisis and austerity measures; 
 
“We are scared. We feel so insecure. The austerity measures will affect 
only the normal people, the politicians and those with contacts will 
continue to „eat the money‟. They are the cause of the crisis and they 
will not be punished, but we will. Therefore there can be no end to the 
crisis because the problem (the corrupt politicians) is not being 
                                                 
116
 On a wider regional basis the eurozone would seem to have been an association of like-
minded states with France and Germany as political and economic figureheads. This was made 
apparent by Germany‟s central role in securing, negotiating and providing bail-out loans to 
Greece in 2010. 
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targeted. If they get taken to court they pay-off the judges. We are 
paying for their behaviour, their money-eating, there is scandal after 
scandal … The pensions have been cut and now we will have to work 
longer and harder just to survive. I heard a woman call into the 
morning chat show O Ormofos Kosmos to Proi (Beautiful World in the 
Morning). She was over 80 years old and said that she had no money 
due to her small pension. Her husband was dead and she couldn‟t 
claim his pension, she did not even have money to buy her tablets and 
medicines that the doctor prescribed. She asked the doctor what she 
should do, he told her it was her problem not his. She didn‟t have 
enough money to give him a fakeláki (bribe). Eventually the television 
presenter promised to help her raise the money by sending it himself. 
We cannot see the light, there seems no end to the devastation they are 
telling us. The politicians played with our money and lost it all, now 
they are taking more money from us to try and stop their problems, 
more tax, cutting our bonuses … (In another story) I went to fill the car 
with petrol two days ago, the prices have risen so much that I could not 
afford to fill it up. I will use my bicycle to get to work in the next 
village from now on. I cannot afford to run the car, and I work nearly 
full-time … I suppose that I am happy to have a job; so many people 
will lose theirs. Young people have no prospect of getting work
117
, the 
students are better off staying in England, not returning to Greece … 
Here, even those with work are not earning money. The private sector 
(implying self-employed) workers have no customers as people hold 
on to their money and the public sector workers face huge pay cuts and 
redundancies … We are thinking that we will return to the bleak days 
of the war like our parents experienced. We have to prepare ourselves 
for that.” 
 
The austerity measures implemented by the Greek government amplified the 
sense of injustice. Many Trikalinoi feel unlawfully persecuted whilst the real 
perpetrators get away with their crimes. Sometimes, far from creating the liberal 
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 For the effects of the Argentine economic crisis and the impact on young professionals see 
Goddard (2010). 
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ideal of “world peace through world trade” (Polanyi 1957:11, Griffin 1994, Lee 
2003, Hart and Hann 2009:72), dramatic social and economic change can be the 
cause of much violent reprisal. This was demonstrated in Greece in May 2010 
when national strikes were called and thousands of people took to the streets to 
protest. Their anger was generally directed at the police, then government 
buildings, banks, national media outlets and multinational business chains, 
eventually resulting in the deaths of three people (known as the Marfin deaths 
[Reuters, 5
th
 May 2010, The Times, 6
th
 May 2010, Kathimerini, 6
th





. This was seen by many Trikalinoi as a new 
and unacceptable escalation in protesting. 
 
At this point I refrain from drawing conclusions to this chapter on theorising 
crisis until after the discussion of how these theoretical ponderings are 
represented on the ground in Trikala. It is important to contemplate how often 
abstract concepts of global and local economic systems impact on local 
populations. To do this it is imperative to consider depictions and 
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 See also Stoler (1985) for discussion of social change initiating violent uprisings in the 
context of Sumatra and Page (2009) for the protests concerning the recent economic crisis in 
Argentina. 
 184 
Chapter Six: Depictions of Crisis in the Public Sphere: 
Observable Phenomena 
 
In this chapter „the public sphere‟ will be critically analysed so as to interrogate 
how notions of crisis are represented in Trikala. The public sphere(s) is the par-
excellence arena of socialisation in Trikala and provides highly visible as well as 
metaphorical modes of understanding contemporary socio-economic conditions. 
A re-assessment of the public/private dichotomy as provided by previous 
scholars of Greece is taken as the starting point for this discussion, before 
moving on to an analysis of how the social impacts of crisis are played-out in 
the public arena in Trikala. 
 
The Public Sphere 
 
The public sphere in Trikala is the par-excellence arena of socialisation where 
the effects of crisis are played out on multiple levels. Additionally, the public 
sphere is an important site for intense status competition as well as an arena for 
the exchange and analysis of past crises. The public sphere can be explored in 
relation to a number of things; politics, gender, space, visibility, sociality, 
commensality, accountability, mass media, narrative and discourse and 
bureaucracy to name but a few. I would like to take a moment to explore the 
interaction between some of these aspects in relation to the analysis of the 
current economic crisis. 
 
In Trikala the public sphere has become especially crucial as an arena of social 
interaction during the current economic crisis. The whole „event‟ of the 
economic crisis is played out in the public domain, both on the level of 
government information exchange and personal experience. An analysis of the 
understanding of crisis in the public sphere is therefore imperative to 
comprehend how crisis is understood in the context of Trikala. To facilitate this 
aim two ethnographic examples have been chosen – one from Mexico and one 
from Argentina – to illustrate the import of the public domain at times of crisis. 
Both of these examples refer to periods of economic hardship and address how 
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crisis is portrayed and understood in the public domain as an arena for the 
comprehension of and reflection on social circumstances. Initially however it is 
necessary to briefly highlight the place of the public domain in Greek 
ethnography and situate the current discussion of the public depiction of 
economic crisis within a theoretical framework. 
 
The public/private dichotomy has been central to the analysis of Mediterranean 
societies since the 1960s (cf. Friedl 1962, Campbell 1964, du Boulay 1974) and 
has been portrayed as adhering to rigid stereotypes of socialisation, political 
subjectivity and gender
119
. Unlike other parts of the Mediterranean, especially 
Italy (cf. Ginsborg 1990, Goddard 1996), the public and private domains have 
remained remarkably separated in terms of space, what Just calls “a series of 
open forums and tightly closed doors” (2000:157). Initially this demarcation was 
almost exclusively explored in terms of gender and the honour and shame model 
(cf. Pitt-Rivers 1954, 1966, Campbell 1964, Peristiany 1965, 1966, Lisón-
Tolosana 1966, Friedl 1962, 1986, du Boulay 1974, Davis 1977, Herzfeld 1980, 
1985, Dubisch 1986, Gilmore 1987, Cowan 1990, Faubion 1993, Sciama 1993, 
Dubisch 1995, Goddard 1996, Booth 1999, James and Kalisperis 1999, Just 
2001, Kirtsoglou 2004). The code of honour and shame “unites ideas about 
power, sexuality, and gender relationships with a rigid spatial and behavioural 
division between women and men” (Dubisch 1995:196). The reputation of men 
is defended primarily in the public domain through the “energetic protection of 
the families‟ interests, as well as of the chastity of their wives, sisters mothers 
and daughters” (Kirtsoglou 2004:20, Campbell 1966:146, Davis 1977:179, 
Dubisch 1995:196). The reputation of women is believed to be related to the 
cultivation of shame or their reputation for being virtuous. This reputation is less 
threatened if the woman stays in the private domain, literally „at home‟ (Dubisch 
1995). The woman‟s reputation depends not only on her sense of shame but also 
on the communal knowledge that the men in her family are willing and able to 
defend her. The representation of an analytic dichotomy, public/private, was for 
decades fairly unflappable. 
                                                 
119
 Just notes that it is a paradox of the rural Greek village that “people so committed to the 
privacy of domestic life nevertheless choose to live in a form of settlement so compact that one 
house is literally on top of another” (2000:157). 
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In her study of pilgrimage to a Greek Island shrine, Dubisch (1995) questioned 
the ethnographic authority of the public/private dichotomy based on the concept 
of honour and shame. Whilst in the field she, as I, found herself experiencing a 
“dissonance” between models they were taught pre-fieldwork and the 
ethnographic reality. Put simply, she found the model inadequate and too 
outdated to fully capture the social dynamics of her field. The female subject in 
Greece is today by no means a „suppressed, downtrodden and reclusive creature‟ 
as portrayed in earlier accounts, and the strict separation of the public/private 
spheres along the lines of gender are not so strictly defined (ibid.:199). This has 
become a central criticism of the honour and shame literature (Cowan 1990:11, 
Goddard 1996:15, Kirtsoglou 2004:20). 
 
For Dubisch the key moment came when observing the public performance of 
women “ascending to the church on their knees”, which contradicted the 
public/private dichotomy that she was taught that she should find before 
entering the field. The reason that Dubisch found such performances 
„anomalous‟ was due to the „ethnographical and theoretical literature that shaped 
and constrained work on gender (and social cohesion) in this particular cultural 
region‟ (1995:195). In relation to contemporary male roles, Faubion argues that 
in modern-day Greece women are actually more „liberated‟ from the social 
restrictions of gender roles than men. He argues that men are still expected to act 
like “real men”, where as recently women have had more license to “be 
themselves” (1993:218). Being a „real man‟ is inseparable from the notion of 
providing for the family, and whilst in modern day Greece a woman may or may 
not manage the home, the man still has to provide for it (ibid.:219). Faubion 
suggests an asymmetry in gender bias in modern Greek reform, opposite to the 
asymmetry of gender roles argued by Cowan (1990). According to Faubion, 
“women are now more free to indulge in traditionally masculine pursuits; but 
men still run a considerable risk of censure for indulging in traditionally 
feminine ones” (Faubion 1993:219, also Herzfeld 1985:124). A man who is 
„shamed‟ for his action – thus bringing his family‟s reputation and honour into 
doubt – is said to have „become like a woman‟ (Dubisch 1995:197). 
 
 187 
Unavoidably, ethnographies of Greece share multiple aspects of theory and 
representation, and keystone theories have directly influenced later work. It 
could be argued that the focus on the public/private dichotomy in Greece in 
terms of gender (and in terms of honour and shame [Just 2001:39]) is almost a 
natural succession. The next generation of researchers after the Mediterraneanist 
scholars of the 1960s, grasped the dominant theoretical trend associated to the 
region and sought to juxtapose or justify its basis in Greek social life. Therefore 
gender roles are portrayed as being the central ideologies from which to analyse 
the social organisation of Greek culture, even if such roles do not conform to the 
structural models of the 1960s; what du Boulay terms “essential classification” 
(1974:105). This is not to say that the analytical models of the 1960s were 
without merit. Social reality has not remained unchanged and untouched over 
the past fifty years. “Cultural stuff” (Barth 1969:15) transgresses the shifts in 
disciplinary focus and theoretical frameworks, and is continuously changing (cf. 
Kearney 1995:547, Amselle 2002:220-227, Moore 2004:71). This is especially 
evident in today‟s world of globalisation, popular culture and tourism, mass 
media and the rapid spread of economic, political and cultural ideas (Amselle 
2002:229). Especially pertinent to the discussion of Greece is the influence of 
mass tourism that became apparent in the 1980s, bringing with it diverse cultural 
ideas and considerable information exchange (cf. MacCannell 1989, Goddard, 
Llobera and Shore 1994:24, Mansperger 1995, Boissevain 1996:13, MacLeod 
1999, Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2004:136, 147, Theodossopoulos 2005). 
According to Rapport and Overing, these processes of globalisation mean that 
there are now local, national and transnational codes that „overlap and intermix‟ 
(2000:169, Clifford 1997). With this in mind, we cannot argue that the „honour 
and shame‟ code was not an integral part of social reality in 1960s Greece. Even 
today, parts of the ideology hold resonance with certain social phenomena. Yet 
the social reality of Greece is ever changing, and – coupled with new 
methodological and theoretical paradigms – contemporary ethnography aids in 
the production of new anthropological knowledge (Moore 1999).  However, the 
theoretical concepts developed during the 1960s have unmistakably formed the 
basis for subsequent fieldwork interests in the region, hence the proliferation of 
the public/private dichotomy being explored in terms of gender. Indeed, Sant 
Cassia and Bada ask the question of how one can address Mediterranean 
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societies without reverting to the old schemata of cultural unity such as honour 
and shame and the public and private domains, initially explored by the first 
generation of Mediterranean scholars and with which “there is now 
uncomfortable dissatisfaction” (1992:3). 
 
Along these lines, I would argue that the public sphere is still the par-excellence 
arena of socialisation and political subjectivity whilst the private domain has 
retained an intimate family-orientated composition; as Hirschon puts it, the 
private domain is “an exclusive precinct, that of the family, closed to outsiders” 
(Hirschon 1993:84). In contemporary Trikala Hirschon‟s distinction of space 
remains largely intact, although it is based on different terms of engagement; 
notably not on gender. Public and private spaces can now be understood as 
semi-permeable in specific contexts, such as when considering the influence of 
the mass-media which cross the public/private divide. Family narratives of crisis 
formed in a private context are also expressed by both men and women in the 
public domain. These „intrusions‟ (Just 2000:167) are governed by notions of 
limited access. 
 
The public/private dichotomy is not devoid of value as an analytical tool for 
understanding social phenomena, as long as one is conscious of both the 
restrictions of such a division and its historical roots. Goddard argues that the 
concepts of public and private are better understood “as ideological constructs 
that define spaces, activities and persons in differing ways. The meaning and 
significance of actions and spaces need to be contextualised and we should not 
underestimate the capacity of agents to redefine and/or undermine such 
boundaries and distinctions” (2000:17). Hence, as the dichotomy is primarily a 
“feature of anthropological discourse” (Collier and Yanagisako 1987:18-20, 
Moore 1993:193) the boundaries are by no means rigid. I again refer to 
Dubisch‟s account of female pilgrims in Tinos to illustrate the „pushing and 
blurring of boundaries‟: 
 
“One of the sights that constantly attracted my attention at the Church of the 
Annunciation … was the many women who chose to ascend to the church on their 
knees.  This was especially common at the busiest times of year … the dramatic 
nature of their vows made them highly visible … Certainly for me the fascination 
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was due in part to the “exoticism” and dramatic nature of the act.  But there was 
another reason for my own interest, and this was the challenge these pilgrims 
presented to certain anthropological representations of Mediterranean women, 
representations that had played a significant role in my own anthropological 
biography … During their devotions at the Church of the Annunciation, large 
numbers of women in effect make public spectacles of themselves in front of 
strangers, as well as family and friends” (Dubisch 1995:194-195). 
 
Based on the fieldwork in Trikala, the appreciation of the public/private 
dichotomy should be as a highly flawed analytical construct which can today be 
summarised along two main lines. Firstly, there remains a definite division 
between types of socialisation in the public and private domains. This is perhaps 
similar to what Weber (1970) might have termed the „attitude-set‟ of the 
domain
120
. Unlike in Italy where scholars have noted that house doors are left 
open for people to come and go as they pass the house from the road (Goddard 
1996) thus meaning that „the home‟ transcends any notion of physical space, in 
Trikala there are clear distinctions in social spaces themselves, even if the 
appropriation of space is sometimes blurry. This is despite the fact that in Just‟s 
words „ideally the division between public and private ought not to exist, they 
ought to blend harmoniously‟ (2000:167). In the Italian context, Pitkin has also 
noted that the kitchen transcends the public and private realms (1999:289, also 
Hirschon 1993:77). In this case, “boundaries can be moved, institutions overlap 
the private and public, and there are a variety of factors which define a situation 
as either public or private. These factors can be social, spatial or metaphysical” 
(York 1997:215). As Hirschon notes, in Greece gatherings in public spaces are 
quite different to those in the home. She notes that public areas become „open-
air theatres‟ with broad conversation topics (1993:83). The public sphere is 
constituted by the aggregate of conversations treating matters of collective 
concern (Campbell 2003:19). In Trikala, Asklipiou is the par-excellence space 
for public socialisation where topical discussion abounds on all matters ranging 
from politics and economics to fashion and „petty‟ gossip. 
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 Indeed, both Marx and Weber argued for the separation of the public and private spheres; 
“The executive office must be separated from the household, business from private 
correspondence, and business assets from private fortunes” (Weber 1970:197, Sayer 1991:138). 
Weber states that without this distinction „modern capitalistic enterprise‟ is deemed impossible 
(1974:21-22, see also Macfarlane 1986, 1987). 
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Secondly, in contemporary Trikala the correlation between public/private and 
male/female is open to much critique beyond the bounds of this chapter. Suffice 
is to say that the public and private spheres have been almost completely 
transcended by both men and women for many years prior to my fieldwork in 
relation to allocating the work load (Theodossopoulos 1999, 2003). Many 
female informants have provided detailed accounts of their employment in the 
public domain from the 1970s onwards, whilst men are no strangers to domestic 
chores. Far from being periodical punctuations of the opposite sphere during 
celebrations or pilgrimage (cf. Friedl 1986, Dubisch 1995); the crossing of 
people between domains is a daily occurrence abided little pre-consideration. In 
line with Theodossopoulos (2003:81), the female role in public economic affairs 
has been underestimated. Many men now assist with public chores and even 
food preparation duties, whilst women sit drinking ouzo in the bars in the town 
centre. Many women are also public figures in their community and much of the 
strength of the ideological public/private divide as a theoretical construct based 
on gender no longer holds truth. 
 
Therefore we need to consider other possibilities of how the public sphere is 
constituted. In some instances the public and private spheres are spatially still 
very rigid, whilst on other occasions they become semi-permeable, such as 
private conversations and small-group socialisation taking place in very public 
places (Just 2000:167-168) in a form of domestication of the public arena. In 
order to build on the concept of a contextual permeation, even „domestication‟, 
of the public sphere some key theories of public/private formation will first be 
introduced, starting with that of Habermas. This will also assist further the 
exploration of how crisis is depicted in the public arena in relation to blame, 
narratives of crisis and how the external effects of crisis are portrayed through 
popular culture. 
 
Habermas classifies events, places or gatherings that are open to a large number 
of people as public, in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs. However, just 
because something is „public‟ does not necessarily imply unlimited accessibility 
(Habermas 1989:1-2). The public sphere arose historically in juxtaposition with 
a society separated from the state. From the perspective of Habermas, the 
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“social” could be ascribed its own sphere to the extent that the reproduction of 
life took on private forms on the one hand, whilst the private domain assumed a 
public relevance on the other. Therefore the interaction of private people 
became of public concern (1989:127). This is to say that the public sphere was a 
space of human interaction/action with limited accessibility. For Habermas the 
public sphere assumed a primarily political function whereby human 
communication ceased to merely concern subjectivity and increased to issues of 
political and economic influence over persons of power to further common 
interests. This, of course, coincided with the increase in private property 
ownership (1989:56). The public sphere was thus deemed to be the realm where 
property owners could assert their influence on figures of political authority and 
others with whom they were in competition, it became a realm of „possessions‟ 
(ibid.). 
 
By the mid-nineteenth century in Western Europe, the public domain inevitably 
came to be under the control of those groups who had no interest in maintaining 
society as a private sphere
121
. The sphere was thus expanded from being 
exclusively bourgeois to an arena for critical debate from the ground up. It 
allowed the critical evaluation of human beings by human beings (Habermas 
1989:127-128). By these parameters people can acquire „public recognition‟ or 
„public reputation‟ (ibid.:2), as in the case of competitive status exhibitions and 
public tournaments of consumerism, what can be termed the “politics of public 
credibility” (Ku 1999:7). The public sphere is an arena of visibility where each 
individual does his/her best to excel, thus making the invisible visible 
(Habermas 1989:7). 
 
The public sphere is one of the largest possible communicative spaces within a 
community – with other forms of „publics‟, such as the internet, encroaching on 
physical domains to broaden realms of influence still further. As a narrative 
space, the public domain helps to map out the moral underpinnings of political 
authority, status, and relationships within a society (Ku 1999:49). The space 
allows for both reflection on past events and postulations concerning the future. 
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 Status in the polis was therefore based upon status as the unlimited master of an oikos, or 
household (Habermas 1989:3). 
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The discourses are based on shared and communicated experience over a span 
of time. Thus cultural and political processes intersect the public discourses and 
changing public imagery, represented through narrative and discussion, and 
exercises power over the same political and cultural processes that feed it. 
Narrative discourse in the public domain can lead to collective mobilisation 
(Hart 1992, 1996), collective identity construction (Alexander and Smith 1993), 
crisis resolution (Jacobs 1996) and a feeling of social solidarity (Jacobs and 
Smith 1997). 
 
In the public sphere, a discourse is usually on a cultural theme, social issue or 
political event (Ku 1999:53). The relevance of the events to the particular 
narrator‟s own experiences is paramount. The plot, Ku argues, is a “temporal 
projection” and can lead to the symbolic embodiment of the theme by the 
narrator (ibid.). Thus, when a certain event is discussed in the public domain, the 
relevance to the individual‟s own experience leads to recollections of past 
experiences expressed in narrative form. Hence narratives of the Great Famine 
can intertwine with current economic pessimism in a „history of traumatic past‟ 
(Winichakul 2002:245). Narratives therefore incorporate cognitive, affective and 
evaluative dimensions into our experience of time and collectivity (Ku 1999:57). 
Of course one must also consider the eligibility of the audience to the relevance 
of public discourse. In many cases the repercussions of public discourse can be 
instigated by one audience – the general public – and directed overwhelmingly 
against another – for example the national government. Especially prominent in 
this process is the inchoate application of the collective “we” (Ku 1999:58, 
Carrithers 2008), employed to demonstrate solidarity to the cause and 
disseminate responsibility and blame across specific levels of the social strata. 
 
As mentioned above, in Trikala the public sphere has become even more crucial 
during the current economic crisis. Intertwined depictions and representations of 
crisis criss-cross the public domain in various forms such as media reports, 
personal narratives and visual representations, as will become apparent through 
the presentation of two ethnographic examples of crisis depiction in the public 
domain, within the contexts of Mexico and Argentina further below. In 
contemporary Trikala, people who until recently would gather in each others 
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houses in the evening for dinner parties now predominantly socialise outside of 
the house, usually in bars around the central commercial streets. They go out 
numerous times throughout the week, not necessarily spending much money, 
and sit at a table around the area of Asklipiou or connecting streets and 
converse, joke and gossip. “Mazevomaste ekso” (we gather outside), it is said. 
This is „in order to escape the house‟. During working hours the shop owners 
also congregate in the street rather than in each others stores; the topic of 
discussion is usually the economic situation. As one female informant, Anita, 
38, explains: 
 
“We are discussing the crisis with the rest of the owners of the shops in 
the neighbourhood, the photographers, the driving instructors, the 
pizza place. We congregate outside of our stores and discuss the 
situation of the economic crisis and the fact that we do not have work. 
What is going to happen? We were discussing and they were telling me 
that we are going to have to close the shops. I do not watch television 
because I am so stressed, I have constant headaches. We gather 
outside. Nobody is invited inside anymore. We are going crazy in 
there, everybody is afraid … I tell you that every Saturday I am going 
out because I would go crazy if I stayed in. I only have one or two 
drinks. We cannot stay at home any more. We gather outside. Nobody 
is invited to the houses any more. We say that we are going out. This is 
our space for gathering”. 
 
Gatherings that would usually have taken place in the private domain now take 
place in numerous small „private‟ groups in distinctly public places such as 
Asklipiou. Small private stages of mixed-sex collectivities are evident 
throughout the day and night. During one return visit to Trikala I was invited to 
meet my female friend, Agapi, a private shop owner, at her house at 8pm. 
During my fieldwork in Trikala I would often attend social gatherings with 
Agapi and her parea (company) which usually consisted of approximately eight 
people, both male and female, who were employed in jobs ranging from an army 
trainer to an accountant, a lawyer and a shop assistant, and even on occasion the 
local priest. The host for the evening would also cook the meal and provide 
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entertainment, music and drinks. The conversation was always very diverse due 
to the range of characters present, often politics and economics would merge 
with personal gossip and stories of friends, relatives and jobs and discussions 
about the latest television phenomenon. The gatherings would take place in the 
dining room or back yard and everyone would try to contribute something to 
help the host in his/her preparations. Hence, my 8pm summons to Agapi‟s house 
did not raise any suspicions in my mind as to a different turn of events. 
 
On my arrival I was invited to wait in the living room whilst my friend finished 
getting ready. I noticed that the table was not set and there was a distinct 
absence of aroma coming from the kitchen. I automatically assumed that we 
were going to someone else‟s house to eat. I called out “so where are we going 
tonight?” The reply was sharp; “out”. 
 
The gathering that night consisted of the usual protagonists; the lawyer, the 
accountant, the army man, the hairdresser, the video store owner and the shop 
assistant. The topics under discussion were similar; jobs, friends and the 
economic crisis were on the agenda. The location was a small unassuming side-
street taverna in the old town. On enquiring as to why we had this time decided 
to gather outside I was told; 
 
“We haven‟t done that for about six months now. None of us have the 
energy to do that now. We don‟t want to stay at home. We might as 
well come out; we can still talk and see each other. It is just like having 
our own table outside. It is nice to see other people doing the same 
thing. This is what most people do now, but we don‟t go to expensive 
places, not necessarily on Asklipiou. We like to discuss openly, we 
can‟t do that in the house, and we want to get out whenever we have 
the chance … In Trikala we have to escape our houses at every 
opportunity so everybody would rather sit out and talk.” 
 
The reasoning behind the increased significance of the public domain in terms 
of sociality is twofold. Firstly, by congregating outside of the house Trikalinoi 
have expressed a feeling of being away from the constant stress of the economic 
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situation. As Anita notes, in the house “there is pressure … people sit around 
dwelling on how bad the situation is”. By being away from the monotonous 
depression exuded by the television broadcasts and the household accounts there 
is a perceptive release of stress. In the context of the 2001 economic crisis in 
Argentina, Goddard notes how excessive stress was one of the central recurring 
narrative themes among her informants. This was related to the prospect of job 
losses and the anger vented towards people employed in dealing with the public 
face-to-face (Goddard 2010:135)
122
. Yet, this is not to say that people 
congregate outside more often in order to forget the situation. Seemingly 
paradoxically the second reason to identify is the need to share narratives of 
economic hardship. Whilst gathering outside the main topic of conversation, 
illustrated through Agapi‟s narrative above, is the current economic crisis. The 
concept of collective victimisation is more easily realised in the public domain. 
 
Spaces within the public arena are thus transformed and gatherings that once 
took place within the privacy of homes are now conducted within a 
compartment of the public domain, what one may be drawn into terming small 
„domestics‟. This resonates with Habermas‟ idea that „circles of people‟ can 
make up different forms of publics upon the same spatial stage (1989:55-56). He 
supported the concept that the public sphere is at times a private affair and visa-
versa with rules of inclusion and exclusion. From a Marxist perspective this 
could be understood as the realisation of the public domain as an arena of equal 
access for political debate, albeit within numerous selective private groups. The 
public space can be appropriated by social groups for political debate, although 
the dialogue between the selective groups is still far from the socialist ideal, 
hence the private nature of the sections of the enlarged public sphere of 
deliberation (ibid.:127). This is due to the multi-strata character of the public 
domain. Within these strata certain social groupings can find their niche. Yet it 
is the same strata that allow representation and inclusion with the sphere of the 
public that maintain it as a hierarchical and exclusivist composition. Hence 
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 Furthermore, due to employment and custom operating on a patron-client basis, many bank 
owners were mortified that they had given the wrong advice to their customers, many of whom 
were very good friends. Due to the Argentine system, even bank managers at branch-level were 
considered liable and prosecuted despite their very limited power and authority in the broader 
context (Goddard 2010:135). 
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Habermas‟ „free individuals‟ are regulated by rules of equality only applicable 
to those of the specific bounded social group in the first place. Thus criticism 
and debate can be understood as taking place within numerous „private‟ (in the 
loosest sense of the term) spaces within the strata of public space between those 
who fit the criteria. As a whole, public arenas lose social exclusiveness but 
inherit numerous exclusive spaces of regulated debate which would have once 
been the concern of „the private‟ (cf. Habermas 1989:131-132). Habermas 
argues that this means that the public domain is comprised of “competing 
private interests” as a consequence of the transformation of the public domain 
from a sphere of socialisation for exclusive private factions to an open and 
accessible arena for political debate within countless collectivities (ibid.). 
 
To an extent the zoning of public spaces such as Asklipiou has always been 
based on criteria of inclusion and exclusion. The bars that run the length of the 
main commercial street attract very different clientele. „Circles of people‟ do 
find their niche within other customers of similar socio-economic persuasion. 
For example, there are the bars/cafeterias that are fashionable with the youth, 
those frequented by the Nouveau-riche, and more traditional cafes with a more 
distinctly mature clientele
123
. This leads to more or less homogeneous groupings 
based on certain social dynamics. Yet during my fieldwork and subsequent 
visits the zoning has become more strictly based on small mixed social groups 
with limited public access that constitute small privates within the wider public 
arena. In this sense various „publics‟ form small domesticated areas. 
 
Kirtsoglou in her ethnography of same-sex relationships in Greece refers to the 
domestication of public space within the context of a town bar (2004:11). She 
suggests that there is a spatial distinction within the tavern between the bar area, 
frequented by regular groups of friends, and the other tables, frequented by other 
customers. Thus the bar area acts as a domestic space within the wider public 
arena. The significance of this distinction, Kirtsoglou suggests, concerns the bar 
area being closer to the „backstage‟ of the tavern – the people who work in the 
kitchen and the singers‟ resting area for example – rather than the tables of the 
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 According to Just, the coffee-shops and drinking places in Spartokhori, Meganisi, constituted 
“a public world where conspicuous attendance was obligatory” (2000:159). 
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„clients‟ (ibid.). The tavern becomes the group‟s stage where they can 
manipulate the clients with their „backstage knowledge‟. 
 
It is true that spaces within the public domain can be appropriated and 
transformed within specific contexts, although in the case of my informants the 
physical aspect of „space‟ as we might envisage it becomes less clear. 
Kirtsoglou talks of the bar and the tables and Hirschon (1993) discusses the 
moveable chair as mediums to transform the somewhat rigid public/private 
dichotomy. In the case of „gathering outside‟ in Trikala, one might imagine a 
conceptual „stage‟ that is transported from within the home to the streets around 
Asklipiou and the town centre. The actors are the same and the conversation 
very similar, but instead of a private dinner party it is now a „private‟ within a 
different spatial context. As will become clear from the case of Lakis below, 
members of these groups become aggravated when „outsides‟ intrude on their 
gathering. These small gatherings constituted the re-creation of intimate space 
along the lines of „limited accessibility‟ (Habermas 1989:1-2)124. This is not a 
matter of front-stage/back-stage but an issue concerning where the „stage‟ or 
platform for these gatherings is located in the first place, how the domains are 
permeated or re-located. As in Kirtsoglou‟s case of the tavern, a small section of 
public space is annexed for a previously private-domain orientated activity. 
Thus the platform for socialisation is folded up, put under the arm and pitched in 
the middle of the public social arena. One may equate this with a traditional 
English Sunday dinner being relocated from the kitchen table to the carvery 
restaurant with the difference being that this is not special celebratory occasion 
and none of the obligatory relatives are invited. 
 
Yet this is not a „stage‟ in the sense of display or performance – either of 
knowledge or of material wealth. For example, I refute the theory that the 
preference of gathering outside of the house is related in this specific case to 
demonstrating the individual ability to spend and remain unaffected by the 
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 Hirschon, amongst others, discusses the re-creation of Asia Minor villages in Greece after the 
compulsory exchange of populations with Turkey in the 1920s. „Refugee quarters‟ are visible in 
many of the major Greek towns and are often characterised by the attempts of the inhabitants to 
re-create life in their villages of origin (Pentzopoulos 1962, Hirschon 1989). In this case the 
public and private spaces – ranging from churches to living quarters – have been re-located and 
„unpacked‟ in a new location. 
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economic crisis. Argyrou discusses the fouartas (a big spender) who wants to 
show that he has no respect for money despite economic situation (1996:21). 
This disposition, he argues, is at the very core of male personhood. Men usually 
frequent restaurants and bars and display their money by buying the whole 
company (parea) food and drink. The slightest allusion, particularly in public, 
that one may be stingy (spangorammeni) is a cause of great embarrassment 
(ibid.:74-75). Furthermore, Argyrou suggests that rising costs and economic 
hardship are seen as a challenge to a fouartas due to the greater recognition he 
will receive (ibid.:97). In Trikala this idea does exist in some sectors of society. 
However, the congregation of people in public spaces during the economic crisis 
is not directly related to an attitude similar to the fouartas; the public 
demonstration that economic hardship has no effect on them. On the contrary, 
the harsh effects of the current circumstances are precisely the topic of 
conversation and discussions on how one can save money are prevalent. Instead 
the dual premises of escapism and collective victimisation are the core reasons 
for the shift in social activity. 
 
Such an example of not conforming to the persona of fouartas is offered by my 
friend Ioanna about a mutual acquaintance, Lakis, 32, a very status-conscious 
person who regularly occupies a table on Asklipiou with his group of friends: 
 
“Lakis went out with his group of five friends in order to relax and 
drink some beers in Trikala. He often does this in order to get away 
from work and all that stress. The empty beer bottles were stacked up 
on the table, you know, as they do, and, as it later transpired, they had 
just finished discussing their economic problems and decided to 
change the subject when a black man came around selling watches. 
This upset the groups of friends more than merely a simple annoyance. 
Usually Lakis would ignore the man but this time he just snapped and 
tore into the poor guy by exclaiming „what do you think that you are 
doing? We have an economic crisis and you expect us to buy your 
watches. Where do you think we get the money? Ah, get away from 
here.‟ This broke the mood of the whole company.” 
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This account is quite different to what one would usually expect from Lakis, for 
usually he would take great pleasure in strolling around Asklipiou showing off 
his friends to people he met on the street. He was always concerned with his 
social profile and relied on his „cool‟ persona of never getting flustered 
whatever the impending social trauma. Indeed, he was generally renowned for 
his relaxed attitude to life and to people. 
 
Through this narrative, once again the idea of escaping from the constant 
stresses of the economic crisis by going out with friends is overtly apparent. 
Although the beer bottles have been allowed to accumulate – an activity 
practiced by many groups of men in order to show that they are both purchasing 
and drinking heavily – this time the motivation for the conduct was not related 
to status perception. Instead the activity was related to „drowning one‟s 
sorrows‟. The request from the street seller to purchase watches was taken as a 
personal insult, enough to make a grown man snap into an uncharacteristic 
barrage of verbal abuse and for the neighbouring tables to overhear that Lakis 
had no money to spend on luxuries. 
 
Escapism, Collective Suffering and Victimisation in the Public Sphere 
 
The concepts of escapism and collective victimisation are closely linked and 
public social spaces, especially Asklipiou, are the loci for such sentiments. 
However, „escapism‟ should be understand to mean two things; firstly the ability 
for the individual to physically remove themselves from a situation of high 
stress, literally to „escape‟ their worries of work or the house; secondly, 
„escapism‟ in the sense that one can escape through the medium of collective 
victimisation. This is to say that through indulging in the sharing of narratives 
and stories, as well as bemoaning the current circumstances, people can 
metaphorically escape from the clutches of reality, or at the very least they can 
relieve the stress of feeling personally persecuted by the economic 
circumstances. Specific social spaces are reserved for individuals to make public 
their personal aspirations of escapism (Trias i Valls 2001:254, 2010:104). 
Furthermore, the actions are semantically loaded with increased sentiment due 
to the nature of their public expression (Trias i Valls 2001:224). 
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In Trikala this release is realised by immersing oneself in discourses of 
collective victimisation and collective suffering. Such narratives help “construct 
a collective individual … (that) emphasize heroism and triumph along with 
victimization … (and) explicitly work on sentiment” whilst placing the blame on 
the Other (Verdery 1996:77, Ballinger 2003:12). Hence people can 
“represonalize the economy” from being something of abstract control to being 
something of shared experience. The expression of public unity during key 
events generates a spirit of solidarity through communal participation (Hirschon 
1989:236). 
 
As Kirtsoglou argues, collective suffering provides people with a collective 
narrative of pain and endurance, what Dubisch terms “a community of pain … 
to protest against injustice” (Dubisch 1995:214, Kirtsoglou 2004:155, also 
Hirschon 1989). The actors are able to find a „common thread‟ – in this case 
economic hardship – through which they can provide mutual support and 
advice. Furthermore, the support system is also good for venting pent up 
frustrations. According to Kirtsoglou an audience, in her case the parea, the all 
female „company‟, legitimise narratives of pain and suffering and help each 
individual in the transition from the realm of pain back to everyday reality 
(2004:96). By congregating in social groups and discussing the personal effects 
of the economic crisis, my informants are legitimising, perhaps justifying, each 
other‟s experiences of suffering. The stress of the situation is partially relieved 
through a collective realisation that „I am not the only one‟ and „it is not my 
fault‟; the common experience of isolation that one may feel under such 
conditions are being re-routed within the reality of the situation. In this sense the 
public domain acts as an arena akin to a political forum for the narrative 
„validation‟ of circumstance (cf. Nichanian 1999:255). 
 
In Greek ethnography the concept of collective suffering has also been 
employed when discussing the refugee populations involved in the obligatory 
population exchange with Turkey in the 1920s (Hirschon 1989, 2003, 
Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2001). This is related to the idea of a “paradise 
lost” and the sentimental reaction to the “predicament of being a refugee” 
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(Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2001:397). Due to the implication of the state 
in the forced relocation, the image of the paradise lost „can be used as a strategic 
resource to simultaneously emphasise the state‟s culpability and its 
responsibility to make amends in the present‟ (Mitchell 1998:93, Kirtsoglou and 
Theodossopoulos 2001:398). The collective victimisation felt by the refugees at 
their enforced resettlement, leaving behind their land, homes and churches, is 
placed adjacent to the culpability of the state. In the case of the refugees, 
collective suffering was therefore always portrayed in relation to another, the 
Other (Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2001:405-406). In a similar vein, 
during the current economic crisis the role of the state is interrogated in terms of 
accountability, discussed below. 
 
Dubisch (1995) has explored the notion of competitive suffering, in many ways 
similar to the concept of collective suffering. Competitive suffering is defined 
by Dubisch as “constant complaints about the difficulty of daily life and 
problems at work, illness, or (particularly for women) personal relationships” 
(ibid.:214). She argues that public performances that communicate the 
difficulties of life „resonate with narratives greater than the actor him/herself‟. 
The individual identifies with the narratives of others in his/her company and 
shares in the experience of pain. Suffering is a performative act that is about 
more than simply the narrative of the individual, but a publicly enacted idiom 
that seeks to express culturally specific experiences (Dubisch 1995: 213-215, 
Kirtsoglou 2004:106-107). Both Dubisch and Friedl note that on being asked 
“How are you?” a Greek villager, as is the case around Trikala, usually answers 
“We are struggling” or “We are fighting”, such complaints, they note, very often 
relate to economic difficulties (Friedl 1962, Dubisch 1995:215). But in any case, 
an audience is imperative to the process of competitive, and indeed collective, 
suffering as a „connection‟ is necessary to facilitate the process of dissemination 
of experience. This connection is sought in the public sphere. 
 
The mutual audience and sense of togetherness relating to the group gatherings 
on Asklipiou could be deemed similar to Victor Turner‟s notion of communitas 
(1969, 1974) in the way that a spontaneous community is formed that share a 
sense of collective experience during liminal times. As Edith Turner explains: 
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“Turner uses “communitas” extensively in anthropology to mean a relational quality 
of full, unmediated communication, even communion, between people of definite 
and determinate identity, which arises spontaneously in all kinds of groups, 
situations, and circumstances … The sense of sharing and intimacy that develops 
among persons who experience liminality as a group” (Turner unknown125:97, 
Stinmetz 1998). 
 
Turner‟s work on communitas is extensive and has been extensively critiqued, 
especially in relation to his concept of anti-structure (cf. Eade and Sallnow 
1991). Here the positive aspects of Turners concept of communitas will be 
outlined in relation to the ethnographic case at hand. 
 
Turner notes that communitas is important for the collective well-being of a 
community as an inherent social critique is created (Dubisch 1995:42). For the 
current ethnographic study, it is also interesting to note that Turner understood 
communitas as able to “liberate individuals from the conformity to general 
norms … (and) warms everyone to each other” in a sense of „comradeship‟ 
(Turner 2008:96). This is evident when a group of people take to the public 
sphere in order to liberate themselves from the stresses of the economic crisis. 
The groups of people gathering in the public domain, although participating in 
„private‟ forums, are in direct visual communication with each other. There is 
expressed a sense of solidarity of “we are not the only ones” and a shared 
common knowledge of the current socio-economic circumstances. Communitas, 
Turner argues, emerges from the spaces of freedom often found in betwixt-and-
between situations. Thus communitas is evident in society through the 
interstices of structure in liminality; times of change, at the edges of structure, in 
marginality; or from beneath structure, in inferiority (ibid., Turner 1974, 
1982:47-50). At first human interrelatedness can „play across structural 
systems‟, but inevitably communitas soon develops a certain social structure 
where free relationships between individuals start to become norm-governed 
(1982:45-47). 
 
In the case of the social gatherings in the public domain in Trikala, we can 
observe that a new space has been created for a very specific purpose. People 
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 Article from Routledge, cw.routledge.com/ref/religionandsociety/rites/communitas.pdf 
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that were once socialising in each others homes at dinner parties are now 
gathering outside of the home with the specific intention to discuss each other‟s 
socio-economic circumstances and partake in a form of collective suffering. 
Hence the public domain has enveloped a new forum for social debate that has 
emerged in reaction to a period of social change. The practice has unspoken 
rules of behaviour, as was apparent in Lakis‟s narrative; one must not allude to 
excess expenditure, but listen to the torment of others and participate in mutual 
consolation. In Turner‟s terms a communitas has been formed at a time of social 
uncertainty. Additionally, such an activity in the public domain could be seen as 
a „crisis ritual‟ that has surfaced along the semi-permeable borders of the 
public/private divide. Crisis rituals are employed when an unfavourable change 
has affected a collectivity, or the group faces a danger or calamity of some kind. 
Such situations spread anxiety, uncertainty, and fear that can be alleviated 
through the performance of mass rituals that provide security and hope by 
reinforcing social ties and pointing to the transcendent dimension beyond 
everyday experience. In the theory of crisis ritual, the individual or family 
becomes a community problem; hence the public/private dichotomy is again 
permeated. I believe that „ritual‟ may be the wrong word to employ here as it is 
semantically loaded and evokes powerful notions of rites of passage, initiation 
and religion. However, the concept that Trikalinoi have adopted activities and 
routines that help them collectively deal with the impositions of crisis by 
reinforcing solidarity through relocating „private‟ gatherings into public spaces 
is fascinating. 
 
Discussing Accountability and Blame in the Public Sphere 
 
The appropriation of the public sphere in order to escape the stresses of the 
workplace and the home, coupled with the concepts of collective and 
competitive suffering, result in “local expressions of disconformity” with 
national and global economic systems (Gledhill 2010:150). Social gatherings 
can be seen as a form of „collective mobilisation‟ employed by Trikalinoi in 
order to deal with the difficult situation at hand. Disconformity is evident 
elsewhere in these congregations, as people also bring up the question of 
accountability; who is to blame? The Trikalinoi assure themselves that it is not 
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them, or indeed their fellow Greek „commoners‟, however much petty 
corruption or tax evasion they may themselves be involved in. Accountability 
and blame for the crisis is located within the bipodial schemata of 
„accountability to the public‟ and „public accountability‟. According to Werbner 
(1995:99), debates concerning accountability stretch from the most personal to 
the “most inclusive public sphere”. Over time arguments concerning 
accountability separate the local and the global and also fuse them in historical 
narrative, as in the case of cultural proximity. 
 
As the austerity measures grasp the nation, the government is publicly seeking 
to hold the external Other accountable for the current turmoil; primarily 
Germany for stealing Greek gold during the Second World War and the United 
States of America for the banking crisis, as well as the European Union for poor 
financial management. Trikalinoi acknowledge this rhetoric but principally hold 
the Greek government responsible for the crisis and thus it is they that must deal 
with the situation. Due to this stance, many Trikalinoi are consistently calling 
for “O allos” (the Other) to be installed in power, a movement that has been 
promoted through the mass media. By “O allos” they mean someone other than 
PASOK and Nea Dimokratia, the two main parties that have dominated Greek 
politics since the downfall of the military junta in 1974 (additionally these two 
main parties have been led by two main families – Papandreou and Karamanlis 
and their sons respectively) (Clogg 1992). 
 
These debates take place primarily in the public domain, both „on the streets‟ 
and through media discussions and debates. The government also officially 
transfers blame through television appearances and press releases, primarily 
towards the external Other as well as the previous Nea Dimokratia party. 
Individual and collective responsibility is disseminated through levels of 
bureaucracy and hierarchical power existing at all levels of capitalist business 
and government which allow for self-denial and moral ineptitude. The process 
of blame-shifting is exacerbated by the implication of globalised economic 
markets and regional integration programmes such as the European Union. Such 
institutions are seen as „absent‟ and „devoid of political accountability‟, or, as I 
was constantly reminded, “not interested in Greece, but focused upon 
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themselves and their own priorities” (cf. Shore 2000). Blame is thus alienable 
and transferable between people, national government and other states and 
international institutions, with the public sphere as the vessel for such strategic 
relocations. 
 
Some examples of the recent blame-shifting will be offered here, set in the 
context of the anger and frustration surrounding current economic conditions. A 
more general analysis of how Trikalinoi understand blame to be circulated and 
transferred will then be presented. 
 
In February 2010 PASOK‟s Deputy Prime Minister Theodoros Pangalos126 
publicly placed the blame for the current financial crisis on the Germans: 
 
“They [the Nazis] took away the Greek gold that was in the Bank of Greece, they 
took away the Greek money and they never gave it back … I don't say they have to 
give back the money necessarily but they have at least to say “thanks””. 
 
The Mayor of Athens, Nikitas Kaklamanis, also waded into the dispute: 
 
“You [Germany] owe us 70 billion euros for the ruins you left behind [in the war].”  
 
Pangalos continued to say that Italy had done more than Greece to mask the debt 
and deficit troubles in order to join the European single currency. He also 
claimed that the current economic crisis in Greece would not have been as bad if 
the European Union leadership was stronger: 
 
“The quality of leadership today in the Union is very, very poor indeed.” 
 
Furthermore, the Greek Consumers‟ Federation called on shoppers to boycott 
German goods
127
. There were simultaneous murmurings heard on the streets of 
Trikala concerning Bulgarian boycotts on Greek holiday resorts and anti-Greek 
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 During the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis Pangalos, then Greek foreign minister, stated “We have 
nothing to do with Turkey … A man can‟t discuss things with murderers, rapists and thieves”. 
Turkey responded by calling Pangalos a „psychopath‟ and “insults began to fly faster than the 
state-of-the-art aircraft which the two countries were using to engage in dangerous mock-combat 
over the Aegean”. Pangalos was eventually forced out of government due to the incident, only to 
return years later (Morris 2005:118). 
127
 news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8536862.stm, www.dailymail.co.uk 
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rhetoric circulated by other Balkan states. The source of this largely exaggerated 
rhetoric is obviously nearly impossible to trace but is became highly popular 
among Trikalinoi, in a similar line to the conspiracy theories concerning the 
renaming of FYROM circulating in Trikala in 2008. 
 
Dealing with crises is often portrayed by political bodies as a „common and 
collective responsibility‟ that cannot be traced to a single state or political body 
alone but can be transferred to numerous politically ambiguous sources. 
Sometimes governments shift the blame towards external bodies, as illustrated 
above. On other occasions blame is presented as a shared responsibility and both 
the general public and other national and transnational bodies are held 
accountable. In March 2009 the slump in the Italian economy led to Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi asking the cash strapped Italian people to “go out and 
spend” to raise their nation out of economic squalor (di Leo 2009). This 
statement holds a logical truth: as the recession got worse, so the public 
experienced restrictions on their expenditure and duly spent less, only to further 
harm the economy, yet it was not a good exercise in public relations. Campbell 
reports how in the American context the U.S. President stood up in front of the 
World Jobs Summit in Detroit in 1994 and announced “how they must 
cooperate in facing their common problem – unemployment – in much the way 
they have cooperated for fifty years to defeat Communism, to stand up against 
Iraqi aggression, and to expand the global trading system” (2003:3), thus 
disseminating the blame for increasing unemployment away from the target of 
the White House. In this case, other political and economic bodies were given 
praise and reminded, rightly so or not, of their role in previous successes such as 
„defeating Communism‟ (always a clutch word in U.S. politics) and „standing up 
to Iraq‟. In another case, Campbell quotes the Mexican President as placing the 
“responsibility to reform” on the participation “of all political parties and of all 
society” (ibid.:4). This case shows a shift of responsibility from the figures of 
the leadership to the people, and a pre-emptive warning that if the reform 
legislation fails then it is not the sole responsibility of the President. Hence a 
feeling of self-responsibility was imposed upon the everyday people, in a 




On the other hand, the general public tends to place the responsibility of crisis 
firmly on the governing bodies. For example, the 2009 swine flu pandemic was 
portrayed in Trikala as a crisis purely of the Greek state‟s making. Media reports 
fed public opinion that the inadequacy of medical treatment, the lack of funding 
for antiviral medication and political corruption were behind the pandemic 
effecting Greece: the issue was also presented as a solely Greek problem and 
blown completely out of proportion by both media and state. However, in 
Trikala in July 2009, many people in the town aired their reluctance to meet „a 
foreigner‟ just in case they were infected. This rhetoric was spread by state 
television channels and nationalist politicians. By playing on notions of national 
sentiment, this was intended to direct the blame away from the national 
government and towards an external Other. Depending on political allegiance, 
much of the mass media portrayed „the foreigners‟ as being infected and „the 
Greeks‟, even those involved in frequent international travel, as being pure. Yet, 
at the same time the situation regarding the virus and its effects in other 
countries were not reported and it was insinuated that if the Greek government 
was not so corrupt then the whole problem would go away. Hysteria and 
pandemonium were paramount but blame was again disputed; was it the 
foreigners fault as the government portrayed, or the Greek politicians fault due 
to wide scale corruption and incompetence? There were even suggestions 
among some sections of Trikalinoi that all people that came into contact with 
foreigners should go and have a blood test to see if they have swine flu. Even 
leaving the village was seen as precarious and anyone moving any great amount 
of distance should be quarantined for at least a week. Hence visiting some 
informants became difficult and sometimes uneasy interrogation as to one‟s 
recent movements became commonplace. Both versions of blame were greatly 
fuelled by media coverage and political allegiance and lend strength to the 
argument that the mass media takes on the institutional role of the public sphere, 
albeit with nationally-specific degrees of state control (Ku 1999:7). Indeed, the 
Greek newspaper Kathimerini has begun to term this obsession with media 
exaggeration and the resulting actions of the people “the media democracy” 
(Lygeros in Kathimerini, 7
th
 May 2010). 
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According to Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos (2010), Greek discontent towards 
external others is bound up in notions of anti-globalisation and 
cosmopolitanism. I would also add that it is intertwined with a discontent 
towards their own politicians. Both anti-government and anti-globalisation 
rhetoric is part of everyday life and is tied up with broader international 
pressures on Greece to conform to external political agendas (cf. Werbner 
1995). The official level rhetoric is disseminated in a top-down manner 
associated with strong nationalist and nationalised institutions (in this sense they 
play with the strong notion of „ethnos‟ prevalent in Greece [cf. Just 1989a]). The 
external Other is sought as the object of accountability for wrong-doings 
towards a group of like-minded „disenfranchised people‟ (Werbner 1995:83-84). 
„Western imports‟ are held responsible for the corrupting authoritarian 
organisations forced upon the Greek people by the European Union and the 
United States of America. Foreign meddling in regional affairs is noticeable on 
an everyday basis when issues such as the renaming of the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and the independence of Kosovo are discussed. Indeed, 
the declining economic conditions in Greece and the waning political influence 
of Greece on the European stage is generally considered as a consequence of the 
government being a „puppet of the US‟ who “systematically want to break up 
the Balkans into smaller nations in order to create more markets to sell their 
coca-cola”. Greece‟s obedience to US command is also publicly considered to 
be connected to military contracts. Blame is therefore lain at the door of those 
perceived to be making “decisions of global consequence (that) shape the face 
of the world” (ibid.:84, Stavridis 2007)128. 
 
However, this is the point where everyday people in Trikala begin to be critical 
of „the Other within‟; those that sell-out the „Greek people‟. Greek nationalism 
is deep-set. The roots have for a long time been bedded down and as a 
consequence „the people‟ are confident in their sense of collectivity. The 
critique often begins along the lines of „why are we subordinate to the external 
Other when we are the Greeks‟. The government, especially that of Kostas 
Karamanlis after his 2007 re-election, is thenceforth held accountable for 
                                                 
128
 For an account of public opinion in Greece regarding America in light of the Afghanistan and 
Iraq wars see Stavridis (2007). 
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„selling-out‟ Greece to the highest bidder – usually deemed to be the US or the 
EU
129
. Political and economic blame gets turned towards the national 
government who are deemed corrupt and only interested in themselves and their 
military contracts. The fact that politicians even have to transfer blame to 
external powers illustrates their own subordination ineffectiveness. They fail to 
protect the interests of their citizens from the influences of the external Other, 
echoing back to the socialist slogan of the 1980s, “Greece belongs to the 
Greeks” (Clogg 1992:179). 
 
Twice a week I would take a morning walk to the village KAPI
130
 (Open Centre 
for Protecting the Elderly) in order to purchase tickets for the local bus. As in 
many small Greek villages, KAPI acted as a cafeteria, post office and ticket 
office for local transport as well as a body that organised day trips and 
excursions for locals. In the store there was always a small television playing up 
high in the corner of the room. Sometimes it was on mute and on other 
occasions it was turned up to a booming full volume which elderly men gathered 
around to watch sport, news or political speeches. On one occasion the then 
Prime Minister Kostandinos Karamanlis was giving a recorded speech in 
parliament addressing the problem of the independence of Kosovo and Greek 
influence on political questions in the Balkans (including „the Macedonian 
Question‟). As I waited for Vaso, the owner, to bring a new batch of bus tickets 
down from the upstairs store room, I had a conversation with an elderly man, an 
agriculturalist, who I had met a few days earlier whilst out cycling around the 
vast agricultural plains towards Kalampaka. Flippantly pointing towards the 
television he gestured; 
 
“Bah, what does he care about us, the men in Germany (meaning 
Brussels), wherever they are, even our own Prime Minister doesn‟t 
care about us. He does what the Americans say … they can afford new 
American aircraft, even those Eurofighters (Greece was at the time 
                                                 
129
 As a study of political responsibility in decision making, Shore tells us, the European Union 
is intriguing as there is a severe absence of accountability to each other, national governments or 
„the public‟; there is certainly little democratic accountability (2000:213-215). This can quickly 
lead to acts of corruption or deliberate paths to „bypass the system‟ (Shore 2000). 
130
 KAPI (Kentra anoichtis prostasias ilikiomenon) was institutionalised in 1979 and in 1982 it 
became a public corporation. 
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reportedly „trialling‟ the multi-billion pound military aircraft), but the 
old women cannot be treated by the doctors because they can‟t pay the 
bribes. You know how many old women still live alone up in the 
mountain villages, they have no central heating and no running water, 
but he (Karamanlis) does not care as long as he gets money from the 
Americans and the EU. And just look at the condition of the roads 
around here. They were supposed to have been fixed ten years ago but 
they started – with money from Europe – and then mysteriously 
stopped again, half finished. Ah, now and then you may see a man 
making some concrete but only for a week and then, nothing. He is the 
bad guy in the story, you cannot blame the Americans, they know that 
they can get money out of him so they take advantage; he is the 
problem, the „fall guy‟ … He has no power in Skopje, the Americans 
want to call it Macedonia they will call it Macedonia and what is more 
our Prime Minister will slap him on the back and blow him a kiss … 
But any of them (Greek politicians) would be the same, as long as they 
fill their own pockets with money … First of all they took away our 
livelihood, the agriculturalists here have no money now … now they 
are dividing up the land to the Americans, and we let them do it”.  
 
The negative sentiments expressed towards Karamanlis are generally directed at 
any Prime Minister or prominent politician once in government. This was not so 
much a personal attack, more of a generalisation of a „type‟, perhaps even 
stereotype (Kirtsoglou and Sistani 2003, Theodossopoulos 2003) as the actions 
of political figures are always assessed with greater suspicion than those of any 
other individual (Piattoni 2002:5, Banfield 1958). 
 
Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos outline how western interference breeds 
attitudes of anti-globalisation creating “indigenous reaction to centres of power” 
(2010:85). I would add that this same opposition to centres of power could be 
applied to Trikalinoi views of the politicians in Athens who sanction the western 
interference and benefit from their decision making; they are the „hands that 
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lead‟ or „defy‟ the Other (ibid.:88, 93)131. Global phenomena such as 
cosmopolitanism and globalisation are locally understood to be the product of a 
foreign agent; however the ultimate accountability for accepting or denying 
these forces lies with the actions of the Greek government. The reply of the 
government to such accusations is a rather Malkovich-esque phrase; “It is 
beyond my control”132 (Lewin 2007:1). This has indeed been the case during the 
current economic crisis where sweeping government rhetoric and conspiracy 
theories concerning German gold and American meddling have been taken on 
board at a superficial level by the Trikalinoi before they unequivocally return to 
narratives of Greek political corruption and calls for those individuals in Athens 
responsible to face trial. In this case the grand narratives distributed by the 
politicians have failed to focus the blame away from themselves as perpetrators 
in the eyes of the public, indeed these claims merely heightened civic debate 
(Werbner 1995:100). Conspiracy theories concerning global power are merely 
one aspect of a much deeper understanding of political accountability. 
 
The circulation of blame advocated among significant portions of Trikalinoi can 
be understood in analogous terms with the circulation of valuables in the Kula 
ring, as first discussed by Malinowski (1922). As Appadurai notes, 
Malinowski‟s original publication can provoke much thoughtful and fruitful 
analysis in terms of circulation and exchange (1986:18). 
 
Like the armshells and necklets of the Kula ring, blame goes “round and round”. 
It is circulated in both a top-down and bottom-up direction but always the „men 
of substance‟ – the politicians and people in positions of power – play a central 
role (ibid.:103). Malinowski tells us that there are two spatially distinctive types 
of exchange and circulation within the Kula ring; internal and external. The 
internal, he states, is within the Kula district and the external is with „overseas‟ 
partners (Uberoi 1971:11). Put explicitly, in the Greek context the external 
circulation is advocated by state rhetorics and exchanges between international 
                                                 
131
 Post Greek civil-war literature attempted to place blame on the differences within. When they 
found that there was no end to accusation and counter-accusation they focused their attentions 
on blaming the external other (see Maranzidis and Antoniou 2004). 
132
 In the 1988 film Dangerous Liaisons John Malkovich‟s character, Vicomte de Valmont, seals 
himself against all moral accountability by repeating this phrase whilst seducing and destroying 
his eventual love interest, Michelle Pfeiffer‟s Madame de Tourvel (Lewin 2007:1). 
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bodies and the internal, which represents “a chronic permanent trickling”, 
(Malinowski 1922:103, Uberoi 1971:11), is circulated through the public 
domain in Trikala. This highlights the two-way dynamic of responsibility as 
discussed by Campbell above.  
 
A “chronic permanent trickling” of blame and accusations of accountability are 
commonplace in most democratic states (cf. Lewin 2007), the level to which it is 
circulating at any given time increases or decreases depending on specific social 
circumstances. The „big overseas expeditions‟ whereby blame is circulated on 
the international level relate to international visits and European Union summits 
where everyone attempts to agree to given strategies but readily cite the 
„differences‟ between members for the lack of responsibility in responding to 
crisis. On this transnational level there is “one enormous transaction, or more 
correctly … ever so many transactions taking place simultaneously” due to the 
sporadic nature of these events (Malinowski 1922:103). 
 
Taking the Trobriand analogy further, in line with the general opinion among 
my Trikalinoi informants, each man of substance (politician) “hopes to secure 
himself supremacy and pride of place” and does this by means of “influencing” 
their counterparts in a calculated manner (Fortune 1963:209-210). 
 
There is this man of local renown called Gravalos. He is a member of parliament 
for the PASOK party. He promised to promote the interests of his constituency, 
to the south of Trikala, including new investment and the building of new 
commercial premises. This, he reassured his voters, would bring jobs to the 
town. Although there was initial scepticism due to the non-local roots of 
Gravalos‟ family, he was elected to parliament on a wave of local vigour and 
optimism. However, “He forgot to tell us who these jobs were for”. Gravalos 
needed the patronage of a senior party member in order to get his desired job in 
the new government in Athens. The influence of the senior politician was great. 
Gravalos kept his word and began to build a new shopping complex on the edge 
of town. Although completed two years after the original deadline, the first shop 
opened among a muted fanfare. “That was the last time anyone saw him here … 
and that was five years ago. He dare not show his face around here after we 
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found out what had happened”. Evidently, Gravalos had „influenced‟ the 
management of the new shop in order to employ people from another village 
where the senior party politician had contacts. Two other people from the other 
village were also “systemised into Athens universities”, in which Gravalos had 
influence as a former lecturer. Gravalos was duly promoted in the party 
hierarchy six months later. Furthermore, the remainder of the project, amounting 
to an additional five retail outlets, remained unfinished. “They ran out of money. 
Who knows where the money went” (ironically said). “He neglected his 
constituency; it was all a show to get the votes. He is doing well now, flying high 
in Athens, lots of money in his pocket. We never see him here now, the 
arsehole”. 
 
Gravalos has so far escaped accountability, even when his party was voted out 
of parliament. His internal contacts with senior politicians in the party hierarchy 
have meant that he has maintained a high status and high paid job. He has 
employed his position of influence to further his own social and economic 
position but has escaped official accountability, whilst being blamed locally of 
wide-scale corruption. 
 
“Everyone knows that these things go on, money-eating here, bribery 
there, but they never suffer the consequences. Even the Prime Minister 
is getting the money from the Americans so there is no need for him to 
care about what his people think … There have been cases when 
people like Gravalos have been taken to court after secret television 
cameras have filmed them making illegal deals; many, many times 
okay. May be they get as far as an Athens court, if that, and then you 
hear nothing more about it. The case is dropped, or may be the video 
goes missing. Obviously they use the same tactics there, either the 
judge has friends that influence him or he gets paid the bribe, anyway, 
the man is never sent to prison, he is let free … You saw the houses 
they have built in Arachova (here begins another narrative concerning 
„second homes‟ in prestigious Greek holiday resorts)”. 
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In Trikala, this type of illegal activity is blamed for the majority of the current 
economic crisis. However, when a person cannot successfully pass on 
responsibility in times of crisis, after a period of time he/she starts to get a bad 
reputation and, in the case of a politician, is often forced to resign, the 
equivalent of a keda collapse; a system of successful circulation breaks down 
(Campbell 1983:218-219). In the Kula case the inability to continuously pass on 
artefacts results in a bad reputation and a decline in trading partners and 
eventual collapse of the keda (road, route, path, track) (Fortune 1963:209-210). 
Reputation is based on acquiring, holding and parting with possessions at 
strategic moments as the artefacts journey around the islands. Thus the 
manipulative skills of the actors are paramount to a successful career in Kula 
trading and the maintenance of reputation; the individual has to make 
judgements of personal estimation and calculation. If this is not the case then the 
keda will collapse. On the occasion of such a collapse, another keda, or in our 
case government/politician/scapegoat, must be formed, one without the tainted 
reputation; a period of realignment takes place. Sometimes a man may never be 
able to form another keda due to their reputation for “bad” Kula activity 
(Campbell 1983:218-219, Munn 1986). By constantly changing keda in the Kula 
ring, the history of artefacts is affected and associations between actors and 
artefacts are lost. Hence, if we continue with the analogy of crisis and blame, the 
changing of governments/politicians/scapegoats, disassociates the blame from 
the new protagonists. An example of this was apparent in Britain during and 
after the 2010 elections when the austerity measures announced in an emergency 
budget by the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, were accepted 
almost without protest by the general public due to the association of blame, 
promoted by Mr Osborne‟s own Conservative Party, with the previous Labour 
government. In the Kula context, Campbell argues that the alteration in keda 
means that the previous „Big Man‟ loses his claim to immortality as others take 
on the responsibility from a position of „a clean slate‟ (1983:218-219). In this 
respect the correct calculation of when and to whom to pass on the artefact 
(blame) in order to maintain reputation is a “suffocating” responsibility in itself 
(Weiner 1983:164-165, 1988, Appadurai 1986:20). 
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Furthermore, like blame, the artefacts themselves gain in significance and 
„wealth‟ the more they are circulated. The artefacts acquire a history that 
endows them with special meaning and importance (also in terms of gift 
exchange see Mauss 1954). The further the blame travels, the more „wealth‟ it 
accumulates; the heavier it becomes. The “circularity” nature of the system 
means that the significance of the object is not static or part of a binary whole. 
This “endless unidirectional circulation” means that the things being passed 
around develop a “circulatory life of their own” (Malinowski 1922, Munn 
1986:44, 58). Blame, like gossip (du Boulay 1974, Zinovieff 1991), is 
manipulated, exaggerated and deliberately circulated between strategic actors, 
thus accumulating a multidimensional life of its own whereby one point of 
accusation leads to numerous other sources of the same network of blame. This 
is exaggerated by the primarily faceless nature of international relations and the 
intertwined global market system which incorporates multiple referential points 
of accountability concerning any one transaction. Hence we can invert the 
concept in the Kula of the traceable history lending desirable properties of 
wealth to the artefacts so as to invite competitive desire, arouse envy and confer 
social distinction and renown: as blame circulates it acquires a poisonous wealth 
through a network of ambivalent connections, resulting in a form of alienability 
(Malinowski 1922:511). The idea of a poisonous wealth being circulated can 
obviously be linked to theories of inauspicious and polluted gifts (Douglas 1966, 
Bailey 1971, Parry 1986, Raheja 1988, 1994, Hendry 1990, Trias i Valls 2001). 
Douglas argues that either the transgressor is held to be the victim of his own 
pollution and therefore suffers the consequences of his actions, or some other 
victim takes the brunt of the danger (1966:133). Pollution, or indeed 
accountability, can therefore be a deterrent to a would-be wrong-doer if s/he 
cannot pass-on the blame successfully as it inspires fear, terror or dread (ibid.:1). 
According to Douglas, 
 
“when action that is held to be morally wrong does not provoke moral indignation, 
belief in the harmful consequences of a pollution can have the effect of aggravating 




Thus the circulation, in Malinowski‟s words, „surpasses size and complexity‟ by 
referring the object, heavy in „mythology and magical ritual‟ (1922:510) and 
poisonous in presence, onto another. The actors “know their own motives, know 
the purpose of individual actions and the rules that apply to them” and like 
Malinowski‟s account of the Kula, some evade responsibility and manipulate the 
circulation process (ibid.:83). 
 
It is also possible to „stall‟ the responsibility of repayment through smaller 
offerings. These offerings are subordinate but stall the repayment of the original 
transaction. Hence, the closing of accounts is dependent on the “complex 
interplay of the incommensurable spacetimes” created by minor as well as major 
circulations (Munn 1986:58). As with any good politician wanting to avoid a 
scandal and shift blame onto another constituent party, the Gawans, Munn 
argues, must watch the activities of their neighbours closely in order to know 
when and where to make their strategic move (ibid.:59). Furthermore, the 
durability of the items that are passed-on commensurate with their power of 
circulation, “it never finishes, it goes around again and again”, in this sense, 
Munn argues, the system creates its own regulatory dynamic (ibid.:60) that is 
intertwined with memory and embroidered with oral history. If opportunities for 
prestigious exchange are missed, or a keda brakes down, the individuals 
involved are held not only personally accountable, but also accountable for the 
prestige of the community (Malinowski 1922, Munn 1983). 
 
We must acknowledge that this is by no means a perfect analogy. To start with, 
in the Kula ring people desire gifts to be passed on, admire them and „bid‟ in 
order to gain possession of especially desirable artefacts (Malinowski 1922:98-
99). Indeed, Malinowski argues that it is mainly due to the “deep desire to 
possess” that the Kula ring exists at all (1922:510). Obviously blame and 
responsibility is not here desirable. This is unless the actor feels that s/he can 
gain more prestige and reputation by resolving the problem, as Gordon Brown 
attempted to do during the British recession in 2008/2009 where he gained 
international recognition, IMF plaudits, public support and opinion poll points 




. In this case it could be deemed to be part of the public display of 
the results of successful economic activity outweighing previous notions of 
political inadequacy (ibid.:146). Additionally, a man in the Kula ring actually is 
made richer by “the continuous possession and exchange” (Malinowski 
1922:81, Fortune 1963:214-215) of artefacts, whilst in terms of blame it is 
usually the success of the „passing-on‟ that determines the reputation of the 
actor, although how one deals with the „possession‟ aspect is also important, as 
demonstrated by Gordon Brown. If for any reason the transfer is unsuccessful 
the „partnership breaks up‟ due to the failing to oblige the expectations of 
another partner, perhaps in this case „the public‟. The Kula exchange 
partnerships are also necessarily based on the transfer of objects with similar or 
the same value in a unilateral manner. In terms of accountability it has difficult 
to measure like-for-like exchanges and the reciprocal nature is not obligatory 
and often not an integral part of the circulation process. 
 
It has also been mentioned that the objects in the Kula ring are endowed with 
history and take on aspects of identity from their possessors; “each one of the 
first-class armshells and necklaces has a personal name and a history of its own” 
(ibid.). This „wealth‟ then builds up as the object circulates, as in the case of 
blame. However, a paradox in the analogy is that here blame is deemed 
alienable. Although it could be argued that each crisis has a history – it does not 
just appear void of socio-historical circumstance and political agency – the 
accountability for the history has usually become alienable or at least 
indistinguishable (cf. Lewin 2007). 
 
What follows is a consideration of different forms of discourse of crisis and 
accountability in the public sphere. In each case the narrators and the audience 
must be considered within the contexts of crisis in which they are presented. The 
circulation of responsibly can be represented, indeed evoked, through many 
mediums. The public sphere is usually the arena par excellence for display and 
portrayal of social unrest and representations of accountability where social 







groups share and come to terms with crisis along the lines of collective suffering 
(Campbell 2003, Page 2009). 
 
Representing and Evoking Crisis in the Public Sphere: how is it portrayed? 
 
Wherever the blame may be deemed to lie, crisis is represented and evoked both 
within the patterns of production and consumption. As mentioned above, I have 
chosen in this chapter to focus on depictions within the public sphere as this is 
central to Trikalinoi understandings of crisis. Outlined here are two cases of 
representation of crisis which portray socio-economic circumstances through the 
processes of production and consumption. How similar processes are at work in 
Trikala is also highlighted. The significance of these mediums is enhanced if 
one considers them within the framework of evocation, not merely 
representation. In this instance the depictions of crisis do not lack a certain 
agency; they promote activism and evoke emotion as well as mobilising a sense 
of collective suffering (Strathern 1995:6). 
 
The two examples of crisis evocation selected here relate to economic crises in 
Mexico and Argentina. These cases were chosen not on the basis of 
geographical proximity but on the criteria of circumstantial similarity, both in 
relation to the causes of crisis and the mediums of public representation. Hence 
the presentation of Mexican mural art aims to highlight how depictions of crisis 
in the public domain shift accountability towards political actors and appropriate 
significant figures in the portrayal of collective victimisation. The Argentine 
case represents a situation with similar temporal and consequential proximity. 
Yet, the example of Argentine film production during an economic crisis also 
illustrates how methods of production and public consumption are affected by 
economic crises. Additionally, the portrayal of crisis in the public arena (and 
especially the mass media) is here multi-faceted; the methods of production are 
seriously constrained due to funding difficulties, the theme of the plot is 
influenced by contemporary socio-economic conditions and the audiences relate 
directly, and indeed are directly proportional in their attendance, to the situation 
of economic crisis. 
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In his ethnography of mural painting in Mexico, Campbell discusses depictions 
of political accountability and public victimisation after the 1985 Mexico City 
earthquake. In this instance the economic aspect of crisis was the 
epiphenomenon of the original event. People were left to rebuild their 
communities amid concurrent economic difficulties and murals of social 
solidarity and reconstruction appeared on working-class apartment buildings. 
These were coupled with depictions of political corruption and revolutionary 
figures from the past (2003:6-7). The government‟s efforts to address the crisis 
were deemed, at best, inadequate, with little support for the working-class 
reconstruction efforts. The murals thus describe “relations of institutional power 
– running hierarchically from global to local mechanisms of authority, 
administration and control” (ibid.:8). 
 
The development of mural art in Mexico is part of a wider aesthetico-political 
modality of public discourse; a composition of public discourse positioned 
within the official public sphere and often in direct opposition to official rhetoric 
(ibid.:70). The „exclusionary machinery of official management of the public 
image‟ means that people seek spaces for self-depiction of “image” (Campbell 
2003:11). Public spaces allow for a place for public discourse and represent 
economic and social situations on the ground through the painting of murals. 
The murals are spaces for public discourse and represent economic and social 
situations on the ground. This is similar to the transformation of the public 
sphere in Trikala during times of crisis and can be related to both the alternative 
use of space, such as the small private gatherings in the public arena, and to the 
change in patterns of competitive consumerism, what is termed in this thesis as 
„tournaments of consumerism‟. In both cases individual and collective 
commentaries on socio-economic circumstances load the public sphere with 
local, nation-wide and international references to crisis. 
 
The prolific Mexican mural movements have their roots in the fallout of recent 
economic as well as natural crises. According to Campbell, the accelerated 
capitalist process, rapid globalisation and the lack of investment in local 
production has led to a dismantling of the state-owned economic sector and a 
flow of capital investment away from the Mexican people (ibid.:16). This has 
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resulted in a decline in wages and quality of life for many citizens. He argues 
that the Mexican state has lost much power in controlling its own social 
problems, such as unemployment, balancing production for export:production 
for internal consumption and monitoring rural to urban migration. Overall, the 
informal economic sector has expanded rapidly as a result of official economic 
policy meaning that the Mexican state can no longer legitimise itself unopposed 
through public rhetoric, leading to a rise in new socio-political discourses 
(ibid.). These opposing socio-political ideals are expressed within a tightly 
controlled public domain through murals. 
 
The mural depictions often have layers of discursive content and incorporate 
many levels of localised representations of cultural images and collective 
experiences (ibid.:11-12). The city has become the stage, as well as the 
protagonist, for exhibiting the national condition and the political agency of 
“emergent publics”. Concepts of collective victimisation and collective suffering 
are portrayed through the medium of paint. The many layers of discourse, beit 
repression, natural disaster, blame, famine or economic crises, are mediated by a 
number of culturally significant actors. For example, one mural depicts the 
Virgin of Guadeloupe with roses – a sacred national symbol relating to a miracle 
in 1531 and once a symbol of state legitimacy and justice on behalf of the 
subaltern
134
 –, painted at the request of a neighbour in order to discourage 
littering outside of her home. The local gang, “Los Caracoles”, were determined 
to have their collective emblem painted next to the virgin, thus appropriating the 
sacred national image. The artist accepted the demands of the gang and obliged. 
A rival gang noticed the new addition to the wall. They spray-painted their 
acronym between the two paintings and appropriated the virgin for themselves. 
Additionally, this act was perceived as a critical comment on the association of 
“Los Caracoles” with the state government and thus their unjust association with 
a sacred image (ibid.:130-131). Campbell notes the polyglossia of such a mural. 
                                                 
134
 Campbell notes that the icon of the Virgin of Guadalupe has become most popular among the 
lowest strata of the social order. In a sense she has become the patron saint of the street 
(2003:130). 
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The original meaning for depicting the Virgin has been over-determined by the 




Thus Campbell‟s research focuses on three main themes; the appropriation of 
space in relation to official/public buildings, the rhetoric and discourse of crisis 
including collective suffering and victimisation – from official and „street‟ 
perspectives – and depictions to illustrate solidarity or contestation with certain 
groups that hold the government accountable for their socio-economic 
conditions. The space chosen to present political differences is the on the street. 
Kertzer suggests that such a public arena allows for conflict and crisis to be 
played out ritualistically (1988:ch.7). It is through ritualisation, he argues, that 
the human species control intraspecies conflict (ibid.:128). Here „ritualisation‟ 
refers to standardised, repetitive symbolic action; in Campbell‟s case, mural 
painting. The meaning of symbols such as the Virgin mentioned above varies for 
different people and the public appropriation of meaningful symbols through 
processes of political ritualisation allow for open contestation between multiple 
parties. Conflict and crisis can be both limited and provoked by ritualisation; 
here Kertzer provides the example of the West Indies international cricket 
team
136
 using the sporting arena to symbolically crush the former oppressors, 
whilst the emotions of the otherwise controlled British rise to boiling point 
(ibid.:129). 
 
In the case of the Mexican murals, unlike in Northern Ireland (Buckland 1981, 
Nordstrom and Martin 1992, Rolston 1992), it would appear that only the one 
side involved in the political struggle are appropriating the street walls as a ritual 
space of political contestation. According to Kertzer, this is not unusual; a single 
group can identify the enemy, in this case the state, recount the moral inferiority 
of the Other and glorify and celebrate their own group (ibid.:130). In this way 
people are provided with a means to express antagonisms through a specific 
controllable frame. 
                                                 
135
 Another highly poignant mural depicts the chupacabras or “goatsucker”, a supernatural entity 
believed to prey on animals. Sightings began at the time of the 1995 Mexican economic crisis. 
The artist had been fired upon by federal police whilst attempting works in the past but was 
provided with an armed guard by the “Los Británicos” gang, as well as with paints 
“decommissioned” from a local paint warehouse (Campbell 2003:128-129). 
136
 Kertzer notes that Cricket is itself a symbol of upper-class British colonial rule (1988:129). 
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The second example of depicting crisis in the public sphere concerns Argentine 
cinema during the economic crisis that engulfed the country at the turn of the 
millennium. The peak of the crisis was in December 2001 (Goddard 2010:131). 
Between 1998 and 2002 Argentina‟s GDP dropped by 20 per cent, banks 
stopped savers from accessing their accounts, protestors rioted as the country 
experienced food shortages, unemployment rose to 20 per cent in 2000, and the 
currency underwent „pesification‟. Within two weeks Argentina had five 
presidents (Page 2009:1, Goddard 2010:131-132). In this case the economic 
aspect of the crisis was primary and the range of „verbal and visual imagery‟ 
during this period has become „iconic‟ (Goddard 2010:131). 
 
The situation evokes many parallels with the current Greek crisis. The 2001 
economic crisis came as a surprise to the people of Argentina. For many years 
previous the nation was deemed to be a “star pupil” of the IMF and World Bank 
(ibid.:132). However, the signs were there for the people who wished to read 
them; the high inflation rates, increasing debts, government interference in 
currency exchange rates, and a general sense of anxiety and terror in both public 
and private sectors. Interestingly in relation to the Mexican example above, 
Goddard notes that many public areas were locations for graffiti concerning the 
crisis. The graffiti was usually in English and in highly visible places, thus 
indicating that the protest was directed at getting a message out to the wider 
world through the mass media (2010:134). 
 
Page examines the films produced during the economic crisis as both depicting 
and being products of the social circumstances (this has also been the case in 
Greece, especially during the 1960s „golden era‟ of Greek cinema). She argues 
that during the crisis directors were forced to make “aesthetic virtue out of 
economic necessity” (ibid.:2). Little money was available for film production 
and they were therefore often made „on the hoof‟ (ibid.). The films depict 
growing unemployment, rising crime and informal economy, poverty and debt. 
Page‟s argument is based on the concept that films portray these social 
phenomena and help in the construction of modes of subjectivity with regards to 
capitalism, neo-liberalism and economic crisis (ibid.:3). 
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When considering the effects of media representations of economic crisis, 
Page‟s observation that crisis spawns nationalist discourses is poignant when 
one thinks about Greece (ibid.:6). Mass media and film can be an important way 
to cross the public/private political divide. In the same way that one may 
encounter partisan news broadcasts concerning crisis, corrupt politicians and 
budget deficits being beamed into a living room in Athens or Trikala, in what 
many have started to term “the media democracy” (Lygeros 2010), so the film 
industry can bridge the public/private domains in the form of videos and DVD‟s. 
Whereas, Page notes, cinemas in Argentina themselves mark a boundary 
between middle-class prosperity and urban decay (Page 2009:11), the product 
itself has wide spheres of influence in multiple social arenas. 
 
In a similar way to Greece, Page notes that in the Argentine context, in times of 
crisis the nation and the state are symbolically separated in the minds of the 
public (see Just 1989a:72 for case of nation/state distinction in Greece). The 
nation is therefore called upon to invoke criticism of the state by accusing the 
latter of selling off the country‟s assets, leaving the nation with uncontrollable 
levels of debt. Thus the nation is rearticulated within the public sphere as a 
collective victim, with the aid of the mass media and film, so as to oppose the 
traitors of the state and to resist the opportunistic poaching of neo-liberal global 
capitalism (cf. Page 2009:6). 
 
On the other hand, mediums of the mass media may represent beacons of hope 
in times of crisis. One example of this comes from the time of the Nazi 
occupation of Greece, 1941-1944. At this time the only channel of information 
to which many people had access was BBC radio. Hionidou notes that the BBC 
Home service augmented rumours of harvest seizures by the Axis authorities, 
leading to revolts in many parts of Greece (2006:76). Archer records in his 
journal that on April 24
th
 1941 that a “small comfort” is found in Athens from a 
BBC report that one thousand aircraft had gone to England from America 
(1944:189). Again, on April 30
th
 1941 he says how a BBC radio broadcast 
informs the Greek people of the safe arrival of British troops in Crete and the 
death of 75,000 German soldiers (ibid.:206). The broadcasts also told of other 
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successes in the Balkans, such as the Russian counterattacks on German forces 
and British RAF bombing raids (ibid.:235). Indeed, many informants, especially 
those around the urban centres during the Second World War, describe how 
BBC radio broadcasts were often the only sources of communication with the 
outside world and led to many people learning English through this medium. 
This was openly acknowledged by the Greek authorities when in 1944 the Greek 
government requested that the British Foreign Office asked the BBC to cease 
direct condemnation of the Greek Security Battalions that were sponsored by 
Germans due to the fact that up to 70 per cent of Battalion members were Allied 
well-wishers that listened to the radio. Thus some radio broadcasts were 
censored (Mazower 1993:330-331). The mass-media continues to play a 
significant role in the communication of crisis, especially in the form of satirical 
entertainment shows and programmes focusing on topical political debate. 
 
When societies are in times of crisis public portrayals of the upheaval can 
provide means for understanding and coping with the threat to social order. The 
world is not predictable and a discursive outlet for the social tensions is 
required; hope, anger or jubilation. The governing bodies can be held to account 
through collective public displays; locked in a war of perceptions and a war of 




This and the previous chapter were concerned with placing economic crisis 
within a theoretical framework to facilitate further understandings of crisis 
among the Trikalinoi. The localised understandings of crisis are inherently based 
on localised perceptions of economic relations as well as specific notions of 
blame and accountability. Through these discourses Trikalinoi bring together 
global and local systems that involve personal and impersonal relationships. 
 
The emphasis on the public domain as an actual and metaphorical gauge of the 
present crisis was illustrated through ethnographic contexts such as the semi-
permeable nature of the public/private divide. This dichotomy has been central 
to the analysis of Greek society for decades and holds a significant position in 
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the anthropology of the Mediterranean. However, I suggest that the 
contemporary value of this analytic tool lies away from the gender divisions and 
the honour and shame model. Instead of problematising the public/private 
dichotomy in terms of economics of the house/economics of the public, which 
would have indeed proven insightful, the divide was explored in terms of 
appropriation of space and semi-permeable contexts of representation. Due to 
notions of escapism and collective suffering, the public domain takes on an 
increased significance in Trikala during times of crisis. 
 
Public visibility is an excellent indicator of economic decline or crisis. Public 
spaces of socialisation such as the main commercial streets, neighbourhood 
squares and cinemas are indicators of the level of economic crisis in both a 
literal and metaphorical sense. In Mexico, as in many Greek provincial towns, 
commercial streets are loci for the display of social and material status. 
Campbell decides to focus on the mural depictions of crisis, Page on the visual 
portrayal through film and the media. Images of the public sphere can be 
important tools for assessing and analysing crisis. In Trikala, the specific social 
arena of Asklipiou is usually the space for people to excel, display their 
possessions and critically evaluate one another, especially in times of economic 
prosperity. The visibility of an altered condition of a public space provokes 
memories of a previous time when these spaces were previously transformed. 
Thus the invisibility of a bygone era is rendered evident through the 
combination of memoirs and a visual representation of similar conditions is 
recounted in relation to the contemporary crisis. As public space in the centre of 
Trikala is usually occupied by those with a desire to display their relative 
symbols of status in an acutely visible manner, a change in this normative 
appropriation of space triggers the activation of previously dormant narratives as 
well as an adjustment in behaviour patterns. Hence, the physical spaces 





Pictures. 4 and 5. Examples of mid-summer sales on Asklipiou. The banner on 
the shop reads “For two more weeks even lower prices”. The sign on the bottom 
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basket reads “Everything 5 euros”. These were symptomatic of the sales in all 
establishments in central Trikala during summer 2010. 
 
Despite the fact that crises such as the Great Famine and the present economic 
decline may not seem directly comparable images, narratives of various crises 
criss-cross public spaces that act as visual aids in the calculation of crisis. This 
takes one back to Mandel‟s argument that crisis causes the narrative of famine 
and not visa-versa (1962:342). In current conditions the coffee shops of 
Asklipiou – the last place that would expect to feel the effects of financial strain 
– has visibly changed as Trikalinoi can no longer afford the excess expenditure. 
People look for alternatives; a backstreet cafeteria, or one with „special offers‟. 
Consequentially, the cafeterias are promoting special offers, the likes of which 
are highly unusual in this part of town. One informant, Popi, 40, tells me: 
 
“One cafeteria on Asklipiou is called “Pour Vous”. They have lost a lot 
of custom to other places. They (Pour Vous) have announced that 
between 2pm and 5pm the coffee will cost 1,50 euros. This is a dead 
hour and the owner came up with this idea in order to take advantage 
of the inactivity. Some friends of mine, a mother and daughter who 
also have a cafeteria, during the same time, 2pm until 5pm, they offer 
buy-one-get-one-free on beers”  
 
The effects of the financial strains are also being felt by the notoriously 
complacent younger generations that usually appropriate the cafeterias of 
Asklipiou, purchasing their coffees with the money of their parents and 
grandparents. Nikos, 16, the son of Maro, explains: 
 
“Before the crisis we as a group (parea) did not consider the economic 
situation of our parents. For example my mother is a hairdresser and 
the parents of one of my friends own a sweet shop. They say that one 
day they have work and another day they do not work. So we need to 
come up with some plans so as to manage our pocket money in order 
not to ask for a raise. For example in Asklipiou from “Eclipse” the 
coffee costs 3,50 euros. So we buy the coffee from Manavika (the old 
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town district of Trikala) from “Hara” where it costs 1,50 euros „to go‟ 
and we go to Frurio (another part of the old town) and we drink our 
coffee alone, away from the people. So we keep the 2 euros difference. 
We have an understanding with each other. Some days I have more 
money than the others. Some days they have more than me. But we do 
the same things because we understand that our parents are very 
stressed because of the crisis. Before we did not think of the money. 
But now we are very aware that our parents are in a difficult situation. 
And we discuss it. We say for example that today my mother did not 
have work. Another day the others say that their parents did not have 
work. We have a friend in the company that is sort of upper class. His 
parents are civil servants with a second house and two cars. He is 
attending the private school in Trikala. But he is ok in the sense that he 
does not try to distinguish himself from the rest of us. Despite him 
having a bigger amount of pocket money he never demands to go for 
coffee in Asklipiou instead of Frurio.” 
 
Hence the public sphere is once again the loci for which to understand the 
effects of the current economic crisis. Yet, as will be presented in the next 
chapter, as the Greek media elaborates and embellishes the current financial 
problems, narratives of other periods of crisis, such as the 1940s famine, are 
brought to the fore by the local people in relation to both social memory and 
contemporary visual references (cf. Halbwachs 1992, Tanabe and Keyes 2002). 
Thus public spaces such as Asklipiou are spaces that reflect local understandings 
of socio-economic situation, strongly informed today by wider perceptions of 








Chapter Seven: Time, Crisis and Social Memory (Cultural 
Proximity) 
 
The current economic crisis in Trikala has provoked poignant narratives of 
identification with previous periods of crisis. Accounts of times of social and 
economic hardship remain just below the surface of daily life even during times 
of prosperity as the turbulent recent past lives on in personal experience, family 
narratives and nationalist rhetoric. Indeed, even before the effects of the 
economic crisis began to take hold, stories of certain crises occasionally 
punctuated daily discourse. Hence during times of crisis recollection of past 
critical events surface in a much more regular and formalised manner (Das 
1995). People are likely to recall how their relatives fared during certain times 
of social upheaval such as the civil war or the military dictatorship, thus 
meaning that past critical events become general reference points for individual 
and collective history and are given a new form of life (ibid.:1). 
 
In culture there exist things which we think of as detached, as distant, but which 
are actually very close. With the resurgence of crisis these past times resurface 
as culturally proximate; through memory, objects and artefacts such as food, 
nationalist rhetoric and the education system. It is more than simply cultural 
memory (although this plays a part), it is an embodiment of times past, an 
embodiment of personal and non-personal memory, embodiment of both past 
and present nationalisms and a condensing of time to a singular moment of 
contemporary socio-cultural experience. Furthermore, as will be highlighted in 
this chapter, the memory of past crises may be transmitted non-linguistically (cf. 
Bloch 1998). „Distant‟ events can be embodied as though they were part of the 
contemporary life of the actors (ibid.:114). 
 
Some past events appear as culturally „close‟ despite being separated by 
significant periods of time, and sometimes by many generations. These accounts 
are apparent both within the public and private arenas, yet it is the public sphere 
which provides a multi-layered canvas for narratives and meta-narratives of past 
events. However, not all past crises are recalled with equal prevalence. Some 
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events appear „closer‟ in the collective social imagery, what I term „cultural 
proximity‟. The purpose of this chapter is to unravel the concept of cultural 
proximity by analysing ethnographic accounts of previous crises within the 
context of the current economic crisis. It is the further aim of this chapter to 
explore the reasons behind why some events are recounted as culturally „close‟, 
with special reference to the Great Famine of 1941-1943. 
 
Cultural proximity is the ability for the individual or collectivity to recognise 
and embody representations of the past within the context of the present, 
“whether the past be 20, 200 or 2,000 years ago” (Sutton 1998:ix). Furthermore, 
people can understand current events based on accounts of the past, whether 
experienced first-hand or not. It is something that is close to the culture and 
everyday life of the person/people. In journalism and media studies, the term 
“cultural proximity” is used to describe a topic that the audience can relate to 
and identify with (cf. Straubhaar 1991, Keinonen 2009). In contemporary 
Trikala people feel that at the present time of economic crisis they can identify 
with previous critical events such as the Great Famine, a crisis that now feels 
culturally and historically very close (cf. Serres 1987). Taking this concept 
further, cultural proximity depends on one or more defined historical moments 
where people can recognise past traits in their contemporary life and they feel as 
if they are in a context where the terms past and present collapse into a 
simultaneously meaningful moment; as Serres argued when stating that „two 
distant points can suddenly become close, even superimposed‟ (1995a:57-59). 
Comparative and genealogical analysis does not necessarily depend on 
perceptions of proximity in lineal time. The communication between two distant 
events can be played out through symbolic systems, cognitive categories and 
local/national vocabularies (Seremetakis 1991:11-12). Understanding the 
significance of past events within the context of the present can be facilitated by 
the analysis of particular aspects of past experience; hunger, violence and 
discrimination to name but a few. In this sense temporal closeness/distance is 
just another restricting dichotomy. 
 
In order to explain this concept further some theories of time will be discussed 
in relation to ethnographic accounts. Hence the beginning of this chapter will 
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focus on the work of French philosopher Michel Serres in order to determine 
how two significantly distant events can be culturally proximate. The focus will 
then shift towards why some crises, such as the Great Famine, are prevalent in 
the collective social memory and are culturally very close. Finally an 
ethnographic analysis of the role of food in the social memory of Trikalinoi will 
be discussed and how notions of hunger and famine assist the process of 
understanding contemporary crises. 
 
Crisis and Collective Memory 
 
Crisis is embedded and embodied throughout generations in the form of 
collective memory, personal narratives, and state-endorsed historical rhetoric
137
. 
Recollections of former crises are brought to the fore in later times of social 
upheaval as if they have been directly experienced and have suddenly become 
both socially and historically very close. Memory is thus „sedimented in the 
body‟ through various channels (Connerton 1989:34-35, Seremetakis 1994, 
Bloch 1998, Sutton 2001:12). The example par excellence of cultural proximity 
during the present economic crisis has been the wide scale references to the 
1941-1943 Great Famine. For reasons that will become clear, the Great Famine 
occupies a significant place in Trikalinoi social memory, recited mainly in the 
form of collective suffering and crisis management. These recollections form 
part of the conceptual framework which is drawn upon to explain people‟s 
possible fate this time around. The events are appropriated in order to explain 
fears and anxieties in contemporary times; the two events seem extraordinarily 
close (Serres 1987, 1995a:205). On collective memory Halbwachs argues that:  
 
“We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives, and these are continually 
reproduced; through them, as by a continual relationship, a sense of our identity is 
perpetuated” (Halbwachs 1992:47). 
 
There are still people residing in Trikala who experienced the Great Famine first 
hand, yet most of the accounts are passed down through the generations in a 
form of embodied social memory (Seremetakis 1994, Sutton 1998, 2001, Bloch 
1998). The „preserved memories‟ in Halbwach‟s terms are reproduced both 
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 For a selection of papers on embodiment and experience see Csordas (1994). 
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privately and publicly, facilitating a sense of collective identification with past 
events
138
. The crises of bygone eras are relocated to the present context. It must 
be considered as to why there is a special collective identification with certain 
events, such as the Great Famine. This is a particularly paradoxical situation as 
it is generally acknowledged by historians and social scholars alike that the 
Great Famine did not have such a significant direct impact on Trikala as did 
other events, such as the civil war. As two events that occurred during the same 
decade, the 1940s, their impact cannot simply be assessed in statistical terms 
(number of deaths, economic impacts) but also in terms of social consequences, 
including the construction of memory on both the local and national scale. In 
this way social memory can be understood to „both separate the local and the 
global and also fuse them in historical narrative‟ (Werbner 1995:99). People‟s 
orientation to local and national accounts of the past glorifies (in national 
myths), laments a loss (as in nostalgia), legitimises (as in social charters), or 
recovers a silenced history (as in the ethnic „search for roots‟) (ibid.). 
 
There is a complex interplay between personal experience that has been 
transmitted inter-vivos through kinship relations and the deliberate construction 
of nationalised narratives communicated through government policy and the 
education system (cf. Anderson 1983:41-43, 45, Gilroy 1987:154, Danforth 
1995:xiii, Karakasidou 1997, Sutton 1998, Winichakul 2002)139. This is not to 
say that processes of nationalism necessarily „collapse the personal experiences 
and memories of individuals with those of the new national group‟ (Karakasidou 
1997:25). For the Trikalinoi, personal accounts and experiences continue to 
reside alongside the nationalist rhetoric as partially intertwined cultural 
„histories‟ (cf. Sutton 1998, Vereni 2000:50, Brown 2003:129, Millas 2007, 
Theodossopoulos 2007:16). This is particularly significant as in real terms the 
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 According to Bloch the reverse is also possible; people can remember past events at which 
they were present and recount them as if they themselves were external, as if the events 
happened to other people (1998:124). 
139
 Both historical and religious beliefs often provoke strong individual and collective emotional 
responses. In the context of Micronesia, Lutz argues that cultural forms of emotional meaning 
are linked to broader political structures and issues of power relations (Lutz 1988:9, 54, 
Bourdieu 1991:1, 37, 41-42, Foucault 1976). The feelings produced through emotions relate to 
culturally-specific ideas of morality, domination and ideology (Lutz 1988). If people and 
organisations with political power to influence „the masses‟ manipulate sensitive feelings of 
identity and belonging, they can provoke emotional and „meaningful‟ responses. 
 233 
Great Famine did not directly impact Trikala to the extent that was felt in other 
parts of Greece, especially Athens, yet accounts are recalled and fears expressed 
as if the inhabitants underwent the same ordeal as those in the worst affected 
areas. As will be unfolded further, rather than being a localised critique of 
nationalism, the rhetoric of nationalism is itself critiquing local experience. 
 
Narratives of the epoch do, however, live on in many households through 
elderly relatives – they are „in the house‟ –, thus creating a genealogy140 of crisis 
connected directly to „the moment‟ and to relatives that may not have 
experienced the events first hand. Recollections of specific past experiences are 
stimulated partially by a fear of returning to the „time of crisis‟ (and a fear of the 
same results) and people „reaching their limits‟. It is interesting to note that apart 
from fearing a return to an era of hardship, many elderly informants exhibit a 
degree of pride for having passed through times of crisis and tend to portray a 
measure of superior knowledge of how to deal with unprecedented 
circumstances. In both cases the fear and the pride is not simply recalled in 
discussion with narratives of the present crisis, they are instead embodied, 
experienced and re-lived as if the past events are the present, not merely a 
critique of the present. 
 
Due to the selective nature of nationalism, collective memory informed by first-
hand accounts has been punctuated deliberately with certain events by means of 
the national educational system and media channels emphasising certain aspects 
of history whilst downplaying others (cf. Das 1995, Karakasidou 1997). This 
plays a significant role alongside the intergenerational transmission of 
autobiographical memories. Nationalism is key to the dissemination of localised 
events to the national conscience (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, Sutton 1998, 
Brown 2003). Due to the nature of Greek nationalism the plight of one part of 
the nation, such as Athens during the Great Famine where 300,000 people died, 
is recalled as if the account were a first-hand personal experience in Trikala. 
Here there is a question of scale. From the localised level of interpretation and 
                                                 
140
 Goddard notes that kinship genealogies anchor history to „family time‟. They form a sense of 
unity on the family and village scale by recreating events of the past. Genealogies provide “the 
means of representing social continuity” (1996:217). 
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experience, some events like the Great Famine have relevance on another level. 
The same concerns now dominate throughout the different scales (Werbner 
1995:112). The shift in scale is produced by a combination of the impact of 
crisis and nationalised conscience. The crisis thus takes on a national importance 
even in the areas that were not so overwhelmingly affected. Maurice Bloch 
(1998, 2004) suggests that autobiographical memories are intertwined with 
semantic memory which thus facilitates the transmission of cultural 
representations. From this we can understand the impact of narratives of the 
Great Famine on people who did not witness it first-hand (Laidlaw 2004:3) 
(either because the region was not so badly affected or because they are from a 
successive generation). Thus collective memory is internalised by processes of 
both autobiographical and semantic memories “burned in the mind, so to speak, 
by the traumatic and emotional nature of the experience” (Bloch 2004:65). The 
process of nationalism is one of the manners that such memories can be „burned 
in the collective mind‟, as master narratives bring certain events into a „schema‟ 
of cultural proximity (cf. Serres 1995, Bloch 1998, Vereni 2000). 
 
Significant individual or collective actions and events are attributed to the whole 
as „meaning structures‟ (Ku 1999:51). People understand their life within both 
individual and collective time frames, relating the present to the past and to the 
future (ibid.:58, Sutton 1998). Individual historical accounts, or „histories‟, are 
often constructed based on the collective experience of multiple groups within a 
society, and done so for many social, political and ideological reasons. Such 
„histories‟ (in opposition to official accounts of „history‟) can be based on 
memory and experience of the past, thus allowing people to reproduce a „first-
hand‟ historical account incorporating various degrees of nationalised rhetoric 
through public discourse. 
 
It has long been argued that memory plays a significant role in the construction 
of collective cultural and historical identity (Anderson 1983, Halbwachs 1992, 
Vereni 2000). Due to the distinctively recent nature of intense conflict in the 
Balkan Peninsula, Vereni argues that collective memory ensures a „coherence of 
existence and unity‟ when faced with challenging and perhaps conflicting 
accounts of experience (2000:47-48, Brown 2003). The „bond between memory 
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and identity is inescapable in its public dimension and in its personal one‟ (ibid., 
Halbwachs 1992:47). In Trikala, the reworking of embodied memory in order to 
understand current socio-economic conditions is based on past experience of 
conflict and crisis as well as nationalised historical accounts that penetrate the 
private domain through public channels. This process assists in capturing 
symbolic meaning (Cohen 1985:21, Sutton 1998:66, Herzfeld 2001:55). It is this 
reworking of accounts of crisis, and their comparative nature, that allow for their 
discussion in relation to contemporary symbolic representations of crisis. 
Memory can therefore be reconfigured according to ideological and symbolic 
parameters as well as personal and collective experience (Ballinger 2003:1)
141
. 
Narratives of crisis that propose historical accounts based on experience and 
memory can incorporate and reinforce significant cultural meaning across 
substantial periods of time. Memory is employed as a “historic resource” (Light 
and Prentice 1994:90, Ballinger 2003) that lends meaning to unusual and 
sometime inexplicable contemporary events142. 
 
Hence the current economic crisis and its socio-cultural fallout is analysed by 
the Trikalinoi in terms of the Great Famine in order to confront the 
extraordinary. The iconic symbol of hunger as a tool to communicate and justify 
concepts of deprivation constantly recurs throughout Greek ethnography. 
Herzfeld explains how Cretan shepherds employ the notion of hunger in order to 
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 In the same line of thought, within a Macedonian context Brown argues that refugees and 
survivors of conflict or crisis are “connected” by their constructions of memory. He believes that 
different communities within the same locality interpret events distinctively. The constitution 
and maintenance of these communities are based on the multiple “styles of imagining” 
(Anderson 1983:6, Brown 2003:21, 51). For example, people in the mountain town of Krusevo 
in Macedonia omit „international‟ revolutions in neighbouring provinces from their oral 
accounts of history, choosing to highlight their own – officially undocumented – experiences of 
international conflict (Brown 2003:129). The “emphasis and omissions of local recall” that 
Brown discusses explains in this context how at times certain memories are emphasised and at 
other times they are omitted. A sense of „experiential meaning‟ is therefore created whereby 
locality, history and experience of circumstance form the basis of socio-historical reality.  
142
 Sutton (1998) illustrates how local perceptions of past events address more than merely local 
histories. He explores how the Balkan war of the 1990s was understood on the Greek island of 
Kalymnos. The U.S. depiction of Serbian “concentration camps” in Bosnia was rejected by the 
locals as being “the Western Great Powers at play” (Sutton 1998:149-150).  For Sutton, this was 
partially due to the „peripheral‟ position of Greece in relation to the “centres of power and 
information” – what Sutton terms „global positioning‟ – (1998:150, 154) and in part because of 
Kalymnians‟ own experience of being occupied by “The Great Powers”, from the Ottoman 
Empire to the Germans and the British in World War Two (ibid.). Hence, Sutton encourages us 
to consider how meanings and structures interrelate between „the Global‟ and „the Local‟ 
(1998:150-153, Moore 2004:80-84). 
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justify stealing livestock. His informants insist that they were hungry under 
Turkish rule so they had to steal, then again under the German occupation to 
fend off starvation (even though they stole flocks from other Cretans and not the 
enemy), and still today a young Cretan “may still plausibly cite hunger as his 
motive for stealing several sheep in a night‟s work” (Herzfeld 1985:21). 
Herzfeld insists that this „hunger‟ must be analysed ideologically and not 
literally. Indeed, as the Trikalinoi, the Glendiots have rarely experienced truly 
devastating famine, “if at all”. Hunger is an integral idiom through which to 
express ideological notions of oppression and deprivation (ibid.:22). In this 
sense hunger is an inherited ideological disposition that is entwined with 
numerous narratives of hardship and oppression; it is truly „burned in the mind‟. 
It is an idiom that has been nationalised and is now collectively felt, feared and 
narrated. 
 
Therefore, despite the fact that crises such as the Great Famine and the present 
economic decline may not seem like directly comparable images, the collective 
fear of returning to times of deprivation and oppression encourage narratives of 
hunger and famine to criss-cross the public domain. This takes one back to 
Mandel‟s argument that crisis causes the narrative of famine and not visa-versa 
(1962:342). In current conditions interaction in the public sphere has visibly 
changed, hence public spaces act as visual and metaphorical aids in the 
calculation of crisis. People gather in intimate groups on Asklipiou to discuss 
their collective destiny whilst the back streets are notably crowded with 
customers taking advantage of the cheaper prices and the special offers. As the 
mass media elaborates and embellishes the financial problems of both 
individuals and the state, narratives of the Great Famine are brought to the fore. 
This is the special significance of the public sphere in Trikala – people can 
compare narratives as they compare their consumer goods, they can partake in 
collective suffering, victimisation and escapism. They recount the past and the 
fate of their parents and grandparents, informed by both first-hand narratives 
and nationalist prose. The ideology of hunger is here employed to account for 
both fear and expectation. The public sphere simultaneously acts as a visual 
reference point onto which the narratives can be attached. The changing 
behaviour of everyday people supports the local understandings of the socio-
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economic situation, strongly informed today by perceptions of history and 
collective memory. 
 
Michel Serres, Time and Cultural Proximity 
 
In arguing that two distant historical moments are brought together in a 
simultaneous moment of cultural proximity, facilitated by specific social and 
economic circumstances, innovative concepts of time must be addressed. The 
provocative work of Michel Serres suggests alternative understandings of time 
that help dispel preconceptions of time as a sequence of lineal events. 
 
According to Serres (1995a:57), it is our perception of time as linear which 
distorts our perception of apparently distant events. He argues that things that 
are very culturally close do exist, but the perception of lineal time makes these 
events appear very distant from one another. On the other hand, events that can 
be temporally very close are in fact culturally very distant from one another. The 
question here is of course what triggers this peculiar functioning of cultural 
proximity. A possible answer would be the reoccurrence of crisis. Crisis 
produces this visibility, this intimacy between historical moments in the swirling 
of time that provokes cultural proximity. 
 
To explain this concept of time Serres uses the example of the handkerchief. He 
states that if you take a handkerchief and spread it out in order to iron it, you can 
observe certain fixed distances and proximities. If you sketch a circle in one 
area, you can mark out nearby points and measure far-off distances. Then take 
the same handkerchief and crumple it, by putting it in your pocket. Two distant 
points suddenly are close, even superimposed. If, further, you tear it in certain 
places, two points that were close can become very distant. This science of 
nearness and rifts is known as topology, while the science of stable and well-
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 This would appear to contradict the central line of theories of time by such scholars as 
Ricoeur who argue that: “Time becomes human time to the extent that it is organised after the 
manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to the extent that it portrays the features 
of temporal experience” (Ricoeur 1985:3). 
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When an informant, Stergios, 76, describes how, when as a child walking the 
streets of his local neighbourhood in Trikala, he was given small pieces of stale 
bread to eat by some local women (see chapter three); that bread he would save 
even smaller pieces from for his mother, who would accept them despite being 
dirty and often covered in various forms of nasal excrement; and recounts this 
when asked directly about the current economic situation, Serres‟ theory of time 
that I suggest explicates cultural proximity appears facilitated by the notion of 
crisis. 
 
In another account of the famine an informant stated how he fears that the shops 
will again be empty and people ought to begin stockpiling their own produce 
rather than selling it on the market “like we did in 1941”: 
 
“The feelings of people on the street is of fear that we will experience 
the same … we know what it was like then, we have been brought up 
on the stories of the war (Second World War) and the famine … I 
never imagined we would be preparing for the same … My wife and I 
know that things could get very hard so we are taking precautions: 
keeping the freezer full and planting more of our own vegetables. We 
can make our own bread and we are on good terms with the people in 
the village, we will help each other … I think anyway. This is what my 
father did, and he survived the crisis … People have started to store 
their olive oil in case the currency drops. They can then trade with their 
oil. I heard that this is what has happened before. I cannot see a way 
out, away from the crisis, to a return to the same situation.” 
 
Social memory is thus pivoted to historically important moments of crisis that 
are the focus of cultural proximity. Thus things in culture that may be 
considered „distant‟ due to the passage of time or changing socio-political 
circumstances resurface in the light of new developments. The multiple distant 
moments are made culturally close through the medium of crisis, recalled in 




In Serres‟ terms the embodiment of historical moments of crisis by my 
informants is more than simply a recollection of past events. Memories relate to 
all daily activities, yet not all memories evoke the same sentiments; what you 
ate for breakfast this morning, your first day at school, the warmth of the 
summer sun on a Greek Island, starvation and violence. Some memories, texts 
and pictures have a physical quality with history seeping from them. As 
witnesses to terrible events – either first hand or through relatives – many of my 
informants embody the events of the Great Famine through social memory. This 
is to say that memories of crises are embodied and experienced to the core; they 
are not merely a reaction to or an analysis of a contemporary critical event 
(1995a:3). 
 
Serres himself was brought up in a time of “hunger and rationing, death and 
bombings” and his accounts of cultural proximity relate closely to those of 
Trikalinoi. His experience, although not always first-hand, was shaped by major 
events such as the war in Spain in 1936 and the blitzkrieg of 1939, the 
concentration camps of the Second World War, reprisal attacks after the 
liberation of France and, at the age of fifteen, the bombing of Hiroshima 
(1995a:2). These experiences are termed “the vital environment” that shape 
individual and collective perceptions of life thereafter. They are indelible 
moments that form social memory and inform experiences of future critical 
events. Serres‟ generation were passive to the events due to their young age, the 
generation before were actively engaged with the destruction and desolation of 
human life. Both generations were severely traumatised by the events and Serres 
now recounts how he cannot look at Picasso‟s Guernica due to its association 
with the France-Spain war of 1936 (ibid.:2-3). When he looks at such pictures 
he physically feels history seeping from them, as witnesses to terrible events. 
Such things are „symptoms of evil‟, not merely reactions or analysis. The events 
he has experienced have been embodied and inherently influence his work today 
and his interpretation of current events. Therefore cultural proximity must be 
understood not merely as a memory or a recollection but as a physicality, a 
feeling, an embodiment. He says: 
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“I have never recovered – I don‟t believe I‟ll ever recover … Now that I am older, I 
am still hungry with the same famine, I still hear the same sirens; I would feel sick at 
the same violence, to my dying day. Near the midpoint of this century (1900s) my 
generation was born into the worst tragedies of history, without being able to act … 
Even my own childhood photographs, happily scarce, are things I can‟t bear to look 
at. They are lucky, those who are nostalgic about their youth … We suffocated in an 
unbreathable air heavy with misfortune, violence and crime, defeat and humiliation, 
guilt … (such events as) the death camps were echoed by Nagasaki and Hiroshima, 
which were just as destructive of history and conscience – in both cases in a radical 
way, by attacking the very roots of what makes us human – tearing apart not just 
historic time but the time frame of human evolution” (Serres 1995a:4). 
 
The fact that later generations of Trikalinoi recite the narrations and 
physicalities of the famine is “just as a river, at its mouth, leaps into wider 
expanses” (Serres 1995a:6). Things get re-formed at moments of crisis; history 
gets re-formed based on past cultural experiences, people still „feel hungry with 
the same famine‟ that their parents experienced. At times of social change actors 
draw on culturally proximate memories, such as the Great Famine, in order to 
decipher present-day events. The fear of returning to the circumstances of a past 
time is socially embedded; it is like hearing the dogs bark once again as a 
warning to take another path to avoid the barks and bites when facing potential 
„rebirths of past situations‟ (ibid.:21, 42). 
 
Therefore we have to pose the question of what constitutes the contemporary. 
The experience of current events is not devoid of historical context either within 
the framework of the individual or the wider society. Something contemporary 
could be, at a singular moment, the whole of a set of component parts, concepts 
formed throughout stages of history. Serres gives us the example of the late-
model car that forms the  
 
“disparate aggregate of scientific and technical solutions dating from different 
periods. One can date it component by component: this part was invented at the turn 
of the century, another, ten years ago, and Carnot‟s cycle is almost two hundred years 
old. Not to mention that the wheel dates back to Neolithic times. The ensemble is 
only contemporary by assemblage, by its design, its finish, sometimes only by the 
slickness of the advertising surrounding it” (1995a:45). 
 
The „assemblage‟ of a present-day crisis finds its component parts rooted in past 
events in order to form the contemporary unity (Serres 1995b:2). For example, 
the current economic crisis in Greece is not a situation devoid of history; it is 
rooted in social and cultural practice, global networks and political activities. 
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Similarly, people‟s understandings of critical events are not devoid of 
component parts – experience and cultural proximity with past events contribute 
to contemporary formations of crisis management. Social memory is the 
assemblage of different periods of crisis, multiple cultural and familial 
narratives of socio-historic experience and nationalised rhetorics of times past. 
The „advertising‟ of the new event, the crisis, is embellished through the mass 
media and is packaged with notions of blame, nationalist rhetoric, and political 
propaganda (Chomsky 1996, Sutton 1998:175-178). 
 
Such an understanding of contemporary events within the wider context of 
historical time leads to a double understanding of contemporaneity: the event in 
its own time as part of our era, and the event as an assemblage of re-constituted 
historical parts (Serres 1995a:47)
144
. This is in contrast to common perceptions 
of events being sealed off in their own time, their own period, unable to 
communicate beyond their own boundaries, imprisoning history and critical 
events, suffocating the remarkable connections between seemingly distant 
events. Such perceptions of events as singular unities are the ploy of human 
beings in order to articulate their experience of a contemporary moment. A 
singular totality is easier to conceptualise, as was the case of linear time, and 
therefore it is the common assumption, for, as Serres states, “a cartload of bricks 
isn‟t a house”, thus only the unity seems rational (1995b:2). 
 
Therefore, it is only the human rationale that implies that the past is by-gone and 
„out of date‟ whilst the present remains as the authentic reality. The idea of time 
as an irreversible line of progress and unity as a singular contemporary entity 
must be challenged if we are to understand how two diverse distant events such 
as the present economic crisis in Greece and the Great Famine can be so 
culturally proximate, a concept of time which is inherently distorted due to our 
irrefutable inhabitance in the present. The common perception of time is as a 
simple line, like a race to the present. Yet history is constantly reinvented, the 
destruction of war, violence or famine repeats itself in the present. Historical 
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language functions to produce a past reality rather than represent it (1995:121). 
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experience lends a sense of reality to the contemporary (Serres 1995a:49-51, 
1987). 
 
The concept of cultural proximity depends on a reassessment of time not as a 
mere „passing‟, but as an extraordinarily complex mixture of stopping points, 
ruptures, gaps in a visible disorder (Serres 1995a:57) much like Serres‟ 
description of the handkerchief. When we can eventually conceive of two points 
in time being culturally and meaningfully simultaneous then the fact that the 
Great Famine can be collectively embodied by the Trikalinoi during the present 
economic circumstances can be comprehensively addressed. 
 
Serres offers a theory of percolating and fluctuating time, „dancing like flames‟ 
that allows for such a perception of culturally simultaneous temporal points. He 
argues that “time doesn‟t pass, it percolates. This means that it passes and it 
doesn‟t pass.” It filters, “one flux passes through, while another does not” (in 
this case the events of the civil war flow through the percolator whilst the Great 
Famine does not) (1995a:58). Some segments of time get caught in the filtration 
process, they remain contemporary. „It is like the fluctuations in the weather‟ he 
argues, – le temps in French, a word that means both the time and the weather 
(ibid.). Time may at first appear as though flowing like a river passing beneath a 
bridge, however one fails to consider the invisible counter-currents running 
beneath the surface in the opposite direction or the hidden turbulences that 
remain out of sight to the casual observer. The distances between points in time 
are not all equally measurable and fixed, yet there is no evidence for 
assumptions that counter a theory of percolating time (ibid.:58-59). 
 
People simultaneously draw on parts of the obsolete, the contemporary, and the 
futuristic to assemble their experience of a critical event. An object or 
circumstance is thus polychromic, multitemporal, and reveals a time that is 
gathered together, with multiple pleats (Serres 1995a:60, 1987, also Gudeman 
and Rivera 1990, Bloch 1998:120). Here people usually confuse time with the 
reading of time, which is a metrical reading on a straight line rather than a 
topographical concept with folds and shifting proximities between apparently 
„distant‟ moments. We can have a situation where time is curiously folded, 
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everything is tied together in one particular spot, at one simultaneous 
contemporary moment (ibid.:87). This closeness is exacerbated by the way 
people spontaneously employ notions of time through recollections of past 
experience. For Serres, the concept of preserving memories of past events in 
order to elucidate later circumstances is akin to a glacier that preserves a body 
frozen for 50 years and deposits it looking as young as when the man had first 
died, whilst his children (other memories) have grown old (ibid.:61). 
 
Serres uses the figure of Hermes and notion of Angels to illustrate his theories 
of time. In his work Hermes and, later, angels act as messengers that pass 
through folded time making connections between relatively distant events 
(1977, 1980, 1982, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). This facilitates the import and export 
of memories of the past into the assemblage of the contemporary. By doing this 
the messenger transports memories, these can be invented and mistaken, but 
there is no other route to understanding the experiences of the contemporary. 
Past events bring plausibility to present situations regardless of the perceived 
lapse in linear time, the inexplicable becomes illuminated (1995a:79). The 
metaphorical Hermes traces networks of related events and objects across space 
and time and creates a mobile globality expressed in narrative form, beyond the 
localised, rigorous and regulated explications of human rationale (ibid.:109, 
115), the ignorance to the „background noise‟ that is ever-present is our 
contemplation and understanding of the present (1995b:13, Serres and Schehr 
1983). This background noise, beit in the form of memories, embedded 
nationalist rhetoric or generational narrative, never ceases to influence 
interpretations of the contemporary, “it is limitless, continuous, unending, 
unchanging” (1995b:13). The background noise influences the observers and the 
observed, passes through constructed channels of information such as the mass 
media and political figures and is apparent in the language of everyday society, 
it informs “the backdrop of the universe, the background of being” (1995a.:62). 
 
The continuous flow of knowledge from different historical periods in the form 
of background systems of information, across time and space, illustrates how 
cultural proximity is not merely concerned with social memories of the past as 
mere commentaries on the present, but also as formulations in anticipation of the 
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future (ibid.:86). In this way social memory guides and directs behaviour 
deemed appropriate for the moment of contemporary crisis and the impending 
events.  
 
Through cultural proximity bringing together many histories into a simultaneous 
moment of experience, there is a collective feeling of pulling an object or a 
burden from the depths of the past (ibid.:88). There are phrases – or variations 
of – which are repeated regularly by Trikalinoi, such as “We don‟t want to 
return to those bleak times”, “We thought that we would never have to go 
through that again”, “They were the worst times that scarred Greece and all the 
people that lived through them, how can we forget”, “Those people were 
different, they carried with them the pain of the Famine”, “Only now can I 
appreciate what my parents and ancestors went through” (cf. Sutton 1998:142-
143). Such reiterations highlight the cultural weight of the Great Famine in the 
minds of the actors. The historical events tie together the collectivity and the 
burden being pulled. A cluster of highly different accounts, narratives and 
experiences come together as one body through the processes of nationalism and 
collective memory. Hence the recurring comments regarding the burden being 
pulled relate not only to the individual but also to the nation and the collective 
pain experienced. The sense of collective burden is enhanced by the perception 
that Greece and Greeks are part of an uninterrupted cultural-historical line that 
links the present citizens with those of the past, as preached through Greek 
nationalism. 
 
Pulling such burdens brings with it the fears and anxieties entailed with the 
experience or collective rhetoric of experience. This inevitably effects how 
people react to current crises as they begin to identify „easily recognisable 
pictures and patterns‟. In this case sections of social memory can fluctuate, 
disappear, illuminate and die out according to contemporary triggers and socio-
political circumstances (Serres 1995a:105, 111, Winichakul 2002). Social 
memory is turbulent, continuously fluctuating, fluid and mobile; 
 
“it is a sort of confluence, a form in which fluxes and fluctuation enter, dance, 
crisscross, making together the sum and the difference, the product and the 
bifurcation, traversing scales of dimension … (it is) ceaselessly inventing different 
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relations … A viscosity takes over. It comprehends. It creates comprehension. It 
teaches … Relations spawn objects, beings and acts, not vice versa … the mind needs 
movement, especially subtle and complex movement” (Serres 1995a:107). 
 
The patterns that are formed through the recognition of culturally proximate 
events are visible on the ground in Trikala. The methods of comprehension of 
the contemporary event – the economic crisis – result in actions and reactions 
which are equally culturally informed. People are conscious of what has gone 
before; furthermore they embody the past events even when not present. 
Seremetakis illustrates this point with her story of cutting wild greens to eat, an 
activity she had never done before, but had heard her mother talk of; 
 
“When I went out to collect them, the sensory memory … was transferred to vision 
and tactility. My body involuntarily knew what I consciously did not … What was an 
outward act of cutting was in fact an inward act of diving into the self, of space-time 
sensory compression … a moment of stillness, where an entire past sensory 
landscape was translated into a present act … For these moments release hidden 
substances of the past” (1994:16-17). 
 
Like the Trikalinoi understanding of the Great Famine, despite a restricted 
amount of first-hand experience, Seremetakis describes how some activities are 
present in social memory and result in culturally-informed actions. Let us now 
consider the similarities and patterns in the social experience of crisis as 
informed through cultural proximity before moving on to explore why the Great 
Famine has come to the fore as the key event that has surfaced as culturally 
proximate in contemporary Trikala. 
 
Dimitris Psathas and Dimitra Papafotis 
 
The reoccurrence of crisis has brought the Great Famine and the current 
economic circumstances into cultural proximity, internalised and expressed in 
narrative form. I here wish to offer an example of this proximity through the 
presentation and analysis of two accounts of queuing within two historical 
contexts. Firstly Psathas‟ account of queuing for food rations during the famine 
will be presented, followed by an account of queuing for petrol in Trikala. The 
relevance of the two stories will become clear and the perceived proximity 
between the two events will become apparent. Like the women queuing for 
spinach in Psathas‟ narrative, people in Trikala today believe that they are being 
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pushed to their limits of survival and their anger and frustration is beginning to 
flow over. This has been demonstrated by the violent protests that were 
witnessed in many urban centres in May 2010 and the continuation of national 
strikes. People feel betrayed by their government and do not know where to 
turn; so they turn to what they know, what they have been told by their parents 
and grandparents, what has been explicitly portrayed through the nationalist 
discourses of the Greek educational curriculum and media coverage, or in some 
cases the hardship that has been experienced personally, what seems so poignant 
in the face of uncertainty – previous narratives of crisis. 
 
The Queue – Athens, 1941 – as narrated by author Dimitris Psathas (1944:15-
18) 
 
Woman1:  Mister Thanasi. 
Grocer:   What do you want, woman? 
Woman1:  When are you going to distribute the spinach? 
Grocer:  Don‟t be in a hurry woman. Do you hear me? For God‟s sake! 
Here your violence does not work and if you don‟t like it go 
somewhere else! 
 
To go somewhere else: but where? The words of Mr Thanasis were sarcastic, 
confident and malicious. He knew very well that Athens was a huge desert 
where you could walk for days without finding a single leaf. Knowing then, that 
the spinach that he was holding was a treasure, once again he was behaving like 
a Maharaja who was just about to open his treasuries and distribute his gold to 
the people. That‟s why he could talk to people as he pleased, despite the length 
of the queue and how long people had been waiting.  
 
That was the language of the time, because the grocer suddenly found himself 
within the class of the powerful people. Before the war he was “just Thanasis”, 
but suddenly the war grabbed him and made him “the honourable mister 
Thanasis”. The situations raise some people whilst other people are doomed. 
The situations are favourable to some people.  
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That day, the queue at Thanasis‟ grocery was comprised entirely of women. A 
variety of women; ladies, lady-likes, servants, housewives, socialites, 
respectable girls, gossipers, worriers, peaceful ones, catty ones and ones 
foaming from the mouth. Thanasis was finding a peculiar kind of pleasure in 
torturing all these women, making them wait and by moving at a glacial pace. 
 
The first half an hour of waiting went relatively well, the second a bit worse, and 
the third much worse. The queue was buzzing like a beehive. Women were 
discussing and gossiping about life in general; their husbands, work, inflation, 
love affairs, scandals, famine, death, transportation, the Germans, the Italians, 
the black market. But all these relieving conversations were interrupted by a 
fearsome female with an acid tongue.  
 
Woman2: You stupid grocer! 
 
Good heavens! This provocation was destined for the Maharaja! 
 
Grocer:  Are you speaking to me? 
Woman2: You, indeed. Who do you think you are, behaving like the bride 
at the wedding? Vre, for three hours we are dead on our feet, 
catch the death yourself, you moron, you have been elevated to 
the status of the humans and you don‟t give a damn for the 
people around you – move your blooming legs for you are 
driving us crazy. 
 
Never before was royalty wounded so deeply during the apotheosis of its 
grandeur. Pale like a corpse, the grocer turned to the woman and screamed at 
her: 
 
Grocer:  You filthy expletive. 
Woman2: You are the one who is expletive, you and your whole family. 
You ravenous rogue, who until yesterday were begging us to 
buy your filthy aubergines from your filthy grocery which no 
living soul was visiting and you were about to die from hunger, 
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you God teaser. And now you pretend to be a gentleman. Get 
lost, get lost you filthy scoundrel.  
 
That was the last straw. The grocer abandoned his scales, his conversations, his 
spinach, everything, and jumped onto the woman. But she was ready, out of the 
queue and ready. Fearsomely she retaliated.  
 
They started pulling each others‟ hair. A policeman tried to separate them but 
the rest of the women took position against the grocer. All of these women 
together; the ladies, the lady-like, the servants, housewives and socialites, the 
respectable girls, the gossipers, worriers, the peaceful and the catty ones – united 
in a glorious moment of solidarity – they were threatening to crush the grocer. 
 
Stories such as this taken from the work of Dimitris Psathas entitled „The Winter 
of „41‟, from which this is one of many that I could have chosen, document the 
famine in Athens during the German occupation of Greece and tell of the 
inverted social roles, corruption, the black market and the never-ending search 
for food – including the necessity in some cases to resort to eating cats, dogs and 
pack-horses (Psathas 1944, Hionidou 2006). The work of Psathas is well known 
in Greece, even outside of Athens. He was a celebrated journalist and writer of 
novels and theatrical scripts. Indeed, many of his plays were adapted for the 
silver screen, thus enhancing his reputation further. Additionally, Psathas is a 
popular figure at the centre of many discussions of literature in Greek schools. 
Psathas witnessed the famine in Athens in the 1940s and went on to write 
numerous books with this as the central theme meaning that his work is now 
taken as a national barometer for the years of the Great Famine. 
 
The Queue – Trikala, 2010 – as narrated by mechanic‟s secretary Dimitra 
Papafotis 
 
The nation-wide freight and haulage strikes that crippled Greece from Monday 
26
th
 July 2010 to Monday 2
nd
 August 2010 caused a major fuel shortage. The 
strikes were in dispute over the government plan to cut licence charges for lorry 
drivers in accordance with IMF stipulations. The fear of the drivers was that by 
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liberalising the sector there would be increased competition for freight and 
haulage contracts. Additionally, the existing drivers‟ unions believed it unfair 
that they had to pay inflated rates compared to the new entry levels. Although 
the strike only lasted a week, significant upheaval was caused across the country 
and a fuel shortage spread panic nationwide. Eventually, Prime Minister 
Papandreou signed an order granting permission for the arrest of drivers that 
refused to go back to work. However, by this time the economy, especially the 
crucial tourist industry, had suffered huge losses, riots had broken out in many 
urban centres and military vehicles were chartered to provide fuel to hospitals, 
airports and power stations
145
. By the fifth day (Friday 30
th
 July 2010) privately 
licensed trucks were being hired to transport fuel to the major urban centres. The 
following account, narrated to me by Dimitra, 33 and self-employed, takes place 
on Friday 30
th
 July, when one such private truck brought fuel to a petrol station 
in Trikala. 
 
It was 45°c by midday. The queue for the petrol station was getting longer and 
longer by the minute. It had started the night before when some people had got 
inside information that after a week of strikes one specific petrol station was 
going to receive a delivery. The cars parked on the petrol station forecourt had 
long been abandoned, but it did not matter as nobody could move and, what is 
more, no petrol had turned up. Now, at 1pm the queue was stretching for 
kilometres, from the forecourt, around the corner, past Dimitra and Angelos‟ 
shop, over the level crossing and into the town centre. Outside of the shop two 
young girls, queuing since 9.30am had erected two beach parasols stuck out of 
the car windows to shield them from the burning sun, “like Victorianas!” Some 
people were saving spaces for family members and friends by strategically 
increasing the usual 5 millimetre space between bumpers when a relative turned 
up. Others were calling friends and relatives on their mobile phones, either to 
inform them that petrol was expected for later in the day or, more frequently, to 
ask someone to come and save their place whilst they took a break from the sun. 
Some people even ordered cold coffees and pizzas to be delivered to them in the 
queue, giving a description of their car to the delivery boy rather than a house 
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address. Lakis, Dimitra‟s friend, called his mother to bring him some cheese pie 
and a beer for lunch as he had been waiting since 8.30am when he was supposed 
to be at work. 
 
Dimitra started work at 9am and, after a week of strikes, desperately needed 
petrol. “The only option was the bicycle if we could not get petrol this time … so 
many people had resorted to the bicycle; it was like going back in time, but 
terribly impractical with a three-year-old child”. The petrol station is about 300 
metres from the front of the shop. Dimitra pulled out of the driveway and 
immediately joined the back of the queue, all of 5 metres away from her own 
doorstep. She left her car and went back into the shop to help her husband with 
the work. From there they could observe the queue. Every now and then 
Angelos was shouting at her to move the car another 10 metres as someone had 
inevitably given up hope of a delivery and returned home. 
 
One woman, seeing that progress was slow, had left her car in the queue 
indefinitely and returned home to make dinner for her husband and children. 
Dimitra thought, “ah, like that is it, whilst we suffer here you leave for home and 
expect to return just like that? … We will see what will happen”. After a couple 
of hours, and with little movement in the queue, the woman returned. All those 
that surrounded her started yelling and hurling abuse in her direction: 
 
Woman1: Eh, you, woman, what, do you think we are stupid or 
something, to wait here baking in the sun whilst you return 
home. 
Woman2: Don‟t expect to get back in the queue now, no, you left, go to 
the back, we are not stupid otherwise we would all do that. 
Woman3: Do you think you are better than us? Eh, you, I am speaking to 
you woman. 
Woman1: Ah, so you are the good housewife are you, don‟t you think that 
we all have other work to be doing now? 
 
The fact that the woman was, according to Dimitra, “playing the good 
housewife” aggravated the other women who had been waiting in the scorching 
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sun for hours. There was one particular woman who was especially vocal in her 
criticism of the absentee car owner. “She was constantly screaming … being 
encouraged by the men of the vicinity, including a mischievous Angelos and the 
man in the neighbouring shop …” 
 
Man1:  Don‟t let her get away with it, tell her what you think. 
Man2: (Ironically and knowingly) What did she do? I don‟t believe it. 
Come here and tell me. 
Man3: She thinks she‟s the good housewife ladies … she‟s not getting 
fried under the sun. 
 
Simultaneously an older man had parked his car next to Dimitra and Angelos‟ 
shop. Angelos invited him in and gave him a chair to sit in the shade. He offered 
to make the man a frappé and stopped work for a chat. Soon after the man left 
his car people started realising that he was sat in the shade drinking cold coffee. 
They were adamant that he would not be allowed to rejoin the queue. This time 
the abuse was heavy and incorporated more expletives than one could possibly 
fit into a single chapter of a doctoral thesis. The general flavour went as follows: 
 
Man1:  Fuck you arsehole, get to the back of the queue. 
Man2: What do you take us for, stupid arseholes, why don‟t we all sit 
in the shade, you missed your chance, the queue has moved, 
fuck off. 
 
For the next ninety minutes the man, back in his car, was trying to creep 
unnoticed down the side of the queue to regain his previous position. Every time 
he moved people were tooting their horns and hurling abuse out of the window. 
“It started to get physical, people were stood out in the road in front of him, the 
old man was pretending not to hear them, not to see them, he was trying to get 
back to his place without being noticed”. 
 
Man3: (with his arms outstretched in front of the car) No, get back, 
you‟re not getting past here, you left the queue, we have been 
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waiting in the sun. You think that you are cleverer than us, ah 
go fuck yourself. 
 
“The other drivers were determined that they would rather create an 
accident rather than let him back into the queue. He was advised to go 
at least back past the distant traffic lights. The other drivers were 
keeping only 5 millimetres between their cars so he couldn‟t get back 
in. Eventually, after ninety minutes someone that knew him let him 
back into the queue to avoid an accident.” 
 
By the time Dimitra got to the petrol station it was 6pm. She filled up the car 
and two jerry cans with petrol, for there was uncertainty about when the next 
delivery was to be expected. The prices were inflated on the week before, 
approximately 25 cent a litre more for unleaded petrol. There were still 
abandoned cars parked on the forecourt; not all people had either the time or the 
patience to sit all day waiting for the delivery. Some cars were abandoned near 
Dimitra and Angelos‟ shop – remnants of people that had “gone home for 
lunch” and not returned. Another car had to be pushed to the station as it had run 
out of fuel before it could reach the forecourt. 
 
Apart from obvious similarities between the two accounts – both take place 
within the context of the queue, a usually very un-Greek past time – there are 
numerous points that I wish to extract from the narratives.  
 
Firstly, in both cases a consumer good is in demand at a time of scarcity. 
German strategies during the Second World War meant that goods such as 
spinach and butter beans, staples of the Greek diet, were not readily available 
and often only accessible on the black market (Archer 1944, Psathas 1944, 
Hionidou 2006). The haulage strikes of July 2010 meant that fuel, a staple of 
modern Trikalinoi life, was in very short supply. Only those with inside 
information could get hold of small quantities of fuel and people were resorting 
to using their long-redundant bicycles to go about their daily business. In both 
cases tensions were rooted in the fact that a staple necessity was being denied 
and, furthermore, there is a limited amount of the product, thus internal 
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competition is rife. Tempers were frayed as the fear of not acquiring the product 
increased. The anxiety of crisis was in the air in both cases. In Trikala in 
2009/2010 the anxiety was apparent through everyday conversation; „fear was in 
the air‟146. The queues for fuel in July 2010 exacerbated the fear of returning to 
the rations of the Great Famine. Dimitra remarked after the fuel shortage that 
“only now can we begin to understand what our grandfathers went through in 
the war; we don‟t want to experience it further … I fear for my child and her 
livelihood … I don‟t want for her to pass on the stories of how she suffered 
because of some corruption in Athens … how her mother couldn‟t provide for 
her”. The local feeling was intensified by media reports of hospitals unable to 
function without fuel deliveries and hoteliers losing custom from tourists in the 
time of economic austerity. 
 
In both accounts, power relations are another source of tension. For Psathas, the 
grocer had acquired a new social status due to his control of scarce resources. 
The conflict was between a united group of diverse women and the grocer, who 
was deemed to be deliberately aggravating the situation and taking advantage of 
his new social role. In Trikala, the conflict was enacted between the customers 
themselves. Although, as expressed by Dimitra, the ultimate anger and blame 
lay with the „corruption in Athens‟, the tension on the day was directed by the 
people towards each other. Neither men nor women wanted to be out-smarted. 
Everyone emphasised that they too had better things to be doing with their time 
in a form of competitive suffering. Especially the woman that „played the good 
housewife‟ (noikokyra) became the focus of much derogatory abuse. By leaving 
her car to return home, she implied that she could not afford to wait in the queue 
as she was „a busy woman‟. This was an insult to those that remained in the 
queue as by prioritising her work in the home the other women were put in „a 
subordinate position‟ concerning their ability to be an effective housewife 




                                                 
146
 The fear and anxiety present in Trikala is surmountable with Low‟s account of how nerves 
are experienced; it is rarely adequately captured in ethnographic texts (Low 1994:139). 
147
 For a discussion of the role of the housewife (noikokyra) see Hirschon (1989), Cowan (1990), 
du Boulay (1991), Faubion (1993), Dubisch (1995), Kirtsoglou (2004). 
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Based on his own experiences of famine, Serres has argued that forgetting runs 
the risk of repeating. „People remember as they do not wish to repeat, they do 
not ignore history for fear of repetition‟ (1995a:53, also Das 1995, Sutton 
1998:1). There are actualities of the past, such as the rationing during the Great 
Famine, that are still active in the present (Serres 1995a:54). Time, the epoch of 
past crisis, is still active in the present; crisis “reveals” the experience of history. 
Like Serres‟ thought being shaped by his childhood experiences, so Trikalinoi 
are shaped by personal narratives, institutionalised accounts and the education 
system. Hence when in Trikala there is a shortage of a staple good, resulting in 
an extravagant queue, recollections of the Great Famine are brought to the fore. 
 
Food and Crisis in Trikala 
 
In times of crisis food takes the form of a „context shifting marker‟. By this is 
meant an indicator of a change in contextuality. Food no longer stands for 
commensality, festivities, the sign of a good housewife, or a status symbol of a 
man‟s successful employment (cf. Herzfeld 1985, Papataxiarchis 1991, Argyrou 
1996, Goddard 1996, Sutton 1998, 2001, Kirtsoglou 2004). Instead, food is the 
marker of hunger, fear and desolation. This shift in the contextual meaning of 
food is due to the combination between the recurrence of crisis and the 
embedded narratives of past events, such as the Great Famine; it is evocative of 
time, place and circumstance (Goddard 1996:207). The marker of crisis – the 
contextual change in the cultural symbolism of food – is transported across time, 
from an era when food was linked to crisis and not prosperity, little and not 
plenty
148
. This is all incorporated with the dynamic and powerful meanings and 
structures relating to food (Douglas 1966, 1971, Sutton 2001:3). 
 
Kirtsoglou highlights an occasion when drink selection is a marker of a shifting 
context, rather than chosen on the merits of commensality. In her case, Jack 
Daniels is regarded „as the appropriate drink‟ for the occasion of separation. The 
drink, „dark and strong and analogous to the darkness and intensity of emotions‟ 
that come with separation, facilitates the expression of pain and loss (2004:90-
                                                 
148
 This is in opposition to the general discourse of “the good old days” (Sutton 1998:3) that are 
also present in everyday discourse. 
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91). The choice of drink is not based purely on notions of commensality 
(although this does play a part as the girls split into „support groups‟ for about 
three days in order to aid the separated partners), but more so on the perceived 
qualities that identify with the shift in context and change in emotions – the 
separation. 
 
Fani‟s grandfather (who lives with Fani, aged 37, and her mother, 60) always 
tells her to „eat up‟. “What you need to experience is a famine” he tells her. “You 
don‟t like your food, eh. You are choosy. You need a famine, then you will 
understand, to appreciate what you have.” These lines are repeated by many 
people that experienced the Great Famine. Even Fani‟s mother once told me 
“eat Daniel, go and help yourself from the cupboard. We don‟t have a famine 
you know … not yet at least”. During the fuel crisis of July 2010 panic broke out 
among Trikalinoi who were concerned with the lack of deliveries to 
supermarkets. Fani narrates; 
 
“All the shelves were bare. Nothing. Aisle after aisle of empty shelves. 
People had bought everything, it was like the stories of the famine, no 
food could be found in the supermarkets, we all had to resort to what 
we had in the freezer. My mother gave me some meat from a 
neighbour who slaughtered his chickens. Not only did the shops look 
like there was a famine, but people started panicking about what would 
happen if the deliveries didn‟t start again. Where would they find 
food? Most people in Trikala don‟t even have a back garden for 
vegetables (although the same is not true in the villages)”. 
 
Although such narratives may seem farfetched, they play on the minds of the 
Trikalinoi. „Food permeates memory‟, Sutton tells us (2001:2). In this case food 
as a marker of crisis pervades memory; “In those days it was a matter of 
survival. Food was scarce and was not a cause for celebration” Stavros, the local 
cafeteria owner in Livadi, tells me; 
 
“The first thing that comes back to our minds is „what would happen if 
the same happens again?‟ Food is no longer about survival, but about 
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indulgence and prestige for the house, but things are changing, our 
eyes are opening to the serious situation and as you know … Greeks 
are obsessed with food … so we start thinking about the stories of 
famine, how would we cope, what would we do?” 
 
Sutton describes how families on Kalymnos hoard food in order to always have 
provisions. During the Italian occupation (1912-1942) wealthy people would 
buy large quantities of foodstuffs to sell-on when prices rose, in what he 
describes as part of the ethic of hunger (2001:23). Food denotes social well-
being and therefore such symbolic obsessions can be linked directly to times of 
hunger and shortage (ibid.:27, 166). In the current economic conditions Greeks 
have taken to hoarding olive oil rather than selling it in current market 
conditions
149
. This practice has a two-fold purpose; firstly, by starving the 
market of olive oil the prices will inevitable rise, secondly, many people 
understand the current socio-economic conditions to be so precarious they see 
the hoarding of a valuable resource as „an insurance policy‟. This activity 
mirrors the wartime practice of hoarding foodstuffs and valuable resources 
whenever possible as little faith was put in stable market conditions and a 
wavering currency (Mazower 1991, Mazower 1993:32, Hionidou 2006). Yet 
again a practice directly related to the Great Famine and the wartime years has 
been one of the first to reappear in the current crisis. 
 
Even in times of prosperity undercurrents that relate to the years of famine are 
ever-present, even if one has to observe a little more carefully. On my arrival in 
Greece I was asked on numerous occasions as to why I was thin; “do you have a 
famine in England? It looks like they don‟t have food there. Perhaps you are 
really from Ethiopia.” These helpful observations have continued on a daily 
basis for many years both among first-time acquaintances and long-term family 
and friends. I am repeatedly reminded that I should make the most of the food 
and eat; “you are so thin, it is unhealthy, it looks like you are starving. It is not 
                                                 
149
 cf. www.myfoxfw.com/dpps/news, www.independent.co.uk/news, 
www.dailymail.co.uk/money (21st July 2010). Between January 2010 and July 2010 olive oil 
prices rose by 20 per cent (www.independent.co.uk/news July 17th 2010). 
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as if we don‟t have any food nowadays.”150 This is in contrast with Herzfeld‟s 
observations of Glendiot assumptions that foreigners always have more to eat 
due to their wealth, thus they (the Glendiots) are victimised by Athens and its 
moral and economic corruption (1985:37). 
 
Such comments are usually not intended to be malicious
151
. They are justified by 
people „making the most of what they have got, whilst they have it‟. The same 
ideology applies to other everyday situations involving food, including how 
people „pounce‟ on food as soon as it arrives on the table, as if it will disappear. 
When bringing back a shopping bag full of fast food to the house one night I 
was amazed to discover that by the time I had put the bag on the table and made 
a trip to the bathroom, the bag was on the floor, the food unwrapped, and the 
culprits – who had already eaten that evening – already half-way through their 
first giro. Food cannot easily be „put to the side‟ for later consumption. On 
many occasions I have gone to the kitchen to retrieve something I had reserved, 
or bought, for an evening snack and it has disappeared. The answer; “why save it 
when it can be eaten now. You will have to hide it better”. 
 
Food is given a prioritised position on every occasion and is never taken for 
granted. It will rarely been thrown away; there should be no waste. When 
Antonia, whose family I was staying with, tried to discard remnants of her 
evening dinner her mother abruptly intervened; “What are you doing my girl? 
Don‟t do that. Po po, remember what your grandfather went through in the 
famine, you mustn‟t throw it away.” 
 
The entanglement between food and social memory has been discussed in the 
ethnographies of Greece in terms of layers of commensal meaning and history 
(Seremetakis 1994:10). Food can provoke the emergence and awakening of 
layered memories, provoking a re-calling of past events and feelings. In this 
sense, food as object is laden with “perceptual recall” within which shared 
                                                 
150
 Goddard recalls how whenever she returned to Naples from London she was inevitably 
greeted by horrified laments referring to how “thin and haggard” she appeared. This anxiety 
only subsided when she accepted a large plate of pasta or soup (1996:212). 
151
 Sutton notes the repetition of comments concerning his diet, especially likes and dislikes, 
whilst conducting fieldwork in Kalymnos (2001:1-2). 
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histories and perceptual topographies that transcend time and space are formed 
(ibid.:11, Bloch 1998:120)
152
. Whereas other entwined histories can be 
eradicated or forgotten, „percolating through time rather than getting caught in 
the filter‟ (Serres 1995a), food retains an extraordinary place in the weaving of 
social memory, history and artefact (Sutton 2001). Invested with sensory 
memory, even the abstract concept of food, employed as a transformative idiom 
rather than an object itself, incorporates social experience. It is transmitted as a 
cultural code, as a „constant contemporary‟, assembled at each moment 
according to the continuous social fluctuations in the process of time. Concepts 
relating to food stand against onrushing changes brought by the time that has 
percolated, it remains as „an island of historicity‟ (Seremetakis 1994:12, Sutton 
1998). 
 
“Those things, spaces, gestures, and tales that signify the perceptual capacity for 
elemental historical creation … the buried, the discarded, and the forgotten escape to 
the social surface or awareness like self-supporting oxygen” (Seremetakis 1994:12). 
 




This chapter has been concerned with how apparently distant events can be 
embodied in one simultaneous contemporary moment; what I term cultural 
proximity. The „closeness‟ of distant events, such as the Great Famine, form an 
assemblage of the contemporary moment. This proximity is facilitated by the 
recurrence of crisis. Certain objects, actions and narratives come to the fore as 
culturally and historically significant. This process is more than simply 
„remembering the past‟ as historical moments are embodied through a range of 
media – first-hand experience, inter-generational narratives, nationalist 
discourse, artefacts and objects. 
                                                 
152
 However, I do not agree with Seremetakis that “the memory of the senses runs against the 
socio-economic currents that treat artifacts and personal material as dust” (1994:12). Without 
rooting such claims within any regional ethnography or stating specific socio-economic 
contexts, Seremetakis lumps „socio-economic currents‟ into a singular category and goes on to 
state that such circumstances do not treat objects as artefacts with meaning and history. This is 
quite obviously not the case, from systems of gift exchange in „capitalist‟ societies like Japan, 
dowry and trousseau in Greece, to the classic ethnographies of Malinowski and Mauss. 
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The work of Michel Serres assists in the understanding that it is common 
perceptions of time as lineal that cause problems with the comprehension of 
contemporary simultaneity of distant events. By thinking of time not as lineal 
but as percolating, fluctuating and folding, indelible moments of the past can 
begin to be understood as more than simply memories. When Serres employs 
the metaphor of the handkerchief, crumpled up in his pocket, the 
superimposition of multiple moments of time seems more plausible. Couple this 
with accounts of what is clearly the embodiment of hunger, famine, starvation, 
in the face of a new crisis then the understanding of time as topological rather 
than geometrical helps explain such experiences (1995a:60). 
 
The three main sections of the chapter – Serres on time, comparative accounts of 
queuing and the role of food in cultural proximity – highlighted the complex 
integration of time, past events such as the Great Famine and the cultural 
importance of food. The Great Famine has been specifically etched into 
Trikalinoi for a number of reasons. In comparing accounts of queuing for 
groceries in Athens during the Great Famine and queuing for petrol in Trikala in 
2010 obvious similarities are identified by my informants. This goes further to 
highlight the role played by nationalism in embedding narratives of historical 
events into communities that did not directly experience them first-hand. The 
plight of Athenians during the Second World War is not only identifiable but 
actually felt by many modern-day Trikalinoi. It is also worth noting that the 
activity of hoarding olive oil is also directly linked back to the collective 
experience of famine, as are other practices such as goat stealing (Herzfeld 
1985) and hoarding valuable foodstuffs (Sutton 2001). 
 
The current economic crisis in Trikala is continuously understood in relation to 
past crises. Some articles operate as context shifting markers that denote the 
change between socio-economic prosperity and crisis. Such is the case with 
food. Food has become more of a catalyst to describe fear, hunger and hardship 
rather than celebration and affluence in everyday discourse. The cultural 
proximity of the Great Famine has meant that mediums of prosperity can now be 
employed as labels of crisis. 
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Chapter Eight: Social Status and Mobility in Trikala 
 
One beautiful August morning in 2008, before thoughts of crisis had 
significantly begun to enter the public mindset, I was invited to go on a day-trip 
to the beach with one of my best friends, Maro, and her parea (company). I had 
met many of her friends on numerous occasions, at dinner parties, whilst waiting 
in the hairdressers, or just „about town‟. That morning at 7.30am the lawyer, 
Dora, the shop owner, Stella, and the tour guide, Giannis, joined Maro, the 
hairdresser, and myself in gathering in central Trikala to „go to the sea‟. We 
were to be met in the town by Tassos, a communications system designer for the 
Greek Army, and Apostolis, who works for a major telecommunications 
company in the town. I was rather excited as despite my multiple visits to 
Greece spanning over twenty years as holiday-maker and later anthropologist, I 
had never visited the Thessallian coastline. The nearest place, Maro informed 
me, was just the other side of Larisa and would take just over one and a half 
hours to reach. This destination was quickly dismissed as “for children” as it is 
popular with families. “The sea is not good there, too rocky” Giannis exclaimed. 
It was decided that we should head for Volos and may be the small village of 
Chorefton, 170 kilometres and 2 hours and 50 minutes drive away. 
 
The two cars arrived in the centre of the town on time. Apostolis, a single man 
in his mid-thirties, wanted to give me a guided tour of his new Mercedes that he 
had especially imported from Germany, paid for with a bank loan. He told me 
that it had lots of gadgets and the leather for the seats he had specifically 
selected himself. It had a top speed of 160 miles per hour. Tassos, 43 years old 
and also single, said that this was nothing, “come and have a look at my BMW”. 
We loaded the cars with parasols, beach bags and inflatable goodies. It was 
finally agreed after much heated debate that I would go with Tassos whilst Dora, 
Maro, Stella and Giannis would go with Apostolis. Tassos, the more extroverted 
character of the two, was pleading his case to me “you have got to see my 
gadgets, I want to show you … I speak much better English than him, I went for 
conferences in England … I want you to meet my friend that we will pick-up in 
Larisa, he is a big name in the army.” 
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We set off just before 8am and Tassos started to speak to me in English. No 
matter how many times I switched the language to Greek he would reply in 
English and English only. It became apparent that, benefited by two trips to 
London to attend army conferences and subsequent private lessons, Tassos did 
indeed speak fluent English, better than anyone that I had met in Trikala. He 
was quite obsessed by displaying his knowledge of England: the sights of 
London, the footballers, the universities, the behaviour of the adorable English 
girls (an opinion that was no doubt informed by the highly publicised behaviour 
of English tourists in Greece). His second favourite topic was his own success; 
he was only in his early forties but would be retiring within two years. These 
years of prosperity served him well. Evidently, Tassos was involved in the 
development of a specialist satellite communications system for the Greek Army 
and was only one of five people in the country that could teach others how to 
use it. He was therefore not only involved in the development of the product and 
teaching others to use it, but was also highly informed as to international 
business deals and geo-politics. I initially took this as male bravado, but over the 
course of the day it turned out that Tassos really knew what he was talking about 
and was indeed a highly competent specialist. 
 
When we hit the main road between Larisa and Volos, and with his friend safely 
collected from Larisa, Tassos began playing with his gadgets. First it was the 
multi-mixing CD player and the remote controls, then the air conditioning that 
would cool the car to within 0.5°c of the desired temperature. Then the pièce de 
résistance: the cruise control. At 120 kph Tassos programmed his car to drive at 
a constant speed within a regular distance of the car in front. This gave him the 
chance to show off the swivelling driver‟s seat which, I was assured, could turn 
all the way around. He put his hands behind his head and put his feet on the 
dashboard. With a booming voice he commanded the car to dial the phone 
number of Apostolis who was following just behind. Apostolis answered and 
they agreed that he should overtake using the cruise control. Apostolis drove 
past on the outside with both his hands placed firmly behind his head. 
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After a brief consultation it was agreed that Chorefton was to be the destination 
of choice. “Let me program my top of the range GPS” said Tassos. The route 
was programmed and we drove into central Volos. After getting lost in Volos 
due to road closures, we appeared somewhere near the Panthessaliko Stadium
153
 
and re-programmed the GPS. After driving around an industrial district we 
turned off onto a dirt track and slowly ascended a steep mountainside. Barely a 
car-width wide the winding track climbed up the mountainside for 10 
kilometres, a journey of some twenty minutes. Numerous phone calls were 
flying between the two drivers; “this is what the GPS says, we are nearly there” 
insisted Tassos, “it is just over the other side of the hill”. Suddenly the track 
came to an end. In front stood a single ramshackle farm building with a small 
ginger and white dog barking fiercely at the unexpected visitors; an old man was 
watering his flowers. Now the big shiny silver BMW was covered in dust and 
parked in the driveway of an old man and a ravenous dog. 
 
Tassos:   Sorry 
Old Man:  (slightly perplexed) What are you doing my child? Who are 
you? 
Tassos:   We are trying to get to the beach 
Old Man:  (gesturing down the mountainside) The beach is down there 
Tassos: I know, how do we get there, can we walk over the mountain? 
Old Man: Which beach? 
Tassos:  Chorefton 
Old Man:  Where? That is 40 kilometres from here over the other 
mountain, go back to Volos 
Tassos:   How? I thought it was here (laughs) 
Old Man:  Come inside my child, bring your friends, I will call my wife to 
make us some coffee … she has just made food, come and have 
some 
 
                                                 
153
 The Panthessaliko Stadium was a major construction project located in Thessaly for the 2004 
Athens Olympic Games. The construction started in 2002 based on plans by Hasapis, Sargentis 
and Associates and was built as a joint venture between three Greek construction companies. 
The cost of the stadium was over 50 million Euros and it served as the location for football 
matches during the 2004 Olympic Games. The capacity is 22,700, making it the largest in 
Thessaly, and it will host the 2013 Mediterranean Games (www.stadia.gr). 
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After politely refusing the invitation for coffee and lunch by explaining that by 
now it was 12 noon and we should have been at the beach hours ago, we slowly 
reversed down the mountain track and back to the main road – among much 
general hilarity about how the old man “must have thought that his son had 
arrived from Athens with his new woman for the wedding”. “This time”, insisted 
Apostolis, “We will ask locals for directions”. Back by the stadium we stopped 
at a cafeteria and asked for directions. We were told to go straight through Volos 
and out the other side. On the pretence of the terrible road works in the town, 
Tassos persuaded the friends to trust his GPS one more time, as he had 
programmed it wrong on the previous occasion. Obviously we agreed. The GPS 
told us to go in the opposite direction from the cafeteria. Within ten minutes we 
were at a dead end. A road that should have been constructed in time for the 
2004 Olympics was still unfinished in 2008 and did not yet entirely exist. We 
drove back past the cafeteria (with an ironic toot of the horn) and, more than 
five hours after leaving Trikala (and two stops to show me the views of the bay 
of Volos), we arrived at the beach. “You see what brilliant air conditioning I 
have. Apostolis‟ car was so hot and you were perfect in mine” was the parting 
remark. Apostolis‟ passengers agreed. 
 
It also became apparent throughout the day that as well as competing for the 
attention of the English anthropologist and competing in all aspects of 
consumerism, Tassos and Apostolis were also competing for the affections of 
the same woman. Apostolis drove us home as Tassos was going to stay the night 
with his friend in Larisa. He decided to play „English music‟ all the way back, 
with his particular favourite, Blondie, delighting us with her greatest hits. “You 
hear her London accent?” he asked me. I said that indeed I could (although she 
is American), but at 2am at the end of an adventurous day it was the last thing I 
was concerned with. Interestingly, at 11pm, having by that time been out of the 
house for 16 of the eventual 19 hours, Eugenia, the mother of the family I was 
staying with, called me to see where I was. Although not insisting that I should 
return immediately, it was suggested that I should have called her to inform her 
where I was. This thought had never crossed my mind as it was something I had 




On this day competitions for and conspicuous display of status were vast
154
. 
Both Tassos and Apostolis are from families whose fathers worked the fields to 
the west of Trikala, neither is highly educated and despite respectable jobs, 
much of their disposable income is borrowed. Apostolis paid for his imported 
Mercedes with a bank loan, mainly because Tassos, who has a higher income 
from his work, had just bought a new BMW. There were competitions for 
knowledge exhibition, demonstrations of consumerism, competition for the 
same woman and even for the rightful appropriation of the anthropologist. Such 
displays, often taking the form of what is best described as tournaments, are 
commonplace in Trikala. Often material artefacts are the main focus, although 
similar competitions take place for the outward display of knowledge or even 
demonstrating one‟s potential political connections. This chapter explores 
perceptions of social status and mobility among the Trikalinoi and discusses 
how such status competitions are conceptualised, played-out in everyday life 
and ultimately affected by changing economic conditions. 
 
Perceptions of Social Status – prosperity and crisis 
 
Brief Historical Notes 
 
The changing social topography of the 1920s-1950s contributed significantly to 
current notions of status and mobility
155
. The redistribution of the ciftliks meant 
the creation of private property; property that could be divided between children 
or sold to release the capital
156
. Even if this was not an immediate consequence 
of the land redistribution programme, as social ideals began to change away 
from land ownership and towards urbanisation and education during the postwar 
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 Drawing on an array of work in the Mediterranean context, du Boulay analyses competition 
in rural Greece in terms of „limited good‟. Intense competition for limited resources such as 
land, health and honour demonstrate how competition spans both the material and non-material 
aspects of society (1987:15-16). 
155
 Bennison 2010 (personal communication). 
156
 From another perspective, Faubion describes how even after the redistribution of the ciftliks 
the previous landlords maintained a sense of “gentry and its administrative officialdom”. Often 
this resulted in a sustainable “status that money itself could not buy” (1993:190). From the rural 
perspective, the break down of local power structures through land redistribution opened new 
corridors for social mobility (Sutton 1983:231). 
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period, the valuable asset of private property could be realised. Even if land was 
not entirely sold, the income provided through agriculture was enough to 
support a child through post-gymnasium (secondary school) education. This, 
according to Karavidas writing in the 1930s, is due to the fact that “the 
traditional aspirations of our rural population do not lie in farming … When the 
harvest is a success, the surplus is used to open a shop or to send the son to 
Athens to study law!” (1931:496). Additionally, improving postwar 
mechanisation resulting in increasing production levels meant that some 
children were not required to work the land. Some land could even be let out for 
sharecropping (Friedl 1976:373). In some cases the social status of Trikalinoi 
has been acquired generationally rather than by recent material expenditure and 
can be traced back to the management of and investment in land holdings, farms 
and agricultural production. This is despite the relative low status associated 
with these occupations in contemporary Trikala. 
 
These processes coincided with the internal migrations during the civil war. The 
socio-economic impacts of these movements were significant. The majority of 
the migrants originated from mountainous regions of northern Greece so were 
not only detached from their livelihoods left behind in their villages, but also 
had limited interest in becoming arable farmers on the plains. In the villages of 
Greek Macedonia, for example, the most prestigious employment was in the 
construction trade; an occupation that afforded little status in Trikala. These 
migrants found themselves at the bottom of the social ladder in Trikala, living in 
parapigmata that were little more than suburban shanty towns. They had few 
social networks in the area which were integral to advancing social position 
when relocating to a new region (Friedl 1976). 
 
The restructuring of the Greek state after the upheaval of the 1940s led to steady 
economic growth and rural development. As conditions improved so aspirations 
towards education and urbanisation gradually increased. According to Friedl, 
during this period the ultimate goal of all parents was upward movement in rank 
of order of occupation based on the criteria of required education, opportunities 
for security and advancement, and potential consumption standards the 
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occupation could support (1976:364)
157
. In Trikala the 1950s witnessed the first 
steady stream of migrants to Athens for purposes of education (initially often as 
teachers who would return to placements in Trikala following completion of the 
degree) (cf. Sutton 1983). The economic situation of increasing employment 
opportunities and agricultural mechanisation allowed for more prospectors to 
move to the city for university education. This was a period of political and 
economic stability; an Athenian industrial boom fuelled by migration, high 
levels of construction to accommodate migrants, expansion in public services 
and infrastructure, low inflation, and improving public transport marked an era 
of prosperity in which social mobility was made increasingly possible to 
peripheral communities. In these cases most were accredited with upward social 
mobility upon completion of university education. The prestige of jobs, 
economic security and potential disposable income were decidedly better than 
what was on offer through education in Trikala. 
 
From the 1940s crises and subsequent prosperous restructuring came another, 
sometimes more temporary, source of social status and mobility. Rapidly 
changing social conditions created spaces for economic opportunism – a 
phenomenon which has repeated itself from the opportunistic purchase of 
ciftliks at low prices by Greek businessmen in 1881 (despite the state promise of 
redistribution), through times of war and conflict to the stock market explosion 
of the 1990s. This opportunistic entrepreneurism is an inherent facet of both 
economic prosperity and crisis (cf. MacGaffey 1987, 1998, 2000). In times of 
crisis social status can be temporarily enhanced, such as in the case of Psathas‟ 
grocer who had access to valuable resources during a time of scarcity. During 
the Great Famine the black market was thriving as desirable resources were 
hoarded and sold to the highest bidder. The grocers were addressed with the title 
Kýrios (Mister)
158
 which was not apparent before the War and accepted large 
                                                 
157
 In the context of Southern Italy, Colclough‟s informants attribute three main factors to both 
upwards and downwards social mobility, namely fortune, cheating, and the acquisition or loss of 
power (1992:67). 
158
 See Hart (1992:74-75) for a discussion of terminologies that imply social status. On Meganisi 
Just describes how the common financial ascendancy of a group of wine-makers resulted in 
them being known as “the rich”, “the Athenians”, due to their associations with Athenian 
businesses (1991:129). 
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sums of money for desirable goods. The transitory position of power that the 




The purpose of this chapter is to explore how social status and mobility are 
experienced today by a cross-section of Trikalinoi during a transitional period 
between prosperity and crisis. The concepts of status and mobility are entangled 
in multiple layers of history spanning numerous times of prosperity and crisis. 
Sometimes social status and mobility are obtained through spontaneous 
opportunism or forced adaptation, other times by strategic planning and long-
term investment; there are a range of options open to different social actors 
(Sant Cassia 1982:643). In Trikala and the surrounding villages there is an 
intricate relationship between village and town, town and city (Athens and 
Thessaloniki) and town and the global which harbour multiple connotations of 
status and mobility. The terms by which status and mobility are identified are no 
longer associated with agricultural productivity or solely communal cohesion 
but more often by education and employment opportunities or by material 




Due to the “incomplete and uneven character of capitalist penetration and 
modernization in Greece” (Seremetakis 1994:39) in many aspects of everyday 
life traditional networks of patronage and clientelism operate simultaneously 
alongside, or „underneath‟, the façade of capitalist systems. One may well feel 
inclined to perceive these as potentially conflicting
160. This „duality‟ is apparent 
in many social arenas, from preferential medical treatment to employment 
opportunities (cf. Lisón-Tolosana 1966). On other occasions a strong capitalist 
initiative has challenged and sometimes completely penetrated the traditional 
systems of relationships and „getting things done‟, underlining the often 
                                                 
159
 In a similar vein, MacGaffey (1987, 1998) notes how entrepreneurs in war-torn Africa utilise 
social networks in order to open small businesses that cater for the demand of scarce resources. 
The products on sale are often acquired in a clandestine manner and sold at highly inflated 
prices. However, through this opportunism small minorities of the population can permanently 
enhance their social position. 
160
 According to Taussig, when a commodity exchange system and pre-capitalist social 
formations come into contact, new socio-economic forms are created (1980:127-128). 
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“awkward relationship between Greek actors and the agents of the state” 
(Theodossopoulos 2000:60), or in this case the Greek actors and the 
government-endorsed rhetoric (cf. Campbell 1964, Loizos 1975, Herzfeld 1991, 
1992)
 161
. Such is the case with the indiscriminate and unquestioned loaning of 
money from national and multinational banks in the town during the years of 
economic prosperity. The interaction between patronage-clientelism and 
capitalist business is strongly affected by the socio-economic circumstances; 
different situations call for various modes of resolution. 
 
Changes in the modes and methods of socio-economic relations, coupled with 
shifting economic contexts of prosperity and crisis, inherently alter the measures 
by which people in the town negotiate and define certain criteria of their 
personal and collective lives. Such is the case of perceptions of social status and 
social mobility. 
 
In the Greek case it is difficult to speak or theorise status in terms of class 
(Mouzelis 1976). Concepts such as class appear problematic and insufficient to 
explain the multiplicity of Greek social life as well as concepts of social status 
and mobility. Nevertheless, for analytical reasons I have decided to proceed with 
a categorisation of the population in terms of upper and lower sections. Towards 
this sectioning I follow the commentary of my informants who tend to divide 
social strata into two opposing categories. In the local understanding this 
sectioning does not accord to notions of class as these are developed in British 
society. My informants usually talk in terms of upsili koinonia (high society), 
kalos kosmos (good world), tzakia (literally fireplaces but implying the powerful 
families); this is what can be deemed the upper section. At the other end of the 
spectrum is emeis oi upolipoi (the rest of us) who are o laos (the people). The 
upper section includes the neoplouti (nuevo riche), ex-ciftlikades, 
autodimiourgitoi (self-made businessmen who rapidly progressed themselves) 
and politicians. Additionally those people that studied as teachers in the 1960s 
and 1970s are also perceived as of higher status due to the era of their education. 
The display of status is vital to both social sections. 
                                                 
161
 The conflict between capitalist government authority and „traditional‟ belief systems has been 
discussed by Taussig (1980). 
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There are two specific sections of Trikalini society that measure and 
demonstrate their social status in ways which reflect the current duality of socio-
economic conditions oscillating between „traditional‟ and „modern‟. The two 
sections of society, which shall be termed the „upper section‟ and the „lower 
section‟, define their status differently within their respective groups but are by 
no means bounded mutually exclusive communities
162
. Some concepts of status 
overlap between the sections. Education is one such point where cross-section 
comparisons of value can be made. When linked with idioms of kinship, the 
display and concealment of education is imperative to both the upper and lower 
sections. The two sections do however demonstrate highly differentiated social 
and material desires (Simmel 1978:71) which constitute patterns of „shared 
styles of living‟ (Bell 1994:51-52). These styles of living have not been affected 
homogeneously with the onset of economic crisis. The two social sections 
include both male and female actors, although the way that status is materially 
externalised may differ (for example; the males of the „lower section‟ often 
invest in cars whilst the females prefer to buy extravagant clothes and 
jewellery). The argument presented in this chapter is based on the externalised 
displays of these diverse understandings of what constitutes social status and 
mobility, externalisations which are markedly different. At all times these 
perceptions of status are presented as they are discussed and understood by my 
informants. There is often internal competition between the members of each 
section as to who can fulfil the perceived requirements of „status‟ to the 
superlative, yet little cross-section competition is externalised. It is 
acknowledged that this detachment of two social segments is not unproblematic, 
but it became apparent in the field that there was a clear distinction between two 
typical ways of defining social status, as expressed by the informants 
themselves. The decision on how to define the two sections has been based on 
the perceptions of the informants of what constitutes social stratification within 
society
163
. Perceptions of social stratification are expressed by Trikalinoi both 
                                                 
162
 As Bell (1994:28) puts it; residents may vote for the same council, use the same roads, and 
often worship at the same church, but circulate socially in fairly homogeneous subcommunities 
of wealth and associated cultural differences. 
163
 This is a method that ethnographers such as Bell (1994) have found to be the most beneficial 
when dealing with concepts of social stratification „in-situ‟. 
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The Lower Section 
 
The „lower section‟ is generally comprised of subsistence farmers, taxi drivers, 
manual labourers and part-time unskilled employees and civil servants as well as 
high school teachers with recent training. These people define their social status 
mostly in relation to material artefacts and consumer-orientated goods. There is 
much competition, especially among the males, to surpass each other with who 
has the latest, the most expensive or most desirable material possession. In this 
case money, and specifically the display of possessions to give the impression of 
having money, is central to their understanding of social status and indeed 
upwards social mobility. This competition has been facilitated by the 
unquestioned and indiscriminate loaning of large amounts of money by national 
and multinational banks during times of economic prosperity in the late 1990s 
and early to mid 2000s. On many occasions my informants have taken out loans 
for vast amounts of money for such things as expensive cars, holidays and 
houses, fully conscious of the impossibilities of repayment. Perhaps this is 
where one area of global capitalism – for as we have recently seen in the context 
of economic crisis such large bank loans have been an unstable phenomena of 
the Western world for the past twenty years on both individual and 
governmental levels – has fully penetrated the lives of this social group to the 
extent that pre-existing social and economic practices have been bypassed. 
Before the indiscriminate loaning of money from a faceless, spaceless 
institution, Trikalinoi had to rely on friendship networks, favour exchange, 
familial financial support and inheritance and years of savings for things which 
during global, national and local prosperity could be immediately purchased 
with somebody else‟s money.165 When coupled with the highly influential 
                                                 
164
 Tentori notes that such cultural symbols of status can include „intolerance‟, „idleness to work‟ 
and the prioritisation of education (1976:274-276). According to Bell (1994:44), such markers of 
social status can be income, occupation, family background, housing, material possessions (e.g. 
cars), life-style, education, property ownership and social acquaintances. 
165
 For a discussion on „credit‟ through a patron-client system, see Colclough (1992). One point 
that Colclough makes is that as most families now have a regular source of cash income, credit 
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phenomenon of the global mass-media, possessions that were once beyond the 
reaches of the majority of inhabitants of rural central Greece have become 
widely available and increasingly desirable. This consumerist phenomenon was 
further facilitated by rises on the Greek stock markets that benefited many 
Trikalinoi with financial resources literally coming „from nothing‟ (even more 
literal when a high percentage for companies did not actually exist in the first 
place). The 1999-2000 stock market crash was soon forgotten when national 
banks started to approve loan applications almost indiscriminately. 
 
During the first months of fieldwork in Trikala the repercussions of not being 
able to repay loaned money seemed not to intimidate my informants. “The worst 
they can do is repossess my car”, I was told. Due to the fact that in such cases 
money is seen as „free‟ as there is no face-to-face relationship involved (cf. 
Crozier 1964) the threat of accountability is perceived as less of a problem. 
Nevertheless the desire for status and recognition “na eisai kapoios” (to be 
somebody) often concludes with the opposite effect; by losing face which is the 
exact opposite of being somebody. The case of Andreas is suggestive of this as 
someone who accumulated a great deal of material wealth, only to lose it all. 
 
Katerina and Andreas, both in their early sixties, live in a small flat near the 
centre of Trikala. Andreas is a son of a builder and Katerina originates from a 
small village towards Kalampaka. Sparsely furnished, their flat it is a modest 
space that is adequate for the couple and their two sons, both in their twenties, 
when they return from university for the holidays. This has not always been the 
type of lifestyle that Andreas and Katerina have enjoyed. Andreas narrates the 
story; “We used to have it all. Whatever Katerina wanted, whatever the boys 
wanted, the latest clothes, the expensive house, whatever we wanted … but I did 
not have the peace in my heart that I have now”. Indeed, as Andreas sits there 
relaxed, chatty, drinking a can of Heineken on the veranda, I think how much he 
has changed as a character from the first time that I met him some six years 
previous. Andreas and Katerina took substantial loans from their extended 
family in order to set up their own furniture shop in Trikala. For many years 
                                                                                                                                            
from shopkeepers is not required (1992:64). However, in Trikala many other sources of „credit‟ 
are regularly required in order to support the family consumption patterns. 
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their lifestyle was excessive. They kept borrowing money from numerous banks 
and members of the family, always promising to „pay them back‟. The family 
loans were given in order to pay off the other loan demands from “various 
sources”. Andreas was not particularly good at returning these „family loans‟ 
that went into tens of thousands of euros
166
. They used to have two houses in 
Trikala, one very extravagantly furnished with chandeliers, Persian rugs and 
stone statues, all the markers of an affluent and prestigious social position. All 
the time the business was losing money. Andreas constructed a four-storey 
house in the most expensive conservation area of Trikala, despite already 
possessing an inherited house in the town, passed down from his father. He 
eventually sold the inherited house to finance the building of the new one which 
he never managed to finish. His specifications were for „perfection‟ and the 
„ultimate finish‟, including expensive marble staircases, plush furnishings and 
bespoke woodwork. Furthermore, the exclusive neighbourhood added to the 




Additionally, the two boys wanted the latest designer clothes and went to Athens 
for university studies. This was where a great deal of the money went. Katerina 
was extravagant in her spending too; fur coats and Persian rugs were her forte. 
Indeed, Georgia, Andreas‟ sister, squarely blames Katerina for the extreme 
                                                 
166
 Campbell makes it clear that family loans are usually expected to be repaid (1964:99). 
167
 The neighbourhood of residence is very important. The area in which Andreas resided 
consisted of villas and large spacious apartments owned by established professionals. It is a ten 
minute walk to the town centre where he had his business. The central street, Asklipiou, is the 
centre for socialisation and business in Trikala. It is the place to see and be seen. To rent shop 
space is very expensive here. Lisón-Tolosana expresses the exact same sentiments attached to 
„the high street‟ in Belmonte, Spain; 
 
“The high street is considered the most elegant; one cannot go out in it dressed just anyhow, 
especially women. When they go out shopping in the street they change their clothes and do 
their hair … Whenever there is a chance one sells a house situated in any other street in order to 
buy one in the high street; no matter if the price is higher or the comforts fewer, as sometimes 
happens” (1966:96). 
 
Many of his sentiments concerning „the high street‟ are mirrored by the Trikalinoi. Asklipiou is 
the desired place to own a business and any of the adjacent roads are highly desirable for 
residential flats, as are conservation areas such as the „old town‟. As well as elitist 
neighbourhoods within the town, some small villages on the outskirts have become popular with 
wealthy professionals. This has given rise to many „complexes‟ of villas in villages such as 
Livadi, a place which is now often referred to as an „affluent suburb‟ where rising professionals 
purchase communal land to build grand houses. In Lisón-Tolosana‟s case, the location of 
property on the high street is of such social prestige, the inheritance of a house along this street 
“generally arouses violent disputes among the heirs” (ibid.). 
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expenditure, yet when I first met Andreas he too was draped in a leather jacket 
and blacked-out sunglasses, a gold ring shining from his index finger. His 
demeanour was aggressive and businesslike. 
 
In 2007 Andreas was facing bankruptcy. His official loan repayment demands 
were enormous and he was facing imprisonment. Andreas sold off nearly all his 
assets; “I couldn‟t go to prison” he says with a smile on his face, “what would 
this lot have done (referring to his wife and sons)”. He sold his house, his shop 
and most of his possessions and is now an employee for a small kitchen-fitting 
company. Everyone in his family acknowledges how this was a change for the 
better. Andreas goes on; “I couldn‟t enjoy life. I was always thinking about 
where the money was going to come from, how I could repay this person, that 
person … there was no need for the big house, the jewellery, the holidays, sure 
it was nice to look at, but my mind was never free enough in order to enjoy it … 
I feared every knock at the door and every time I went to pick up the post”. I 
asked him if all of this expenditure got him any social prestige. He replied that it 
brought him „credibility‟ when among like-minded people and that although 
there was external pressure to participate in competitive consumerism he mainly 
did it because that was what he and his wife wanted and what they valued. I 
know that Andreas has made many contacts through his business. In my 
experience these were always other small business owners or friends of fellow 
„villagers‟. Despite his material possessions he has always been without the 
social and political contacts to advance his social standing on a patron-client 
basis. Coupled with his lack of education past the secondary school level, his 
ability to be upwardly mobile, as he tells me that he aspired to be, was severely 
limited. 
 
Andreas‟ case reminded me once more of Argyrou‟s study in the context of 
Cyprus. Argyrou discusses the „big-spenders‟ (fouartas) that make public 
displays of money and demonstrate their „power to purchase‟. This is another 
aspect of how the social persona is cultivated. These actions were made by „any 
man who respected himself and expected to be respected‟ (Argyrou 1996:74). 
The rhetoric of the „big-spenders‟ is that “money is for spending”, although 
Argyrou relates this stance to the concept of „the good heart‟ and the social 
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stigma of being „stingy‟. Yet in Andreas‟ case it was not his money that he was 
spending. A feeling of status was however created and noticed by the people in 
his social arena – family and friends. This following quote taken from Lisón-
Tolosana‟s work in Spain, sums-up how money and the display of wealth can 
gain social prestige. One of his informants says; 
 
„When I had money 
they called me Don Tomas; 
now I have none 
they just call me Tomas‟ (1966:81). 
 
This example resonates with Psathas‟ account of the grocer during the Great 
Famine acquiring the title Kýrios before his name as a sign of elevated status, 
although his wealth was not primarily monetary. A person can gain many 
degrees of esteem through the display of wealth, although it is socially 
contextual within a certain time and space. What became apparent in the case of 
Andreas and Katerina was that such a display was not sustainable due to the lack 
of a sufficient socio-economic basis. It is open to speculation about the 
sustainability of such a lifestyle if, lets say, Andreas had a significant network of 
influential political contacts (perhaps the court cases could have been dropped?) 
In any case Andreas has descended the social ladder if ever he could be 
considered to have climbed it, partially due to faulty business administration and 
partly because of material excess (cf. Lisón-Tolosana 1966:116, Colclough 
1992). Andreas is conscious of this change in terms of displaying himself. He is 
no longer attired with labelled clothes, and no longer resides in the most sought-
after area of Trikala; neither does he live in an expensive house. He is adamant 
that his loss has changed the way people perceive him.  He does notice that 
people treat him differently now, “probably they think I am a villager 
(choriatis), not a businessman, and people treat villagers different to 
businessmen”. 
 
Their debts spiralled out of control and familial loans were not sufficient enough 
as well as causing great tensions among the kindred. Andreas felt respected 
within his social circles and faced ridicule from bankruptcy. Rather than risking 
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being deemed pusillanimous, he continued to invest in a lifestyle of material 
luxury that he had no means of sustaining. 
 
Material success is a primary concern for many of the „younger adults‟ in Greek 
society. Hirschon argues that through material success the family receives 
recognition and prestige in the eyes of the community (1989:226). Furthermore, 
the financial power must be “shown by expenditure, particularly on consumer 
goods (electrical appliances, furnishings, clothing), meaning that external 
appearances become extremely important” (ibid.). In the context of Cyprus, 
Argyrou notes that, “every Cypriot man who respected himself … wanted us to 
know that he did not respect money” by exhibiting the ability for excessive 
expenditure (1996:21, Lawrence 2007:90, cf. Lisón-Tolosana 1966:ch.4). 
 
This was the case in Trikala during the first part of my stay, and for the majority 
of my long-term „fieldwork visit‟ in 2008 before the first rumblings of global 
economic troubles. The rhetorical display of „economic hardship is not affecting 
me‟ meant that the common opinion of rising prices, low wages and economic 
hardship, as well as later rumours concerning impending economic recession, 
was contrasted with extravagant spending of money gained from a variety of 
sources. The first suggestions of global recession in late 2008 and the eventual 
Greek economic crisis changed such perceptions drastically. The consequences 
of outstanding loans – and the banks‟ leniency on repayment – and the practical 
reality of curbing excessive expenditure has, for the time being, altered the 
opportunities for the public display of social status. Narratives of consumption 
that once criss-crossed the public sphere have been replaced with narratives of 
crisis, famine and hardship. What will be termed a „tournament of consumerism‟ 
has, to some degree, become a tournament of hardship and suffering, as 
demonstrated in chapter six and the social gatherings on Asklipiou. The public 
narrative has shifted focus as economic prosperity turned to crisis. In direct 
relation to the „lower section‟, social status based on conspicuous consumption 





The Upper Section 
 
What is defined as the „upper section‟ of Trikalini society consists of 
professionals and the „grand families‟ (megales oikogeneies) who have built up 
a notion of social status over the course of generations occasionally stretching 
back nearly one hundred years (Sant Cassia and Bada 1992, Faubion 1993, Just 
2000)
168
. The indicators of social status for these people are less about material 
artefacts as indicators of prestige – although these do exist in a different form – 
and more focused on education, family reputation, employment and social 
networks, all of which accumulates into social capital
169
 (Bourdieu 1977, Mach 
and Wesolowski 1982, Narotzky 2004, Narotzky 2006b, Narotzky and Smith 
2006). Many of the informants categorised as belonging to the „upper section‟ 
work as doctors, dentists or academics within the town and have usually been 
educated abroad. The collective sense of status within this group is not openly 
defined in relation to those of the „lower section‟ and status is related to 
concepts of reputation and socio-political networks rather than explicit financial 
capital and consumption. Socialisation, both inside and outside of work, is 
desired between those of a similar status, although this is sometimes attributed 
as being „natural‟ as these people are more likely to enjoy the same things and 
inevitably be working together in the first place. If material artefacts are desired, 
Dionisis, a dentist, informs me, he and his friends prefer to buy rare vinyl 
records or foreign antiques for personal consumption, rather than designer 
clothes and big cars to put on public display. He states that recreationally people 
“enjoy life” differently (cf. Tentori 1976:274). Dionisis claims that money is a 
by-product and a good education and an ambitious nature to succeed is what 
should be prioritised. The benefits of opening up political networks through 
education and employment can be enjoyed and political favours are 
commonplace. These enhance social standing in terms of reputation and 
                                                 
168
 Familial reputation in Mediterranean societies has often been linked to the notion of honour 
(Campbell 1964, Sant Cassia 1991:11, Colclough 1992:63). Bourdieu attempted to show how 
honour could be understood as „symbolic capital‟ (1977). According to Sant Cassia, on some 
levels honour can be “linked to material factors such as wealth, poverty etc.” (1991:11). 
169
 In terms of networks of relations, Narotzky (2004:57) defines social capital as “the 
importance of embeddedness … for successful economic organization”. Thus economic 
development incorporates “noneconomic” social relations for the establishment of dynamic 
entrepreneurial practices. 
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reliability (and sometimes in terms of material rewards). It is important to note 
that the sense of internal competition between peers appears less of an issue 
within this social segment. 
 
Yet even within the same social section there is a wide variety of status display. 
Yannis, a doctor, places significant prestige on the display of family heirlooms. 
He emphasises how inherited handmade rugs can be a signifier of status. As will 
become apparent, both Dionisis the dentist and Yannis the doctor generally 
agree as to the ways they display their wealth and status, but the means to do so 
are not monolithic. 
 
Yannis, 63, is a prominent doctor and a self-proclaimed „political consultant‟ to 
the town council. Nowadays he can be considered as being from one of the elite 
families in Trikala, what Lisón-Tolosana may term “a strong house” denoting a 
very well known family with a lot of possessions (1966:81). His wife, Maria, is 
a university professor and comes from a wealthy family with a good reputation. 
They live in the most prestigious neighbourhood in Trikala and the family own 
houses in their villages of origin in Greek Macedonia
170
. His medical practice is 
on Asklipiou, the central street in Trikala. Working for many years in the 
building industry as a contractor, Yannis‟ father also had „his hand in‟ with local 
politics. He further owned many properties in Greek Macedonia. He was 
originally of Vlach origin, a fact that Yannis is very proud of and to which he 
attributes much of his success.
171
. Maria is a Karagouna and received a 
significant dowry (cf. Sant Cassia 2002 for the manipulation of a wealthy dowry 
for advantageous marriage). Her family‟s name, wealth and profession 
counterbalanced the fact that she was not of Vlach origin. Their son is a budding 
                                                 
170
 As Sutton (1983:241) argues, migrants participating in rural-urban movements or relocations 
across significant geographical distances in Greece rarely sever their connections to their „home 
area‟. Often this connection entails maintaining houses and land in their home villages 
(1983:242). 
171
 Vlachs in Trikala are often stereotyped as „taking care of their own‟. Furthermore, Vlach men 
are often required to marry women of the same cultural origins. Numerous are the cases in 
Greece where Vlach men who have gone against such family wishes, yet the partner is often 
rejected by the man‟s family. In one case a Vlach, Theodoros, has been married to a Karagouna 
woman for 35 years, yet she remains “outside of the family”. If anything goes wrong in their 
lives or in their relationship the man is reminded that “he should not have married a Karagouna, 
what did he expect. A Vlach woman would not behave like that”. For further discussion of 
stereotypes of Vlach populations in Greece see Cowan (2000). 
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local politician, now employed in the local council as an agricultural advisor, 
with a US university education to Masters level. 
 
Yannis‟ father managed to accumulate significant monetary wealth over his 
lifetime when he eventually sold most of his property in Greek Macedonia. 
Yannis inherited most of the wealth due to the premature deaths of his two elder 
brothers (one of a childhood illness and the other of cancer). This money was 
primarily used to fund Yannis‟ university education and help set up a small 
practice in the town. Furthermore, Yannis was facilitated by his father‟s 
extensive contacts made whilst travelling around the local villages in the Trikala 
area and the clientelism of the closely knit Vlach community. He tells me that he 
“fulfilled and surpassed” his father‟s expectations and can only hope that his 
children will do the same for him.  
 
“I felt an increased obligation to my father, being the only surviving 
child … he wanted me to go to university, to be somebody, to be 
recognised … he was thinking of this, even though I was still so young 
… We had humble origins (referring to his grandparents and his 
parents), but I am lucky (he pauses) no, not so much lucky, we (him 
and his wife) worked hard for this. It didn‟t come from nowhere. My 
grandparents back in the mountains were quite poor and my father 
worked very hard to build up his business. After the tragedy with my 
brothers I was feeling that I needed to please my father, educate myself 
and become somebody in the town. I hope that my children will never 
face any hardship. This is what my wife and I are working for”. 
 
Similar to the case of Dionisis presented later in this chapter, Yannis has an 
idiosyncratic way to display his social status. Clearly belonging to the social 
elite of the town he claims: 
 
“I have great friends, a great reputation and I long for nothing 
(implying that he is financially secure) … I buy my cigars like any 
other man, I enjoy sampling other cultures and their cuisine, travelling 
when I can.” 
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His house is furnished with plush inherited rugs and chandeliers and old 
handicraft pieces that have been passed down from both his and his wife‟s 
grandmothers. Many of these familiar „positional goods‟ demarcate the fact that 
he has „really made it‟ and not just buying into consumption patterns with 
borrowed credit. It is very important for him to display his colourful kourelou 
(rug) – a precious handicraft that his grandmother produced on her private loom. 
The inherited goods display the proud family history and connections to his 
village of origin in Greek Macedonia (cf. Mitchell 2002:95). He thrives in his 
position as medical consultant to the town council and his relatives and friends 
benefit from his contacts with top surgeons in Thessaloniki and Athens. 
 
Yannis also insists that high education abroad – and as a result, occupation – is 
the key ingredient for success, status and social mobility. I ask him for his 
opinion of the people that „throw their cash‟ (and the bank manger‟s cash) at 
expensive goods. “This is a game” he astutely replies. “They try to out-do each 
other … you have this watch so I must get one bigger … they do not seem to 
worry about the consequences … I wouldn‟t be able to sleep …” Yannis gives 
and receives strategic favours, and lets me understand that his son has got a 
prestigious post on the council at a young age as a result of a chari (favour) 
from one of his close friends (although he says that he would have got the 
position anyway in due course, it was just slightly „hurried up‟). He occasionally 
„fixes‟ (meaning „organises‟) some paperwork for his close friends172 and has 
also used his position as a prominent member of the community to help get 
problems in his family‟s village fixed at short notice. Such was the case when 
some apparatus in the children‟s playground was broken or when persuading the 
council that a dangerous junction on the outskirts of the village needed to be 
altered. I was, on many occasions, a grateful recipient of contacts that I would 
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 Colclough (1992) notes that in Pertosa, Italy, schoolteachers are often accused of „buying‟ 
their teaching certificates. Both Yannis the doctor and Dionisis the dentist admit to „organising‟ 
documents some of the time. Indeed, Campbell discusses how through strategic contacts at 
government institutions bureaucratic processes can be sped up (1964:98). To the extreme, it is 





otherwise have struggled to gain access to and which allowed for, in Campbell‟s 
words, „flexibility in the administrative machinery‟ (1964:247). 
 
In the remainder of this chapter the differences between the multiple 
understandings of social status in Trikala will be illustrated through a series of 
ethnographic examples. This will take into consideration the incomplete and 
uneven capitalist penetration
173
 in and around the town of Trikala and the 
subjective value criteria of the people under discussion. These status perceptions 
will be related to the intertwining of the traditional identifying factors of status 
and those encouraged through capitalism and mass-consumerism. It will be 
demonstrated how the opening of alternative socio-economic gateways to the 
„unprofessional‟ sections of society in Trikala has meant that there is at least a 
two-fold understanding of social status at play in the town. The impact of 
ensuing economic crisis on the social groups will then be analysed. As Simmel 
(1978) has argued, the increasing individuation that money brings about results 
not just in the individual‟s independence of the group, (in this case an 
independence from the pre-existing patron-client systems in relation to material 
goods), and new forms of association, but the replacement of honorary prizes by 
monetary prizes as ultimate recognitions of achievement. He goes on to note the 
dual-relationship between how social systems change and „men remain‟ and 
visa-versa thus leaving the actors with a duality of criteria by which to measure 
their achievements and aspirations (1978:353). Such has been the case in 
Trikala, even more so if the consequences of the change from times of economic 
prosperity to crisis are taken into consideration. In this case the social conditions 
have rather suddenly been drastically shifted, yet „men remain‟ with the 
consequences of previous economic decisions. In line with Sant Cassia‟s 
argument (1991:15) that much of the Mediterranean is currently „somewhat in 
between two types of social formations‟, such a dual relationship between 
capitalist criteria of social status and that of the „traditional‟ has allowed for 
different sections of the Trikalini society to measure status by a multiplicity of 
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 Like Crozier‟s (1964) discussion of bureaucracy, capitalism has certain „bases‟ that are 
applied, constructed and re-constructed in different national and local contexts. It can also 
„mean‟ different things to different people depending on multiple socio-cultural, political and 
geographical circumstances. 
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criteria and means that the consequences of economic crisis are not 
homogeneously experienced. 
 
How perceptions of social status affect the capacity for social mobility as this is 
perceived as the direct result of accumulating status is also alluded to. Put 
bluntly, just because an individual can accumulate a relatively large amount of 
material wealth it is still difficult to become upwardly socially mobile through 
this alone, which again highlights the insufficiency of the class concept to define 
the complexity of the Greek social case. Although social status is now defined 
both in terms of material capital and social capital, mobility is still governed 
primarily by the pre-existing notion of patronage and socio-political networks. 
This is to say that money can only get you so far up the social ladder. Indeed, 
very often money and material wealth alone are not sufficient to move beyond 
one‟s original social group. Where as the availability of material artefacts has 
been fully penetrated by the capitalist system, the modes of advancing social 
position in relation to other „sections‟ has yet to be so, thus illustrating the 
complexity and multi-faceted nature of Trikalini society between the classical 
definitions of „tradition‟ and „modernity‟ as defined in the works of scholars 
such as Sayer (1991). 
 
Social arenas are not rigidly delineated and thus to a certain extent contain 
within them micro-strata of inferiority and superiority. This creates a sense of 
competitiveness on many levels. The outward display of money by the 
acquisition of material artefacts (Mitchell 2002:95) – such as purchasing status 
with cars and clothes – are not (to the greatest extent) symbols of social status 
and mobility across extensive inter-group social boundaries. This is because the 











In terms of theoretical direction, the work of Simmel (1907, English translation 
1978) will be considered alongside the theories of exchange, money and value 
proposed by Appadurai (1986). Through employing the theories of Simmel, 
Appadurai discusses the idea of the „exchange of sacrifices‟ (Appadurai 1986:3). 
Through the exchange of sacrifices the distance
174
 between the desired objects 
and the person who desires them can be overcome; “that is, one‟s desire for an 
object is fulfilled by the sacrifice of some other object, which is the focus of the 
desire of another” (ibid., Simmel 1978). In Trikala the distance between desired 
object, or indeed „desired position‟ in relation to employment opportunities in 
particular, can be overcome through either the exchange of favours as in a 
patron-client relationship or on a capitalist consumer-orientated exchange basis. 
 
The exchange of sacrifices fits in nicely with these overlapping economic 
systems. For those who do not prioritise equating material possessions to social 
status, exchanges of sacrifice may work along the lines of the following case in 
the context of Trikala.  
 
An employee in a supermarket has a brother who is out of work. She has been 
an employee with the company for five years and has got to know some 
individuals in the management hierarchy
175
. She uses these contacts in order to 
get her brother a job in the supermarket, although there are no real „vacancies‟ 
and he has no prior experience of this line of work. In return for giving him this 
opportunity – and one could argue that the manager underwent sacrifices both 
financially for unnecessarily employing the man and in terms of the quality of 
work – the woman provides her manager with an array of vegetables from her 
well-stocked garden. Although the employer is understood to have taken pity on 
her for her unfortunate social situation, it has also been suggested that she 
provided him with a financial contribution later on. The use of an employee‟s 
relationship with an individual in the managerial hierarchy in order to get their 
                                                 
174
 It is interesting to note that Miller believes „distance‟ to be a „central element of modernity‟ 
(1995). 
175
 Narotzky notes that acquiring jobs through friends or relatives can increases tensions between 
friends due to hierarchies of authority in the workplace (2006b:345). 
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brother a job overcomes the distance between desired position – that of 
employee – and the original position of being unemployed. In this case, a third 
party bridges the gap between position of desire and the person that desires it. 
The exchange is made two-way due to the obligations imposed on the woman 
(cf. Mauss 1954). She also feels obliged to be available to cover for other 
employees when they are unable to work. In the case of medical treatment a 
monetary sacrifice in the form of a „fakeláki‟ may always be more appropriate in 
order to bridge the distance between desired treatment and the person that 
desires it. Other exchanges may include using political networks in order to „get 
jobs done‟ in return for votes or other „favours‟ (cf. Boissevain 1966, Zinn 2001, 
Pipyrou 2010a) – once again the exchange of desired non-object „things‟ that are 
valuable to the individual participants. In this sense one could argue for a 
„commoditisation of services‟. It has been noted that the „value‟ of the „things‟ 
desired by the exchanging parties is situationally relative and may be deemed 
illogical or unequal by the observer (cf. Simmel 1978:ch.1, Kopytoff 1986). 
 
For some sections of Trikalini society material artefacts have become more and 
more desirable. These can only be gained through the „sacrifice‟ of money for 
object; desires that can rarely be fulfilled through a patron-client system.
176
 
Money can be understood as both a medium of exchange and a measure of 





Many informants believe that there is little point having wealth if it is not 
demonstrated outwardly in terms of materialism “external appearances (of 
expenditure) become extremely important” (Hirschon 1989:226). The word 
„sacrifice‟ takes on a multi-faceted dimension when it can be employed not only 
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 Bloch and Parry have argued for the highly contextual understanding of money. They argue 
that money can be „symbolically represented‟ and put the focus on the „moral evaluation of 
monetary and commercial exchanges‟, although this does not exclude individual competition 
(1989:1). For Taussig, money is an abstract mediator that leads to „objective value‟ in the form 
of established prices (1980:194), an idea that can be traced back to Marx (cf. Sayer 1991), for 
whom money is „an eminently civilised vice‟ of the capitalist world (1858:155). However, for 
Schneider, money “is material, it is power, it is impersonal and unqualified by considerations of 
sentiment and morality”; it is seen as a polluting substance (1980:48, Carrier 1997:144). 
177
 For Smith, money was useful as a common instrument of commerce due to its „durability, 
divisibility, recognisability and trustability‟ (Narotzky 1997:59). 
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in the discussion of giving money for artefacts, but also to identify the sacrifice 
of basic standards of living in order to outwardly project the ability to 
demonstrate status through the purchase of often unnecessary objects. The use 
for such goods can be deemed „rhetorical‟ and „social‟ or as a „register‟ for the 
ability for consumption (cf. Appadurai 1986:38). Objects are elevated within a 
socially formed sphere of desirability, wherein the perceived need for the object 
in question becomes completely undivided (Simmel 1978:65) and often with a 
basis illogical beyond the specific social arena. In relation to wedding 
celebrations, Argyrou discusses the work of Surridge in 1920s Cyprus; „he 
found it difficult to come to terms with the fact that a people living at the brink 
of poverty squandered their resources to stage grand celebrations … “The very 
natural temptation to show off on these occasions and to pretend that their 
financial circumstances are better than those of their neighbors leads peasants to 
cripple themselves”‟ (Argyrou 1996:74). Interestingly, Surridge notes that up to 
sixty percent of the dowry was paid for by loans (ibid., Surridge 1930:25). 
 
As demonstrated in this chapter by cases such as that of Eugenia, these 
exchanges of sacrifices generate economic and social value. Value is never an 
inherent property of objects, but is a judgement made about them by subjects 
(Simmel 1978:66-67, Appadurai 1986:3-4)
178
. The judgement made concerning 
social status by my informants affects the different value placed on a variety of 
economic activities. The judgement of sports cars and designer clothes equating 
to symbols of socio-economic status by some informants, makes these objects 
both socially and economically valuable within this community. The social 
value of such objects would be debateable within the sections of society that 
place higher value judgements on political networks and education (or indeed 
other „artefacts‟ such as antiques, paintings or inherited rugs). Likewise, the 
value of exchanging money for education and the „degree certificate‟ would not 
hold weight in other sections of society. In both cases Simmel‟s theory that 
economic value is generated by such exchange of sacrifices seems to be 
pertinent within specific groups of people with similar value judgements. 
                                                 
178
 Simmel argues that the inability to access an object of desire endows it with a value 
disproportionate to the enjoyment it will bring due to the remoteness of the object. Thus value 
judgement is directly related to the desire to purchase (Simmel 1978:66-67). 
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In this sense, the mutual valuation of object value that Simmel deems to be 
sourced in exchange is assessed in value-specific social arenas. For example, the 
mutual valuation of material goods by people of the same social segment is 
assessed by publicly parading objects in certain social arenas thus creating a 
desire in others to partake in the sacrifice of exchange – if the objects are judged 
to have significant social or status value. The desires of others are played out in 
communal life and the display of objects allows the opportunity for physical 
impressions of others and the consequential evaluation of desires to originate 
from the observations of the external world (Simmel 1978:471). Although this 
assessment of value is never static as new, innovative objects enter the market 
and new desires and demands
179
 are created, this system is in part self-
reproducing as „walking advertisements‟ for artefacts are evaluated within 
“specific cultural and historical milieus” (Appadurai 1986:4). This contextual 
valuation creates a space where exchangeability for some other thing becomes a 
“socially relevant feature” (ibid.:13). In this context everyday material 
experience generates the perceptual codes of „elemental historical creation‟ 
(Seremetakis 1994:12). Elements of material possessions find expression in 
everyday life since the latter is “a privileged site of political colonization” where 
agents can formulate their new identities and collective perceptions of the 
material (ibid.:13). Going beyond Appadurai‟s discussion of advertisement in 
terms of „textual and graphic images‟ (1986:55), the mutual observation of the 
objects on show from others that belong to the same social arenas means that the 
objects become not only desirable, but “reachable”. In the public domain actions 
constitute „informing spirits‟ that pervade the experience of life within the group 
and facilitates the flow of social exchanges (Bell 1994:52-54). Thus the impulse 
that Simmel discusses of facing financial uncertainty in return for material 
purchase is at least partially socially created and endorsed. During times of 
prosperity in Trikala from the mid-nineteen-nineties until 2008, these financial 
uncertainties seemed a small sacrifice to make in return for desirable goods. 
 
                                                 
179
 I follow in the line of Appadurai and his argument that demand emerges “as a function of a 
variety of social practices and classifications rather than a mysterious emanation of human 
needs, a mechanical response to social manipulation … , or the narrowing down of a universal 
and voracious desire for objects to whatever happens to be available” (1986:29). 
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In addition to the advertising of value through public displays of artefacts, an 
extra element of advertising commodities as being of social or status value is 
through gossip
180
. The power of people to use words to put value on objects 
should not be underestimated and gossip could be deemed as another form of 
public display. In Trikala I was constantly confronted by people all too willing 
to inform me about Mr X‟s latest acquisitions, or communicating their utter 
disbelief at the apparent disregard shown to money by Mrs Y when purchasing 
something for her grandson. This was usually accompanied by the underlying 
desire to obtain a similar „thing‟ for oneself and sometimes a projection of mock 
distain for the irresponsible transactions of others. 
 
In Livadi, on the outskirts of Trikala, people seemed to know all the details of 
each other‟s most recent economic activities in regards to material objects, 
whilst gossip concerning economic and political activity was also encountered 
on a nigh daily basis. In the town bars the conversation would often start with 
the phrase „did you know …‟ and the discussion would incorporate the details of 
the recent exotic holiday of a mutual acquaintance. In each case, one may pay 
no attention to the information gathered if it is not relevant to the criteria that is 
set in one‟s own social arenas, or conversely – as was usually the case – choose 
to act upon the information received. This helps feed the „tournaments of 
consumerism‟ discussed later in this chapter. 
 
The different criteria of what constitutes social value and status value set by my 
two groups of informants discussed in this chapter govern the exchangeability of 
commodities, artefacts and services. Indeed, Appadurai notes that in an intra 
cultural setting there can be “deeply divergent perceptions of value” taking place 
within “regimes of value” (1986:14-15). However, in both the cases of material 
and non-material exchanges the consumer, in order to purchase the goods and 
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 Gossip should also be understood as a socially accepted, and arguably necessary, form of 
„padding‟ employed during utilitarian conversation and information exchange. It helps build the 
relationship between those exchanging utilitarian information and such „unnecessary 
information exchanges‟ help the cohesion between the exchanging parties, not only at the time 
of one single conversation, but also in reference to past and future encounters. On a slightly 
different note, gossip as a form of advertisement could be viewed as an equivalent to product 
placement advertisements in films. People are requested to buy into ideas and rhetorics 
concerning a product – in this case the person/persons and their activities – alongside the „plot‟ 
of everyday utilitarian narratives. 
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services desired, must first purchase access to the transaction (Kopytoff 
1986:73) – be it through taking out a substantial bank loan or partaking in a 
patron-client relationship. 
 
„Show Me the Money‟: cars, clothes and holidays as social status 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, depending on the group in 
question, the criteria by which people in Trikala gauge social status varies. For 
those who may be considered, according to my informants, as belonging to the 
„lower section‟ of society – subsistence farmers, taxi drivers, cleaners, manual 
labourers and part-time workers – money and material possessions are what 
categorise social position. Christina, a shop owner in Trikala, told me that 
“money (lefta) is everything, without money you are nobody, you cannot exist”. 
It is the outward display of this wealth that is of social importance and this was 
in part what Christina was referring to. 
 
Through a range of ethnographic examples the parameters by which Trikalinoi 
in the „lower section‟ of society understand and play-out social status in relation 
to various forms of social activity and materialistic consumption will be 
explored
181
 (cf. Hobsbawm 1981, Colclough 1992:61). This activity, Bennison 
suggests, is a result of the steady increases in real incomes for the majority of 
the Greek population since 1951. As incomes grow an increased amount is 
available for the purchase of manufactured goods (1979:446). This has been 
more recently coupled with the substantial loaning of money from third-party 
institutions. 
 
One of my key informants, Lakis, 32, a waiter in a bar, among many others, 
often stressed to me the importance of “money, designer clothes and a great car 
… then in Trikala you have everything, you are someone. You are noticed and 
have credibility”. It became a recurring theme that the car and the clothes182 
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 See further Hobsbawm (1981) for a discussion of how people have come to understand 
consumption as an identifier of social segmentation and stratification. 
182
 Friedl has noted as early as the 1950s that clothing “signifies a family‟s degree of modernity” 
(1962:44) a point that Hirschon reiterates (1989:226-227). Bell (1994:28) has referred to the fact 
that cars can be symbols of status identification in a British context. 
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were status symbols for men of all ages. “It does not matter where the money 
came from to get the Mercedes. You may have to return it in six months because 
you cannot repay the loan, but you have a Mercedes and people see that … I can 
walk up to any bar on any night and choose which girl I want to pick up. They 
see the style, I flash my money and I get the girl. I am better than her boyfriend 
that only has a donkey!” I asked him if there was much competitiveness between 
his friends and acquaintances to surpass each other in terms of material status 
symbols. The response was affirmative; “I know I am better than him. I have the 
charm, but really they think I have the money. When someone passes me on 
Asklipiou they think, „that is Lakis I want to be like him‟”. 
 
Lakis was not alone in his perception of „buying status‟. Among my male 
informants of this social sector it was specifically the car – the make, the 
customisation and the noise – that were at the forefront of their search for social 
credibility. Most were bought with substantial bank loans and were not kept for 
more than a few months before the repayments surpassed the financial capability 
of the owner. Tassos and Apostolis, introduced in the opening narrative, were 
both single men who prioritised the purchase of their most cherished possession; 
the car. Apostolis took out a bank loan to import his car, partially in response to 
his best friend, Tassos, purchasing a BMW. The car modification business is 
also very significant in Trikala where mechanics make a living by modifying 
and customising normal road cars to increase speed, volume and aesthetically 
enhance the vehicle. As Sakis, a mechanic with a private garage, tells me, “the 
only problem is that we have far too many of these places competing for custom 
in Trikala. I know another ten garages just from my group of friends”. The car 
then represents a conquering of previous socio-economic constraints. As a 
machine it is an extension of the ego. The ideals of both are a cultural 
construction; the machine stressing the mastery of social surroundings which 
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 Many people were also very interested in what cars my family owned. To my surprise, a 
Rover and a Vauxhall was seen as rather prestigious, mainly due the former‟s relationship to 
MG and the fact that Opels (Vauxhalls) are not readily available in rural Greece. 
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From the above narrative of Lakis, the comparison of having a car better than 
the boyfriend‟s donkey is striking. Lakis himself comes from a family of 
agriculturalists that reside in a village five miles from Trikala. As with the 
majority of his fellow village residents, his family were using animals to 
cultivate the land up until the late 1960s when a communal tractor was 
purchased (cf. Layton 2000)
184
. He believes that his jet-black Mercedes gives 
him a status that others desire, but ultimately fail, to compete with. His friends 
also aspire to the same material status that was generally lacking from his 
parents‟ generation. The objects are put on display in the centre of Trikala as he 
sips his frappé and watches the world go by from behind his dark sunglasses. He 
is not alone on Asklipiou, the cafeterias would often be full to bursting point 
during 2008 – an observation that was contrary to the general rhetoric of a 
declining economic situation in the town – with the majority of people between 
the ages of eighteen and thirty, but also up to the age of fifty, highly-groomed 
and basking in the morning sun or partially hidden in the midst of the late 





According to Appadurai, exchanges – in this case exchanges of symbols of 
status between individuals – can turn into „tournaments of value‟ whereby 
status, rank, fame or reputation of actors and social prestige are being transacted 
(1986:21)
186
. These transactions are usually in terms of material goods – with no 
actor wanting to be surpassed in his material offerings. Appadurai talks of 
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 In the village of Livadi there is still a set of communal farming equipment stored on the edge 
of the village. As well as two tractors there is a small plough, a baler, large trailer and numerous 
other accessories to which approximately ten individuals have regular access.  In the context of 
rural France, Layton (2000) extensively documents the purchase and access to communal 
farming machinery which began to increase throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Often agricultural 
activity took place through co-operatives so as to manage communal pasture (still a feature of 
the villages around Trikala), stud bulls, and agricultural machinery (2000:96). Agricultural co-
operatives operate around Trikala, especially in relation to the harvest, storage and distribution 
of cereals. 
185
 In my experience of central Greece, Tentori‟s (1976:274) observations of an Italian 
community where the upper section of society “was characterized by the possibility of enjoying 
idleness” does not hold strong. In Trikala it was the young generation of what in Tentori‟s 
language would be deemed the „peasants‟ that were prone to being idle and living off the loans 
from their parents. Most weekdays the cafeterias of the central street, Asklipiou were packed full 
of young men and women of working age, posing in the morning sunshine. 
186
 Appadurai uses the case of the Trobriand Kula exchange system to illustrate this point (cf. 
Appadurai 1986:18-21). 
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„tournaments of value‟ taking place periodically and the participants being 
„privileged‟. In the case of Trikala „tournaments of value‟ are ongoing events 
open to all social actors sharing the same criteria of „value‟. Although the term 
„tournaments of value‟ could well be employed to describe the social processes 
at play in Trikala, perhaps a variation of the term is more appropriate – namely, 
„tournaments of consumerism‟. This is more appropriate when discussing the 
purchasing of social prestige in Trikala. The actual ability to engage in 
consumerism is as important, if not more so, than the inherent value of the 
object purchased – a point alluded to by Hirschon when she discusses how 
financial power must be “shown by expenditure, particularly on consumer 
goods” as the “external appearances” are of great import (1989:226). Therefore 
the social value stems originally from the ability to partake in the consumerist 
transaction in the first place – an ability that is oblivious by choice to the 
necessary subsidies required to facilitate the transaction. Yet this does not render 
all objects inserted into space and time meaningful in this context (Seremetakis 
1994, Pipyrou 2005). It must be strongly emphasised that by making this 
distinction not all objects belong to the sphere of capitalist consumerism and 
social value is played out on many levels simultaneously – a specific social 
arena is referred to. In a Greek context the traditional dowry and trousseau
187
 
would be an example of this incompatibility with a tournament of consumerism 
(cf. Seremetakis 1991, 1994, Sant Cassia and Bada 1992, Pipyrou 2005). 
 
The tournament could be played out in the cafeterias of Asklipiou, through the 
gossip in the village shop, or at the pista karta (go-kart race track) to name but a 
few overlapping arenas. In the first location – that of Asklipiou – the 
competition is usually direct, observable and stimulated by the presence of the 
material goods. The second situation – that of gossip concerning mutual 
acquaintances – has multiple locations and does not require the presence of the 
actor or the artefacts under discussion. The third example, that of the pista karta, 
is the one I wish to discuss further at this point as it is an interesting and 
illustrative context where ideas of social networks and tournaments of 
consumerism are highly visible. 
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 The trousseau can consist of linen, handicrafts, clothes, loomed carpets etc. 
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The pista karta is a small race track on the north-western outskirts of Trikala, 
just off the main Trikala-Kalampaka road. Here a group of men, and the 
occasional woman, gather up to three times a week – and always on a Sunday – 
to drive their modified cars. The cars are entered into races all over Thessaly and 
many of the men work as mechanics and technicians on cars that are entered 
into the national championships. Angelos, aged 36, is one such person. He 
partially owns an old red 1970s Vauxhall which is driven by his friend Lakis (of 
above narrative fame), aged 32. The men are often accompanied by numerous 
young ladies in their early twenties who live in the Trikala area. On Sundays the 
gathering sometimes becomes more family-orientated as many of the men are 
accompanied by wives, girlfriends or children. There is a cafeteria, viewing 
balcony, children‟s playground and free rides on the petrol go-karts for the 
children. First the background of my relationship with Angelos and his 
obsession with cars and their outward status symbolism needs to be outlined 
before going on to discuss our experiences at the pista karta. 
 
Angelos‟ car is his pride and joy. As a mechanic he devotes much of his spare 
time to „doing-up‟ his 1990s Ford Escort. It now has a large spoiler, alloys, 
hand-made large exhaust pipes and racing wheel-arches, red brake disks and a 
rally-car interior. The bonnet has a large picture of a caricature animal 
advertising his mechanics company, with a slogan propagating his hand-made 
car parts. He takes great pride in driving around Trikala with his dark sunglasses 
on … with his wife and two-year-old daughter in the back. One evening 
Angelos, who lives in the centre of Trikala, came to Livadi to drop off some 
melons for his mother. He arrived in Eugenia‟s car, a small white Nissan Micra, 
which he had borrowed earlier in the day. He then had the idea that we ought to 
go and buy spatula, a syrupy Greek sweet. Angelos insisted that the best spatula 
was to be found in Kalampaka, but in order to go there he would have to drive 
back to Trikala (10 minutes in the opposite direction) in order to drive to 
Kalampaka in his beloved Ford. When I asked why, he excitedly exclaimed, 
“what if someone sees us. I can‟t be seen in that car, vvvrrrooommm 
vvvrrrooommm (imitates the engine noise of his Ford) I will lose all credibility, 
no one will come to my shop anymore”. Angelos returned thirty minutes later in 
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his Ford. At 9pm we were driving in the dark with the window down and 




In an intriguing episode Angelos took me to the pista karta which he frequents 
twice a week to “have fun”. This is his main arena of socialisation outside of 
work. On the way he informed me that “tha kanoume plaka stin pista” (literally, 
“we will „make fun‟ at the race track”). It became apparent that Angelos wanted 
to exhibit me to his friends – and rivals – as an anthropologist who had an uncle 
in England who is one of the top mechanics. Therefore, Angelos told me, I must 
„play-along‟. Evidently, my lack of knowledge on the mechanics of automobiles 
deemed it impossible for me to have a father as a top mechanic, so an uncle 
would have to do. I had to tell them, he said, that I could get anything for 
Angelos from England and that I have come to see the cars and how they 
compare with those in England – and how they can be improved. I intriguingly 
agreed to „play along‟, but told him that I needed to state that I myself was an 
anthropologist doing fieldwork. He agreed. 
 
Angelos wanted to show that I had „connections‟ and that I could help him get 
parts from England. This was supposed to make his rivals envious. Not only did 
Angelos have connections in England – itself a highly prestigious asset in such 
circles – but, according to Angelos, I was there to „assess‟ their performance and 
report back on their success, or lack of it, to my influential uncle. By offering 
Angelos to become a client through my family connections, he would gain 
prestige. As it turned out this was not much further from the truth as Angelos 
utilised his friendship with me in order to order car parts from an English 
supplier on three separate occasions during my stay. This started with an internet 
search and a telephone call from Trikala to East Anglia and ended with an 
insight into the Greek banking system. In this relationship it is interesting to 
note that we both utilised our „contacts‟, the global information service and a 
multi-national shipping corporation to supply his self-employed mechanics 
garage. Angelos‟ plan worked, to an extent, as his fellow competitors were eager 
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 Angelos has bought an old car for his two year old daughter. He plans to „do it up‟ over the 
next ten years in order for her not to have that expense. Of course, it is another Ford. 
 
 293 
to talk to me and find out more about the role of my uncle. He was keen to keep 
the story believable and not to over-elaborate the points that seemed 
implausible. 
 
The competition in material artefacts can therefore be developed into a 
competition for social networks. In the same way that cars and clothes – or Kula 
shells as Appadurai discusses (1986:18-21) – are displayed in a tournament-
style setting, so too are the other non-visible perceptions of social status such as 
networks. The competition is rife at the pista karta. Angelos moans about the 
lack of financial support in the form of advertising – only Billy has this privilege 
due to his brother being the area manager of a well-known bathroom sales 
company. Although the competition between material possessions was on show 
in the form of the cars, on this occasion Angelos wanted to demonstrate the fact 
that he has more useful social networks than his fellow racers. This linked back 
to the materiality through the emphasis on him being able to gain access to good 
quality „racing gear‟ that the others could not purchase. On top of that Angelos 
emphasised the cheap price at which he could purchase his parts and that he 
would not have to save up (or more likely to take a loan) like Billy or Sakis 
(both drivers at the pista karta). On this occasion there is a significant 
overlapping of the consumerist desires for material goods and the prestige 
emphasised on the social network itself, however the network was always 
referred to by Angelos in terms of access to material artefacts to further his own 
social prestige. The fact that he could get a special price for otherwise expensive 
hardware was another key aspect; his consumerism was not restricted by money. 
 
Connections are highly prized assets within Angelos‟ circle of friends. The 
reasoning is twofold; it is considered that knowing the right people is the 
primary way to enhance one‟s own position and connections to foreign bodies – 
and especially to businesses in England – which are highly desirable and often 
quite inaccessible to people in this sector of society. Secondly, the networks 
themselves provide access to privileged material goods that bring social status 
and prestige to the individual outside of the manner of purchase as it is difficult 
to compete with objects to which one does not have access. In this case Angelos 
would have won the tournament of consumerism as it was impossible for his 
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friends to acquire the same goods due to their lack of connections. This 
highlights how Angelos‟ social activities lead to the regard of certain objects 
and connections as valuable and ideal. Instrumentalist friendships – although 
these friendships are often formed on the basis of, or acquire over time, 
emotional frameworks (cf. Papataxiarchis 1991, Pipyrou 2010a) – are indicators 
of the ability to further oneself. Among my „upper section‟ informants such 
relationships are understood as the par-excellence unit by which they define 
themselves and by which the actor could enhance social standing and reputation. 
Although it is widely accepted that such relationships exist across the board in 
Trikala, according to my „professional‟ informants, such socio-political 
networks are more meaningful in their circles because they are often constructed 
with influential council members, politicians and other professionals. Thus any 
personal advantage resulting from such relationships is likely to have greater 
significance to their everyday lives. Yet Angelos‟ desire to show to his fellow 
competitors that he too had significant social networks was driven much less by 
the desire to equate himself to a different social arena – for this he does not 
much care – but to demonstrate the ability to purchase unique goods at special 
prices through a network that nobody else at the pista karta had access to. This 
type of social network is not durable in times of economic crisis as the service 
offered by its appropriation is based on the availability of investment capital. 
Whilst the concept of being linked to prestigious people in foreign countries 
may still bring prestige, utilising these connections in a practical sense is not 
possible. Indeed, Angelos has now stopped ordering any new car parts from 
England, a source which brought him much prestige, due to the economic 
conditions in Greece and through a fear for the sustainability of his private 
business. 
  
At the pista karta I also met Marianna, a young lady aged eighteen. She told me 
that she had studied seven years of English in school but hardly spoke a word; 
only “sorry” in a Californian accent. Her nails were long and black with the tarr 
of cigarettes. I found the opportunity to engage in some explanatory 
conversation concerning my research in Greece. Over the course of five hours I 
learnt that she is, supposedly, working in logistics in the family firm but states 
that she is “bored to work” (“variemai na doulepso”). She currently spends most 
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of her time at home, watching television, smoking and drinking coffee – and not 
bothering to turn up for work. Nevertheless, she insists that she wants to one day 
own a Porsche Carrera, at least £30,000 worth. I asked how she plans to get the 
money for her aspiration. The response is along the lines of “a miracle or win 
the lotto”. She expects that I work a lot for my doctorate and is in disbelief as to 
how anyone would want to work so much. 
 
Most of the spectators at the race track are employed as mechanics or car 
salesmen, live in villages around the periphery of Trikala, and are uneducated 
beyond secondary school
189
. Many wear leather jackets adorned with race and 
manufacturer logos, but not sponsors. They take much pride in their clothing 
and the jackets are admired in conversation
190
. The outward appearance was 
obviously extremely important. The competition in the banter off the track was 
more intense than the competition on it, for they were all very respectful and 
protective of each other on the track. This was demonstrated on such occasions 
as when a tyre is seen to be shredding, a faster car wants to overtake, someone 
loses control temporarily, or, such as on one occasion, someone‟s scarf gets 
caught around the wheel. At a later date there was great hilarity when Lakis 
crashed his old Vauxhall into the telephone pylon at the track whilst trying to 
chat-up the female passenger. The car was a write-off but, Lakis exclaims 
proudly, “the telephones in the village had interference on the line for 15 years. 
The company would not do anything about it. Now they are perfect, so clear – 
thanks to me”. The pylon remains to this day at a 45° angle. 
 
Cars and clothes are the material artefacts that denote status to some members of 
Trikalini society. It does not matter how they are acquired, as long as one can 
display them to others. Another purchase that Stella, my travel agent friend, 
insisted is part of the perceived social status is holidays. Over the course of my 
fieldwork it became apparent that holidays were an explicit example of how 
social status is gauged through the ability to engage in capitalist consumerism. 
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 The exception to the aforementioned demographic is Sakis. Sakis, 55, is a teacher from 
Trikala who contributes some money to the running of the cars on race days. 
190
 Friedl notes that clothing “signifies a family‟s degree of modernity” (1962:44). 
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Perhaps in this context the term „tournament‟ is at its most pertinent to the 
informants themselves. 
 
Stella is 27 years old and moved to Trikala nine years ago from Germany (via 
three years in Thessaloniki)
191
. Her grandparents were originally from Trikala 
and after much resistance her parents, presently residing in Germany, funded her 
to set up a travel agency in the town. She takes great pride in being Greek, but 
“not as Greek as the locals” as she claims. Every day at 4pm Stella has a tea 
break. She purchases tea in Germany on her return visits and invites employees 
from the neighbouring shops to join her at 4pm for tea and cake. She was very 
excited about sharing this with an Englishman as she equated it to the practice of 
English aristocracy. Tea in rural Greece is more usually equated with illness, 
thus in Stella‟s case tea is another context shifting marker where the meaning of 
a cultural practice is shifted away from immediate collective assumptions. The 
4pm tea break formed the basis for an enduring friendship in the field. 
 
Concerning the expensive and exotic holidays, I asked her how, when I am 
constantly told that the Trikalinoi have no money, there is appalling 
unemployment and everything is so expensive (this is the rhetorical stance even 
in times of prosperity), can people afford to book such holidays (in exotic 
destinations including five stars hotels and yacht vacations), who books them, to 
where and for what reason? 
 
“It is what people in Trikala do Daniel … They want to compete with 
each other. It is not the wealthy people, the people with money and 
good jobs that book these types of holidays. Many people get loans to 
go to such places. Loans are so easy to get from the bank now, for 
anything – to improve the house, go on holiday or buy a car; people 
forget that you have to pay them back. They don‟t think about that. 
Their friend goes to Dubai and tells everyone about it. The next person 
then wants to go somewhere better, more exotic and further away, so 
they go to the Maldives (a favourite among the Trikalinoi). They return 
                                                 
191
 It is now commonplace that second or third generation immigrants return to their towns of 
family origin in Greece to set up small businesses (Hart 1992:70). 
 297 
and tell their friends. The next person then either wants to go to the 
same place, the Maldives, or somewhere more exotic, like Mauritius. 
They try to outdo each other. To be able to say that they have been 
there. For no other reason. That is why Trikala is such a good place to 
have a travel agency. That is why there are so many here
192
. I worked 
in a travel agency in Thessaloniki and it was totally different. 
Thessaloniki is a big place and people don‟t speak to each other so 
much. Here everyone knows each other and try to go „one higher‟ than 
the people they know. Also, in Thessaloniki the attitude is different. 
They are not so competitive. Exotic holidays are not a way of showing 
that you have money, here they most certainly are. That is one of the 
main reasons that I decided to set up my business in Trikala … People 
don‟t even know why they are going, what they are going to do when 
they get there or even where the place is … for example … 
 
“I had a woman that came in the other day who wanted to go to Java. I 
said „why do you want to go to Java? That is unusual‟. She replied that 
her friend had just come back from Java, was talking about how 
wonderful it was and now she wanted to go too. I asked, „what do you 
want to do in Java?‟ The woman replied that she did not know what 
she wanted to do in Java, she did not know what there was to do in 
Java, but she wanted to go, she was sure. “It is not far, I want to go 
there” she insisted. “Ok”, I said, “do you know where Java is?” “No”, 
the woman replied, so I had to get out the map to show her. She still 
booked a two-week package holiday to Java. I really don‟t know what 
she is going to do when she gets there! 
 
                                                 
192
 Stella tells me that the competition is fierce, with 30 travel agencies in central Trikala, 25 
dealing mainly in domestic and foreign coach travel – a Greek favourite – and five dealing in a 
variety of travel. In recent years the encroachment of transnational companies offering 
convenient travel at competitive prices has affected the local businesses but not to the extent that 
the growth of hypermarkets has similarly altered the food retail sector in the major urban centres 
(cf. Boutsouki and Bennison 1999:98). This is mainly because, Stella tells me, Greeks still feel 
more confident booking with Greek operators at short notice, rather than with budget companies 
in advance. Also, the fact that Trikala does not have an airport means that cheap flights are not 
as appealing to the locals as they would be, lets say, to inhabitants of Thessaloniki. 
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“The other type of competition where people have to go one better than 
their friends is for „cultural‟ destinations. If someone goes to Paris, 
their friend wants to go to London. Their friend then wants to go to 
New York. Only for the weekend or four days. In Thessaloniki it was 
only the wealthy people that wanted to do this. May be that is why it is 
so popular here now, to say “I am going to London””. 
 
In her narrative Stella refers to the role played by face-to-face relations in 
increasing competition between her customers. „If one person goes to Dubai, 
their friend wants to go to the Maldives‟ she says193. For Stella the size of the 
town and the ability to „be seen‟ and communicate the fact that you have been 
on holiday to Dubai plays a crucial role in this competition for prestige. A 
similar phenomenon occurs when walking through Trikala with Lakis, the 
waiter. He seems to know every other person he sees and we had always to stop 
on multiple occasions to greet people and exchange news. There is the inherent 
knowledge that any information exchanged will be passed on to other people in 
the same village or neighbourhood and thus be circulated to other members 
outside of the immediate community (du Boulay 1974, Zinovieff 1991). This is 
another form of advertisement for the social desirability of consumer goods. 
 
                                                 
193
 I was once privileged to accompany 43 mainly elderly residents of Livadi and neighbouring 
Agios Georgios on a coach excursion to Arachova and Delphi in February. Arachova has many 
prestigious connotations as being the ski resort of choice for many famous Athenian actors and 
politicians. Delphi and the ancient Temple of Apollo is one of the most famous sites of Ancient 
Greece. At Delphi the villagers were allotted one hour to look around the museum. Within 20 
minutes they were sat back down in the coach waiting for the lone Englishman, myself, to 
emerge a lonely figure from the building. “We are not interested in such things” I was told, “all 
these small artefacts”. This was obviously the case as one gentleman insisted on flicking a 3000 
year old bronze pot which he found to make a rather amusing noise. On returning to the bus the 
driver announced that there was no need to see the ancient Sanctuary as it was “just a lot of 
stones that you can see from the bus”. After a brief lunch break in the village of Arachova, 
where only two people of the party chose to visit the main feature of the village – a wonderfully 
restored church – the coach proceeded to battle its way through the snow for four hours to reach 
the peak of the 2500 metre mountain just as it was getting dark. After admiring the skiers for 10 
minutes and refusing a coffee due to the extortionate prices, the coach set off back down the 
mountainside. The villagers then took great enjoyment from passing comment on the 
unacceptable nature of all the expensive private houses on the mountainside and collectively 
worrying about possible attack by bears. The new houses with large gardens were seen as 
inappropriate and all foreign tourism was collectively denounced. We left Trikala at 7am and 
returned at 1am due to problems getting stuck in the snow; however we could all say that we had 
been to „see‟ both Delphi and Arachova and all those expensive houses. 
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The topic of loans in order to purchase often expensive items has been brought 
up by both Lakis and Stella. In the theoretical introduction to this chapter it was 
noted that the desire for such items often resulted in informants placing 
themselves in positions of financial uncertainty. They often lost the control over 
their own financial assets. It was noted that this went beyond the natural 
impulses suggested by Simmel and were, at least partially, socially created and 
endorsed. Loans are difficult to repay and one‟s money is often at the discretion 
of the bank – the ultimate „faceless party‟. Furthermore, the repayment of loans 
has put a great deal of tension on family relations, as the first people to turn to at 
a time of financial difficulty are the parents, who in turn feel an obligation to 
rise to the request and make „sacrifices‟ (in another sense of the term) in order to 
facilitate this
194
. The desire for expensive items in this context directly relates to 
Simmel‟s theorisation that a person becomes „completely concerned by the 
satisfaction‟ of the desire and pays little or no attention to the economic 
consequences of the transaction (1978:65). The actors are fully immersed into 
the tournament of consumerism. 
 
In relation to this point I would like to once again refer to the work of Argyrou 
in Cyprus. Argyrou discusses the „big-spenders‟ (fouartas) – the display of 
money and the demonstration of „the power to purchase‟ – as another aspect of 
understanding how the social persona is cultivated through such actions. These 
actions were made by „any man who respected himself and expected to be 
respected‟ (Argyrou 1996:74). The rhetoric of the „big-spenders‟ is that “money 
is for spending” although Argyrou relates this stance to the concept of „the good 
heart‟ and the social stigma of being „stingy‟. For Argyrou, Cypriot weddings 
were the ideal opportunities for the „big-spenders‟ to practice and display their 
generosity. This example illustrates the alternate meaning of the term „sacrifice‟ 
as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter through the ethnographic 
example of Surridge and the significant loans taken out for Cypriot weddings 
and their accompanying dowries (1930). Nowadays, Argyrou notes, „big-
spending‟ is “antagonistic and competitive and largely determined by what 
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 I was to find out that as money became more readily available for the general population, 
especially the „lower section‟ of society, it was reinvested into the children of the family by 
paying for material goods rather than in long-term financial arrangements. 
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one‟s peers do and how much they spend … If others persist in staging grand 
weddings despite the costs involved, then, one has no option but to follow suit” 
(1996:97). This is an observation that I believe sits well with my argument for 
competitive consumerism in Trikala during times of prosperity. 
 
Status and Prestige through Generations, Reputation and Social Networks 
 
As previously mentioned, the social values that are believed to denote status and 
prestige among the „upper section‟ of Trikalini society include familial 
reputation and the construction and reaffirmation of status over generations
195
. A 
brief theoretical background to the generational approach is required. This is 
followed by a variety of ethnographic cases of how some Trikalinoi have built 
up social status – and indeed mobility – based on reputation or through 
education, employment and „good character‟ over the course of many years196. 
Thus social status is accumulated and stabilised, enhanced or even downgraded 
over time. 
 





“an age-group of men and women who share a common mode of existence or 
concept of life, who assess the significance of what happens to them at a given 
moment in terms of a common fund of conventions and aspirations” (1966:180) 
 
Lisón-Tolosana argues that through the sharing of time and a „common image of 
the world and of life‟ people create and are conditioned by ideas and attitudes 
constituting „the fundamental nerve of a generation‟. Thus every individual, 
regardless of age, that adheres to the aforementioned way of life belongs to the 
same generation (ibid., cf. Kertzer 1983, Loizos 2007). He makes a striking 
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 The building of both economic and social capital over generations has been understood as a 
key aspect of social stratification in Britain (cf. Bell 1994:39-40, Strathern 1981, 1992). 
196
 In the context of Italy, those members at the „top‟ of the social ladder are select families 
known as the signori (Silverman 1975:88, Tentori 1976:274, Colclough 1992:61, White 1980). 
The signori are highly educated and are employed as the doctors, lawyers, teachers and 
government officials within a community. These people and those of a slightly lower socio-
economic position, the mastri, have the greatest access to the political arena and the local 
councils, so therefore often act as patrons. 
197
 Also see Loizos (2007) and Kertzer (1983) for definitions of „generations‟ and the analytical 
problems this term may cause. 
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point that this refers to „social generation‟ and not necessarily „biological 
generation‟. This is especially interesting when considering social status as 
constructed generationally. Lisón-Tolosana explicitly notes that a generation is 
directly affected by both the “cultural legacy” of former generations and “the 
new contribution or contributions” of the members of the current generation 
(Lisón-Tolosana 1966:181). Political ideologies and social position may be 
inherited through generations and result in certain individuals occupying 
positions of governmental power not usually associated with their biological 
age. When discussing social economics in a rural Greek context it must be noted 
that socio-economic change over time has been dramatic. Lisón-Tolosana notes 
that in Spain the „declining generation‟ can remember when money was rare and 
most transactions were by barter (ibid.:182, Humphrey and Hugh-Jones 1992, 
La Pradelle 2006). This image of time and economic conditions goes a way to 
the understanding of how indiscriminate loaning
198
 of money by banks in 
Trikala has opened the door to social sectors who have not inherited social-
economic position through the generations to a new dynamic way of acquiring 
social status within their community. When entangled with the history of 
economic crisis in the region it is clear that access to new channels of money is 
an enticing prospect. It may also suggest as to why the „upper sections‟ 
negotiate their status identity in accordance to codes/attributes that are not 
accessible to the „lower sections‟. This is to say that people cannot simply 
purchase a social history of status, yet the dynamics of capitalism allow for them 
to represent status through a different set of codes that are meaningful to them in 
the present. The legacy of generational social status has been formed from 
within a time where consumerism was not the merchandise of status. Both 
material and non-material aspects of inheritance can be understood as opposed 
to economic individuality by tying the individual to a sequence of generations 
with moral and social obligations (Simmel 1978:354)
199
. In this respect a reverse 
aspect of the (im)moral economy comes to the fore where accumulation and 
                                                 
198
 According to Lisón-Tolosana (1966:191), the attitudes towards loaning money from banks 
are directly related to the world view of different generations. Such generational attitudes 
towards economics shape the types of transactions on a local scale and furthermore affects other 
social dynamics such as kinship relations and the division of labour (ibid.:192). 
199
 Simmel notes that family continuity has always been the objective of Greek aristocracy, 
especially in relation to inheritance. Furthermore, he suggested that in ancient Greece to sell 
inherited property was a violation of the ancestors (1978:353). 
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preservation is prioritised, yet often entailed with patronage, favour exchange, 
bribery in the form of fakelákia and social prioritisation (in terms of being given 
precedence and flexibility when dealing with banks, schools or local 
government officials). 
 
In Trikala, if one‟s family has been in a position of power in terms of socio-
political administration or professional respectability for generations – on the 
council to borrow Lisón-Tolosana‟s example – then one‟s networks (and hence 
the family networks) reach to areas such as medicine, teaching and politics. 
These networks, if maintained, are part of the non-material inheritance and can 
be modified, enhanced or erased accordingly over time. 
 
Capitalism (hand in hand with processes of globalisation and transnational 
policy) has helped develop rich political and economic networks to encompass 
an even more diverse social and geographical spectrum
200
. These networks can 
be maintained for future generations. Kamaras argues that in a capitalist Greek 
context “networks that link firms and connect persons across them … (in such 
networks) the unit of entrepreneurship is not the isolated individual but networks 
of actors … (while networks) are not simply resources of the past but can serve 
as resources of the future” (2001:2-3). Economic networks can thus be formed 
on nearly every level of the social stratification, yet the types and socio-political 
influences of such networks varies greatly across the board (cf. Simmel 1978). 
Thus capitalism has added another line to the already dense Greek 
entrepreneurial web and has inherently been incorporated into pre-existing 
notions of inheritance. Traditional patronage networks have been enhanced and 
expanded through late capitalist enterprise. 
 
Case.1: Dionisis the Dentist 
 
Dionisis, 60, is a prominent dentist in Trikala. I built up a relationship with 
Dionisis over the period of a few years. He has a well rounded figure and sports 
a bushy jet-black handlebar moustache and a large mass of curly black hair. He 
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 Kamaras (2001) discusses the socio-economic networks of Greek business entrepreneurs in 
the Balkan region. 
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owns a third floor surgery on Asklipiou – the central street of the town. He 
gained his degree from the University of Thessaloniki and has been practicing 
dentistry for thirty years. He is the son of a well-known builder – the occupation 
that was the pride of his provincial village. His wife, Eleuteria, 58, is also from a 
family of labourers and is a beautician with a university education. She owns a 
studio next door to Dionisis‟ surgery. They have three sons, all educated in 
British universities. His house is in a sought-after suburb of Trikala and is 
furnished elaborately inside with chandeliers and Persian carpets. Dionisis‟ 
external display of wealth is very limited. He told me that he does not care for 
clothes or cars, as they are a waste of money … “look at me” he exclaims 
“imagine me driving round in one of those cars”. He owns an old battered red 
Nissan and prefers to collect rare antiques and records. When asked whether his 
friends are pursuing similar hobbies he informed me that his social circles are 
usually with doctors, politicians or professionals, therefore their hobbies would 
inevitably be similar. When questioned about „political favours‟ he says that he 
is often asked to use his contacts to help his friends and relatives. He does not 
always say „yes‟ however – it depends on the circumstances. He rarely uses his 
socio-political networks for people that he does not know. On numerous 
occasions he put me in contact with teachers, doctors and university professors 
with „inside knowledge‟. Once he called the curator of the local archives centre, 
informed her that I would be around „immediately‟ and to give me any help that 
I desire. Dionisis told me that he obviously wants the best for his family and 
friends, thus he will do anything to help them (including financially) if they 
present a good case. Some hares („favours‟) may include the writing of official 
„papers‟ and references or putting in a „good word‟ to help someone gain a job. 
 
His obsession is education. Apart from his own specific university education, he 
is highly informed on many academic topics. During my visit in September 
2008 he was halfway through reading Jane Cowan‟s (1990) ethnography „Dance 
and the Body Politic in Northern Greece‟ and is always willing to engage in 
anthropological and philosophical debate. On my first visit he almost seemed 
apologetic that he was a dentist and emphasised his childhood aspiration to be a 
philosopher – but that was not deemed economically plausible at the time of his 
university education. I was often questioned about the academic reputation of 
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Durham University, as his youngest son is currently at University College 
London. There seems to be some internal competition between him and his 
friends as to where their children are educated. This was brought to the fore 
when he asked for my opinion of a certain Scottish University that he was 
interested in transferring his son to. When I answered in a rather ambivalent 
way, he congratulated himself for not going through with the transfer. He has 
explicitly repeated that education is the primary mark of social status in his 
opinion – and this has to backed-up by a respectable job for, “it is not good to be 
like these kids you see on Asklipiou, returned from university in Athens but 
sitting drinking coffee all day until they are 35 (years old) and living off their 
father‟s money”. 
 
Dionisis and Eleuteria choose to holiday in cities such as London
201
. This line of 
questioning was selected so as continue one of many specific comparative lines 
between informants. Dionisis was quick to point out that he does not go to 
London as a tourist; “We like to see the real place … the real people … you do 
not get that in the tourist places. We like to sit in that park … what is it called … 
(I prompt him) ... ah, Hyde Park, yes. We take our lunch and a rug and sit there 
with all the local people … We also like the street markets; that is where we can 
find old English records that I like”. His emphasis on not being a tourist is 
because “these things do not interest us … we can go wherever we want, but we 
go there for the experience of the people, the culture, not because we have to 
impress our friends. We also love the Greek Islands. Why to go to Barbados 
when we can get on a boat and be in such a beautiful place, a unique place, 
within a few hours?” 
 
At this point I will refrain from any analysis of this case and proceed 




                                                 
201
 In the popular Greek filmography of the 1960s – the famous „Finos Films‟ – the offspring of 
Athenian aristocratic families are portrayed as having vacations or being educated in London, 
Paris or New York. 
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Eugenia, 60, was born in a village of nomos Trikalon after her parents – builders 
– moved from the village of Kalimera in Greek Macedonia in 1947. They 
moved due to the impact of the civil war in northern Greece and the increasing 
amount of kidnappings occurring in the mountainous regions. Additionally, and 
consequentially, there was more work available for her father in Thessaly
202
.  
She explains that the villages were relatively poor and the work was low paid, 
yet in the town there was enough work in order to support a family, although the 
levels of prestige were lower. This status was confirmed by the terrible 
conditions in which the family resided in Trikala upon their arrival. The 
parapigmata were small, cramped and often only made of corrugated iron and 
timber. Eugenia‟s father was a well respected and a popular man in the 
Macedonian village, an image that was enhanced by his wife who „worked like a 
man‟ along side him on the building projects as well as looking after a young 
family. She was respected publicly not because of her chastity or cultivation of 
shame, but because of a hard work ethic and the charismatic personality in both 
public and private realms. As a builder his reputation spread to surrounding 
villages and many of the stone houses he built are still inhabited in Kalimera
203
. 
Eugenia‟s extended family currently own five houses there, one of which is 
Eugenia‟s, her brother inherited the parents‟ house and Eugenia‟s daughter also 
has a house in the village, as do her cousins. All family members own at least 
one other property outside of Kalimera, primarily in the towns of Trikala and 
Kozani. This is not unusual for the migrants from the mountainous areas to 
urban centres such as Trikala. Houses – in various states of repair – are often 
retained in the „home‟ or „ancestral‟ villages. 
 
Eugenia‟s father built their first house in Trikala, which Angelos, her son, now 
inhabits with his young family. Eugenia herself chose to become a teacher in a 
local primary school after attending university in Athens. Her first husband was 
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 This can be equated to the „forced migration‟ as discussed in relation to generations by 
Loizos (2007). 
203
 Kalimera is now only seasonally inhabited apart from the one remaining goat herder, Aris, 
and his wife Toula. People left the village due to the civil war and to find work during the mid-
twentieth century. Most moved to one of the two closest large towns – Kozani and Trikala. 
Eugenia‟s extended family is split between these two towns, two hours apart. The village comes 
alive in the summer as the families return to spend their vacations and participate in the 
„Panιyirι‟ (a public religious or commercial celebration). Thus the village has become a vibrant 
„summer community‟ (cf. Hart 1992). 
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a French-educated academic who set up the first ever foreign language school in 
Trikala and her daughter obtained a doctorate in a British university. The job of 
her husband was very prestigious and he was a renowned scholar. His reputation 
was somewhat famous for his work in the school. The family name is still well 
known within Trikala. 
 
After the divorce, Eugenia had to take up multiple jobs in order to support her 
two young children as her ex-husband refused to make financial contributions. 
The refusal to make payments towards his children was in direct retaliation to 
Eugenia requesting a divorce. As well as working during the day as a teacher, 
she has been at intermittent times simultaneously; a travelling kitchen hardware 
(pots and pans) saleswoman, a weaver and seamstress, a part-time employee as 
what can be best described as an „odd-job tailor‟, and a paid babysitter (as well 
as other „seasonal‟ jobs when the school was on vacation). She tells me that she 
didn‟t even think about it, as she had two children and the children had needs; 
she had to work. Through doing such diverse work Eugenia started creating an 
extensive social network both in the town and the surrounding villages. Her 
skills as a seamstress were, and still are, admired and she gained much respect 
from the female contingent for raising two children on her own. 
 
In the mid-nineteen-nineties Eugenia remarried and moved to what is publicly 
perceived to be a wealthy suburb of Trikala, after having travelled around 
Europe with the regional choir and with her children grown up and living 
elsewhere. She had what can be described as a partially-arranged marriage to a 
retired tax-collector from a neighbouring village. As his job meant a lot of local 
travel, he was also well known in the area. They both have a good state pension, 
as both were dimosioi ipalliloi (public sector employees) but by no means have 
extensive monetary wealth. The wealth that has been accumulated has been 
more social capital than monetary. The reputation of her parents and her first 
husband helped raise the social profile of the family name. When coupled with 
the „good character‟ shown from the raising of two children – and the devoted 
care of her elderly parents who resided with her for ten years – and her social 
networks created through work, she is a publicly recognised and highly 
respected figure. Theodossopoulos notes in his study of a Greek Island 
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community that some people are „still treated with high respect‟ within the 
community for „noble‟ acts that were carried out forty years ago – in his case it 
was the selling-off of plots of land at low prices to local people, a respectable 
act that showed good character (2000:62). In a similar vain Eugenia‟s profile is 
partially based on the public recognition of her good character. 
 
Eugenia is still very socially active. Because she is a recognised figure within 
the local communities, people contact her when they need to communicate with 
members of her family or friends. She does all the manual and physical work for 
the immediate family, more so than her husband or her son. She organises all 
public rendezvous and deals with the builders and business men and is the 




Her social networks spread through family and friends so as to incorporate 
regular favours and preferential treatment from surgeons in Thessaloniki, local 
dentists, the education authorities and architects. Her cousin is a surgeon, 
another cousin‟s husband is a dentist, her close friends are involved with the 
education authorities and her family name is renowned in the building trade. 
When asked, Eugenia says that she values a good character and a good 
education as the most important things to be respected. These are her 
understandings of social values that demarcate status. This has been underlined 
in practice by the funding of her daughter to complete a Ph.D. in Britain which 
has caused her to make personal sacrifices in terms of material possessions. This 
in return has enhanced Eugenia‟s social status – she takes much pride in her 
daughter‟s education and now takes much satisfaction in saying that her 
daughter is a lecturer in Britain – who however insists that this was not her 
original motive. The most important thing, she argues, is that her daughter will 
now be economically secure. This reiterates Friedl‟s observations that economic 
security and the level of education required for the occupation are paramount to 
notions of social status (1976:365, Kirtsoglou 2004:127). Her own economic 
situation is affected by the fact that she is contributing highly to the repayment 
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 I have found from my female informants that often their friendships and „connections‟ get 
utilised for personal ends to a similar extent to that of the men. Men often seem „bored‟ to ask 
friends for favours or to employ their services as a patronage utility, yet women such as Eugenia 
are often very forthcoming when utilising their contacts. 
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of her step-son‟s credit card loans, as her second husband has contributed to his 
step-daughter‟s foreign education. The step-son, 45 years old and working in 
Athens, has a good job, drives a sports car and is unmarried. Eugenia replied 
that he cannot afford his own repayments so they assist him. Here I remember 
the story about Andreas, Eugenia‟s brother, his loans, the threats of the bank and 
Eugenia „bailing him out‟ just before he went bankrupt and his house was 
repossessed. However, the „loan‟ from Eugenia to Andreas was always 
promised to be repaid immediately, yet years passed and Eugenia was lending 
him more and more money. Eugenia agreed with her second husband that they 
should financially support their children whenever possible. The reputation of 
the family can be enhanced or decreased according to the activities of the 
children. 
 
In both ethnographic cases (Dionisis and Eugenia) the externalisation of 
understandings of social status is not outwardly material but focused on 
education and employment. This is more than mere rhetoric; it is an ideological 
position built on generations of cultivating reputation and social networks. 





Dionisis understands the collective emphasis of he and his parea on education 
as an indicator of status „natural‟ as all his friends are of similar professional 
dispositions and deem this route best for their children. This means that whilst 
financially supporting his children‟s education, he will not concede to all 
favours requested by his immediate kin. In one conversation he actually checked 
with me the living costs of a student in London to make sure that he was not 
giving his son too much financial aid. He insists that materialism is secondary 
and does not in itself bring social prestige. Such goods are more for internal 
consumption than external competition (although the loci of competitiveness do 
lie elsewhere). He often seems to deliberately distance himself from such 
competitive consumerism. This could be because his family has built up a 
reputation over generations through other means, and the participation in 
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 Scholars such as Lisón-Tolosana (1966) have suggested that in a Mediterranean context the 
„possession‟ that marked social status would usually be land. 
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tournaments of consumerism was not a necessary, or desired, route to status. 
Dionisis further encases the decision in a rhetoric of moral justification. 
 
Over time, the entry of new generations into Eugenia‟s world has caused 
inevitable changes in the familial organisation and economic priorities. Eugenia 
went against the perceived norm for a woman of her generation by taking 
multiple jobs outside of the house. She has now received much social credit for 
this. She has found that her socio-economic position is such as to be able to fund 
the education of her daughter abroad, a significant status symbol for the „upper 
section‟ of the Trikalinoi. The „customary limits‟, to use Lisón-Tolosana‟s term, 
of both education and employment have changed over the generations. Eugenia 
enjoys telling people of her daughter‟s educational activities and always plays 
the uninformed and subordinate role in relation to the knowledge of her 
daughter. She has come from a humble but well respected background and has 
developed the educational background of her family members – first she went to 
university in Athens to complete a degree, her husband went to France to be 
educated up to Masters level and now her daughter has a doctorate in England. 
This has been accomplished by the allocation of money away from explicit 
materialism and towards the funding of education, a difference in the 
prioritisation of capital investment. If we follow Lisón-Tolosana‟s line of 
thought then such a movement towards education is as much a „generational‟ 
feature as it is a element of „mobility‟ (1966:193-195, Kirtsoglou 2004:127). 
Eugenia was „direct heir‟ (Lisón-Tolosana 1966:198) to the reputation and 
social position of her father, which was consolidated and cultivated and 
consequentially her daughter has become „direct heir‟ to the social and 






Concerning how people construct status over a period of at least three 
generations, we can consider the case of Christina. Her case demonstrates how 
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 In the context of central Spain, Lisón-Tolosana notes that the „style of living‟ of those 
educated at university and thus with a „prestige-bearing profession‟ is radically different from 
that of previous generations (1966:199). 
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generational status and mobility is intertwined with ever-changing and 
expanding modes or „passages‟ to assist mobility over time. 
 
Christina, 39, is a beautician who owns a small salon in the centre of Trikala and 
close friend of Maro, the hairdresser. Due to both women working in the 
„beauty‟ business of Trikala they constantly feed each other‟s clientele with new 
customers. Christina is divorced and lives in an adequate three bedroom flat just 
off the main street, Asklipiou, with her two teenage sons. Her locale is 
considered rather prestigious. Her grandparents worked the fields on the 
outskirts of Trikala as hired labourers and were themselves relatively 
unambitious in terms of employment, but were highly revered for their hard 
work ethic and ability to support adequately their two children. They were 
uneducated past their early childhood. Christina puts this down to the equivalent 
in English as „the sign of the times‟207. Christina‟s parents were also employed 
manually (her mother assisted her father) but, thanks to a small inheritance on 
her mother‟s side and the relative economic stability of the 1960s, they were 
able to become self-employed and set up a small carpentry business based in a 
village just 5 kilometres outside of Trikala. 
 
“They both worked very hard and all the business came from word of 
mouth. The friends – even the former employers – of my grandparents 
would give them work when they needed a carpenter.” 
 
Based on the good reputation of the grandparents, the next generation were 
given opportunities to get the business up on its feet. 
 
“When people saw the quality of work and passed on his (Christina's 
father‟s) name to others, my father realised that the business was 
viable. In order to support his children and his elderly parents he was 
taking on bigger projects, working with my mother … some were even 
commissioned by the local council. He eventually specialised in 
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 In her 1960s ethnographic account of Vasilika, in rural Greece, Friedl notes that it is believed 
that „rational judgement‟ cannot be formed through formal academic education (1962:85). 
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building children‟s playgrounds in the villages of the area … that one 
in Livadi, he worked on that too”. 
 
From an early age it was obvious that Christina was a talented athlete. Her 
parents sent her to extra training sessions at the municipal stadium with 
aspirations of their daughter going to the Department of Sports Science in 
Thessaloniki. Unfortunately Christina did not acquire the sufficient grades to go 
to the academy so, after gaining the correct certificate, she set herself up as a 
travelling beautician. She recalls;  
 
“My father especially was very upset that I didn‟t quite make the 
grade. But personally I was not so disappointed. I was already hired as 
an assistant to work next to one of the best beauticians in Trikala. The 
customers liked me and I came to like to the job. When I decided after 
some years to go out on my own my father did not hesitate to give me 
the money necessary. He even supplied a lot of the first customers – 
family, friends … I am happy with my life now, but I do wonder what 
would have happened if I had kept up the athletics and went to 
Thessaloniki”. 
 
In 2005 an opportunity came up for Christina to purchase her own salon in the 
centre of Trikala. Apart from Christina‟s parents, this enterprise was aided by a 
European Union grant to encourage new small private businesses (my mechanic 
friend Angelos, hairdresser Maro, and Stella, the travel agent, have received 
similar government grants to help set up their own businesses). The money is 
paid in 3,000 euro instalments, twice a year for three years and comes from a 
European Union led scheme to encourage the establishment of small 
businesses
208. Christina‟s last instalment was due in May 2008 and she is 
already being subsidised by her father and maintenance payments from her ex-
husband. Christina‟s beauty salon is currently making approximately 1100 euros 
profit a month, “which is a respectable salary in Trikala”. She has built a 
significant customer base, but informs me that „passing trade‟ is almost non-
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 In some cases there is an additional initial payment of 20,000 euros to fund the purchase of 
the shop space and first product lines. 
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existent, even in the town centre; it is all based on a word of mouth, friends of 
friends basis and previous attempts at local advertising have turned into 
substantial financial losses. Christina‟s aspirations for her children are for them 
both to be university educated, preferably in England. Her eldest is due to start 
in Thessaloniki this year (2010). Indeed, Christina herself has recently attended 
the state school for blind people in order to be trained to teach blind and 
partially-sighted students. 
 
Christina, herself 70 per cent blind in one eye, was accepted on a one year 
programme. She was trained in reading in brail, computing for blind people and 
teaching languages. After her graduation, and public quota allowing, she could 
be hired as a civil servant in a position on the local council. She believes that 
this would have been a good alternative had her work failed to support her and 
her children financially, especially during the economic crisis. 
 
In Christina‟s case, generational social mobility has been rather slow, yet 
irrefutably „the family‟ has acquired upwards social mobility over the period of 
seventy years albeit still in the same social section. From paid labourers to self-
employed unskilled labourers to petty entrepreneurs, facilitated at first by 
personal contacts providing a clientele and secondly by the development of 
different channels for available investment capital. Christina‟s children will 
most probably both go to university. Her eldest is already enquiring to British 
universities as to the qualifications required to be accepted for a Masters degree, 
although Christina is now concerned with how she will fund his education. 
Small government contracts given to tradesmen, such as Christina‟s father, 
allow for political networks to be built up and for reputation to be enhanced 
occupationally (Colclough 1992:66). Governmental and European Union grants 
given in times of prosperity have become essential to providing livelihoods to 
members of the lower section of society with entrepreneurial tendencies. The 
small businesses are often economically insecure and require a pre-existing 
network of potential clientele and additional funding from family members. The 
availability of the grants means that competition between similar businesses in 
the town is fierce. Yet such external funding is potentially a very efficient route 
to sustainable social mobility. 
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As an explicit account of generational status and mobility relating to this 
narrative, one of the most detailed works in a contemporary Mediterranean 
context is that of Yanagisako in Como, North Italy. In her most significant 
generational narratives, some informant‟s families had gone from sharecroppers 
to one of the top twenty elite families in the silk industry (2002:42). This was 
achieved by the continuous reinvestment of limited financial assets. One such 
„decisive break‟ in the family history is the founding of a self-employed 
business rather than working for someone else. This certainly resonates with 
Christina‟s narrative; she altogether enjoys being her own boss. In this situation 
if one does not work in the public sector
209
 then self-employment in the urban 
context is always preferable to other forms of manual labour as it is understood 
as an indicator of both social prestige and upwards mobility. 
 
Although it could never be claimed that Christina‟s family have reached the 
pinnacle of social prestige in Trikala – they are not local aristocracy (cf. Faubion 
1993), nor have they reached beyond their social section – on many criteria they 
have advanced their social positioning; the ownership of positional goods such 
as their own home and business in good neighbourhoods, some plush 
furnishings, the ability to educate oneself and one‟s children – Christina 
eventually managed to somehow educate herself and has aspirations for her 
children to be university educated – and a small, yet quite sufficient disposable 
income. 
 
Family aspirations play a role in generational mobility. Every parent of my 
informants always had higher aspirations for their children, and often material 
goods and more “comfortable ways of life” were sacrificed for the benefit of the 
                                                 
209
 A joke on the very popular satirical show Al-Tsadiri News, hosted by a son of Thessaly, 
Lakis Lazopoulos, highlighted the „perks‟ of being employed in the public sector: 
 
„There was a Chinaman, an American and a Greek. 
The Chinaman told of how, back in China, the roads were so good that his father, who works so 
far away, can be home within one hour and sat down eating dinner. 
The American said, “bah, this is nothing. My father works much further away and within 30 
minutes he can be home and sat down eating dinner”. 
The Greek said, “well, my father works in the public sector. He finishes work at 2pm and he is 
home eating dinner at 1pm”.‟ 
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children (cf. Friedl 1976, Davis 1977:32, Argyrou 1996:36, Just 2000:70-71). 
This is pertinent throughout the ethnography of Greece and goes beyond 
rhetorics of competitive suffering (Faubion 1993:189, also Davis 1977). The 
aspirations of ambitious parents are a recurring theme throughout the 
ethnographic cases and especially after the 1960s this is often manifested 
through the desire for education. Education is often seen as a way past the hard 
work of the fields (Lisón-Tolosana 1966:89, Friedl 1976, Just 2000:71). 
 
According to Friedl (1976:364) in Vasilika, rural Greece, people are always 
“striving for the improvement of the conditions of life for one‟s children”. 
Furthermore, the nuclear family believed that collective resources should be 
manipulated towards that goal; “The major criterion for improvement was 
movement upward in a rank order of occupations” (ibid.). This is exactly what 
happened in Christina‟s case. In the context of Vasilika – and very similarly in 
Trikala – “the ranking was based on a combination of the level of education 
required for the occupation, the opportunities for security and advancement it 
afforded, and the consumption standards that the income from it could support” 
(ibid.). Many of these criteria still hold true today; especially the pooling of 
family resources and the desirable occupation:education ratio. In contemporary 
Trikala the routes to such realisations have been complemented by new passages 
such as governmental and European Union grants and bank loans. Additionally, 
Argyrou argues, during the mid-twentieth century skilled craftsmen started to 
rise higher on the socio-economic scale and the occupations of carpenter, 
builder, mechanic, became „professions‟. In contrast the „unskilled labourers‟, 
shepherds and cultivators were dropping towards the lowest strata of society
210
. 
This led to a “recasting of the occupational structure” (Lisón-Tolosana 
1966:123). 
 
Another informant, Ioanna, 28, described to me her father‟s aspirations for her 
to “either become a doctor or university professor, anything with good money 
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 According to Argyrou, the primary route for social mobility at this time was a high-school 
education (1996:34-35, cf. Lisón-Tolosana 1966:59, Colclough 1992:64-65). 
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and social prestige … or at least join the family business211”. When she dropped 
out of university and stated that she wanted to set up a retail outlet in Trikala, 
her father refused to listen to her suggestions for six years whilst she was told to 
“look for a respectable husband instead” (cf. Lisón-Tolosana 1966:82-83, Friedl 
1976:365). After a lot of serious pressure from Ioanna, her father eventually 
gave in and matched the amount of the government grant in order to buy a shop 
space and set up the business. The money he gave her was what he had saved 
whilst working in Germany during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1950s and 1960s 
Greece much emigration was of a temporary nature, and a common source for 
the investment of savings made while working abroad was in a shop, which was 
often in the emigrant‟s home town or village (Bennison 1979:452). “Now he 
couldn‟t be prouder”, Ioanna insists. “I, for my part, am happy for doing what I 
intended to do and earning a respectable income. I am known in the business 
world of Trikala and I often travel to Thessaloniki and Athens and once a year 
to London to in be informed for the latest fashion trends”.  
 
In both Ioanna‟s and Christina‟s case, the father‟s aspirations had unfortunately 
„escaped from reality‟ (Lisón-Tolosana 1966:356). Nevertheless, both women 
managed to craft for themselves a social space within which they enjoy the 
status of the self-made professional woman. They managed successfully to build 
upon the resources put in place by their parents and thus step up on the social 
ladder. 
 
A Further Note on Education 
 
Education as it relates to occupation has been understood as a central aspect in 
the discussion of social status and mobility in Greece by anthropologists such as 
Friedl
212
. The roots of contemporary social status and mobility in many parts of 
rural Greece can be traced back to the periods immediately before and after the 
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 In a British context Bell (1994:35) notes that the money spent on education is one of the key 




. The increasing social value of a good education over the 
“unquestioned acceptance of the agricultural and pastoral life” (du Boulay 
1974:248) coincided with changing farming conditions and an altered 
conceptualisation of self-interest. According to Friedl the possibilities for 
improving one‟s conditions of living are enhanced by education (1976:364-365). 
In the same vein, one‟s possibilities for enhancing social status are also 
improved and the „standards of living‟ are affected by the diverse social 
networks formed through education, as discussed in Eugenia‟s narrative. Loizos 
notes that many parents will emphasise the security of professional career 
choices, just as their parents did to them (2007:3), an element that is less likely 
to be stressed among the less educated „lower-section‟. 
 
Yannis‟ family status has come a long way relatively quickly – especially when 
compared to Christina above. He has achieved a position of power and influence 
from the origins of a building contractor. His father had the money but he did 
not receive the social recognition that Yannis enjoys due to his education, 
profession, a good marriage, successful children and implication in politics. His 
father‟s214 aspirations have, it seems, been surpassed. It became a recurring 
theme that the elite families of the town, or those striving for significant 
upwards mobility through education, have always sought to distinguish 
themselves in terms of university qualifications (Kirtsoglou 2004:128). Until 
recently, a university education has been “the pinnacle of esteem and repute” 
(Lisón-Tolosana 1966:81, Faubion 1993, Mitchell 2002). Indeed, in 1960s 
central Greece, any education
215
 beyond the secondary school allowed for a 
greater chance of secure employment as there were few „eligibles with 
university or higher education training‟ (Argyriades 1968, Friedl 1976:368, 
Colclough 1992:61, Pardo 1996:74). This line was echoed by Argyrou in 
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 According to Layton (2000:260), social change in many European contexts started before the 
Second World War, thus anthropologists must go beyond the usual historical boundary of 
placing change as a result of the upheaval of the 1940s. Many social processes of change were 
„deferred‟ by the Second World War (2000:267, on the issue see also Vaughan, Kolinsky and 
Sheriff 1980). 
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 „The father‟ is referred to throughout this text as this is the term most frequently used by my 
informants. 
215
 Just notes how members of the extended family may provide money towards the education of 
children (2000:176). Alternatively, parents could emigrate ahead of their children in order 
qualify for residency and therefore the subsidised „foreign‟ education of their offspring (Just 
1991:119). 
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Cyprus; “Education, not land, had now become the most valuable asset” 
(Argyrou 1996:35)
216
. Hence people with university education from this period 
have more social status than those with a similar education gained more 
recently. 
 
Faubion argues that schooling is “the catalyst of social mobility” and one of the 
securest means of “procuring social and symbolic “dignity”” and power. He 
states that the petty bourgeois go to enormous lengths in „seeing to‟ the 
education of their children. This is linked to the „economy of distinction‟ present 
in the capitalist context (1993:59). 
 
Yet often education had to be complemented with circles of friends with inside 
information on job vacancies. This was a time consuming process for many 
students who went to study and later reside in another city, such as Athens, as 
they had no pre-existing contacts (Friedl 1976:368-369). This again stresses the 
importance of constructing social position over generations. By the time that the 
second generation migrated to the same city for educational purposes, the first 
generation, who had by now settled into life in Athens, “were sufficiently well 
placed to have information about superior schooling and housing, and eventually 
have access through contacts to better jobs” (Friedl 1976:380, Argyrou 1996:35, 
also Davis 1977, Pardo 1996). According to Friedl this insured upward mobility 
because as well as these recent connections, the money sent back to the family 
from the first generation also allowed for more money to be put into the 
livelihood of the next generation (1976:380). This means that, in Davis‟ terms, 
„prestige is achieved in their native communities‟ as well (1977:30). This was 
demonstrated in the case of Eugenia whose daughter received her doctorate from 
a British university. 
 
Just notes that during the 1980s, young male Meganisiots were receiving a 
tertiary education in Athens on the proceeds of their father‟s employment in the 
merchant marine (2000:71). The generational „progress‟ in occupation was 
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 In a different ethnographic context, that of Sri Lanka, Stirrat notes that education as a route to 
social mobility in the 1960s was often „unattractive‟. This was due to the high levels of 
unemployment in the „educated youth‟ and the low incomes of the middle classes (1989:110). 
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acknowledged by Just‟s informants who stated that; „first we were 
agriculturalists; then we were sailors; now the young people are educated‟ 
(ibid.). Just argues that this different occupational and educational structure 
allowed the young generation access to “those social (rather than strictly 
economic) means of reproducing and consolidating advantage” (ibid.). 
However, he goes on to say that such opportunities eventually allow the 
individual to break away from a strictly generational formation of social status 
(ibid.). 
 
University education in Greece is free
217
 and has become the norm for all cross-
sections of society (Faubion 1993:189). Thus it is seen as a state responsibility 
and as long as the correct grades are gained, a university place is guaranteed 
(ibid.). If sufficient grades are not obtained for the top universities in Athens and 
Thessaloniki, then other universities in Greece usually accept the students
218
. 
Thus university education is available on a mass scale. Recently, in order to 
distinguish oneself, one must obtain either a undergraduate degree from a 
foreign – preferably British, French or US – university or, as is most common, 
go abroad to gain a Masters or Ph.D. Foreign education is far more expensive 
and, the argument goes, of a higher quality, thus the „pinnacle of esteem and 
repute‟ can be recaptured. Faubion also suggests that; “Greeks who receive their 
educations at the University of Athens typically acquire less social and cultural 
capital with their degrees than those who receive their educations even at 
relatively undistinguished universities abroad” (1993:189). The situation with 
university qualifications in Greece and the wider Balkan region where many 
Greeks go to study has been stigmatised further by instances of people „buying‟ 
degrees from institutions without attending or passing the course. Thus, on two 
bases – that of social prestige and on the practicality of distinguishing oneself in 
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 As of 2010 there has been much talk concerning the privatisation of higher education in 
Greece. The topic was reduced to a political sub-text with the onset of the current economic 
crisis. 
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 According to Faubion, education is more „distinguished‟ in Athens, to the inevitable 
disadvantage of provincials (1993:189). 
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 Piault‟s ethnographic film „My Family and Me‟ (1983), based in Ano Ravenia, Epirus, 
Greece, captures conflicting ideologies regarding the best way one can earn a respectable 
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According to Lisón-Tolosana, 
 
“A man who has received higher education enjoys the highest esteem and social 
status. The superior knowledge of anyone with a degree is recognised not only in his 
specific field of study but in all spheres of knowledge and activity … other reasons 
why a career implies superior social position are the comforts, style of living, 
manners and speech that go with it. In this aspect of the educated man the relation to 
wealth also appears” (1966:91-92). 
 
Social position is then often a combination of education plus x. The „style of 
living‟ can be imitated, as in the case of Andreas and Katerina above, yet the 
„wealth‟ is not sustainable. A distinguished education, as in the case of the 
doctor, will usually be required in order to have a respectable career to support 
such expenditure. Likewise, an education may not be enough without social 
networks (Friedl 1976). 
 
Thus the priority of a distinguished education must be emphasised here, as what 
constitutes a high education is constantly changing; once it was a high-school 
education, today it is at least a Masters degree in most cases. This is what 
Faubion terms „the economy of distinction‟ and in a capitalist context this is 
world-systemic (1993:59). A distinguished education in turn often results in 
more affluent, influential and prestigious forms of employment. This allows 
access to a diverse pool of social and political contacts, which can be added to, 
erased and utilised over time. 
 
Education brings prestige to the whole family. It is the focus of social status and 
mobility in Trikala and thus the centre of many parent‟s attention. The prestige 
received by the distinguished education and resultant occupation outside of the 
                                                                                                                                            
livelihood. In Trikala, such ideologies have recently been replaced with the prioritisation of 
university education over „systemisation‟. In Piault‟s film a dialogue ensues between a teacher 
and the shepherd father of one of her students. Whilst the teacher advocates a good education as 
to furthering one‟s livelihood, the father insists that „connections with the right people‟ is the 
only way for the child to succeed in life. Both opinions are well grounded in the actor‟s own 
experiences of life in rural Greece. 
 
Slightly conversely, in the context of Spain Lisón-Tolosana states that if a schoolmaster informs 
a father that his son “would make a good student”, the family would “spare no effort or sacrifice 
so that he can study” to get a position in the city, or at least not in the country, although he does 
no suggest how this is best achieved (1966:17). 
 
 320 
patron-client networks of the town is directly conveyed to the whole family. It is 
often certain that an overseas-educated graduate will find employment in Athens 
or remain overseas to match their level of education. This is also imperative in 
order to achieve higher levels of status and mobility (Just 2000:77). There are 
however individuals who return to Trikala to be inserted into prepared positions 
often organised by their fathers. The education is always linked to the ability for 
good parenting and the financial investment in the children. In the past, strategic 
decisions had to be made in order to accommodate post-gymnasium education. 
As this has become commonplace, postgraduate studies in foreign universities 
have become imperative for social distinction. The financial strains of foreign 
education are well publicised by Trikalinoi but can provide social mobility for 
the whole family rather than simply the individual (cf. du Boulay 1974:254). 
This phenomenon is exacerbated by the nigh absolute investment of only family 
capital into higher education. Although loans for university have been advertised 
over the past ten years, not once in my seven year association with Trikala have 
I heard of anybody paying for foreign university education through government 
loans or private grants. Sometimes small bank loans are taken to subsidise living 
costs of children studying in Athens, but the domain of foreign (usually 
postgraduate) education is related to the upper sections of society or those 
realistically striving toward it. Hence all foreign higher education is self-funded. 
The consequences of economic austerity and financial uncertainty in 
contemporary Trikala will seriously affect the number of students able to study 
abroad, further adding to the great worry of parents concerning the cost and 
competitiveness of education (Hart 1992:73). 
 
The Consequences of Crisis 
 
With the onset of economic crisis in 2008-2009 the difference in perceptions of 
social status were underlined. Much status among the lower section of society 
proved not to be sustainable during the economic downturn. The first sign of 
this was on the streets of Trikala around Asklipiou and in the accountancy books 
of small businesses. As the mass media began to focus on global recession there 
was an observable downturn in the amount of shopping bags passing up and 
down the central commercial streets. Stella‟s travel agents experienced a sharp 
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downturn in exotic holiday bookings with people preferring to holiday either on 
Greek Islands accessible by coach or simply in the coastal resorts of Thessaly. 
She believes that she may be facing closure by the end of 2010 when her grant 
expires if she cannot diversify further. Angelos stopped importing his exclusive 
car parts and now complains about the queues for petrol which regularly block 
the entrance to his garage. The tournaments of consumerism still take place but 
on a more subtle scale – the cars are still present, yet not in such great numbers. 
As with crises that have gone before, economic activity has been checked as 
uncertainty concerning the future sets in. Extravagant consumerism is 
observably down in Trikala whilst people take stock of the emerging situation. It 
feels as though people are waiting to see what will happen next; although 
patience is already starting to wane. 
 
The indiscriminate bank loans were one of the first things to stop. Both from the 
perspective of the banks and the clients, high-risk loans were no longer an 
option. When loans could not be immediately repaid many possessions were 
repossessed and on rare occasions courts proceedings were instigated. This route 
to social status has for the time being been curtailed. The general reliance of the 
lower section of society on material consumption and observable wealth to 
maintain social status was not sustainable. Where people have already purchased 
valuable items such as clothes or jewellery these are still displayed and rarely 
sold. If money is needed desperately then family networks are called upon to 
provide financial assistance. 
 
Another aspect severely affecting social status among the lower section is 
unemployment. Cutbacks in the highly inflated public sector have left many 
people without a job. One informant, Takis, 45, lost his job working for a 
telecommunications company when approximately 100 people were laid-off. 
Due to his lack of political connections, he tells me, the only option was to share 
a taxi shift with his best friend (who was already a taxi driver). “It was this or 
return to the fields … I have to put the food on the table (for my family)”. 
Disposable income is now widely valued as better invested in bank accounts (or 
in one case under the bed in a tin) than worn on the back or being driven. 
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Some consequences of the economic crisis resonate with the stock market crash 
of 1999-2000 when over 100 billion euro were lost by small-scale investors, 
only this time many Trikalinoi find it hard to see any light at the end of the 
tunnel. The crisis was almost as unexpected as the stock market crash, but the 
consequences even more widespread. As Simmel aptly puts it „society changes 
but men remain‟ (1978:353), even more striking when considering that the 
people to lose out on the stock market were the same to be most severely 
affected by government austerity during the economic crisis. 
 
In the upper section of society the economic crisis has had a more limited effect. 
Although expenditure is now restricted and Dionisis the dentist decided to visit 
London once in 2009 rather than the usual two or three times, the upper section 
has been less affected by unemployment and austerity. The majority do not have 
significant bank loans to repay and the intricate socio-political networks built up 
over generations have become a safety net to avoid the devastating 
consequences of austerity measures. When jobs have been threatened then often 
the ability to acquire favours from politicians and business managers has meant 
that family jobs remain secure whilst other people have been made redundant. 
 
Where the upper section has been significantly affected is with continuing to 
fund their children that are studying abroad. This is once place where the global 
recession has really impacted the local community. Among my informants, all 
children studying abroad were funded by their parents and grandparents. Usually 
the amount of money provided was far above the basic living costs of the 
students – meaning tuition fees, accommodation and food. The amount of 
money that people like Dionisis or Eugenia allocate to their children studying 
abroad has drastically fallen as fear and uncertainty sets in to all sections of 
Trikalini society. It is generally considered that relative living costs are rising as 
a result of the government austerity measures in Greece and that no investment 
is now completely secure. Dionisis has asked his son “to be careful with the 
money … don‟t buy so many books from Amazon, go to the library instead”. He 
has told his son on many occasions that “things are not like they were here, may 
be we can‟t secure you a job on your return … we have to be careful with our 
investments”. The localised consequences of the Greek economic crisis are 
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coupled with higher relative living costs and unemployment in the host countries 
such as Britain and France where most Trikalinoi foreign students study. Thus 
the financial strain is at the liberty of the economic policy of at least two 
national governments and many more institutions. Hart notes in her ethnography 
set in the Peloponnese that “the cost and competitiveness of education is a great 
worry to parents” with the rewards of education depending on the current 
economic situation (1992:73). With the cost of university education in Britain 
set to rise further, the long-term consequences for foreign education remains to 
be seen. 
 
Dionisis‟ stance also reflects the loss of confidence in socio-political networks. 
The national economic situation is understood to be very serious – it is often the 
only topic on all news broadcasts – and the influence of local contacts is now 
considered as unreliable at best. The intervention of the European Union and the 
IMF has put pressure on the national government to reform. This pressure has 
consequences further down the political line and there is a feeling among small 
businesses and the public sector employers in Trikala that everyone must first 
look after themselves and their immediate family. Hence Dionisis warns his son 
that there may be difficulties in finding him a job upon his return. 
 
As alluded to, the local economic situation is much more explicitly linked to the 
national political crisis and the global economic circumstances in the 
experiences of the upper section of Trikalini society. Small and medium 
businesses are affected by global trends and national policies and the decline in 
overt material consumption on both the local and sometimes transnational level 
resonates through their businesses. In this respect some of the upper section rely 
on the sustained consumption patterns of the lower section in order to facilitate 
their regular income. 
 
Generational status has passed through many eras of prosperity and crisis since 
the break up of the ciftliks during the agricultural reforms, through geographical 
displacement and political asceticism. Where generational status is still in its 
early stages the economic situation is more uncertain. Often it depends on what 
bases early-stage generational status, and mobility, is based on – education and 
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social investment or solely financial ventures. The latter often have more limited 
alternative financial and social resources to draw upon. Conversely, Nikos, the 
large land and property owner who played the stock markets (chapter four), was 
a member of „the high society‟ in Trikala due to family association before he 
began to invest his family‟s wealth. After the sudden crash he was still widely 
regarded as belonging to the upper section of society, despite having gone 
bankrupt and losing most of his property. Thus it is apparent that economic 
fluctuations can have severe consequences on individuals‟ financial 
circumstances without necessarily altering social status. In the lower sections of 
society, the inability to participate in unconcealed material consumption 
automatically relegates social status.  
 
Fear, worry and despair of the current economic situation transcend social 
boundaries. Here the collectivity is at its strongest. Fuelled by the mass media 
and overtones of nationalism, all sections of Trikalini society despair over the 
crisis and the perceived persecution of the Greek population by the national 
government, the very wealthy (usually referred to as „Athens‟) and the European 
Community. The circulation of blame toward these actors runs throughout the 
cross-section of society. Feelings are homogeneously expressed in public, as is 
sympathy for „the Greek people‟ and anger towards those in power who are not 
brought to justice. Hence historical events such as the Great Famine are recalled 
in order to evoke the collective suffering. Such notions unite both the upper and 
lower sections of society, even when the consequences of crisis are subjectively 
experienced. Thus, although the economic crisis has affected the routes to status 
in very different ways, often the public accounts of the crisis are very similar. 
 
Previous shifts from prosperity to crises and back again have led to alterations in 
how social status is perceived on the local level. In the 1950s ownership of land 
and livestock was seen as culturally desirable and provided a great deal of status 
(du Boulay 1974:248). This was especially the case after the peasant uprisings 
and the creation of wide scale private property and the later land repossessions 
by the Germans during the Second World War. These two events meant that 
land was an incredibly valuable social asset. With the liberalisation of markets 
and increased access to global ideals of material prestige, from the early 1990s 
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onwards land owners were not considered of high status among any section of 
society. The lower section based status on consumerist materialism and 
conspicuous monetary wealth, the upper section primarily on socio-political 




Panayiotis, in his mid-thirties from the village of Pyli near Trikala was courting 
a girl from Larisa for over two years. Panayiotis owns 200 stremata of land and 
was financially very secure (1 stremma = ¼ acre). The girl, Litsa, was persuaded 
that Panayiotis was not a respectable husband as he was uneducated. Litsa‟s 
father was a schoolmaster and her mother a philology teacher. They had little 
money and only a few material possessions. However both parents were 
educated at university level and believed that they would one day have access to 
the aristocracy of Larisa. Panayiotis even built a new house on his land to 
demonstrate that Litsa would be well provided for, yet Litsa was eventually 
persuaded not to marry him. As Hart states in 1992 the general perception was 
that a life of farming should be escaped from by all means (Hart 1992:71). 
Indeed, by the mid-nineteen-sixties Friedl listed „unskilled farm work‟ on small 
plots of land at the very bottom of the hierarchy of occupations (employment 
requiring post-gymnasium education was at the top, jobs such as lawyers, 
doctors and university professors) (1976:365, Hart 1992:77). This couplet taken 
from Argyrou‟s work in Cyprus highlights the significance of marrying an 
educated partner with the promise of secure employment and the common 




“I don‟t want him mother, 
the dirty shepherd, 
I want a lawyer 
or an office employee” (1996:35). 
 
In current times of economic crisis such security is highly desirable and I 
suggest that such individuals as Panayiotis will begin to regain some social 
                                                 
220
 According to Lawrence, the opening up of European markets offered the opportunity for 
Greeks to escape “the forms of class and gender domination that characterized postwar society. 
Many rural Greeks perceived an opportunity to subvert the old structures of patronage and 
dependency that had locked them into chronic underdevelopment” (2007:89). 
221
 According to Sant Cassia and Bada, in nineteenth century Athens, marriage did not signify 
„the capture of economic power‟ or „a vehicle for social mobility‟. It was more a „demonstration 
of having arrived economically‟ and having a „morally safe urban lifestyle‟ (1992:55). 
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status, and once again become marriage material. As people experience the “less 
happy sides” of capitalist materialism more social value may return to 
livelihoods such as agriculture (ibid.). As du Boulay states, “land … is immortal 
– it cannot die, it is always a secure investment” (1974:250). The same logic 
applies for public sector workers. With more redundancies in this sector the 
employment positions will become rarer. This scarcity could, I propose, have 
two alternative effects on the status of this post. Either public sector jobs will 
rise in status due to scarcity and the declining inclination for employers to 
allocate unnecessary new positions simply to accommodate family and friends, 
or the placements will no longer be considered as secure due to the amount of 
mass redundancies. In the case of the latter, other forms of employment may 
become more socially desirable, such as landholding. 
 
Panayiotis is not alone in finding it difficult to marry due to shifting notions of 
social status. Another informant, Petros, 39, owns over 200 stremata of land 
near Trikala plus an assortment of livestock. Despite being a relatively 
handsome (and financially secure if not extravagant) gentleman he cannot find a 
wife; “people don‟t want an agriculturalist … working the land when another 
man could be taking them out for coffee on Asklipiou”222. 
 
Economic crisis has had significant impacts on perceptions of social status in 
Trikala as well as the ability participate in competitions for status; especially 
with respect to tournaments of consumerism and foreign education. However, 
many aspects of how status is altered by the current crisis remains to be seen. 
For example, there is currently little sign of any dramatic shift in values among 
either section as to what constitutes social status. The general feeling is one of 
suspended liminality. There are some clues from crises past concerning how 
status values may or may not change, such as the loss of all property not being 
terminal to the status of some people in the upper section of society and the 
                                                 
222
 Hart notes that „farming women‟ in the Peloponnese do not go to the village square to eat 
souvlakia at the taverns in the evenings. This is considered the arena of the „big ladies‟; women 
who have moved to Athens and exhibit a great deal of self-regard. The issue is treated with 
much sarcasm by the villagers (1992:75). According to du Boulay, in the 1970s a farming man 
could not even “gain a relative prestige from his fellow villagers” (1974:251). She goes on to 
say that rural villagers cannot compete with their „civilized‟ counterparts who can “dress up and 
sit in a café „like a human being‟” (ibid.:253). 
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shifting perceptions of status as associated to forms of employment. For socio-
economic value can only be gauged by the terms of the present day, thus are 
liable to change (du Boulay 1974:251). It is fascinating to note that despite the 
consequences being diverse and manifold throughout the cross-section of 
society, the public rhetoric surrounding the effects of crisis is harmonious. A 
collective outward projection glosses a multitude of experiences of the current 
crisis. This highlights that fact that despite the upper and lower sections of 
Trikalini society gauging status and experiencing crisis in a multitude of 
manners, they are not detached from wider collectivities – primarily each other 
and the nationalist rhetoric of the state. Businessmen rely on the extravagant 
consumerism of the lower section, which in turn involve bankers, prestigious 
family businesses and national/transnational tour operators in order to purchase 
status in the context of their own social groups. 
 
The local is not detached from the national consciousness in terms of collective 
suffering or the global economic trends and political decision making located in 
Athens, Brussels or London. There are local cultural patterns that operate on 
wider sets of cultural structures and economic trends. Indeed many of the 
perceptions of material status among the lower sections are initially not 
cultivated locally but through international media productions and global 
advertising. The interaction of cultural patterns with economic trends is 
facilitated through global channels; in this respect desires are constructed and 
fulfilled according to both local and global perceptions of status. Trikalinoi are 
thus consequentially affected by national and global times of crisis as well as 
prosperity. The cultural patterns give a localised flavour to a national and global 
phenomenon and in Greece as a whole this has contributed to the severity of the 









Notes in Conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed to highlight the significant differences in the externalisation 
of understandings of social status and mobility among Trikalinoi. Through 
indiscriminate bank loans which facilitate the prioritisation of material objects, 
the „lower section‟ of Trikalini society place significant value in the „here and 
now‟ consumerist lifestyle. This results in overt tournaments of consumerism; 
the ideals of which are constructed and played out in the public realm. For the 
„upper section‟ of the inhabitants, there is a different understanding of both time 
and investment. The investments – although material to some extent – are made 
as much for the future as for the present. Financial and social prioritisation is 
usually given to education and socio-political networks. In these alternative 
placements of value lie a history of generational status and unequivocal relations 
to the patron-client system. 
 
Simmel argues that value “is not a particular quality of the objects of valuation, 
but consists rather in the significance that the objects have for us as subjects 
through their position in the order of that ideal realm” (Simmel 1978:68). If we 
take the „ideal realm‟ – which Simmel believes to „not lie within us‟ – to be the 
social ideal as conceived by a certain socio-economic group then we can 
understand how specific objects or social networks are placed at the top of 
various „orders of desire‟. 
 
Furthermore, I would like to invert Marx‟s (1859) theory that „material life 
conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general‟. In the 
case of Trikala, social, political and intellectual positioning informs the patterns 
of material consumption creating „definite forms of social consciousness‟ (ibid., 
Bell 1994). In the same respect, crisis is thus experienced differently, located as 
it is in a range of value judgements. Yet in the case of crisis the actors are 
publicly united under a collective rhetoric of suffering, victimisation and the 
search for accountability. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions: Socio-Economic Patterns, Crisis and 
Proximity  
 
This thesis was concerned with how aspects of history and culture inform local 
experiences of economic crisis. By examining ethnographic accounts of crisis 
experience in Trikala, central Greece, the case was made for understanding 
crisis trends with global implications within the context of cultural repertoires 
and historical frameworks. Similarly, economic processes have localised traits 
and meanings; they interact with specific social institutions on numerous 
cultural stages. The history of crisis is pertinent to the contemplation of current 
events and cannot be overemphasised. By considering time as not merely a 
lineal substitution of chronological events, the consideration of past events as 
imperative to the formation of present crises can be comprehended. The concept 
of cultural proximity was introduced to illustrate how certain key events such as 
the Great Famine could be embodied in the present to assist the understanding of 
current events. Furthermore, past events do not simply form a „background‟ for 
studying contemporary crises, but are themselves felt and experienced by the 
Trikalinoi as simultaneously present moments of a-linear time within the realms 
of the spatio-temporal present. Cultural proximity staples specific events 
together as culturally close through socially embedded practices such as 
narrative transmission, the nationalisation of keystone events, and the 
significance of certain aspects of culture, such as food. 
 
The discussion of social status and mobility further highlighted the complex 
intertwining and varied interpretation of economic systems on the local level. 
Present perceptions of status and mobility are also embedded in the local history 
of crisis and prosperity, as well as global economic processes. Forms of status 
identification and mobility perception draw on numerous modes of socio-
economic relations. However, these interactions are not homogeneous even on 
the local level. Certain sections of society place higher value judgements on 
specific social and material indicators of prestige. The intricate economic 
channels facilitating forms of status and mobility lead to a complex nexus of 
social relations spanning spheres of patronage and social status ascription, 
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global capitalism and market systems. Hence the investment in different modes 
of social relations – each with their own cultural flavour – stimulates alternative 
forms of socio-economic status and mobility, as well as internal competition 
within different social groups – tournaments of consumerism in the case of the 
lower social section. Furthermore, the consequences of economic crisis are not 
homogeneously experienced due to the alternative paths toward status and 
mobility in times of economic prosperity. Thus opportunism must not only be 
understood as the selective investment of time and capital in times of crisis, but 
also the strategic economic decisions made in times of affluence and prosperity. 
A singular notion of status and mobility is not adopted locally, neither is one 
form of economic investment. Subsequently, there is not one all-encompassing 
consequence of crisis. Once again, history is the most appropriate guide to 
understanding these alternative decisions (cf. Layton 2000). For example, the 
stock market crash of the late 1990s emphasised the impact alternative forms of 
capital investment provided for the lives of Trikalinoi, and the reliance on 
national and global „abstract‟ markets for creating money, elevating status and 
upholding consumerism. This phenomenon was in itself the consequence of 
national market liberalisation after accession into the European Union. It was 
also part of a wider global phenomenon at the time, focused on investment in 
shares and bonds. However, the employment market in Trikala still very much 
operates on a patronage basis regardless of the transnational ownership of 
companies. For adequate medical treatment one must invest in both patronage 
and the cultural interpretation of capitalist exchange – namely bribery in the 
form of fakelákia. This income goes undeclared so as to evade taxation and, 
especially in situations of life and death, forms a distinctive part of the 
(im)moral economy. This is most certainly a case of „moral money‟ (cf. Bloch 
and Parry 1989). 
 
Historical events are also inextricably linked to notions of social status and 
mobility. The peasant revolts and the eventual creation of private property 
through the redistribution of the ciftliks created spaces for strategic investment. 
Generational social capital has been under construction since before the Second 
World War. The constant reinvestment of time, property and finance has been 
abundant among some Trikalini families since the 1960s. These strategic 
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decisions to invest have often been materialised in the education of children. 
This has been a long-term investment which has long-term consequences on 
social mobility. Another investment in generational mobility has been in the 
form of social networks. Patronage relationships are constructed over long 
periods of time and are entwined with increasing standards of education and 
politicisation, as well as emergent prestige. Such investments have been fairly 
resistant to fluctuating times of crisis and prosperity. Indeed, patronage relations 
allow for a greater deal of entrepreneurial opportunism in times of both turmoil 
and affluence. On the other hand, short-term investments in the stock market 
and through materialism have helped people acquire social mobility. This 
mobility is often intra-sectional and has proved less resistant to fluctuating 
periods of economic crisis and prosperity as there is more risk involved with 
such investments. Often the investment capital is borrowed in the first instance. 
The lack of generational status accumulation has meant that some people have 
status devoid of social capital beyond their own immediate social group. 
 
Strategic investments and calculated risks are prevalent on both the local and 
international level. The incorporation of Greece into the European single 
currency was acknowledged as a risk by many international advisory bodies. 
This has turned out to be a major contributory factor to the intense regional 
circumstances of crisis, yet was deemed a measured risk at a time of global 
economic prosperity. Thus local decision making processes were mirrored on 
the national and international stage. This is a similar case to the embeddedness 
of cultural economic patterns such as tax evasion, bribery and „petty corruption‟ 
that proliferate at the grassroots and governmental levels. It is part of the Greek 
way of „doing economics‟ (Bratsis 2003, Featherstone 2008). The investment of 
time – including a low retirement age and an outspoken emphasis on the 
prioritisation of „the good life‟ (kali zoi) – is another cultural factor that has 
contributed to the intensive experience of crisis within Greece. In short, when 
the cultural patterns of Greek capitalist economics merged with downward 
global market trends, here commenced a perfect storm of personal and collective 
vulnerability, market instability, fiscal failure and search for ever elusive 
accountability. The fact that the current economic situation is being compared to 
the Great Famine is not a matter to be taken lightly. In Trikala, the effects of the 
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economic crisis and subsequent austerity measures have had a severe impact on 
the local community, both ideologically and practically. This ranges from the 
inability to partake in tournaments of consumerism, hence a loss of social 
prestige, and disillusion with market economics, to bankruptcy, unemployment, 
fuel shortages and the fear of starvation. The sudden nature of the crisis and the 
experience of two decades of nigh-uninterrupted prosperity increased the impact 
still further. The investment in material goods until late 2008 often went 
unchecked and was undertaken with little apprehension. By 2010 food is 
hoarded and queues for petrol are reminiscent of wartime rationing in the minds 
(and the bodies) of the informants. 
 
Public spheres are significant as realms where hypotheses of crisis can be 
disseminated. This ranges from the cafeterias on Asklipiou to televised political 
debates and the streaming of European Union forums. Public spheres have 
become integral to the communication of crisis, as mediators between publics 
and the state, vehicles for collective suffering and victimisation and as channels 
for escalating hypotheses of blame. The mass mobilisation of publics in protest 
and in victimisation has been channelled through mediums such as the television 
and internet. This activism is fuelled by the inward-looking Greek media that 
often portray the nation as closed, alone and victimised in itself. Often the links 
to external socio-economic networks and their current conditions are ignored 
unless the purpose is to direct blame elsewhere. The recessions in other nations 
are now rarely mentioned. Thus Greece is depicted as an island disconnected 
from European markets and global trends, as self-sufficient and suffering alone. 
This nationalist approach increases the sense of persecution and collective 
suffering and stimulates political activism directed at those who are perceived as 
possessing the power to stem the persecution. Thus there is a battle of 
propaganda, both on the streets and from political bodies, with the public 
domains as the forums central to debate. From a top-down perspective the media 
channels are the spaces for political control and reassurance. There are 
continuous shifts in the location of blame and accountability and deliberate 
blurring of boundaries between national and international, collective self and 
other, bounded and open economic systems, and notions of self-destiny and 
enforced austerity. The same nationalist processes elaborating on the Great 
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Famine as an event of national experience are present in emphasising notions of 
internal control and stability in the face of economic uncertainty. 
 
But although „the Greek crisis‟ has become a political trope for mobilising 
fringe political movements around Europe, the general publics in Trikala have 
also taken to sharing the experience of crisis through public spheres, such as the 
appropriation of Asklipiou for „private‟ gatherings in the public domain. Thus 
some public arenas have been transformed by the economic circumstances; they 
take on a different social purpose. Here blame and accountability are located in 
numerous places and political rhetoric is critiqued both within and against a 
milieu of nationalism. The result is the construction of numerous nodes of blame 
depending on political inclination and agenda and degrees of cultural proximity. 
The main focus is either towards corrupt national politicians, the European 
Union, the external Other or sometimes (but rarely) inwards towards the 
everyday people themselves. Discussions of this type have transformed the 
public spheres in Trikala. The intrusion of the mass-media into the private 
domain of the home has forced people out to congregate as „privates within the 
public‟. This is perceived as a form of escapism but at the same time enforces 
the perception of collective suffering. Here narratives of crisis past and present 
criss-cross nexuses of private and public relations. It is here where history, not 
political rhetoric, is the main informant of potential futures. Times of embodied 
crisis – both those experienced first-hand and those of generations past – assist 
people with the negotiation of political unrest and economic uncertainty. The 
multitude of complex factors contributing to cultural patterns at both the 
grassroots and governmental level, coupled with the ambiguous nature of global 
economic markets means that blame and accountability are more difficult to 
locate. 
 
Local Patterns, Global Crisis 
 
Global economic trends fused with local socio-economic systems and bound 
with culturally embedded economic patterns such as tax evasion, petty 
corruption, and patterns of consumerism have exacerbated the current economic 
crisis in Greece. This combination has also contributed to a distinctly Greek 
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crisis exacerbated by a distinctly Greek way of doing economics. Formal 
institutions do not operate within cultural vacuums or independently of each 
other (Crozier 1964). The underlying cultural patterns associated with Greek 
socio-economic behaviour interacted with global economic trends – both 
prosperous and critical – to concoct the perfect economic storm. At other times 
the interaction has formed the perfect economic affluence, assisting social 
mobility in certain social sectors. In terms of structural patterns, consumerist 
competition, petty corruption (in a cultural sense) and patronage relations run 
through society from the very top of government to the grassroots level, as was 
apparent in Trikala. 
 
Periods of crisis and prosperity allow for dynamic spaces of augmentation and 
social change, as has been demonstrated throughout the history of Trikala. From 
the peasant uprisings leading to land reform and private property, to liberalising 
the markets after the military junta, from civil war to European Union 
membership, political crises, economic upheaval and severe conflict, Trikala has 
undergone many changes over the past one hundred and twenty nine years. 
Times of crisis and hardship are not forgotten, most poignantly demonstrated by 
the collective embodiment of the Great Famine which is integral to the 
contemporary experience of crisis. This demonstrates how the social 
environment is a formation of the social actors and not a homogeneous 
prescribed context. In Trikala, the appropriation of economic channels for 
enhancing status and mobility are not homogeneous. Instead they are 
strategically selected according to social background and economic 
prioritisation. These decisions form part of the complex cultural and historical 
canvas through which international trends are realised. Assumed universals such 
as capitalist market systems and the role of money (see Taussig 1983, Gudeman 
1986, Bloch and Parry 1989, Gudeman and Rivera 1990) are open to cultural 
interpretation, yet this interpretation must not be supposed as all-encompassing 
in any given society. This sounds like cultural relativism to the extreme, but 
these are interpretations of wider structural processes within diverse cultural 
repertoires. The repertoires are made even more diverse by localised 
prioritisations of historical events. The interpretation and selective embodiment 
of historical events contribute to the direction of social change and strategic 
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investment (cf. Layton 2000) in times of prosperity and to strategies for 
experiencing and dealing with crisis. 
 
Economic relations are bound up in social and cultural relations in a form of 
embeddedness (Polanyi 1957, Granovetter 1985, Levi 1997, Narotzky 2004, 
Thiel 2010). The local operation of „economies‟ rely on socially embedded 
relations which are not in themselves „economic‟ – or at least not in the sense of 
neoliberal global capitalism (Narotzky 2004:59). Cultural patterns based in 
institutions such as kinship, religion, politics and cultural associations, bind with 
different forms of „doing economics‟, deeming economic action as culturally 
embedded (ibid.). This does not however mean individual agency is restricted. 
As Layton (2000) suggests, interaction with the cultural environment and 
„imported‟ concepts can lead to innovation and diverse possibilities for strategic 
decisions. Furthermore, the cultural embeddedness of economic relations is not 
impenetrable. Through notions of „autonomy‟ certain individuals within the 
community can forge and sustain socio-economic relationships with individuals 
and institutions outside of the immediate cultural setting (Narotzky 2004:61). 
Successful economic development and individual entrepreneurship must 
therefore imply different forms of economic relationships. A separate economic 
level is thus rejected as “material relations cannot be theoretically separated 
from their cultural expressions which, in turn, are materially produced and 
embodied” (Narotzky 1997:7). This approach does not deliberately pay homage 
to formalism, substantivism or cultural economics, but instead suggests an 
appropriate consideration of the three; from formal structural institutions to 
cultural economic relativism. 
 
The cultural patterns operate alongside and entwined with wider sets of 
economic structures and trends. Social action, including strategic investment, is 
facilitated through numerous channels of local, national and global discourse. In 
observational terms, these complex interactions are most evident within public 
spheres in Trikala. Tournaments of consumerism reflect a certain interpretation 
and implication of global trends and routes of resource investment within a 
section of Trikalini society. Although the transactions at source are very much 
within the realms of neo-liberal capitalist relations, the purpose of the 
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transactions and the subsequent display of artefacts are highly socially qualified. 
Some examples will be offered here. 
 
The cultural proximity of the Great Famine in the current economic crisis is an 
event that is a significant reference point in local history. The import is escalated 
through processes of nationalism; the nationalisation of significant events. The 
reverse is true of the civil war, where nationalism has glossed over sinful events 
as the outcome of external actions, yet on the local narrative level in Trikala 
these sensitive events are not openly discussed. Public competition for 
employment within multinational corporations is at the discretion of local 
managers who operate within other realms within the cross-over of socio-
economic relations, namely patronage. Such is the case with patronage and 
bribery as well as with multiple employment and tax evasion, which go hand-in-
hand. Political support and business custom is based on similar principles of 
patronage and allegiance (cf. Just 2000). Still within public arenas, the 
reappropriation of Asklipiou in times of crisis has changed the space both 
physically and on a narrative level as historical events, corruption, and collective 
suffering are discussed in relation to global economic systems and transnational 
political bodies such as the European Union. The materialisation of these 
patterns is fuelled through another form of public communication – the mass 
media. The media offers forms of representation and misrepresentation (Hendry 
and Watson 2001), often with nationalist overtones. It operates as a form of both 
direct and indirect communication of global economy, international politics, the 
importance of historical events, and the current national crisis. The mass media 
therefore perpetuates cultural patterns. 
 
Trikalinoi interrelate within a wider socio-cultural background which operates 
within dyadic relations of cause and effect. Hence from the structural, 
institutional, level, to the cultural, narrative level, there is interplay between vast 
nexuses of relations. It is within this matrix that the causes and consequences of 
economic crisis and prosperity must be discussed. The interaction of people 
within cultural patterns and economic trends is often facilitated through 
channels of nationalised and globalised discourse. Trikalinoi therefore 
experience times of national and global crisis and prosperity in a specific 
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manner. The cultural patterns lend a localised nuance to national and global 
socio-economic phenomena, often contributing to the severity of crisis. 
 
„The Greek Crisis‟ as Political Trope 
 
Trikala may be considered a microcosm for the study of the pan-European 
economic crisis. The often abstract consequences of global economic trends are 
being played out within the context of a small town in central Greece. This study 
is then representative of the processes at play within wider socio-political 
spheres such as the eurozone; in this instance Greece would be the mediocosm 
and Europe the macrocosm. With escalating social unrest, increasing public 
spaces for the opinions of once niche political parties, the circulation of blame 
and overtones of xenophobia, the „Greek crisis‟ is a political trope which 
highlights the complex relationship between global systems and local 
experience. 
 
On the political level opportunity on national stages has been created due to 
international media coverage of the Greek crisis. The event has been 
appropriated by political bodies throughout Europe. „The Greek Crisis‟ has been 
employed as a political trope (Fernandez 1986, 1993), a persuasive „story seed‟ 
(Carrithers 2007:2), and a filter for political aspirations rich in both metaphor 
and narrative. In the realms of European publics the „Greek crisis‟ is 
synonymous with poor government, austerity measures, financial bail-outs, civil 
unrest and economic turmoil. Hence it has become a piece of political 
propaganda that successfully provokes fear, panic and movement for political 
change. Additionally the crisis rouses the necessity for accountability – be this 
through regime change or in terms of targeted xenophobia. 
 
The consequences of „the Greek crisis‟ advertised in the salons of Europe as 
being of national making has it effects both internally on people such as the 
Trikalinoi and far beyond the national borders as a metaphor of persuasion. This 
has led to Trikalinoi and their Greek counterparts alike calling for the 
installation of „O Allos‟ (the Other, someone else, implying none of the present 
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political figures) to government
223
. This is an idiom that has been seized 
throughout Europe on the basis of economic circumstances. Layers of rhetoric 
have been built around the crisis and disseminated on the global political stage. 
 
As other nations experience economic downturns and political uncertainty, the 
metaphor is employed by opposing parties around Europe on two main 
principles. Firstly it is to place blame for the global economic circumstances 
firmly on the national governing bodies. The contemptible state of national 
economies must be due to similar mishandlings akin to that in Greece, it is 
postulated. The Greek crisis has become a model to signify governmental 
mismanagement, unregulated markets, corruption and capitalist intemperance of 
the powerful, to which no politician desires to be compared. The people of 
Greece are portrayed as those unfortunate souls that, despite contributing to the 
situation themselves through equally contemptible tax evasion, suffer the 
consequences of economic austerity. The second aspect relates to the notion „we 
don‟t want to end up like Greece‟. This is the acknowledgement that although 
economic conditions may be adverse in European nations, there is potentially 
worse to come. If the first point can be defended by governments in power, even 
against the backdrop of „corrupt‟ expenses claims, then the second attack is 
harder to repel. It is a hypothetical situation of a possible future and a hypothesis 
that can only be denounced through solid economic data. Such data are often 
unattractive to the public imagination when politicians are denouncing claims of 
impending crisis. The metaphor of the Greek economic crisis is thus employed 
to empower collectivities to strive for political and social change in order to 
avoid a similar socio-economic situation. Through panic and fear, 
uncontextualised claims and political propaganda stimulate public interest as a 
paradox to the commonplace “disenchantment with public politics widespread in 
modern democracies” (Narotzky and Smith 2006:170). As such the 
implementation of the Greek crisis as a political trope is both a top-down and 
bottom-up process as enduring iconic „verbal and visual imageries‟ are 
constructed around critical events such as economic crises (Das 1995, Goddard 
2010:131). 
                                                 
223
 During the Argentine economic crisis of 1998-2002, the country had five presidents within 
two weeks (Page 2009:1, Goddard 2010:131-132). 
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This highlights on a more macro-level the highly complex process of social 
destruction and creation caused by economic crisis. On a local level crisis may 
create opportunities for social mobility or opportunistic entrepreneurship (these 
are also reflected on the macro level). On another stage, crisis is employed as a 
political trope to provoke governmental change. In this instance the idea that 
„we must start afresh‟ in order to avoid economic disaster („on the scale of 
Greece‟) is promulgated to serve many purposes. The metaphor of the Greek 
crisis is used to “help people persuade themselves” of the need for social and 
political change (Chomsky and Barsamian 2001:ix). Through persuasion based 
on the propaganda of crisis many political aspirations can be achieved and 
opportunities for political and social change are identified. Crisis opens multiple 
spaces for opportunism and change such as economic diversification 
(MacGaffey 1987, 1998, 2000), political change (Mazower 1991) and social 
mobility (Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2001). These dynamic spaces are 
formed as phenomena and epiphenomena of crisis. In this respect crisis is akin 
to a mass extinction facilitating numerous forms of opportunistic growth. 
 
One comparative example of the implication of „the Greek crisis‟ as a political 
trope comes from the context of the United Kingdom. During the 2010 election 
– against a background of exaggerated expenses claims and over a decade of 
highly publicised political spin – the question was constantly posed as to 
whether Britain faced a similar fate to Greece
224. The generic response was „we 
have to be careful but probably not‟, yet the propaganda for just such a situation 
was ubiquitous. Fuelled by the imagery of rioting on the streets of Athens 
(screened live on Sky News), headlines focused on how „Britain is facing its 
own Greek tragedy‟ (BBC, 28th April 2010). Opposition parties were suggesting 
parallels between the Greek situation and the potential fate of Britain. The 
Conservative Party continues to this day (October 2010) to frequently emphasise 
that they are dealing with the remnants of Labour‟s economic mismanagement 
and they alone are stopping Britain sliding deeper into economic turmoil; they 
are the heroes saving the nation from a perilous fate. Any such comparisons 
                                                 
224
 This notion was invoked in other nations across Europe, such as the Czech Republic, in order 
to motivate people towards political change. 
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with Greece were dismissed by the then Labour foreign secretary David 
Miliband as “economic illiteracy”225, yet the proposition would not disappear. 
One week before the election Vince Cable, then treasury spokesman for the 
Liberal Democrats, told of how “the country risks following Greece into crisis” 
unless there is a change of government; “unless the next government gets 
seriously to grips with the deficit problems, as we‟re determined to do, we could 
have a serious problem”. David Cameron‟s line had a similar precautionary 
tone; “Greece stands as a warning to what happens if you don't pay back your 
debts … You can‟t go on borrowing at this level forever” (The Times, 28th April 
2010, Buenos Aires Herald 29
th
 April 2010). The line coming from the Unions 
concerning political change in times of economic uncertainty was more hard-
line; “If you want a snapshot of what we are facing take a look at what‟s 
happening in Athens today. Junk status, key services ripped to shreds and 
workers on the streets. Greece today – UK after May 6” (the date of the 2010 
general election [Bob Crow, quoted in The Times, 28
th
 April 2010]). As recently 
as October 2010 former Chancellor of the Exchequer Kenneth Clarke informed 
journalists of how dramatic spending cuts amounting to some £81 billion over 
four years were necessary in order to save Britain from „the Greek alternative‟, 
reiterating remarks made in March that the United Kingdom was living on 
“borrowed time”, only to be saved by new Conservative economic policy (The 
Guardian, 18
th
 March 2010). The October spending review and the re-entry of 
the Greek crisis into the public domain of political debate was understood by 
many in esteemed political and economic arenas as a façade for other political 
power-games, although this truly is a matter of opinion. 
 
One question remains concerning the longevity of „The Greek Crisis‟ as a 
political trope. Will this crisis remain a trope that is associated with poor 
government, economic mismanagement, corruption and public rebellion – a 
future reference point for impending crisis as is the panic of 1907 (cf. Bruner 
and Carr 2007) or the Great Depression of the 1930s and the associated images 
of Wall Street bankers throwing themselves off buildings? On an international 
scale the answer is probably “yes” and “no”. Economic crises come and pass; 




South-East Asia (1997), Argentina (1998-2002), Turkey (2000-2001). Like 
these events, the Greek crisis will occupy a limited time in the global public 
arena, its impact as a clutch phrase for political debate is finite. The difference 
though is that this particular regional elaboration on a global crisis had far wider 
transnational consequences than any of the aforementioned three, with direct 
repercussions on the Eurozone and European Union politico-economic policy. 
Yet Greece is a peripheral economy, a non-Anglophone nation that is 
experiencing its fifteen minutes of global infamy. The moment for political 
opportunism based on the international panic instigated by the Greek crisis will 
be temporary. The power to persuade based on this trope has stringent temporal 
limits. 
 
In Greece the events of 2009-2010 will be recalled with great poignancy when 
similar situations undoubtedly arise on the national level in the future. The event 
itself will become part of past historical experience, to be embodied as culturally 
proximate at some point in the future. Indeed the current economic crisis has led 
to extensive public discourse focused on drawing parallels with the Great 
Famine of 1941-1943, especially narratives of food shortages and hoarding. It is 
as if the experiences of previous generations are being relived in a kind of 
Serresian culturally proximate moment of simultaneity (cf. Serres 1995a). In this 
sense, the economic crisis will remain as a constant point of historical reference, 
the consequences of which will be at the fore of public imagery for decades to 
come. Therefore the „trope‟ is more than merely metaphor for Trikalinoi, yet 
through this microcosm the wider implications of global economic crisis can 
begin to be understood. 
 
A Final Remark on Cultural Proximity and the Role of History 
 
Thomas was born in Greek Macedonia in December 1911. His life-story 
encapsulates much of what this thesis has been about; periods of crisis, historical 
import, social mobility. Thomas was the son of a builder who moved to Trikala 
as part of the internal migrations of the 1940s. After fighting the Italians on the 
Albanian front during the Second World War, he secretly fled his village with 
his nuclear family and his brother-in-law in 1947 due to the upheaval of the civil 
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war. The impact of this period on his village was great, including the constant 
threat of kidnap. Thomas‟ narratives of his time in the Greek Macedonian 
village are vibrant and recount multiple eras of social change. He tells of trade 
between „Turkish‟ villages and „Greek‟ villages, explaining the fact that he, like 
many of his generation, speaks pidgin Turkish. 
 
Late one afternoon Thomas‟ brother-in-law met him outside a small church in 
the village in an attempt to persuade him to leave for Trikala (some 115 
kilometres away). There had been increasing rumours that communist guerrillas 
were planning to ransack the village within the next two days, an act that had 
already been executed in numerous surrounding villages. Thomas, who was 
uninterested in the politics of the civil war, had already lost two brothers to 
kidnap and murder, but his wife was heavily pregnant. He tried to convince his 
brother-in-law to wait until after the birth to travel; his wife had already lost one 
daughter to childhood illness. Yet Thomas was persuaded that there was no time 
to hesitate, the attacks may even commence that night. Thomas and his family 
fled the village later that night. After a few days on the road they stopped at a 
monastery halfway between the village and Trikala. Here the nuns provided a 
separate room for the heavily pregnant woman and Thomas continued on his 
own towards Trikala. Two days later Eugenia, Thomas‟ only surviving daughter, 
was born. 
 
When he took the decision to relocate to Trikala Thomas permanently changed 
the trajectory of his family‟s life. Indeed, this population movement was to 
become a significant event in the history of sociality in Trikala. Himself a 
builder, after living in temporary accommodation for the first year, Thomas 
constructed a house for his family on the outskirts of the town. Construction 
workers were highly valued in Trikala during the late 1940s-early 1950s so 
work became plentiful as he developed his reputation. Thomas embodies 
multiple eras of social change. Just a selection of keystone events that he has 
lived through include land reform, the Greek-Turkish population exchange, 
German and Italian occupation, famine, dictatorship, and European integration. 
All events have had differing impacts on Thomas. For example, consider the 
adoption of the European single currency in 2001; Thomas, at the age of 90, 
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took this completely in his stride. His pockets were lined with euros as his set 
off for the coffeeshop every morning. 
 
His family became socially mobile, partially due to their relocation, emphasising 
the important link between historical events and current circumstances (Wolf 
1982, Narotzky 2004). His daughter attended university in Athens and obtained 
a secure public sector job that would have been impossible if they had remained 
in the village. His granddaughter was educated abroad and now holds a 
prestigious academic post. Thomas‟ accumulation of property is also 
noteworthy; after building the first family home he would build another two as 
well as the two in his Macedonian village. He additionally owns a range of small 
pieces of registered land. Both his daughter and his two sons have been able to 
purchase separate houses in Trikala. 
 
The event that Thomas would most often discuss would be the German-Italian 
occupation and subsequent famine. The civil war that displaced his family and 
claimed the lives of two brothers was not a topic of everyday conversation. 
Neither was his time spent on the Albanian front line. What increases the 
poignancy of the famine in relation to Thomas and his fellow villagers is that at 
the time under-equipped and unprepared occupying Italian troops were 
themselves starving to death in the mountains of northern Greece. The villagers 
tell of sharing the little food they had with Italian soldiers who; 
 
“… were worse than us. They had no food, no shelter, they were dying. 
We all tried to help them, not leave them dying in the mountains. We 
shared our bread and gave them shelter … sometimes they would stay 
in the church. 
 
“You people have to experience famine to understand difficult lives … 
When you complain of food, being hungry, and the plate is half 
finished … you need famine to understand the significance of food”. 
 
The prominence of his everyday references to famine serves a pedagogical 
purpose, but also acts as a warning. This warning has penetrated into the culture. 
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His granddaughter says that this warning was the most important thing of all. 
This was the greatest fear of all for Thomas. “He always tells us to not throw 
any food away. Do not let it go to waste. We do not know what famine is like; I 
hope I never have to experience it. He embodies the hunger, it is in his body”. 
The warning, according to Seremetakis, “is a knowledge of future events and 
processes that are manifested in the present through a conventional system of 
signs” (1991:48). Furthermore, warnings intertwine „the natural and the social, 
life and death‟. In a similar line to Seremetakis in relation to death, the 
expectation of finding the roots of why famine is embodied during the current 
economic crisis is allusive; the „event‟ is already happening as a constituent part 
of embedded social reality (ibid.:49). That is to say that it is an underlying 
simultaneity imbued into cognitive processes that penetrates both past and future 
„histories‟ (cf. Seremetakis 1991:63). It is yet another example of the intricate 
socio-historical weaving of time. 
 
Thomas has experienced many social changes, but for him this was the most 
prominent, the one closest to society on a daily basis. For Thomas, hunger is a 
distinctly embedded form of cultural proximity; the embodiment of a specific 
event that is simultaneous with contemporary lived experience and brought into 
public domains of collective consciousness during times of crisis. 
 
Throughout this thesis the role of history has been advocated as central to the 
understanding of crisis experience and the linking of global processes to a 
localised context. It has become apparent how aspects of local culture such as 
perceptions of social status and mobility are shaped by the intricate entwining of 
global and local economic systems and specific historical events. The impact of 
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